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Foreword
Allan Fels and John Wanna
The aim of this foreword is to introduce the rationale and main themes of this 
volume. When we at the Australia and New Zealand School of Government 
were planning this research initiative, we were confronted by an avalanche of 
momentous events—especially crises and natural disasters. We had just gone 
through the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09; Australia had just endured 
seven years of incredible drought; we were then hit by massive bushfires across 
southern Australia (in Victoria and Western Australia); then by a series of major 
floods across Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria over three successive 
years; then the massive Canterbury earthquakes occurred from September 2010 
to June 2011, destroying much of Christchurch; and following that some huge 
cyclones wiped out entire communities in northern Queensland. Many of these 
disasters came at the cost of a substantial toll in human lives. We had also been 
impacted by many health scares: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
and bird flu in the early 2000s; the H1N1 influenza; and the equine or Hendra 
virus. 
Elsewhere, the communities of South-East Asia had been decimated by the Asian 
tsunami in 2004, leaving more than a quarter of a million people dead; the south-
eastern states of America were severely damaged by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
flooding New Orleans and closing much of the city; the capital of Haiti, Port-au-
Prince, was devastated by a catastrophic earthquake in 2010, killing hundreds 
of thousands of residents; much of Europe was covered with volcanic ash from 
Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano in May 2011, causing massive disruption to 
air transport; and in the same year the Japanese island of Honshu experienced 
a massive undersea earthquake that caused a huge tsunami onshore, which 
resulted in a series of nuclear meltdowns contaminating vast tracts of the coastal 
plains. 
Discussing these events, we were aware of a growing literature on disaster and 
crisis management—some of whose leading thinkers appear in this volume; but 
as nations we still seemed unprepared and underprepared, even ill prepared, for 
such eventualities. 
We were also conscious that trans-Tasman governments and their organisations 
had undertaken a substantial body of reform over many years and that they 
were now in better shape than previously to meet pending challenges. They 
have been reformed by New Public Management, have introduced better 
business systems and processes, have used markets and other sectors to improve 
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delivery; and have attempted to embrace whole-of-government responses to 
problems, and talked about including more citizens’ engagement in forming 
policy and guiding its delivery. 
Consequently, without being overly triumphalist, we were prepared to accept 
that governments do some things very well and are doing some things to the best 
of their ability. They are particularly good at dealing with the predictable, the 
expected, the routine and issues of business continuity. They can be good on 
occasions in recovery and rebuilding when disasters strike.
There are, however, other things governments are not doing well at all—and 
these issues are what we have turned our attention to. 
Governments are not good at precautionary management and preparing for 
the future; they are not good at thinking through and taking the necessary 
preparations; they are not good at anticipation and planning, and managing 
for future risk; sometimes they are not even good at collecting or analysing the 
information necessary to prepare for future events. And this, we might say, is 
when they can reasonably predict future events. As Jocelyne Bourgon argues in 
Chapter 4, governments and their public sectors are not good at dealing with 
things ‘beyond the predictable’. 
In short, governments are not (yet) good at future-proofing the state or their 
societies. Moreover, to the extent that governments consciously think about 
these issues, they get sidetracked by expedient and short-term concerns and 
bogged down by the hegemony of immediacy and political time frames. 
We know that Australia will experience bushfires again—possibly up to two to 
three major ones every decade—yet we continue to allow people to build and 
live in bushfire-prone areas. We know floods and cyclones will regularly recur, 
but do we take adequate precautions about the known risks? On both sides of 
the Tasman we continue to build in earthquake-prone areas, and do not require 
buildings to meet exacting standards. 
Too often the best intentions of governments, and normative considerations of 
what best they should be doing, are outweighed by immediate political, economic 
and social pressures and the existing array of vested interests calculating their 
partisan advantage or minimising their disadvantage. 
In this volume we do not just focus narrowly on natural disasters—their 
occurrence was merely one catalyst to encourage us to explore these themes. We 
have chosen a much wider lens. 
We focus on four broad groups of complex future challenges, each with different 
and particular drivers. Throughout the volume, we consider 
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• population-based and demographic changes that place huge stresses on 
global systems—these challenges relate to population size, growth, their 
impacts on resources, food shortages, problems of ageing and long-term 
health care, social movements and social dislocation 
• environmental problems and challenges from climatic changes—these 
involve the known and unknown, the acknowledged or agreed and disputed 
effects of threats to the global environment, and what we can effectively do 
about meeting these challenges
• our increased susceptibility to natural disasters that may be occurring 
and recurring at more regular intervals and with greater magnitude; we 
are interested less in disaster response and crisis management and more in 
readiness and how to rebuild recoveries to minimise future risks
• crises we inflict on ourselves: human-induced problems emerging from the 
economy and from changes in society—local, national, regional and global—
these are varied in form and cause and include anything from financial crises 
to civil unrest and terrorism, risks to technological and security systems 
as well as cyber attacks, conflicts between minorities and majorities, and 
conflicts over social values and problems of social integration, bred by social 
and political divisions. 
And although the volume is entitled Future-Proofing the State, we are also 
interested in how society future-proofs itself, and how it develops its capacities 
for resilience. 
To future-proof societies calls for different thinking about our management of 
complex problems. Building solutions will necessarily have to involve multiple 
actors and agencies, be focused across policy fields, involving cross-disciplinary 
approaches and mutual trust and resilience. We will have to find ways to 
gain political ‘buy-in’ for longer-term solutions and turn the attention of our 
politicians to issues beyond the immediate and the predictable. 
If we look back, we have historically dealt with problems of market failure 
(usually by seeing the state step in to provide, insure or regulate); then we 
have dealt with problems of state failure as government over-reached itself and 
unleashed perverse effects (usually by refocusing the state, deregulating and 
transferring functions to non-state providers); and now we are arguably facing 
community failure, a failure of local communities to retain social capital, to 
maintain robustness and systemic resilience. These are new challenges.
To explore these issues we ask four questions.
1. What are the long-term challenges we are likely to face, and how can we 
predict, estimate and anticipate our future better?
2. How can we transform our political, economic and social institutions to ensure 
that long-term issues receive proper attention, and that our policymakers in 
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government, in the community, in the non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
sector and in the private sector address these future issues more seriously?
3. What learnings from previous crises, disasters, failures and looming time 
bombs can be extracted to enable us to better manage as we go forward and 
meet similar but different challenges?
4. How can we work together to rebuild and reinforce some of the important 
mortar of our societies: trust, respect, awareness, societal resilience, and 
above all capacities to act and respond to whatever challenges come along?
It is worth remembering, however, that governments cannot exclusively commit 
to future-proofing. We ought to recognise that our governments do contradictory 
things—they are not just committed to incubating resilience but simultaneously 
to breeding dependencies and reliance among clients and constituencies; they 
are extending statist regulations and nanny-ing at the same time as they are 
preaching the virtues of self-reliance; they are still engaged in various forms of 
social engineering and orchestrating social outcomes while wanting communities 
to be more resilient and cognisant of managing future risks. It can be a difficult 
political environment in which to build future-proofing.
Finally, we began this project with the proposition that governments were not good 
at future-proofing and preparing for future challenges. We then identified the major 
problems and impediments that prevented them from doing so. But identifying 
problems and labelling them were the easy parts of our analysis; finding effective 
solutions was the much harder component of the exercise—the rationale for this 
volume is precisely to discover the effective solutions for future-proofing our states 
and societies. 
Professor Allan Fels, AO (Inaugural Dean, 2002–12)
Professor John Wanna 
The Australian National University 
Canberra 
July 2013
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Part 1: Governing for the Future

31. Governing for the Future while 
Meeting the Challenges of Today
Jonathan Boston
The world we have made, as a result of the level of thinking we have done 
thus far, creates problems we cannot solve at the same level of thinking at 
which we created them. (Albert Einstein, quoted in MacHale 2002)
Powerful global forces will reshape the context … over the next 
few decades. They include increasing international connectedness, 
geopolitical power shifts, rapid technological developments, demographic 
changes, climate change, growing resource scarcity and changing values 
… Together they are creating a world that is fast-paced, heterogeneous, 
complex and unpredictable. (Gill et al. 2011:29)
The Nature of the Problem
We live in the midst of significant social, demographic, economic, technological 
and environmental changes and challenges. In tackling these, governments need 
to focus simultaneously on issues of immediate, practical concern and those of 
a longer-term, more enduring or fundamental nature. Moreover, in responding 
to the pressing problems of today, policymakers and public managers must keep 
a watchful eye on the issues of tomorrow, including how the short-term policy 
‘solutions’ they adopt will affect future risks, challenges, opportunities and 
capabilities. Put briefly, this means governing for the future. Governments must 
take a long-term view—looking out over decades, if not centuries, not merely a 
single electoral cycle of three or four years. 
A crucial goal of such an approach is future-proofing the state—that is, 
anticipating and preparing for foreseeable challenges, managing and mitigating 
risks, building resilience and reducing future vulnerabilities, thereby ensuring 
a better, more sustainable tomorrow. These tasks, of course, are complex and 
hard—conceptually, analytically and, above all, politically. A range of possible 
futures needs to be imagined. Potential risks need to be identified and assessed. 
Judgments must be made about what level of risk is socially acceptable. Difficult 
policy trade-offs must be confronted. Intergenerational costs and benefits must 
be calculated. Ethically justifiable discount rates must be applied. And in the 
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midst of all this, governments need to be constantly mindful of the likelihood 
of surprises, including rare, unpredictable, high-impact events—what are now 
referred to as ‘black swan events’, as discussed by Peter Ho in Chapter 5.
To undertake all these tasks competently requires astute leadership, foresight 
and wisdom. It also depends on robust evidence and excellent science. Some of 
these ingredients are often in short supply. Yet frequent calls are made for ‘better 
future-proofing’ as governments attempt to manage in the aftermath of crises 
and disasters; this applies not only to natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
floods and fires, but also to financial crises, pandemics, technological failures, 
moral panics and the unintended, damaging consequences of the state’s own 
actions. So how can we improve the future-proofing of the state?
The 2012 Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) Annual 
Conference held in Wellington, New Zealand, brought together leading thinkers 
and expert practitioners to consider various dimensions of future-proofing, 
including the following.
1. What does the future hold, and can we predict and manage it better? What 
long-term challenges are likely to confront our political systems and how 
can we identify them and prepare for them sooner rather than later? 
2. Can we realign or transform our political context—which is dominated by 
the tyranny of the urgent, short-term policy imperatives and the pervasive 
effects of the electoral cycle—to ensure that long-term problems and risks 
receive adequate attention and thereby prepare ourselves to meet future 
challenges? And what institutional mechanisms might be available to increase 
the incentives for policymakers to take long-term issues more seriously?
3. What can we learn as policymakers and public managers from our region’s 
recent experiences in recovering from major natural disasters? Such learning 
may involve rethinking our practices of public management (including 
the processes of inter-agency collaboration), getting better at anticipating, 
managing and sharing risk (at individual, local community, national and 
international levels), and using recovery strategies to enable communities to 
withstand better the turbulent times that lie ahead.
4. How do we (re)build trust and foster resilience, which holds our nations and 
communities together, in the face of significant challenges, such as natural 
disasters?
The decision to focus on future-proofing our modes of governance reflected 
the fact that governments and communities will confront many significant 
challenges and risks over the coming decades—be they economic, social, 
political, environmental, technological, geological or meteorological (see 
Howell 2013). There is thus a need for appropriate foresight, planning and 
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preparedness. Serious risks that threaten public health and safety or the 
capacity of governments to maintain public order must be properly identified 
and mitigated (at least to the extent that this is feasible and cost-effective); and 
governments need to develop the capability and tools to address such challenges 
as and when they arise. 
For those immersed in emergency management, such tasks are part and 
parcel of the job. The relevant policy frameworks and language may differ 
somewhat between countries, but the basic roles and demands are similar. For 
instance, in New Zealand, emergency management focuses on the so-called 
four ‘rs’ relating to disasters: reduction, readiness, response and recovery. The 
Australian equivalents are prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. 
Of course, whatever the precise labels, the basic objectives are closely related 
and interconnected. Thus, for instance, any sensible recovery effort in the 
wake of a major disaster needs to give appropriate attention to prevention and 
preparedness—that is, for the next disaster. Moreover, the recovery process is not 
merely about the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, but it is also—more 
fundamentally—about the restoration of the afflicted communities (assuming 
this is feasible and sensible). It is thus concerned with all aspects of human 
wellbeing—social, economic, environmental, psychological and physical.
Yet future-proofing the state goes well beyond emergency management, as 
is highlighted by many of the contributions to this volume. It is not simply 
about preparing for, or responding to, disasters of one kind or another. The 
challenge is far broader. Indeed, so large is the potential canvas, so demanding 
the task, it might reasonably be asked whether future-proofing the state is a 
meaningful, realistic or sensible objective. After all, future-proofing may simply 
be too difficult. For instance, the future may be considered too unpredictable 
and uncertain, and/or the potential risks too severe, and/or the complexity 
and gravity of the challenges too great and/or the policy tools, resources and 
capacities of governments too limited. Yet while such impediments might render 
the goal of future-proofing immensely demanding, and while complete future-
proofing is certainly a forlorn hope, this does not mean that no effort should be 
made. There is no case for giving up in despair. Realistically, we cannot turn our 
back to the future; nor would it be ethically justified to turn a blind eye in the 
face of well-established and serious risks. Individually and collectively we have 
a moral responsibility to take seriously the challenges that confront us on the 
horizon and prepare as best we can for whatever the future may hold. Equally, 
we owe it to future generations to consider carefully how our actions today 
will impact on their wellbeing—and, wherever possible, minimise the potential 
harms and maximise the projected benefits. 
In all such matters it will be essential for governments to take the lead. Only 
the state has the means to undertake the necessary horizon scanning, risk 
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identification and assessments, and the required strategising and planning. 
Only the state has the coordinating capacity, legitimacy and coercive powers 
to determine the appropriate actions, channel the required resources and 
incentivise the desired behaviours. Unavoidably, therefore, citizens look to their 
governments for leadership—to understand what is going on, to prepare and 
plan, to mitigate risks and to respond when crises occur. Inevitably, too, citizens 
are quick to blame governments that fail to exercise proper foresight or tolerate 
unacceptable levels of risk. This immediately raises several difficulties. What 
constitutes an acceptable level of risk varies over time. Citizens tend to be much 
more risk-averse immediately after a disaster or crisis than before such events. 
Equally important, the incentives in democratic political systems are for 
decision-makers to focus on contemporary ills rather than future threats and 
opportunities. Likewise, there are short-term electoral incentives for politicians 
to engage in ‘bias arbitrage’—that is, to focus on issues for which the public 
exaggerates the risks and to downplay or ignore those issues for which the 
public underestimates the risks (for example, climate change). This structuring 
of political incentives generates a constant and enduring challenge to ensure 
that the state invests adequately in the task of governing for the future and 
protecting humanity’s long-term interests. Fundamentally, of course, this is 
a governance issue: it is about the quality of leadership; it is about resource 
allocation and priority setting; and it is about ensuring that narrow, short-term 
considerations and powerful vested interests do not override the wider public 
interest.
With these broad considerations in mind, this chapter has three main purposes. 
First, it identifies the major long-term challenges and risks facing humanity, 
including some of those specific to the Australasian and South Pacific regions. 
Second, it briefly examines the respective roles of governments and other 
stakeholders in preparing to meet these challenges and risks. Third, it explores 
what is meant by ‘future-proofing the state’ and discusses some of the specific 
issues raised by this task. These include, among other things, how to increase 
the incentives for governments to give proper weight to long-term policy issues; 
how governments might enhance the resilience of public institutions and critical 
subsystems and hence improve their capacity to cope with shocks; and how, in 
responding to various stresses and crises, it might be possible to maintain, if not 
enhance, public trust in governmental institutions. Where appropriate, I will 
refer briefly to other contributions to this volume.
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The Challenges Facing Humanity
What are the critical long-term challenges, risks and potential shocks that 
humanity faces? Plainly, there are many: some we know about or can be readily 
foreseen; others are as yet unknown (see Howell 2013; Lee et al. 2012; Smil 
2006; Upton 2012; and Chapter 3, this volume). Those we know about differ 
significantly in their nature, complexity, probable impact and likely duration. 
They can also be grouped in many different ways. For instance, a risk analysis 
prepared for the 2013 World Economic Forum (Howell 2013) classifies the 
most important current global risks under five general headings: economic, 
environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological. Ten specific risks are 
then identified and assessed under each heading, giving 50 risks in all. These 
are set out in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Global Risk Landscape by Categories
General 
category
Type of risk Description
Economic 1 Chronic fiscal 
imbalances
Failure to redress excessive government debt 
obligations
2 Chronic labour 
market imbalances
A sustained high level of underemployment 
and unemployment that is structural rather 
than cyclical in nature
3 Extreme volatility 
in energy and 
agricultural prices
Severe price fluctuations make critical 
commodities unaffordable, slow growth, 
provoke public protest and increase geopolitical 
tension
4 Hard landing of 
emerging economies
The abrupt slowing of a critical emerging 
economy
5 Major systemic 
financial failure
A financial institution or currency regime 
of systematic importance collapses with 
implications throughout the global financial 
system
6 Prolonged 
infrastructure 
neglect
Chronic failure to adequately invest in, upgrade 
and secure infrastructure networks
7 Recurring liquidity 
crises
Recurring shortages of financial resources from 
banks and capital markets
8 Severe income 
disparity
Widening gaps between the richest and the 
poorest citizens
9 Unforeseen negative 
consequences of 
regulation
Regulations that do not achieve the desired 
effect, and instead negatively impact 
industry structures, capital flows and market 
competition
10 Unmanageable 
inflation or deflation
Failure to redress extreme rise or fall in the 
value of money relative to prices and wages
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General 
category
Type of risk Description
Environmental 1 Antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria
Growing resistance of deadly bacteria to 
known antibiotics
2 Failure of climate 
change adaptation
Governments and business fail to enforce 
or enact effective measures to protect 
populations and transition businesses impacted 
by climate change
3 Irremediable 
pollution
Air, water or land permanently contaminated 
to a degree that threatens ecosystems, social 
stability, health outcomes and economic 
development
4 Land and waterway 
use mismanagement
Deforestation, waterway diversion, mineral 
extraction and other environment-modifying 
projects with devastating impacts on 
ecosystems and associated industries
5 Mismanaged 
urbanisation
Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and 
associated infrastructure that amplify drivers 
of environmental degradation and cope 
ineffectively with rural exodus
6 Persistent extreme 
weather
Increasing damage linked to greater 
concentration of property in risk zones, 
urbanisation or increased frequency of extreme 
weather events
7 Rising greenhouse 
gas emissions
Governments, businesses and consumers 
fail to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
expand carbon sinks
8 Species 
overexploitation
Threat of irreversible biodiversity loss through 
species extinction or ecosystem collapse
9 Unprecedented 
geophysical 
destruction
Existing precautions and preparedness 
measures fail in the face of geophysical 
disasters of unparalleled magnitude such as 
earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides or 
tsunamis
10 Vulnerability to 
geomagnetic storms
Critical communication and navigation systems 
disabled by effects from colossal solar flares
Geopolitical 1 Critical fragile 
states
A weak state of high economic importance 
that faces strong likelihood of collapse
2 Diffusion of 
weapons of mass 
destruction
The availability of nuclear, chemical, biological 
and radiological technologies and materials 
leads to crises
3 Entrenched 
organised crime
Highly organised and very agile global 
networks committing criminal offences
4 Failure of diplomatic 
conflict resolution
The escalation of international disputes into 
armed conflicts
5 Global governance 
failure
Weak or inadequate global institutions, 
agreements or networks, combined with 
competing national and political interests, 
impede attempts to cooperate on addressing 
global risks
6 Militarisation of 
space
Targeting of commercial, civil and military 
space assets and related ground systems that 
can precipitate or escalate an armed conflict
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General 
category
Type of risk Description
7 Pervasive 
entrenched 
corruption
The widespread and deep-rooted abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain
8 Terrorism Individuals or a non-state group successfully 
inflict large-scale human or material damage
9 Unilateral resource 
nationalisation
Unilateral moves by states to ban exports 
of key commodities, stockpile reserves and 
expropriate natural resources
10 Widespread illicit 
trade
Unchecked spread of illegal trafficking of 
goods and people throughout the global 
economy
Societal 1 Backlash against 
globalisation
Resistance to further increased cross-border 
mobility of labour, goods and capital
2 Food shortage 
crises
Inadequate or unreliable access to appropriate 
quantities and quality of food and nutrition
3 Ineffective illicit-
drug policies
Continued support for policies that do not 
abate illegal drug use but do embolden criminal 
organisations, stigmatise drug users and 
exhaust public resources
4 Mismanagement of 
population ageing
Failure to address both the rising costs and the 
social challenges associated with population 
ageing
5 Rising rates of 
chronic disease
Increasing burden of illness and long-term 
costs of treatment threaten recent societal 
gains in life expectancy and quality
6 Rising religious 
fanaticism
Uncompromising sectarian views that polarise 
societies and exacerbate regional tensions
7 Unmanaged 
migration
Mass migration driven by resource scarcity, 
environmental degradation and lack of 
opportunity, security or social stability
8 Unsustainable 
population growth
Unsustainably low or high population growth 
rates and sizes, creating intense and rising 
pressure on resources, public institutions and 
social stability
9 Vulnerability to 
pandemics
Inadequate disease surveillance systems, 
failed international coordination and the lack of 
vaccine production capacity
10 Water supply crises Decline in the quality and quantity of fresh 
water combines with increased competition 
among resource-intensive systems, such as 
food and energy production
Technological 1 Critical systems 
failure
Single-point system vulnerabilities trigger 
cascading failures of critical information 
infrastructure and networks
2 Cyber attacks State-sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal or 
terrorist cyber attacks
3 Failure of 
intellectual property 
regime
The loss of the international intellectual 
property regime as an effective system for 
stimulating innovation and investment
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General 
category
Type of risk Description
4 Massive digital 
misinformation
Deliberately provocative, misleading or 
incomplete information disseminates rapidly 
and extensively with dangerous consequences
5 Massive incident of 
data fraud/theft
Criminal or wrongful exploitation of private 
data on an unprecedented scale
6 Mineral resource 
supply vulnerability
Growing dependence of industries on minerals 
that are not widely sourced with long 
extraction-to-market time lag for new sources
7 Proliferation of 
orbital debris
Rapidly accumulating debris in high-traffic 
geocentric orbits jeopardises critical satellite 
infrastructure
8 Unforeseen 
consequences of 
climate change 
mitigation
Attempts at geo-engineering or renewable 
energy development result in new complex 
challenges
9 Unforeseen 
consequences of 
nanotechnology
The manipulation of matter on atomic and 
molecular levels raises concerns about 
nanomaterial toxicity
10 Unforeseen 
consequences of 
new life-science 
technologies
Advances in genetics and synthetic biology 
produce unintended consequences, mishaps or 
are used as weapons
Source: Howell, L. (ed.) 2013. Global Risks 2013, 8th ed (Geneva: World Economic Forum).
Of these top-50 global risks, the five with the greatest likelihood (as assessed 
in late 2012 and early 2013 by the report’s authors) were: severe income 
disparity; chronic fiscal imbalances; rising greenhouse gas emissions; water 
supply crises; and mismanagement of population ageing. The top-five risks 
in terms of impact were: major systemic financial failure; water supply crises; 
chronic fiscal imbalances; food shortage crises; and the diffusion of weapons 
of mass destruction. Interestingly, two risks appear in both lists: chronic fiscal 
imbalances and water supply crises. The emphasis placed on severe income 
disparity—that is, the widening gap between the richest and the poorest 
citizens in many states—is also intriguing. It suggests that the report’s authors 
concluded that income inequality has reached such high levels in a sufficiently 
large number of states as to pose significant risks to political stability and social 
cohesion. Whether this assessment is correct, of course, is open to debate.
While the risk classification system adopted by Howell (2013) has merit, it is 
important to note that many of the 50 global risks cannot be readily confined 
to a single category. For instance, environmental risks, such as species 
overexploitation, poor water management and the development of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria, may pose significant economic risks (or even geopolitical 
risks). Likewise, societal risks, such as rising religious fanaticism, may affect 
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geopolitical stability, which in turn may have negative economic impacts. 
Moreover, many of the risks are closely interconnected. For instance, food 
shortage crises (listed under societal risks) are clearly linked to water supply 
crises, land and waterway mismanagement, persistent extreme weather and 
rising greenhouse gas emissions. In short, many of the 50 risks are linked in 
various ways and/or have multiple potential consequences for humanity.
For the purposes of this brief analysis, I have clustered the major challenges 
facing humanity over the coming decades into four broad categories: the 
pressures arising from population growth, demographic changes and migration; 
the environmental challenges arising from resource scarcity and the waste 
absorption limits of the biosphere; a range of other, largely human-induced 
challenges and risks; and the seemingly increased prevalence of natural disasters. 
Population-Based and Demographic Changes 
Looking forward over the next half-century, the global population is projected 
to expand—from around 7 billion in 2012 to around 9 billion by 2050, and 
possibly 10–12 billion by the close of the twenty-first century (Royal Society 
2012). This growth is likely to exacerbate existing resource scarcities (for 
example, with respect to land, water and energy supplies), intensify the stresses 
on certain ecosystem services, increase migration pressures and generate new 
geopolitical tensions. The risks of food shortages and international tensions over 
water and energy resources are particularly concerning. 
In the developed world, most countries, including Australia and New Zealand, 
will experience significant demographic shifts. Their populations will age 
and become more diverse. Migration—whether internal or external, inward 
or outward—may pose significant issues of adjustment, inclusion and social 
cohesion for national governments. These factors will also pose a range of 
economic (including fiscal) and political challenges. A notable migration issue 
over the longer term in the South Pacific region will be the inundation of certain 
low-lying micro-states, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, as a result of sea-level rise, 
and the need to relocate entire peoples.
Environmental Challenges
Likewise, various global (and sub-global) biophysical constraints—including 
the scarcity of non-renewable resources (such as oil and gas) and conditionally 
renewable resources (such as water)—and increasing pressures on the planet’s 
common-pool resources (for example, the atmosphere, oceans and biodiversity) 
will generate a range of economic and social stresses. Compounding this, climate 
change over the coming century is very likely to increase the frequency and/
or severity of meteorological and hydrological disasters (see IPCC 2007, 2013). 
Human settlements will thus face a growing threat of damaging large-scale 
events (for example, severe droughts, floods, heatwaves and bushfires).
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Other Human-Induced Challenges and Risks
Governments face many other types of difficulties (including largely self-inflicted 
wounds, such as the costly ‘leaky-building disaster’ in New Zealand or the 
failure of local councils to require fireproof housing in bushfire-prone areas in 
Australia), which need to be managed and responded to. These human-induced 
challenges and risks vary in their likely magnitude, impact and duration, and 
include 
• global and regional economic shocks, such as the global financial crisis of 
2008–09 and the related sovereign debt crisis of 2011
• major technological changes, with resultant impacts on the pattern and 
structure of employment
• civil unrest and disorder, perhaps triggered by high-profile, politically 
divisive events
• acts of terrorism, cyber attacks and the failure of critical systems
• entrenched inequalities in wealth, income and opportunities, including 
severe and persistent ethnic inequalities
• major health problems, including the rise of obesity and epidemics
• biological disasters resulting from specific bacteria or viruses (exacerbated in 
some agricultural subsectors by crop monocultures)
• changes in societal values, attitudes, expectations and family structures, with 
significant implications, amongst other things, for the delivery of various 
social services
• changes in the nature and pattern of social media and mass communication, 
with implications for democratic processes, the character of social movements 
and forms of protest
• the risks posed by the increasing complexity and interdependence (at various 
spatial levels) of multiple systems—social, technical and infrastructure.
Natural Disasters
In recent years many countries have witnessed highly destructive natural 
disasters, including major meteorological, hydrological and seismic events. In 
the case of Australia and New Zealand, these have included
• the Victorian and West Australian bushfires of 2009–11, the widespread 
bushfires of late 2012 and early 2013, and the NSW bushfires in October 
2013 
• the large-scale flooding in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria during 
late 2010 and early 2011, with subsequent major flooding events during the 
summers of 2011–12 and 2012–13
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• the Canterbury earthquakes, especially those of September 2010, February 
2011, June 2011 and December 2011
• the Cook Strait earthquakes in July and August 2013, which did significant 
damage in the small settlement of Seddon, but fortunately only modest 
damage in Wellington 
• damaging hailstorms in Sydney (19 April 1999), Melbourne (7 March 2010) 
and Perth (22 March 2010) 
• major tropical cyclones, such as Larry (2006) and Yasi (2011)
• protracted and severe drought conditions in many parts of Australia during 
2003–09. 
Some of these events not merely caused large-scale damage to property and 
infrastructure (and related economic losses), but also resulted in significant loss 
of life.
Equally, within the wider Asia-Pacific region, there has been a string of 
devastating natural disasters in recent years—most notably: severe floods in 
Pakistan in mid 2010 and mid 2011, and in Thailand in late 2011; and large 
earthquakes and tsunamis in Indonesia in late December 2004, in the South 
Pacific islands in late March 2009, in Chile in late February 2010 and in Japan 
in mid March 2011. Epidemics, such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) pandemic in 2002–03 and the H1N1 influenza (that is, swine flu) 
pandemic during 2009–10, have also posed challenges for many governments 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Other kinds of natural disasters remain constant 
possibilities, including volcanic eruptions, cyclones and solar flares. 
Clearly, some of these risks and challenges could be isolated events; but many 
may impact to varying degrees on our societies simultaneously. Indeed, there 
is an increased risk of multiple disasters occurring within short periods, thus 
placing extreme pressures on the resources and capabilities of the state (at 
all levels) and the communities affected. In response terms, this implies that 
governments and communities will have to deal with inordinately complex and 
interrelated problems, many taking the guise of ‘wicked’ problems defying 
simple or immediate solutions. Unfortunately, some of these disasters may be 
‘unmanageable’ in that governments will lack either the resources to cope or the 
capacity to intervene with any degree of effectiveness, and local communities 
will be left to fend for themselves for extended periods. But it is surely better to 
know about, prepare and plan for such eventualities ahead of time, even if our 
responses may be inadequate. The fact that we cannot anticipate and regulate 
all risks, let alone control the future, does not mean that governments should 
simply relax and sit on their hands.
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Preparing for Long-Term Challenges and Future 
Risks
Governments, in short, will be confronted by a multiplicity of complex future 
risks, the scope, scale and severity of which may all increase over time—in 
some cases markedly. Of course, such risks will also affect many other important 
stakeholders, such as business, civil society organisations (for example, think 
tanks, research institutes, interest groups and professional bodies) and local 
communities. Together they will be expected to prepare for and help manage 
these eventualities. But such actors are not necessarily presently geared 
up to deal adequately with the many challenges on the horizon. And to act 
appropriately and effectively may require more sophisticated thinking than has 
hitherto been demonstrated, as well as new ways of approaching problems. In 
this context, some stakeholders are unlikely to have the required knowledge 
or research capabilities, the right staff and skills, the appropriate mindset and 
aptitudes, or even the authority or capacity to deal with future risks.
Moreover, given the nature, magnitude and range of the risks, many different 
tasks require attention. In no order of importance, these include
• the need for improved global and national governance of common-pool 
resources, including the capacity to take effective action to reduce long-term 
risks, such as human-induced climate change, resource scarcity, biodiversity 
loss and ocean acidification
• the need for heightened disaster preparedness and adaptive capacity
• the need for robust scientific evidence and a capacity to assess risks in a 
rigorous and independent manner
• the capacity to mobilise resources quickly and efficiently
• the capacity to maintain critical infrastructure, including essential services, 
social assistance programs and important supply chains, during protracted 
‘emergencies’
• the need to enhance coordination and cooperation at multiple levels: 
intergovernmental, inter-agency and across governmental and non-
governmental organisations, including business and the not-for-profit sector
• the need to foster increased community resilience and forms of community 
self-reliance
• the need for improved investment in risk mitigation, including enhancing 
the resilience of critical infrastructure (for example, via greater built-in 
redundancy). This applies to water services, wastewater services, electricity 
networks, transport infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure, and 
other essential services. Although public funds will be available to cover 
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some of the costs of such re-engineering, more creative funding instruments 
will also be needed, including shared funding, co-funding, public–private 
partnerships, levies and charging.
Governments do not, of course, ‘own’ this policy space; nor will they necessarily 
deal with future challenges solely by means of direct or in-house provision. It is a 
shared space and requires a shared commitment across all relevant stakeholders. 
It will also entail smarter policy responses, cultural changes, some normative 
reconceptualisation, and learning from empirical experiences of what works 
(whether locally or elsewhere). 
The challenges and risks outlined above raise a variety of philosophical and 
practical questions. One of these concerns the respective roles and responsibilities 
of governments, business, civil society organisations, communities and 
individuals, including how risks should be shared and how the ‘policy bounds’ 
or ambits should be negotiated. But there are many related questions.
• To what extent can (and should) the state reduce the range and magnitude of 
the risks it is likely to face over the coming decades, and how should it prepare 
to manage the hazards, disasters and exogenous shocks (whether natural or 
human induced) that are bound to occur and over which governments have 
little or no control?
• Of the risks that societies face, which are the primary responsibility of 
governments, and how, in general, should the costs be shared and/or 
allocated?
• What weight should be placed on the precautionary principle, and what 
potential benefits and opportunities might we be willing to sacrifice in the 
interests of ‘playing safe’?
• To what extent can (and should) the state enhance its resilience (for 
example, by increasing reserves and redundancy) and hence its capacity to 
withstand negative shocks, whether economic, social, ecological, geological 
or meteorological?
• What policy frameworks and approaches appear to offer governments 
the best prospects of coping with uncertainty, minimising the impacts of 
negative shocks and maximising the potential to seize new opportunities?
• How can governments, other stakeholders and communities best learn from 
their mistakes, avoid repeating the failures of the past, and minimise policy 
regress over time as the political salience of a major disaster recedes?
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Future-Proofing the State 
In broad terms, the notion of ‘future-proofing’ refers to the process of attempting 
to anticipate or predict future developments in order to: a) prevent, or at 
least mitigate, possible negative consequences by reducing vulnerability and 
enhancing resilience; and b) seize opportunities as and when they arise. It has 
been applied to various spheres of human activity including, for instance, the 
future-proofing of electronic data—where it means selecting data formats and 
physical media that will maximise the chances of enabling continued access to 
the original information.
Accordingly, future-proofing entails exercising foresight and implementing 
strategies that are likely to enhance sustainability and resilience (for example, 
institutional, fiscal, environmental, innovation, incentives, social capital and 
so on) and reduce potential hazards and threats. From the state’s perspective, 
governments can influence, at least modestly or at the margins, the kind of 
futures that societies experience. At the same time, however, human societies 
and the natural world are dynamic. The extent to which any future-proofing 
can be effective will necessarily be limited, as underscored by Bridget Hutter in 
Chapter 9: there are many uncertainties; our predictive capacity is constrained; 
some risks cannot be foreseen and/or are difficult to assess; some risks are costly 
and/or politically inconvenient to mitigate; and other risks may be very difficult, 
if not impossible, to mitigate (for example, because they are globally driven or 
beyond the control of governments to influence). 
Many areas of academic research are relevant to the issues surrounding ‘future-
proofing’, including future studies, governance (including adaptive and lateral 
governance), strategic management, organisational learning, sustainability, 
social capital, complexity, transformational change, innovation, and so forth. 
There is also a vast body of work on risk identification, risk assessment and 
management, distinguishing between risks and uncertainty, risk sharing and 
financing, asymmetries of information, and how to realign incentives and avoid 
moral hazards.
The remainder of this chapter considers briefly five particular challenges that 
are crucial if progress is to be made towards the goal of future-proofing the state. 
Many of these are explored more fully in subsequent chapters 
1. increasing the incentives for governments to consider important long-term 
policy issues 
2. increasing the resilience of public institutions and critical subsystems and 
hence their capacity to cope with future shocks 
3. maintaining and enhancing trust in public institutions 
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4. improving emergency management and disaster recovery
5. improving the capacity of governments to learn from their own failures.
Bringing Important Long-Term Issues into Short-Term 
Political Focus
A significant body of social science literature suggests that democracies are 
systematically biased towards the present. In short, it is argued that elected 
governments tend to focus on short-term issues at the expense of long-term 
issues, and typically give more weight to the interests of current voters 
over those of future generations. This ‘presentist bias’ or ‘political myopia’ 
is evident in many policy domains across the democratic world. Examples 
include underinvestment in major infrastructure, inadequate protection of 
biodiversity, an unwillingness to address the long-term fiscal costs of current 
policy settings (for example, with respect to retirement income policy, long-
term welfare dependency, student finance and criminal justice policy), the poor 
management of natural capital (especially critical, non-substitutable resources), 
and inadequate measures to mitigate human-induced climate change. The long-
term economic, fiscal, social and environmental consequences of such political 
myopia are potentially serious, both in scope and in scale.
In relation to possible solutions, it is important to consider the merits (or 
otherwise) of various institutional arrangements and policy measures that 
governments have already put in place in an endeavour to give more weight to 
the interests of future generations and/or ensure that policymakers take future 
risks (and opportunities) more seriously. Such arrangements include
• statutory requirements for treasuries/finance ministries to produce periodic 
long-term fiscal forecasts and statements of the long-term fiscal position of 
the government (for example, in New Zealand the Treasury is required to 
produce annual 10-year fiscal forecasts and periodic 40-year forecasts) 
• statutory requirements for government departments/agencies to prepare 
and publish strategic plans or related documents that scan the horizon, 
identifying risks and developing possible policy responses
• statutory requirements for local governments to undertake long-term 
planning and disaster management exercises on a regular basis
• the creation within relevant agencies of specialist risk-management and 
contingency planning units
• the establishment of independent institutions with specific mandates to 
consider long-term policy issues (for example, commissions for the future, 
planning councils, and so on) 
Future-Proofing the State
18
• enhanced legislative oversight with respect to long-term policy issues (for 
example, Finland’s Parliament has a Committee for the Future, which, among 
other things, undertakes research on futures-related issues)
• legislative provisions that require policymakers at various levels of 
government to take account of the precautionary principle in their decision-
making processes
• constitutional requirements for policymakers to consider the interests of 
future generations (for example, as noted by Pierre-Alain Schieb in Chapter 3, 
Finnish prime ministers are required on taking office to outline in Parliament 
their vision for Finland 15 years ahead).
The relative merits of these and other policy instruments designed to bring 
long-term issues and considerations into short-term political focus need careful 
consideration.
Building Resilience to Cope with Future Stresses and 
Shocks
As previously highlighted, resilience is critical to the successful management 
and regulation of risks. In recent years the notion of resilience has been much 
in vogue and has generated a large literature, especially in relation to socio-
ecological resilience. Many definitions and conceptualisations are on offer. As 
applied in engineering, for example, resilience has been associated with three 
main properties: the capacity to bounce back after a shock or stress; the capacity 
to endure greater stresses; and the capacity to be disturbed less by a given level 
of stress (Howell 2013:37). But while this particular understanding of resilience 
is relevant to objects or infrastructure, such as buildings, bridges and dams, it is 
less appropriate to people, institutions and systems. For instance, an institution 
or a system may demonstrate resilience ‘not by returning exactly to its previous 
state, but instead by finding different ways to carry out essential functions; 
that is, by adapting’ (Howell 2013:37). Accordingly, a broader understanding 
of resilience is required. In this regard, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2007:90) has defined the resilience of a social or ecological system 
as its ability ‘to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure 
and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organization, and the capacity 
to adapt to stress and change’. A resilient system, therefore, is one that can 
maintain its basic functions when confronted with disturbances or stresses; 
it retains, as Jocelyne Bourgon argues in Chapter 4, the ‘capacity to adapt, to 
evolve and to prosper in a turbulent world’.
Resilience is closely related to the notion of vulnerability, as Brian Walker notes 
in Chapter 11. Vulnerability refers to a community’s or a system’s susceptibility 
to, and ability (or lack thereof) to cope with, adverse impacts. The degree of 
vulnerability depends on the nature, magnitude and duration of the shocks that 
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are experienced, the sensitivity of the community or system to these shocks, 
and their capacity to adapt. While some known risks can be reduced or even 
eliminated, other risks are either too costly or too difficult to reduce. Having the 
capacity to manage ‘residual risk’, as it is termed, is critical.
Building on such insights, at least three kinds of capabilities are essential if a 
country, and in particular its governmental institutions, is to be resilient: a) 
adaptability—able to respond and adapt to changing demands and circumstances; 
b) sturdiness or robustness—able to survive unexpected or sudden shocks, 
including systemic shocks; and c) resourcefulness and recoverability—able to 
re-establish a ‘desired equilibrium’ (whether this is close to the previous order 
of things or a new regime of some kind) while ensuring critical services and 
operations are maintained. If these capabilities are important at the national or 
governmental level, they are equally necessary at the sub-national, subsystem 
and sectoral levels. Indeed, the resilience of governmental institutions will be 
influenced by, and dependent upon, the capacity of the various subsystems to 
cope with the stresses to which they are subjected. 
Such an analysis immediately raises two questions. First, how might the 
resilience of countries (and their respective subsystems) best be assessed? And 
second, how can the level of resilience be improved and, moreover, improved in 
the most cost-effective manner? 
With regard to an assessment diagnostic, Howell (2013) proposes a framework 
for evaluating a nation’s resilience involving five subsystems (economic, 
environmental, governance, infrastructure and social) and five components of 
resilience (robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, response and recovery). 
For each of the five components, specific evaluative criteria or attributes are 
identified. For instance, ‘robustness’ is defined as ‘the ability to absorb and 
withstand disturbances and crises’ (Howell 2013:38). Ways of increasing 
robustness might include ensuring that there are adequate fail-safes and firewalls 
in a country’s critical networks and infrastructure. Criteria for assessment 
might include specific tests of reliability, the capacity to contain the impact of 
unexpected shocks and the adaptive capacity of decision-making processes—
or to take another example: redundancy. The concept of redundancy refers to 
‘having excess capacity and back-up systems’ to help ensure core functions 
and critical systems can be maintained in the event of unexpected shocks, 
disturbances and volatility (Howell 2013:39). Without doubt, redundancy can 
be vital, as both Peter Ho and David Kirk emphasise in their contributions to 
this volume. Criteria for assessing whether the level of redundancy is adequate 
might include the capacity of backup systems to undertake a specified level of 
core functions and the extent to which risks are spread through the provision 
of diverse delivery systems.
It is one thing to develop a diagnostic tool to assess the level of resilience; it is 
quite another to apply this tool effectively and improve the level of resilience. 
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Increasing the degree of redundancy will almost certainly entail additional 
costs. In other cases, the level of resilience may not be readily amenable to policy 
interventions. For instance, having a robust level of social capital—including a 
strong network of civil society organisations, high levels of trust and social 
cohesion, and a tradition of social entrepreneurship—is undoubtedly important 
during the response and recovery phases of major disasters (as highlighted 
by recent natural disasters in Australia and New Zealand and emphasised by 
various contributors to this volume). But it is by no means self-evident how 
governments can enhance the level of social capital, let alone ensure that it 
is properly harnessed and deployed when disaster strikes. Having said this, 
governments can certainly facilitate or hinder the development of social capital. 
For instance, empowering local communities, implementing collaborative modes 
of governance (and lateral governance) and co-funding various local initiatives 
can help facilitate, but not guarantee, the accumulation of social capital.
Maintaining and Enhancing Trust in Public Institutions
There has been considerable concern in recent decades about the decline in 
the level of trust in public institutions in many long-established democracies. 
Various explanations for the loss of trust have been advanced, but whatever 
the causes, there is general agreement that low trust is politically, socially and 
economically damaging. Other things being equal, governments are likely to 
be less resilient and less able to cope with difficult challenges if citizens have 
little trust and confidence in those who hold public office and/or provide public 
services. Hence, rebuilding and maintaining adequate levels of trust in public 
institutions should be priorities. Possible ways of addressing the current ‘trust 
deficits’ are usefully explored by Murray Petrie in Chapter 8. As he indicates, 
transparency, participation and robust accountability mechanisms are critical.
Managing Natural Disasters: Recovery strategies, 
modalities, institutions and lessons
A considerable part of this volume is devoted to the topic of natural disasters, 
with various reflections on the multiple challenges and opportunities such 
events generate for governments. This includes the ways in which governments 
can best prepare for, respond to and help the recovery process after disasters; the 
opportunities disasters provide for policy innovation and experimentation by 
governmental agencies (and non-governmental organisations); the role of social 
capital in enabling communities to cope with and recover from disasters; and the 
challenges large-scale disasters can pose for the maintenance of decentralised 
governance systems and the integrity of the democratic process.
Different kinds of disasters, of course, require different responses and modes 
of recovery. Localised, one-off events, such as fires or hailstorms, specific acts 
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of terrorism or short-lived riots, pose different recovery challenges to large-
scale and protracted events, such as major floods, damaging earthquakes with 
numerous significant aftershocks, or substantial economic shocks, such as the 
Global Financial Crisis and the related sovereign debt crisis, particularly in 
Europe. 
For good reasons, the 2012 ANZSOG conference gave particular attention to 
several of the major natural disasters that have afflicted Australia and New 
Zealand in recent years, in particular 
• the Victorian bushfires in early February 2009 
• the Queensland floods during late 2010 – early 2011
• the Canterbury earthquakes, especially those in September 2010 and 
February 2011.
In each case, these disasters caused substantial damage and generated significant 
stresses for the governments of the respective jurisdictions. Unsurprisingly, 
too, in each case the relevant governments established independent bodies to 
investigate aspects of each disaster and how well the response and recovery 
strategies worked in practice, although analysis of the latter has varied 
significantly, reflecting the particular circumstances and distinctive features of 
the disasters in question. Drawing on the reports of these independent bodies, 
Rachel Brookie and James Smart in their respective chapters outline and assess 
the recovery strategies adopted and highlight the lessons arising. Likewise, 
John Ombler and Sally Washington in Chapter 21 explore the opportunities 
created by the Canterbury earthquakes for policy innovation and, in particular, 
new ways of delivering public services, while in Chapter 22 Lyn Provost and 
her colleagues provide an audit perspective on the public sector’s response to 
the earthquakes. Here, I briefly summarise some of the key features of the three 
particular disasters. 
The Victorian Bushfires
The Victorian bushfires in late January and early February 2009 affected almost 80 
townships, destroyed more than 2000 homes (and 3500 structures) and displaced 
about 7500 people; 173 people died, with more than 400 injured; there were also 
large forestry, agricultural and horticultural losses, with total costs estimated at 
more than A$4.4 billion. The Federal and Victorian governments established the 
Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (as a joint initiative) 
several days after the main disaster on 7 February (Black Saturday). This was 
headed by Christine Nixon, the outgoing commissioner of Victoria Police. Its 
mandate was to oversee the rebuilding of the many communities affected by 
the fires. Subsequently, in April 2009, the Victorian Government established a 
royal commission, which was asked to examine the ‘causes and circumstances 
of the bushfires’, all aspects of the government’s bushfire strategy and 
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responses, and the issues arising (for example, with respect to preparation and 
planning for future bushfire threats, land-use planning and management, the 
fireproofing of buildings, emergency response, the quality and availability of 
public information, training and resourcing, and so on). The royal commission 
delivered its interim report on 17 August 2009 and its final report on 31 July 
2010 (which contained 67 recommendations covering a diverse range of issues, 
including emergency and incident management, planning and building, land 
management, and so on).
The Queensland Floods
Large-scale flooding affected much of Queensland (and several other States) 
during December 2010 and early 2011 as a result of a series of storms and 
cyclones. At one point, three-quarters of the State of Queensland was declared 
a disaster zone. The floods forced the evacuation of many thousands of people; 
more than 30 people lost their lives; and there was significant and protracted 
disruption to business activity across much of the State. Insurance losses 
exceeded A$1 billion, and total economic losses may have exceeded A$10 
billion (with some estimates as high as A$20–30 billion). A recovery taskforce, 
headed by Major General Michael Slater, was established to coordinate initial 
recovery efforts. Later the Queensland Reconstruction Authority was created 
(under legislation) to develop, coordinate, implement and manage the Statewide 
plan for rebuilding and reconnecting communities affected by the floods and 
cyclones. The authority’s board is chaired by Major General Dick Wilson, and 
the chief executive is Graeme Newton, previously the State’s Coordinator-
General and Director-General of the Department of Infrastructure and Planning. 
The Queensland Government also established a commission of inquiry into the 
floods on 17 January 2011, with broad terms of reference, and the commission 
completed its interim report on 1 August 2011, with 175 recommendations. The 
Australian Government imposed a flood levy to fund reconstruction work.
The Canterbury Earthquakes 
Earthquakes are very common in New Zealand, but few cause major damage. 
An unexpectedly large quake occurred in the vicinity of Christchurch on 4 
September 2010; this was followed by three significant aftershocks—on 22 
February 2011, 13 June 2011 and 23 December 2011—with numerous smaller 
aftershocks. The February quake resulted in the collapse of many buildings 
with the loss of 185 lives. The cumulative damage has thus far been substantial, 
with much of the central and eastern parts of the city severely affected. More 
than 30 000 houses are estimated to have sustained damage exceeding NZ$100 
000, with the total fiscal costs estimated to exceed NZ$13 billion and insurance 
losses well in excess of NZ$20 billion. 
In response to the quake in September 2010, the Government established the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission under the Canterbury Earthquake 
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Response and Recovery Act, which was enacted on 14 September. The commission’s 
role was to offer advice on prioritising resources and allocating funding and 
to help coordinate the efforts of central and local governments. Subsequently, 
following the February quake, the Government established the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) (also via legislation). CERA’s mandate 
is to lead and coordinate the recovery effort, including business recovery, 
restoring local communities, and enabling effective and timely rebuilding. The 
Chief Executive of CERA is Roger Sutton. On 14 March 2011, the Government 
announced the establishment of the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission 
to investigate a range of issues including building collapses and the consequent 
loss of life, damage to key buildings, and the adequacy of building standards and 
codes. An interim report was released in mid October 2011, and a final report 
(in seven volumes) was completed in stages during 2012. A separate technical 
investigation into a number of specific building collapses was commenced on 16 
March 2011 by the Department of Building and Housing, and several reports 
have been released.
With these three major natural disasters in mind, it is important to step back 
and reflect on some of the broader policy issues to which they give rise. For 
instance, relevant questions include
• the merits or otherwise of the specific institutional arrangements that 
were established to investigate the disasters and coordinate the recovery 
process—including their design features, powers, capability, resourcing, 
administrative arrangements and consultative processes
• whether there was adequate leadership and competent governance, including 
effective intergovernmental and inter-agency coordination 
• whether government agencies effectively coordinated and partnered with 
business, other non-governmental organisations and local communities
• whether there was adequate protection of democratic rights, including 
opportunities for citizen participation and consultation
• whether short-term political imperatives, such as the pressure for quick 
decisions on future land-use options, prevailed over long-term planning 
considerations and the wider public interest
• whether policymakers applied the lessons arising from previous disasters, 
both local and international (for example, Kobe and New Orleans), in their 
disaster response and recovery processes.
Quite apart from this, the large-scale disasters that have afflicted Australia and 
New Zealand in recent years have raised a raft of difficult policy issues that will 
no doubt be the subject of ongoing and vigorous debate. Such issues include: 
the cost of, and limits to, insurance (and reinsurance); the related question of 
how the losses arising from major disasters should be shared across the relevant 
communities (including taxpayers and ratepayers); the extent to which those 
faced with losing their land and/or various property rights (for example, due to 
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damage, flood risk, fire risk, and so on) should be compensated; and the extent to 
which new, and potentially costly, building standards and planning procedures 
should be implemented and, if so, over what time frame. Such issues, needless 
to say, are all politically charged and require adroit management.
Responding to Human-Induced Disasters and 
Government Failure
Aside from natural disasters, governments are also confronted from time to 
time with human-induced disasters; this includes self-inflicted wounds or 
government failures. Such failures are inevitable. The many possible causes 
include poorly designed and/or badly implemented regulatory frameworks, 
weak governance, human error, poor conflict management and corrupt practices. 
Some of these failures have been, and will no doubt continue to be, extremely 
costly. In New Zealand, as discussed by Peter Mumford in Chapter 7, significant 
changes were made to the regulation of the building industry during the 1990s, 
with a move from relatively prescriptive building codes to performance-based 
regulation. Some years later it became apparent that many new residential and 
commercial buildings were leaking. Investigations revealed that this was due to 
poor construction, the use of inappropriate materials and bad design. In short, 
the new performance-based regulatory framework had failed (Mumford 2011). 
The cost of rectifying the so-called ‘leaky building’ problem has been estimated 
at more than NZ$10 billion. 
A central issue arising from cases of this nature is whether governments 
are prepared to invest adequately in policy learning—including rigorous, 
independent evaluations of what went wrong and why, and careful analyses of 
how similar self-inflicted wounds might be avoided, or at least minimised, in the 
future. If policy learning is not an integral part of the decision-making process 
then it is inevitable that similar costly failures will be repeated. Thankfully, 
the democratic process includes some automatic stabilisers: electors ultimately 
reject those who prefer not to learn.
Conclusion
In summary, governments face a daunting array of risks. For various reasons, as 
discussed earlier, both the complexity and the magnitude of these risks appear to 
be increasing. Moreover, unless the crucial environmental and resource-related 
challenges currently confronting the global community are effectively tackled, 
there will be a greater likelihood of major natural disasters (for example, arising 
from climate change) and heightened geopolitical tensions (for example, arising 
from resource constraints). The existing weakness of our global governance 
arrangements, especially for managing common-property resources, increases 
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the probability that the required policy changes will not be made—or at least 
will not be made in time. Accordingly, the management of, and recovery from, 
disasters is likely to become an ever more demanding burden on governments, 
both national and sub-national.
Elected officials will have little choice but to respond. Citizens, after all, expect 
governments to manage and, if possible, mitigate severe and large-scale risks on 
their behalf. Indeed, this responsibility is arguably one of the state’s defining 
or inherent functions. But it is no easy task. Nevertheless, while governments 
certainly cannot control the future and while the state can only be ‘future-
proofed’ to a modest degree, there is a strong ethical imperative for governments 
to devote resources to addressing long-term policy challenges and enhancing 
the capacity of public institutions to withstand future shocks.
Politically, perhaps the most difficult challenge is the powerful electoral incentive 
for decision-makers to focus on today’s problems at the expense of tomorrow’s 
threats and hazards. As discussed in this chapter, there are various institutional 
mechanisms that can help rebalance the incentive structure in democracies so 
that governments give more attention to long-term risks and the interests of 
future generations. But realistically such mechanisms are likely to have only a 
modest impact.
Finally, resilient governments depend on resilient societies; the two are 
inextricably intertwined. Hence, future-proofing the state requires vigorous 
non-governmental institutions and secure reserves of social capital. If 
governments have only a limited capacity to ensure such outcomes, neither 
are they powerless. Above all, they need to use their resources prudently and 
intelligently.
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2. The Role of Government  
in Future-Proofing Society
The Right Honourable John Key
My government has four priorities in its second term (2011–14). The first is 
to manage the Government’s finances responsibly. New Zealand has faced a 
number of challenges over the past three-and-a-half years, from a recession to 
the Canterbury earthquakes. The Government has absorbed much of the cost 
of these events on its balance sheet, so we can cushion New Zealanders from 
the worst effects. But that money has to be paid back. So we have put a huge 
amount of effort into making savings and, in particular, into changing some 
of the long-term term drivers of government spending, so we can get back to 
surplus over the next few years and start getting our debt down again.
The public sector has played—and continues to play—a very important part in 
this approach. We have worked with the public sector to identify opportunities 
for savings, and indeed to identify opportunities for investment, too. We 
believe people who understand their own services are in the best position to 
make financial trade-offs and to introduce innovation that genuinely improves 
public services. As a result, chief executives and senior public servants have 
been focused on understanding how their organisations work, what drives their 
costs and how to measure service levels. That approach seems to be working.
Our second priority is to continue building a more competitive and productive 
economy. We have a very busy program of work going on in a number of areas, 
to make sure that our regulatory settings are right, that the infrastructure is 
there to support growth and that resources can flow to their most productive 
use.
Our third priority is to deliver better public services to New Zealanders within 
tight fiscal constraints. If you think about it, New Zealanders—and Australians 
for that matter—have two fundamental interests in their public services. On 
the one hand, as users they get the benefit of these services, and on the other 
they also pay for them. For the most part, they do not have much choice either 
way. They are required to pay through their taxes, and there is often little or no 
alternative in the provision of public services. So the key challenge facing the 
Government, and public servants, is to fashion a public sector that works for 
the people who use its services and is affordable for the taxpayers who fund it.
But the world has changed over the past few years. What seemed affordable, 
at a pinch, in 2006 or 2007 is now contributing to a structural deficit in the 
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Government’s accounts. Spending is being reined in to match what the country 
can afford, but at the same time people’s expectations of public services continue 
to grow. So over the next few years the Government needs good advice and new 
thinking from the public sector. In fact there has never been a better opportunity 
for experienced and committed public servants at all levels to contribute to 
constructive change. It will not be easy but it will be rewarding.
Our fourth and final priority is to support the rebuilding of greater Christchurch, 
our second-largest city. This will be the biggest economic project ever undertaken 
in New Zealand. There have already been big implications for the New Zealand 
Public Service, and that will continue over the course of the rebuild. I will have 
more to say about Christchurch shortly. 
First, I would like to begin with a few brief reflections from the perspective I 
have on the ninth floor of the Beehive in Wellington. The first is that public 
policy is hard. So is public management. They are challenging tasks, and 
much more difficult than commentators, businesspeople, newspaper column 
writers and the public often think. To my mind, the intellectual and practical 
challenges of the public service are what attract so many capable and motivated 
New Zealanders to work in it.
Public policy and management are also hugely important tasks. Governments 
always need good advice, they need a sound system of financial management, 
they need skilled people to run what are often large organisations, and they 
need to know how their decisions will affect society and the economy. 
As prime minister, I find the most difficult, hard-to-tackle issues of public 
policy inevitably end up passing across my desk. In working through those 
issues, I rely heavily on the advice and judgment of public servants. It is crucial 
that ministers know all the sides of a particular issue, have all the relevant 
information and fully understand the implications of different courses of action. 
Since becoming prime minister in late 2008, I have been impressed by the 
professionalism and competence of public servants in my own departments and 
across the public sector as a whole. The approach of my government has been to 
respect people’s professional skills and to back public servants who want to get 
on and make New Zealand a better place.
As just one example, we have reintroduced the practice of having officials 
regularly attend cabinet committee meetings. That is for two reasons. We want to 
get advice from the people who have the greatest knowledge of particular issues. 
And we actually think it is good for officials to see where ministers agree and 
disagree, what they feel comfortable with and what drives their consideration 
of a particular issue. 
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We also respect the neutrality of the public sector. It is one of the great strengths 
of the New Zealand public management system. But while it is important for 
governments of all stripes to respect the political neutrality of the public sector, 
it is equally important for public servants to respect the political mandate of the 
Government. So the first thing I would say to you is that advice from the public 
service is highly valued and it is always considered carefully.
Yet that advice can only go so far, for government is not a technocratic exercise. 
In the end, the biggest, most fundamental decisions governments are called on 
to make cannot be calculated in a spreadsheet. And in a lot of areas, the most 
thorough policy analysis does not lead to an inevitable conclusion; it simply 
highlights the fundamental judgments that have to be made around concepts 
like fairness, opportunity and the balance between individual and social 
responsibility. That is why we have an elected government—so that politicians 
make those sorts of judgments and are accountable to the people of New Zealand, 
or of Australia, for doing so.
Governments also have to bring things to a head. The public and the media can 
debate issues forever but, in the end, the government has to cut through them 
and make a decision, which will invariably please some people and disappoint 
others. In some cases that decision is to do something and in other cases it is 
to not do something. Either way, a decision has been made. In making those 
decisions, my government has been very pragmatic. 
We are guided by the values and principles of the party we represent in 
Parliament, but we are also focused on what is sensible and what is possible. 
Partly, that is the nature of the political system in New Zealand. It is sometimes 
said that politics is about convincing 50 per cent of the population plus one, and 
that has never been truer than under our multimember proportional electoral 
(MMP) system. But, in any event, government is a practical business. You do 
not start with a blank sheet of paper; you start with the country as it is. And 
by making a series of sensible decisions, which build on each other and which 
are signalled well in advance, and by taking more people with you as you go, 
you can effect real and durable change. That has certainly been our experience 
in New Zealand.
I also believe in keeping my word with the electorate. One of the characteristics 
of this government has been that we have been consistent and upfront with 
New Zealanders about what we are doing and why. We campaigned openly on a 
very clear program and that is what we are implementing. At each election we 
have sought a mandate for new policies we want to put in place. And we have 
made clear assurances about the policies we will maintain.
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Trust is fundamental to the relationship between politicians and voters, just as 
it is fundamental to the relationship between politicians and public servants. 
Some governments have really surprised people on coming into office but that 
has never worked out very well. So whether people like us or not, they know 
what to expect from us.
Looking ahead, good public sector management will be critical in the years to 
come. Around the world, governments are facing persistent budget deficits and 
a growing debt burden they will be struggling with for years. Yet their citizens 
are rightly expecting the sort of twenty-first-century services they get from 
private sector industries competing aggressively for their business, like banks 
and airlines. The combination of these two forces will place governments and 
public servants around the world under constant pressure to deliver better 
services for less money.
New Zealand is no different. We are in a new environment that will persist for 
at least the next decade. The mid 2000s were characterised by the idea that big 
increases in government spending, dispensed across a whole range of areas and 
in a relatively untargeted way, could transform society. According to this view, 
the sheer weight of spending would eventually prevail; however, that particular 
experiment ran out of money in 2008 with little genuinely transformational to 
show for it.
Public management in the foreseeable future will be focused on determining 
which public services and income-support measures are the most effective, and 
working out how to provide those within a tightly constrained budget. It will 
be focused on presenting a service that is far more coordinated than it is now. 
New Zealanders do not live in government departments and they do not always 
understand the demarcations between different arms of government. To them, 
the government is one big organisation that should be able to help them when 
they need it. And they are right—it should. 
Technology will make that goal more achievable. It is important that new 
technology is not just tacked onto current business practices. Rather, it should 
facilitate change in those business practices. And public management will be 
focused on getting results.
We have been very clear with the public service about what we want it to focus 
on. In March 2012, I announced a set of results I want to see achieved over the 
next five years. They are not everything the Government is doing, or everything 
the Government thinks is important. But they are results for which I want to see 
real progress. They involve tackling some of the longstanding, difficult issues we 
have in this country. And they tend to fall between or across the responsibilities 
of individual government departments, which is part of the reason they are 
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difficult to tackle. Many readers, especially New Zealanders, will be familiar 
with these 10 results and with the targets attached to each of them. The targets 
are quite ambitious. Some of them are, for example
• to reduce by 30 per cent the number of people on a working-age benefit for 
more than 12 months
• to reduce the incidence of rheumatic fever by two-thirds
• to reduce the violent crime rate by 20 per cent.
I make no apologies for having high expectations. I do not want targets that 
are easy to reach. I want people to have to stretch, and feel uncomfortable, and 
change the way they have always done things, in order to reach the targets. And 
the Government will back them in doing that. 
I have appointed a minister to lead each of the 10 results and a public service 
chief executive has been made accountable for demonstrating real progress 
against his or her result. We are giving the public sector the flexibility, the 
encouragement and the mandate to make real change.
I certainly do not underestimate the challenges involved in this new approach. 
The targets are difficult, and to reach them means changing the way the public 
sector functions. In the past it has almost operated as a loose federation of 
separate agencies. In the future it will have to operate much more as an integrated 
system. I am delighted to say the leadership of the public service has been very 
supportive of this new approach. At times during the process of developing the 
results program they were at least as ambitious as ministers were. That is a great 
sign that things needed to change and that in fact they will change.
I would like now to discuss the Canterbury earthquakes, our response to them 
and the lessons we have learnt from that response. Governments on both sides 
of the Tasman have been tested by disasters quite frequently in recent years. 
Australia has experienced the Victorian bushfires and the Queensland floods. In 
New Zealand, we have had earthquakes. 
The first Canterbury earthquake struck in the early hours of Saturday, 4 
September 2010. Damage and liquefaction were widespread. But when we look 
back at that event with the benefit of hindsight, it’s clear that in many ways 
we were lucky. We were lucky the earthquake happened at 4 am, when most 
people were not out and about. We were lucky that while people were injured, 
no-one lost their life. And we were lucky for another reason that we could not 
have known at the time: that we would be practised and ready when a far more 
destructive earthquake struck a few months later. 
On 22 February 2011, 185 people were killed in one of this country’s worst 
natural disasters. It is the kind of event governments spend years preparing 
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for, but in truth you never really know you are ready until the day comes. 
In Canterbury, we saw the benefits of good preparation and planning. The 
immediate response was well coordinated, with clear leadership structures 
that were widely understood. People knew what their roles were and set about 
getting things done.
Beyond the initial emergency response, the Government faced a huge number 
of challenges. There were accommodation needs; questions over whether 
employers could keep their businesses open; and major infrastructure needs like 
water, wastewater, electricity and roads. On the ground, the public sector was 
forced to find new ways to deliver services. I am pleased to say that in adversity, 
the public sector really stepped up to the plate. A healthy amount of freedom 
was given to frontline staff to get things done—and they did.
The Government also moved rapidly to address the many policy issues we faced. 
For example, we had a support package for employers and employees, including 
subsidies, available less than a week after the earthquake. It was crucial to keep 
the lines of communication open between employers and employees in order 
to preserve jobs, so we designed the package quickly and erred on the side of 
generosity rather than having stringent rules.
Another example was the Government’s residential red zone offer to property 
owners. This involved the Government offering to purchase properties on 
the worst affected land at their current rating valuation. The scheme enabled 
homeowners to move on with their lives quickly. There were many other policies 
developed in those conditions and sometimes we pushed people very hard. It 
will not surprise you that there were some robust conversations at times—
because, to some people, it appeared things could not be done as rapidly as we 
wished. But we got there. We got there because people were innovative and 
flexible.
It is now 17 months since the destructive earthquake on 22 February and as a 
government we have been examining the lessons we can take from it, particularly 
around how the public sector operates. The kind of innovation we saw is what 
we would like to see from the public sector in ordinary times—not just in times 
of disaster. Collaboration between agencies was a feature, and this extended 
to involving the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
representatives of the public alongside government. There was greater sharing 
of information between agencies, and more sharing of resources. People were 
agile and showed initiative. They came up with solutions that focused firmly on 
what the people of Canterbury actually needed. The challenge now is to take 
that innovative approach and apply it to the public sector when we are not in a 
time of crisis—and I think the public sector is open to that.
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The final point I would like to make about Canterbury is that the earthquake 
response has taken us into new territory as a government. We have learned some 
valuable lessons from overseas disaster recoveries, but have very much taken 
decisions that fit the New Zealand context. Our response has included appointing 
a minister, Gerry Brownlee, to specifically oversee the recovery. We have passed 
legislation to give additional powers to central government and we set up a new 
government agency, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, or CERA, 
to provide leadership and coordination. CERA has wide powers, which were the 
source of some contention when we passed the necessary legislation. We were 
conscious to strike the right balance between getting things done and having 
adequate checks and balances around the organisation. 
I believe we got that balance right. There is still a lot to be done in Canterbury 
but we are making good progress.
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3. Foreseeable Shocks and the 
Critical Challenges Facing Humanity 
in the Twenty-First Century
Pierre-Alain Schieb
My contribution to this volume is about the notion of foreseeable shocks and 
what their consequences or implications are for risk governance. But I have 
expanded the title to its current form because the chapter is also a discerning 
conversation about a new class of global risk, the likes of which we have not 
seen before—at least over the course of the postwar generation. 
For the past 18 years, I have belonged to the International Futures Programme 
(IFP) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
which is a slightly different animal to, say, the community structure of the OECD 
or the working parties in the OECD. In contrast to these institutions, the IFP has 
a number of degrees of freedom to select themes and to invite international 
organisations, NGOs and members of the private sector to collaborate with us. 
We are also to a large extent a self-funded program, with 95 per cent of our 
budget coming from voluntary contributions. 
Unlike other OECD institutions, however, we don’t need all 34 member 
countries to be aligned about priorities. Consequently, we can have six, seven 
or 10 countries help decide what should be our next pioneering or pilot project. 
I insist on this point because if you think about future-proofing the state, the 
first lesson is that one way or the other governments in member countries have 
to have some kind of foresight strategy or foresight unit. It could be embedded 
at the prime ministerial level of cabinet; it could be in different departments or 
outside the government altogether, as with the case of think tanks in the United 
States.
Several models are available to try to make sure that the future is to a certain 
extent taken into account. And yet, the only country we know of having 
something related to the long-term future embedded into the constitutional by-
laws is Finland. Every new Finnish prime minister coming into power has to 
deliver a speech to Parliament about his or her 15-year vision for Finland, and 
also serves on a permanent commission of the future in the Parliament.
Finland’s institutional arrangements to facilitate long-term planning are 
exceptional in the world and raise an interesting question: how do we incentivise 
the political system to give more weight to the long run in a context in which all 
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the political incentives typically lead to planning that only extends the length 
of an electoral cycle? This is particularly difficult—and pressing—in the current 
global context, where we are faced with short-term economic difficulties. 
So what mechanisms, institutional arrangements or processes would I 
recommend at the political and national governmental levels to encourage long-
term thinking? That is a difficult question, because ‘one size fits all’ will never 
work. Finland’s approach may be exceptional, but there are other approaches to 
long-term planning around the world. In other cases, the notions of consultation 
and inquisitiveness—rather than a constitutional requirement as in Finland—
also result in a longer-term approach to planning.
Take Sweden. When they were faced with the long-term problem of what to 
do with nuclear waste, the institutions in charge of the problem selected three 
spots on the coast of Sweden. What they then did was supply funding to local 
communities to ensure they had access to the expertise of independent scientists. 
This is an example of addressing long-term potential challenges, albeit by a 
different mechanism. 
Probably the first deficiency we have in the government structure of OECD 
countries is that not all of them have the same quality of research about the 
policies relating to emerging issues—something we reported on in July 2011 
(OECD 2011). In so doing we were trying to establish a set of policy options 
(everything we do is aimed at delivering policy options for governments). We 
also know we have to have a positive attitude to shocks, because shocks can be 
positive—they can be a disruptive technology, change the market structure or 
have other positive impacts. In this chapter, however, I will explore the kind of 
damaging shocks that may happen, especially the global ones.
Twelve years ago the IFP launched its first project on emerging risk, and since 
then we have recognised several trends: growing interdependence in the 
economic, environmental and social spheres; increased interconnectedness 
and also complexity of systems; and an increased concentration of assets and 
population.
Two notes on this: first, even if you do not consider climate change or any 
change in the occurrence of important share-damaging hazards, the trend is 
leading to a high concentration of population and assets. This trend is growing 
even in OECD countries and is creating a lot of potential damage and casualties. 
So to a certain extent, you could split up the debate and say that even if we take 
constant probabilities of occurrence into account, there is still greater potential 
damage from any kind of event like that.
The second note is that, as you may remember in 2007, just when the subprime 
mortgage crisis was supposed to stop, we had a new economic factor due to 
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globalisation, which was that economists were starting to recognise a notion of 
synchronisation of economies on a global scale. And I am reminded of this with 
the current debt crisis many countries are facing, because a possible consequence 
of this high level of debt is that we could again see a kind of synchronisation 
of microeconomic trends—but this time in the declining trend. This would be 
very harmful, and is something I will explore later in this chapter, because there 
is a big difference between what you usually call a large-scale disaster and a 
global shock.
What constitutes a global shock? First, you need a vector, itself characterised 
by the notion of mobility—whether it be the mobility of people, the mobility 
of money, the mobility of information, the mobility of viruses or the mobility 
of goods. Often a high level of mobility occurs because many of the potentially 
damaging global shocks are local shocks drifting or cascading into other 
continents or countries. 
Returning to the notion of population concentration, even in OECD member 
states people are continuing to migrate from the country to the city (currently 
78 per cent of OECD members’ populations live in cities; within 10 or 15 years 
that figure will be above 80 per cent). Moreover, migratory trends within these 
countries cannot be characterised just by urbanisation: within many OECD 
countries there is also a trend of transmigration to coastal areas—particularly 
among retirees. Population concentration increases your vulnerability to shocks.
Let me now move on to an example of future-proofing—in this case, concerning 
aviation safety. Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) is the codename for 
Europe, and NextGen is the codename for the United States. The only thing you 
have to understand about these new air traffic-control systems is that they are 
examples of conversion technology. They represent a new level of complexity, 
whereby assistance is given but a pilot is not needed. (I am a pilot myself 
and I have learned that now I have become a mission manager, I will just run 
computers—something that is perhaps not so pleasing for both the passenger 
and myself.)
Despite my personal reservations with these developments, they are obviously 
highly beneficial because they are leading to safer travel with fewer collisions; 
the aim is a shorter separation time when you land or take off at an airport. 
Although this is a good aim, it also leaves the regulators with a more difficult 
task, because the systems won’t be fully operational for 15 years; until that 
time there will be two systems in place. So although the new technology will 
eventually be beneficial, its rollout is potentially causing problems for the 
regulators. 
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The Future Global Shocks Project
The process we had for this OECD project was to have a steering group 
of delegates from 15 governments, with the additional input of five or six 
multinational companies. In this way we like to always have a blend of academics, 
research institutes, private sector representatives and governments to make 
recommendations, and to make our analytical component as robust as possible. 
To this end the steering group decided to go with five case studies. These five 
studies are not necessarily of the most important or even most damaging events, 
but rather represent an important sample of global trends. 
To select the case studies we first consulted the World Economic Forum, which 
every year produces a risk map on a global scale. This provided an easy starting 
point to select our five case studies. When consulting the risk map, we were 
particularly interested in cases that illustrated the propagation of local to global 
shocks and rapid-onset shocks, and also complexity theory agent-based models, 
which look for tipping points.
Of 25–35 potential threats, we selected the following five case studies: pandemics, 
financial crises, cyber security, solar storms and social unrest. Of course, 
pandemics are a good example of special propagation, because they usually 
start in one place and then become a kind of global shock. When it reaches 
this stage, we know that part of the response is dealing with quarantine, and 
closing airports, schools and so on. So it’s an example of spatial, geographical 
propagation.
Solar storms are an interesting case, with a range of possibly damaging 
consequences. These fall into three categories: spacecraft effects; ionospheric 
effects (concerning the atmosphere between the stratosphere and the exosphere); 
and ground effects. Spacecraft effects include things like astronaut radiation, 
solar cell damage and solar flare radiation; ionospheric effects include enhanced 
ionospheric currents and disturbances, aircraft crew and passenger radiation 
and navigation problems; ground effects include geomagnetically induced 
currents in power systems, signal scintillation, HF radio wave disturbance, 
pipeline corrosion and disturbed reception. In the worst-case scenario, a solar 
storm could lead to the collapse of 400 000-volt transformers and with them the 
entire power system.
NASA and the US National Academy of Sciences have predicted that in such an 
event it would take four hours for the first effects to assert themselves; within a 
month there would be a complete collapse of the economy and society. Recovery 
from such an event could take years. Moreover, we simply do not have a stockpile 
of quality transformers anywhere, so you cannot simply replace them. There are 
ways of shielding transformers, but this can be extremely costly. 
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There have already been examples in history of this type of disaster occurring. 
The Carrington Event of 1859 was a geomagnetic storm that produced the largest 
known solar flare. At the time there were no powerlines, computers or airlines, 
but there was extensive damage to the telegraph system in Europe and North 
America. We have seen recent geomagnetic storms cause damage in Sweden, 
Canada and parts of the United States, but nothing compared with the scale 
of the Carrington Event. In fact, these recent storms are estimated to be one-
quarter as powerful as the Carrington Event. Another storm on the scale of the 
Carrington Event would lead to extensive damage. 
The ash cloud over Europe in 2010 caused by the eruption of the Icelandic 
volcano Eyjafjallajökull was a good example of the danger of having just one 
disaster-prediction model—in this case, based in the United Kingdom. The 
principal problem was that neighbouring countries affected by the ash cloud 
had no access to the model so had no way of observing where the cloud was 
moving, the size of the ash particles, how they would affect aeroplane engines 
and so on.
This created a difficult situation for many countries, and is probably why 
most of Western and Central Europe chose to close their airports. The havoc 
Eyjafjallajökull wreaked on Europe’s air traffic was a good example of what 
happens when you lack resources on a global or even multilateral scale, 
especially during the crisis itself. 
Still on the subject of aviation safety, the United Kingdom recently published a 
Chatham House report concerning everything that relies on airfreight transport. 
The report concluded that if we were to face another volcanic eruption that 
produced a cloud that stayed for months rather than weeks, there would be all 
kinds of implications for the economic system. 
I will now move to cyber security. Cyber security was the subject of a recent 
report by our team in the United Kingdom. They reached the same conclusion 
as our counterparts in the United States and France: there is no case for global 
shocks on the basis of a cyber security attack, at least in the next 10 years or so. 
When this UK report was published in January 2011, we had more than 100 
quick reactions all over the world. They were mainly comments made by 
journalists or experts who believed we had underestimated the risk of cyber 
attacks, and that they could lead to global shocks. They were confused by 
the fact you can have a strong attack on Australia or perhaps a strong attack 
targeting a particular company without it being classed as a global shock. But 
even though these events can be devastating for the victims, it is not a global 
shock if it doesn’t have worldwide economic ramifications. After we received 
these criticisms, we put more in our report about what the difference is between 
a large-scale disaster and a long-term global shock. 
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Global Shocks: Lessons to learn
This brings us to the first of my concluding points: a global shock is quite 
different from a large-scale disaster. The second lesson we need to learn is that 
while we think there are increased opportunities for global shocks to occur 
in the twenty-first century, society at large is now quite resilient. Even if the 
preconditions for a global crisis as I have stated earlier in this chapter are met, 
there is now a high premium on international cooperation. 
But we cannot take this for granted. First, there needs to be a greater level of 
international cooperation in terms of scientific mechanisms to meet potential 
threats. This also means more monitoring of potential threats. Second, to 
effectively combat potential threats there needs to be a continuation of projects; 
it doesn’t work to discontinue projects every few years. Instead, governments 
need to be consistent over time—and climate change is a pertinent reminder of 
this. 
Third, diversity is crucial: you don’t want to put all your eggs in one basket. 
Because if, for example, you have software that is in 85 per cent of global 
computers, we think that’s a big risk. In such situations the system should be 
dismantled so as to avoid a global engineering failure. We don’t want that kind 
of monopoly.
Another recommendation is the stockpiling of supplies in case of a crisis—be 
it of food or whatever. Undoubtedly this would be very costly, but it probably 
could be done on a regional basis. The success of such a scheme would depend 
on having a very accurate real-time system to know where those resources are 
and what is in them. 
But building reserves and building redundancy, of course, run contrary to all 
the trends in the public and private sectors over the past 30 years. In a time of 
economic constraint, convincing people to do this can be difficult.
So it’s a combination of having real physical reserves and tracking where 
those reserves are and what is in them. But who will pay for them? During a 
global shock you cannot rely on your nice neighbour to provide potable water, 
generators and spare parts; perhaps the private sector could help foot the bill. 
This goes even further for vaccines and rare resources; we know that when it 
comes to pandemics, the countries that are home to the larger drug companies 
feel they are quite safe. 
If you don’t have a drug company in your own country, however, you start 
to question who will have priority for the delivery of vaccines. These are the 
things countries and regions must start thinking about, because when a crisis 
strikes, you can’t rely on others to help you sustain your population’s needs. 
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Getting back to the issue of global science mechanisms, one of the big questions 
is: who will monitor them? It should be done affordably, so international 
cooperation is critical—because if you share the cost you have no redundancy; 
no country is in the mood to do it themselves. 
We need, then, to inject more science during crises to better understand what is 
happening and to invest in real-time models to evaluate the location of resources 
or evacuation plans and other aspects of preparedness. So you have a range 
of questions about this, and, as I said, if you have more diversity you need 
less redundancy, and you are not competing for the same resources as your 
neighbours. 
The same goes for the private sector. In the private sector the key factor will 
be sharing data; the sector needs to get over its current preoccupation with 
confidentiality and trade secrets. One way we can start to make this happen is 
to ask the private sector to release some of the duties regarding deregulation, 
and to provide greater access to their transactions: perhaps transactions of their 
system or environmental transactions. It could be a trade-off: we give the private 
sector more freedom in certain areas if they give us more access to their data. 
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4. Governments Fit for the Future: 
Lessons in building resilience
The Honourable Jocelyne Bourgon
In this chapter I will explore the topic of building more resilient communities 
and public institutions, drawn from the lessons of the ‘New Synthesis Project’ 
(Bourgon 2011). The theme of resilience is very much related to the theme of 
the social context or landscape within which governments are called upon to 
serve, the increasing complexity of the issues they have to deal with, and the 
increasing volatility of the environment within which they have to make policy 
decisions and take action.
For some, the concept of resilience brings to mind images of catastrophic 
failures, natural disasters and pandemic diseases, because resilience is on such 
strong display in those circumstances. But I prefer to explore the concept of 
resilience in a softer way. Yes, it is strongly on display when you say a society 
is able to weather a crisis and emerge from it stronger than before. I would 
argue, however, that resilience is also on display when countries and public 
institutions show they are able to adapt, evolve and transform themselves in 
response to changing circumstances—and are able to do it in a manner that 
avoids crises and reduces the risk of failure, in particular when the costs of these 
failures will be borne by society as a whole.
The first point to make about resilience is that it is built gradually over a long 
period. This is what is needed if it is going to be in abundant supply when 
countries need it most. Resilience is found in self-reliant individuals who 
are able to take charge of their lives and find solutions to the problems they 
are facing; it is found in the bonds and the relationships of trust between 
individuals, families, communities and public institutions. And it is found 
in public institutions which are able to adapt to changing circumstances and 
coevolve with society.
I believe that focusing on resilience can help us shed a different light on the role 
of government in society, and the relationship between government, citizens and 
society. In the course of this chapter, I will draw freely from a project conducted 
over a couple of years that has explored a new synthesis of public administration. 
Called the New Synthesis Project, it involved senior practitioners and academics 
from six countries working as partners. By bringing together a representative 
sample of national public administrations, we were able to benefit from the 
richness of diversity of socioeconomic circumstances, history, ideology, culture, 
language and so on. 
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Countries were selected to give a truly global spread: there are two from the 
Americas (Canada and Brazil); two from Europe (The Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom); and two from the Asia-Pacific region (Singapore and Australia). But 
there is also a huge degree of diversity in this matrix, reflected in the vastly 
different geographies, demographics, democratic histories and economic 
situations that these six countries have. And this diversity was the starting 
point of our research project about governance in the twenty-first century: are 
those differences significant enough to change our practices, and if so, what do 
these different approaches entail?
Building on Strong Foundations for Resilient 
Capacities
We live in a world which is increasingly complex, volatile and prone to global 
cascading failure. As a consequence, governments today are called upon 
not simply to do what is predictable (to do it with increasing productivity, 
performance and efficiency), but they are also expected to effectively address 
those issues that are beyond what can be predicted, and to do this in a way 
that improves the capacity of society to absorb shock and disturbances, and to 
prosper in all circumstances.
I would argue that the task of those who are in government today is more 
challenging than ever before. There is now a long list of potential crises 
a government can face—some predictable and preventable, others not. 
Governments today must accept and recognise that there is every reason to 
believe that the frequency and the scale of shock from crises and disturbances 
will continue to increase. 
When it comes to building resilience, there is no doubt there are many people 
across the globe who have invested years of effort in conducting relevant public 
service reform and exploring why we are not better prepared and equipped 
to anticipate and prevent crises. These people strive to steer their respective 
countries in a way so that they can prosper and adapt to changing circumstances. 
They have adopted business principles to improve productivity; centred many 
policies on citizens, with greater focus on user satisfaction; and they have 
eliminated sizeable government deficits (although post GFC many other nations 
have to relearn how to balance their books).
No-one is disputing the commitment of the men and women around the world 
who have been leading ambitious public sector reforms aimed at increasing the 
resilience of their states; but we need to delve into this issue more deeply. The 
reformers have given us solid foundations but these are insufficient to address 
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some of the complex problems we are now facing. Their reforms did not prepare 
government for the problems that stem from living in a post-industrial world. 
So, in spite of all these reformist efforts, in spite of all this energy and courage, 
we need to ask ourselves: is there a systemic reason that explains why it is still 
so difficult to depart from the traditional ways of governing our societies?
To address this question, it is valuable to consider where the governance system 
in our respective countries comes from. In most cases, the system of public 
administration in place has evolved over hundreds of years, taking its modern 
shape from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. This 
period was characterised by a process of change related to industrialisation and 
democratisation. Looking at the systems of public administration that are deeply 
entrenched across the OECD, you find fundamental institutions and conventions 
that have served their countries well and have given them strong foundations. 
But these systems also beg the question: what is the ongoing contribution 
of these institutions and conventions to governing in the future? From the 
‘industrial age’ we inherited a system of public administration premised on a 
political system governed by the rule of law. Together these systems value due 
process and a delegated authority that are the bases for control, accountability 
and performance management; they became systems ideally suited to the mass 
production of public services.
At the same time, a particular strength in some circumstances can become a 
weakness in others. While traditional systems of public administration may 
be ideally suited to the mass production of public services, they have found 
difficulty in anticipating what is needed for a society to adapt to that which is 
not foreseen and not predicted. Hence, our starting point in the New Synthesis 
Project was to recognise that traditional approaches of public administration 
leave governments in a reactive position when it comes to unpredictable shocks 
and crises. Therefore, we needed to improve our capacities to anticipate, to 
introduce proactive interventions and course corrections, and to build capacities 
to absorb shocks and disturbances.
There is more to the role of our public services than the programs they 
administer and the services they provide. They serve a broader public purpose, 
and whatever they do has wider ramifications beyond the authority and 
responsibility they operate within—in particular, they contribute to system-
wide results reflected in societal results. To achieve these public results, we build 
self-reliant individuals and resilient communities; we develop a sense of civic 
spirit that is conducive to collective actions and a sense of working together to 
achieve better results at a lower overall cost. A country with these attributes is 
better positioned not only in predictable and favourable circumstances, but also 
in unpredictable and chaotic circumstances. 
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Yet many problems in society exceed the capacity of government when working 
alone. Their traditional powers, such as the authority to legislate and to enforce 
laws or powers to tax and spend, are not sufficient to be effective on their 
own. Governments need to work with and through others to achieve public 
results. All the instruments of state have to be used to lever greater collective 
capacity in society to achieve better results and allow the entire society to make 
contributions to the value-adding chain. This opens up an expanding space of 
possibilities as governments contemplate the complex decisions necessary to 
achieve improved societal results.
Improving Institutional Capacities
In order to focus on these broader possibilities, we need to improve our 
institutional capacities—the very institutions that govern society that evolved 
over a long period. We need to strengthen the organisational capacity of our 
public sector organisations so they are not only efficient but also contributing 
to future societal benefits. We want them to have the capacity to work 
collaboratively with each other (multi-institutional) and to engage across the 
community and private sectors.
We also need a society and government able to innovate, shape so-called 
‘emergent solutions’, and to find and address the complex problems we are 
facing. Moreover, no matter how smart governments are, they need to develop 
a very strong adaptive capacity because there will be unpredictable shocks and 
crises. If they are successful in escaping the traditional triangular definition 
of public administration (based on the rule of law, the separation of politics 
from administration, and a merit-based career public service characterised by 
political neutrality and anonymity), they will have something that is much closer 
to a dynamic and adaptive system, where government transforms society and 
must be transformed by society, and where the government adapts to changing 
circumstances on an ongoing basis.
Institutions, then, are not necessarily fit for the challenges they confront or 
face ahead. I will cite two examples briefly. The European Union is in trouble 
because the institutions that have been created are not commensurate to the 
problems they are facing. There is an increasing gap between the aspirations, 
the challenges at hand and the capacity of the collective institutions that have 
been created. The United States is also facing a crisis of authority, because the 
institutions they have created to introduce checks and balances to serve the 
collective interests have lost sight of this purpose. The strength of ‘blocking’ 
interest groups is now greater than the collective instrument that should give 
effect to the will of the majority.
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In short, no institutional arrangement is appropriate for all time: it needs to be 
able to adapt to changing circumstances. That is part of the challenge for people 
in government—not only to deal with the immediate policy issue or firefighting 
crisis of the day, but also to make sure that as the guardian of public institutions, 
we bring in the capacity to adapt on an ongoing basis. I would venture a 
hypothesis: the developed countries that have been the most successful with the 
previous concept of governance may find it more difficult to adapt than those 
which are inventing and creating a different model of governance. 
Framing an Adaptive System of Governance
The conclusion to this point is that different times require different ways of 
thinking, different mental maps and forms of openness to different ways of doing 
things. I believe we need a new analytical framework to create a government 
fit for the future, and we need to work out the interconnections between the 
four essential functions of governance: compliance, performance, emergence and 
resilience (as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, spanning the continuum between 
predictability and unpredictability). We need a compliance function that 
we know well; we also need a performance function to deliver outputs, an 
emergence function to anticipate likely scenarios and a resilience function to 
build enduring capacity. These four functions must work together to produce 
an adaptive government (Figure 4.2), and in the rest of this chapter I will explore 
some of the innovative practices that are emerging as powerful connectors 
of these four functions: anticipatory abilities and adaptability through co-
creation and co-production. These connectors increase the adaptive capacity of 
government, and contribute to the government’s resilience.
Figure 4.1 Functions of government
Source: ANZSOG, after Bourgon 2011.
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Figure 4.2 An Adaptive System of Government
Source: ANZSOG, after Bourgon 2011.
We need an emergence function to be able to anticipate and to introduce course 
correction and to do it before time. In particular, when the cost of failure will 
be borne by society as a whole, we need to be able to shape solutions in a 
more organic way than we have been able to do in the past. We need constantly 
to be aware of this insight and conserve energy; we need the stability and 
predictability provided by institutions so we can cope with the volatility that 
is out there. We need to be able to work across and we need to be able to adapt. 
So what are the important connectors that link these four essential functions?
First, anticipation is a key quality if we want to prevent crises, and crisis 
prevention is far less costly than crisis recovery. I do not think our recent track 
record on crisis prevention has been as good as it could be. Singapore has a long 
tradition of looking far into the future and of long-term strategic planning. They 
developed the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) program and set 
up the Centre for Strategic Futures, both in 2009. These anticipatory ventures, 
perhaps the most sophisticated of their type in the world, enable Singapore to 
combine the strength of scanning and scenario planning with a strong focus on 
experimentation and innovation. Singapore’s ability to detect emergent signals 
gives them an advantage to initiate proactive intervention.
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Other countries are undertaking similar futures exercises and foresight scenario 
planning initiatives. Finland has adopted a more political process involving an 
all-party parliamentary committee looking ahead 25 to 50 years. It is a public 
process and they engage civil society in a conversation about the future of their 
country. These initiatives give a country the advantage of better anticipation; 
however, countries which are investing in these practices over a long period 
derive more benefit than just the capacity to anticipate. They develop a high 
level of public understanding of the challenges faced in the country, the 
consequences of various choices and the trade-offs. That awareness facilitates 
consensus building, it improves the capacity to align leaders from the public, 
private and civil sectors, and improves the likelihood of success for an ambitious 
collective agenda.
By improving the capacity to focus on the future, we produce a long chain 
of interrelated results that improves the government’s adaptive capacity more 
generally. In particular, we improve the government’s capacity to blend short-
term considerations with long-term actions, and also society’s capacity to 
develop an awareness of what might be a preferable future. So we have created a 
process of dynamic change, transforming government and society. This process 
builds resilience including the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.
Second, co-creation is another important form of connection linking the four 
functions. Co-creation is the coming together of end users, beneficiaries, 
interested parties and service providers for the purpose of shaping, testing 
and experimenting with policy response in practice. It would be a mistake to 
prescribe co-creation in all circumstances as there will always be situations 
where governments are best positioned to act on their own. Governments are 
best positioned to act on their own when they can define the issue, when they 
have the necessary tools and can enact reform with confidence.
Let me provide an example of co-creation from Denmark. Denmark has a range 
of laws and programs supporting people with disabilities, but the Government 
faced a traditional dilemma: unlimited or growing demand, and limited or 
declining resources. In the traditional space policymakers have few options: 
they can explore how to do more with less; they can provide fewer services 
or make a case to inject more resources. The range of possible solutions in the 
traditional space is narrower than it needs to be; however, if governments 
explore the possibilities of co-creation then many more options are possible. 
In the Danish case, the first step was to map out each process or stage step 
undertaken by potential users—those trying to qualify for the services. The 
mapping report found major problems and paradoxically argued that a citizen 
would have to be healthy to go through all the hoops that are required in order 
to qualify for a program that is aimed at supporting disabled people. It also 
found public servants themselves had to go through many loops to provide the 
services for people with disabilities. 
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Having done the client-mapping exercise and provided that to the stakeholder 
group, it was not hard to come up with better ways of doing things—a case 
of co-creation in practice. They tested various ideas and improvements and 
established they were working before they rolled them out nationally. They 
have evaluated the results from the first year, demonstrating that they have 
achieved better results with lower costs—an impressive achievement for a 
government operating under fiscal constraints. What is more impressive is that 
they have dramatically improved the satisfaction levels of their users. The Danes 
were prepared to test their ideas even if they could not establish direct causality 
between their proposals and the outcomes. They were prepared to experiment 
and explore co-creation because they believed they could come up with a better 
policy response.
Hence, public agencies have to be able to operate as experimentation platforms, 
which many of our agencies and departments have not been designed to do. 
They have neither the policies nor the infrastructure to facilitate that end. They 
are imbued in traditional ways of doing policy: undertaking research, devising 
policy options based on the best available knowledge, mapping out which 
options to take, and finally taking the option to a minister for a decision. These 
agencies generally do not have a safe space where policy workers can go and test 
ideas in practice or transform delivery processes, such as the Danish ‘MindLab’ 
initiative provides.
Good policy formulation depends on monitoring the implementation stages to 
examine whether the policy is achieving the intended result and/or becoming 
aware of unintended consequences. Hence, it is a more experimental and 
long-term process. We need to capture the implementation knowledge from 
stakeholders so we continue to improve the policy response—this gives 
policymakers a stronger adaptive capacity but also builds resilience. It builds 
resilience because it involves all stakeholders in a manner whereby they share 
responsibility for the result. And it develops a much more active relationship 
between government, users and beneficiaries.
Another possible connector is co-production. Co-creation of a solution by a 
group of diverse actors does not necessarily mean that government is obliged 
afterwards to co-produce the service with them. Co-creation and co-production 
could occur a long time apart and could involve different groups. In Bourgon 
(2011), there are many examples of co-production. Some are major undertakings 
and others are relatively minor. In Singapore a prison manager used co-
production to improve the successful reintegration of inmates. The manager 
reconceptualised the role of the prison, going from a focus on the agency’s 
narrow results (the safekeeping of the inmates), to asking where does the prison 
add value in system-wide or societal terms? Once the prison authorities began 
to consider how systemic and societal factors and a range of outside actors 
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affected results, they were better able to cooperate with these actors. In this case, 
mapping out individual prisoner’s circumstances prompted prison authorities 
and stakeholders to conclude that they had to change public opinion about the 
benefits of facilitating more effective reintegration of inmates into the community. 
This new approach made it possible for employers to feel comfortable in offering 
jobs to former inmates, which in turn increased the confidence of inmates, who 
believed they had gained a second chance and a way to gain skills and support 
themselves once released. It also made the families of inmates more confident in 
supporting the inmate while they were still incarcerated. Ultimately, this process 
created a long chain of shared responsibilities. It produced a collective effort to 
achieve the intended results, which no single actor could do on their own (not 
the prison system, the families, employers or the community). This example 
is now supported by evidence from 10 years of data. Much progress has been 
achieved over the 10 years in the successful reintegration of ex-offenders, and 
the reduction of recidivism.
The second example concerns the transfer of welfare payments to the 50 million 
poorest families in Brazil, many living in remote communities. Traditional 
programs alleviating poverty were run out of individual departments, which 
addressed various aspects of the problem such as education, family and health 
problems. All of these departments ran good programs, but were effectively siloed 
in their approaches. Each program addressed one aspect or one consequence of 
poverty: poor children not going to school because they are put in the labour 
force, high child mortality because of poor health, and lack of attention to 
women during pregnancy, among others. Each program had a long list of factors 
that contributed to their success. They were well managed, complied with all 
the requirements of central agencies in a traditional way, and reported back to 
Parliament. The only problem was that poverty was not decreasing. It is the irony 
of public administration that officials can sometimes comply with every legal 
and political requirement and miss the mark of a program’s intended purpose, 
which in this case was to reduce poverty. In Brazil’s case, program redesign 
involved integrating all the services, removing virtually all the conditionality of 
the programs, and empowering the head of the family to receive the money and 
use it in the manner felt to be most appropriate—a huge act of faith. The head 
of the family would become an active co-producer in the achievement of results.
Media coverage of the policy change was ferociously hostile: it portrayed 
considerable sums of money being given to people who ostensibly could not 
be trusted; it suggested the money would be used for alcohol, drugs and other 
antisocial purposes. It took the strength of President Lula da Silva to proclaim 
that the Government refused to design a program based on distrust, and his 
administration would fix any problems whenever they found them along 
the way. Three program evaluations have now been completed: one by the 
United Nations, one internal program review and another by the World Bank/
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International Monetary Fund (IMF). The program is now a source of inspiration 
to others in Latin America, even though it was challenged politically when 
it started. Furthermore, during the last election, every major Brazilian party 
publicly supported this as the best program they had to reduce poverty.
A third example involves the city of Charlotte in the US State of North 
Carolina, which reveals the potential for technology to enable self-organisation 
and to contribute to the adaptive capacity of society and build its resilience. 
Charlotte has a large, and therefore expensive, energy consumption footprint. 
The traditional approaches to manage energy usage by governments and their 
bureaucratic administrations involve taxation powers and pricing, legislation 
and regulation. Instead of adopting such traditional approaches, the Charlotte 
City Council forged an agreement with the owners of commercial buildings in 
the central part of the city to install large television screens in the foyers of these 
buildings that displayed to residents or workers up-to-the-minute information 
about the amount of energy being consumed by each building. Generally, these 
screens showed the energy consumption from the previous day and the previous 
week, and projected the present day’s energy consumption as a way of showing 
users of the building how their behaviour was changing energy usage. Based on 
the initial phases of this initiative, the managers of the project expect a 20 per 
cent reduction of energy consumption within the first year.
A similar, smaller example of the benefits of co-production using technology 
occurred in downtown London over attempts to reduce the number of accidents 
involving cyclists in the area. Instead of adopting a traditional policy route to 
identify the problem—that is, creating a committee, commissioning a study, 
submitting to a parliamentary committee, taking the recommendations and then 
shaping policy based on the final report—what the City of London council did 
was simply to issue regular public data about the location of cycling accidents 
downtown. The local cycling association did the rest. They created an app 
that provided up-to-the-minute advice to cyclists about dangerous routes, 
congestion, what to avoid and how to navigate. The results were remarkable and 
the number of cycling accidents has been reduced. In both of these examples, no 
law was created or changed, no subsidy was given, no new tax was imposed; yet 
noticeable results were achieved. Public administration was used intelligently 
to encourage people to pursue their individual interest in a manner that also 
enhanced the collective interest.
What has emerged from these examples is that co-production starts from the 
fundamental notion not only that a user or a beneficiary of a government service 
should be considered a ‘cost’ to government in the short-term, but also that 
in the longer term, with proper investment in co-produced programs, users 
can become real assets. Moreover, if these assets are put to productive use in 
society, the results of social programs demonstrably improve and end up costing 
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society less overall. A third finding from these processes has been the realisation 
that no country is rich enough not to put to productive use all available assets. 
Our experience with co-production processes has transformed our concept of 
service delivery: the responsibility for creating and achieving public results 
is not just a matter for government; it is a shared responsibility and requires a 
collective effort.
Significantly, new technologies have the potential to achieve an array of results in 
self-organisation and self-reliance. We have perhaps only just begun to explore 
the full potential of technology-enabled self-organisation. Governments could 
use these technologies to assist them to become ‘fit for the future’. Technology 
is potentially more powerful and more cost-effective than creating a new funded 
program. It can be more efficient and more instrumental in changing behaviour 
than legislating, without the burden of compliance and enforcement that 
legislated approaches entail. 
Conclusion
So, to conclude, resilience is ultimately a test of our capacity to adapt, to evolve 
and to prosper in a turbulent world. As I said at the beginning, resilience is not 
found in one place or in one format; indeed, paradoxically, the more despair and 
crises occur the better because resilience only develops through experience and 
learning. It is found in self-reliant individuals able to take charge of their future 
and solve problems. It is found in an innovative society able to shape emergent 
solutions to the complex problems of our time. It is found in relationships of 
trust and the social capital we accumulate over a long period. And it is in public 
institutions which are able to adapt to changing circumstances, because they are 
not fit for all time.
So, to paraphrase a famous quote, we cannot solve the problems we ourselves 
have created using the same thinking that was used when we created them. 
In this contribution, I tried to address the issue of what are the capacities of 
government administrations worldwide to give themselves different mental 
maps of our collective capacity, which in turn encourages more collective 
responsibility and inventive solutions to the constantly changing challenges of 
our complex post-industrial world. 
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5. Governing for the Future:  
What governments can do
Peter Ho (Hak Ean)
On 25 February 2003, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus 
entered Singapore through three women who had returned from Hong Kong 
with symptoms of atypical pneumonia. The virus then spread with frightening 
speed through the hospital system. It confounded our medical authorities in 
the beginning. They did not know how the virus spread and why it spread so 
aggressively. The fatality rate was shocking. By the time the SARS crisis was 
declared over in Singapore, 33 people had died of the 238 who had been infected.
‘Black Swans’
SARS was an unexpected ‘black swan’ for Singapore. Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
(2008) described a ‘black swan’ as a hard-to-predict event with a large impact. 
Indeed, it was a frightening time for Singapore. Overnight, visitor arrivals 
plunged and the entire tourism industry came to a grinding halt. SARS severely 
disrupted the Singaporean economy, leading to a contraction and a quarter-long 
recession that year. There are many lessons to be learnt from the SARS crisis 
of 2003, but I would like to highlight one, in order to set the context for my 
contribution to this volume of essays. It is that other ‘black swans’ will surprise 
us, time and again, as much if not more than SARS.
In recent years the world seems to have been beset by a succession of strategic 
shocks including the destruction of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 
2001, the financial and economic turbulence of 2008–09, the 2011 Japanese 
tsunami and nuclear meltdowns and the Eurozone crisis. I imagine the 
Christchurch earthquake of February 2011 was a ‘black swan’ for New Zealand. 
Furthermore, the frequency of such shocks seems to be increasing, and the 
amplitude of their impact appears to be growing. The question is why?
The Great Acceleration
From the middle of the twentieth century—a period sometimes called the 
‘Great Acceleration’—change has accelerated at a pace on a global scale that is 
unprecedented in history. Population growth has surged. Combined with rapid 
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urbanisation, it has generated enormous consumer demand. The effort to meet 
this demand through industrialisation and mass production has had a huge but 
unpredictable impact on the Earth’s ecosystem. Globalisation resulting from 
and combined with technological innovation has in turn accelerated change 
on all fronts—political, economic and social. Much of this change has followed 
unpredictable trajectories. The reason for this is ‘complexity’. 
Complexity
Complex is not the same as complicated. It is something very different. The 
natural world is complex. An engineering system like a machine or an aeroplane 
or a telecommunications satellite is merely complicated. Its inner workings 
may be hard for a layman to understand, but it is designed to perform certain 
predetermined functions that are repeatable. It embodies the Newtonian 
characteristics of predictable cause and effect.
In contrast, a complex system will not necessarily behave in a repeatable and 
predetermined manner. Cities are complex systems, as are human societies. The 
Earth’s ecology is also a complex system. Political systems are complex. Countries 
are complex. The world as a whole is complex and unordered. In all likelihood, a 
complicated world has not existed for a very long time—if it ever did.
The Great Acceleration has seen huge leaps forward in technology—in 
telecommunications, the Internet and transportation—leading to vastly increased 
trade and the movement of people around the world. But the connections and 
feedback loops resulting from the Great Acceleration have greatly increased 
complexity at the global level.
The ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu instinctively grasped the complex 
nature of the world we live in when he wrote in the Tao Te Ching (or The 
Way) that ‘everything is connected, and everything relates to each other’. But 
connections and interactions within a complex system are extremely difficult to 
detect, are inexplicable and emergent. Efforts to model complex systems, such 
as the Club of Rome’s famous model of economic and population growth, have 
not proved very useful. Unlike in a complicated system, the components of a 
complex system interact in ways that defy a deterministic, linear analysis. As 
a result, we are constantly surprised and shocked by ‘black swans’ and other 
unknown unknowns. 
Wicked Problems
Unfortunately, complexity not only generates ‘black swans’, but also gives rise to 
what the political scientist Horst Rittel (Rittel and Webber 1973) called ‘wicked 
problems’. Wicked problems have no immediate or obvious solutions. They are 
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large and intractable issues. They have causes and influencing factors that are 
not easily determined ex ante. They are highly complex problems because they 
contain many agents interacting with each other in often mystifying ways. They 
have many stakeholders who not only have different perspectives on the wicked 
problem, but also do not necessarily share the same goals.
Tackling one part of a wicked problem is more likely than not going to lead to 
new issues in other parts. Satisfying one stakeholder could well make the rest 
unhappy. A key challenge for governments is to move the many stakeholders 
towards a broad alignment of perspectives and goals; but this requires patience 
and a lot of skill in stakeholder engagement and consensus building.
Climate change is an example of a wicked problem at a global level. Pandemics 
are another. So are ageing populations in the developed world. Sustainable 
economic development, which is not unconnected to the triangular problem of 
food, water and energy security, is an enormous wicked problem.
In our increasingly interconnected and globalised world, such wicked problems 
do not manifest in a singular fashion. Their impact can and will be felt around 
the world, in many forms, and in many fields such as politics and economics, 
and in social and many other dimensions.
Retrospective Coherence
Complexity theory includes the concept of ‘retrospective coherence’. The 
current state of affairs always makes sense when we look backwards. The 
current problem is logical. But this is more than saying that there is wisdom 
in hindsight. It is only one of many patterns that could have formed, any one 
of which would have been equally logical. Simply because we can explain why 
the current state of affairs has arisen does not mean that we are operating in a 
complicated and knowable world.
While what we are today is the result of many decisions taken along the way, 
retrospective coherence says that in a complex system, even if we were to start 
again and make the same decisions, there is no certainty we would end up in 
the same situation. This is another way of saying that applying the lessons of 
history is not enough to guide us down the right path into the future.
Governments which do not understand retrospective coherence will often 
assume that the operating environment is merely complicated, not complex—
one in which cause and effect are linked such that the output can be determined 
from the input, in which one step leads predictably to the next. This is of course 
a dangerous assumption if the operating environment is complex.
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Governments and Complexity
When governments ignore the complexity of their operating environment, they 
are at risk of assuming that policies that succeeded in the past will continue 
to work well in the future. They will deal with wicked problems as if they are 
amenable to simple and deterministic policy prescriptions. The temptation to 
take this approach is understandable. It is easier, requires less resources and 
may actually lead to positive outcomes—but only in the short term; however, 
government policies that do not take complexity into account can, and often 
do, lead to unintended consequences, with a real danger of national failure in 
the long run.
Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that many governments will opt to take this 
path, out of political expediency, because of cognitive failures or simply because 
they lack understanding and the tools to deal with complexity. Governments 
which learn to manage complexity, and how to govern in a complex operating 
environment, will gain a competitive advantage over those which do not. But to 
manage complexity requires fundamental changes to the mindset, capabilities 
and organisation of government.
In his book Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World, 
Yaneer Bar-Yam writes that ‘the most basic issue for organisational success is 
correctly matching the system’s complexity to its environment’. This is another 
way of saying that the complexity of the government developing the policy 
should match the complexity of the system that will be affected by the policy.
Fighting a Network with a Network
Let me illustrate this with an example. On 7 December 2001, the Singaporean 
authorities announced the detention of several Singaporeans who were 
members of a previously unknown network of Islamic extremists, the pan-
South-East Asian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). JI had been plotting acts of mass terror 
against several targets in Singapore. Singaporeans were preparing to kill fellow 
Singaporeans in pursuit of demented ideological goals.
This was the ‘black swan’ for Singapore that literally overnight produced a 
wicked problem for the Government: how to deal with the threat posed by 
extremists who were part of a larger South-East Asian network, and who lived 
and worked within the community, like ordinary Singaporeans.
Someone told me in those uncertain days that you needed a network to fight a 
network. It was a profound observation that implicitly acknowledged that JI, as 
a sprawling, multilayered network, was a complex organisation.
5 . Governing for the Future
61
Our response, in terms of both organisation and policy, had to match JI’s 
complexity. It was not possible to destroy the JI network by just hunting down 
the leadership and decapitating it. To do so would be to deny JI’s essentially 
complex nature.
Singapore took a whole-of-government—perhaps even a whole-of-nation—
approach to the threat posed by JI. The traditional approach—of delineating 
the boundaries between agencies, so each would be responsible for a particular 
area—clearly would not work. No government agency had the full range of 
competencies or capabilities to deal completely with this complex threat.
Rather than go the American way by creating our own Department of Homeland 
Security, we decided a better way would be to strengthen coordination and 
integration among government agencies. We leveraged on the diverse strengths 
of existing agencies. This meant coordinating the counterterrorism efforts of line 
agencies and ministries at the operational level, while integrating strategy and 
policy at the whole-of-government level. This approach meant we would only 
have a small but active centre, the National Security Coordination Secretariat, 
with the capacity to drive the strategic national agenda in counterterrorism, but 
which would not interfere with the accountabilities of each agency. 
So, many agencies were included at different levels from the security, economic 
and social sectors. Community groups and leaders were activated to manage 
potential frictions and manage communal sensitivities. In the beginning, it was 
a real challenge. The non-security agencies felt that this was a matter to be dealt 
with by the security agencies. The security agencies in turn felt that their turf 
was being trampled on.
Whole-of-Government
Now, looking back, this whole-of-government approach had a compelling 
logic. A complex and multilayered network of government agencies and 
non-governmental organisations had been created. The policies that were 
implemented were complex—both defensive and offensive, employing both 
hard and soft powers. We established a complex system to deal with a complex 
situation. It is an approach the Singaporean Government has since applied to 
other wicked problems like population and climate change.
Governments will need to consider how they should be organised to deal with 
black swans, unknown unknowns and the wicked problems that complexity 
generates. Creating new departments to deal with new wicked problems can 
be wasteful and ultimately ineffective if these creations do not contain enough 
organisational complexity.
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Developing policies and plans to deal with such wicked problems requires the 
integration of diverse insights, experience and expertise. People from different 
organisations, both from within and outside government, have to come together 
to pool their knowledge in order to discover potential solutions. Cooperative 
mechanisms need to be set up to enable the sharing of information and to 
strengthen collective action.
The whole-of-government approach injects diversity and complexity into the 
policy process. It recognises that in complex situations, and when dealing with 
wicked problems, insight and good ideas are not the monopoly of single agencies 
or of government acting alone. It strikes a balance between the strength and 
stability of the formal vertical government structure and the diversity of forms 
of different perspectives and solutions derived from a larger and more varied 
horizontal network of government and national resources.
While the whole-of-government approach may be an imperative, it is not 
easily achieved. Governments, like any large hierarchical organisation, tend to 
optimise at the departmental level rather than at the whole-of-government level.
In a hierarchy, the leader at the top receives all the information and makes the 
decisions; but, under stress, hierarchies can be unresponsive—even dangerously 
dysfunctional—because in reality decision-making bottlenecks exist at the top.
Complexity stresses hierarchies. The world that governments operate in 
today is too complex and too fast changing for the people at the top to have 
the full expertise and all the answers to call all the shots. Therefore, vertical 
silos need to be broken down, so information can flow horizontally to reach 
other departments. It is not ‘need to know’ but knowing enough so that each 
component of the larger organisation can respond to issues and challenges as 
they arise. An environment that encourages the spontaneous horizontal flow of 
information will enlarge and enrich the world view of all departments. This in 
turn improves the chances that connections hidden by complexity, as well as 
emergent challenges and opportunities, are discovered early.
‘Auftragstaktik’ (Mission Command Tactics)
The German military adopted with great success (at least at the operational level) 
a concept of military command called auftragstaktik (‘mission-type tactics’). It 
was a philosophy of command that acknowledged the complexity and the chaos 
of war. 
In auftragstaktik, even the most junior officers were empowered to make 
decisions on the spot, because they had a better and more direct feel for the 
situation on the ground. It meant that down the line, every officer had to 
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understand not just the orders, but also the intent of the mission. In turn he 
was empowered to make decisions to adjust to the situation as he judged it, in 
order to better fulfil the intent of the mission.
Whole-of-government implicitly contains the central idea of auftragstaktik, 
which is that in complexity it is not possible for everything to be centrally 
directed. Not unlike auftragstaktik, whole-of-government depends critically 
on people at all levels understanding how their roles fit in with the larger 
national aims and objectives. Agencies must have a strong sense and a shared 
understanding of the challenges the nation faces, and the underlying principles 
to guide responses. Then it depends on the good sense of each agency to ensure 
its own plans and policies are aligned with the national imperatives, to the point 
that they instinctively react to threats and opportunities as they arise, knowing 
that what they do will advance the larger national, rather than departmental, 
interests.
Whole-of-government is a holy grail. In countries like Singapore, it remains very 
much a work in progress. It requires emphasis, support and constant attention 
from the top.
Dealing with Cognitive Biases
There is another challenge to governments in complex situations, as was evident 
in the April 2010 eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull. When a 
huge cloud of volcanic dust started to spread over Europe, air-traffic authorities 
grounded thousands of aircraft as a safety precaution. Europe was almost 
paralysed. It caused travel chaos around the world and disrupted global supply 
chains for weeks.
We know volcanoes erupt from time to time. We also know it is risky to fly 
through volcanic ash clouds. Yet why, despite this knowledge, was the world so 
surprised by and unprepared for the impact of this eruption?
First, although the risk of eruption is known, it is very difficult to assess its 
probability of occurrence. Behavioural economists point out that we underrate 
the probability of an event when it has not happened recently and overrate the 
probability of an event when it has. As a result of this cognitive bias, the risk of 
an eruption was underrated in this case, as Eyjafjallajökull had been quiescent 
for a long time.
Second, the effect of the eruption on aircraft flights was the result of complex 
interconnectivities and was therefore highly unpredictable. When the volcano 
erupted, aviation authorities depended on the predictions of analytical models 
and reacted with caution by shutting down all flights. But as the commercial 
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impact grew, the industry began to question the reliability of these models and 
proposed doing experimental flights to probe whether it was safe to fly. In the 
event, the experimental flights proved to be a better indicator for action than 
reliance on the models. This is a clear demonstration of the value of exploration 
and experimentation when we are confronted with complex phenomena instead 
of depending only on the predictions of analytical models.
Cognitive bias and the extreme difficulty of estimating the cumulative effects of 
complex events make preparing for unforeseen situations an exercise fraught 
with difficulty. It also adds to the challenges of governments operating in 
complex situations.
Managing Complexity
In such a complex operating environment, governments should be adaptive 
and able to navigate situations characterised by emergence, multi-causality and 
ambiguity, as they were during the eruption of the Icelandic volcano.
Governments often have to make big decisions, and develop plans and policies, 
under conditions of incomplete information and uncertain outcomes. It is not 
possible to prepare exhaustively for every contingency. Instead, a ‘search and 
discover’ approach should be adopted. The deployment of experimental flights 
to check out the real risk of flying into a cloud of volcanic ash exemplifies this 
approach. The military calls this approach the ‘OODA’ (observe, orientate, decide, 
act) loop, which is a recurring cycle of decision-making that acknowledges and 
exploits the uncertainty and complexity of the battlefield.
Scenario planning is a linear method of carrying out the OODA loop, in the 
sense that it projects futures based on our understanding of the operating 
environment today. Used intelligently, it can be a very important tool for 
planning, and can help overcome cognitive biases by challenging our mental 
models. But it is insufficient in a complex, unordered environment. 
Nonlinear methods should be part of the government complexity toolbox. They 
include back-casting, policy gaming (which is akin to military war-gaming, but 
applied to the civilian policy context to condition policymakers to complex 
and uncertain situations, and to help them confront their cognitive biases) and 
horizon scanning (which is the process of detecting emerging trends, threats 
and opportunities). 
Governments must also be able to manage the risk that is a natural result of 
operating in complexity. There will always be threats to national outcomes, 
policies and plans, because no amount of analysis and forward planning will 
eliminate the volatility and uncertainty that exist in a complex world. These 
threats constitute strategic risk.
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There is, however, little by way of best practice to address systematically or 
ameliorate the threats to national goals that these risks pose. In Singapore, the 
Government is developing a unique Whole-of-Government Integrated Risk 
Management (WOG-IRM) framework—a governance chain that begins with risk 
identification and assessment at the strategic level to monitor risk indicators 
and, finally, to resource mobilisation and behavioural changes to prepare for 
each anticipated risk. WOG-IRM also plays an imperfect but important role 
in discovering the interconnections among risk factors. This in turn helps to 
reduce some of the complexity. The WOG-IRM framework is a work in progress, 
and we have started using it for strategic conversations on risks that occur at the 
whole-of-government level.
Organising in Complexity
The WOG-IRM framework is also critical to building resilience, which is the 
ability to cope with strategic shock by adapting to, or even transforming with, 
rapid and turbulent change. Resilience ought to be a key characteristic of 
governments that operate effectively in a complex environment.
Resilient governments must go beyond an emphasis on efficiency. Lean systems 
that focus exclusively on efficiency are unlikely to have sufficient resources to 
deal with unexpected shocks and volatility, while also having the bandwidth to 
make plans for an uncertain future filled with wicked problems.
This is not an argument for establishing bloated and sluggish bureaucracies; but 
it is important for resilient governments to have a small but dedicated group of 
people to think about the future. The skill sets needed are different from those 
required to deal with short-term volatility and crisis. Both are important. But 
those charged with thinking about the future systematically should be allocated 
the bandwidth to focus on the long term without becoming bogged down in 
day-to-day routine. They will become repositories of patterns that can be used 
to facilitate decision-making, to prepare for unknown unknowns, and perhaps 
to conduct policy experiments through policy gaming or other simulations.
To this end, the Singaporean Government set up the Centre for Strategic 
Futures (CSF) a couple of years ago. It is a think tank which promotes a whole-
of-government approach to strategic planning and decision-making. It works 
on leading-edge concepts like WOG-IRM and resilience. It promotes fresh 
approaches like policy gaming for dealing with complexity. It encourages 
experiments with new computer-based tools and sense-making methods to 
improve horizon scanning. Although a small outfit, the CSF is a catalyst for 
strategic change in the government and its agencies.
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Conclusion
The future promises ever more complexity, carrying in its train more black 
swans and unknown unknowns. Governments must learn how to operate and 
even thrive in this complexity, and to deal confidently with strategic shocks 
when they occur. The first step is to acknowledge the inherent complexity 
of the operating environment. Then they should consider the imperative of a 
whole-of-government approach, and the adoption of new nonlinear tools for 
managing complexity and strategic risk. These will not eliminate shocks. But 
by improving the ability to anticipate such shocks, governments might actually 
reduce their frequency and impact. In turn this will help make governments 
and nations more resilient as their leaders govern for the future.
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6. Do Governments Suffer from 
Political Myopia: What is the problem 
and what can be done about it?
Robyn Kruk and the Honourable Sir Michael Cullen
Robyn Kruk
The former US President Bill Clinton was fond of saying that he was always an 
optimistic, ‘glass half-full’ person, because he took pessimism to be an excuse 
for inaction. And while I occasionally express cynicism about governments 
and ministers, I am generally positive about ongoing change and the need for 
change, but also realistic about the challenge of the task.
I speculate that I was probably asked to address this topic because I have run 
the NSW health agency (Australia’s largest) and both the State and national 
environment agencies. In the health agency, State treasury officials too often 
considered me the cause of their deficit problems and said if I could only get 
the budget in order there would be no problems across the rest of the State 
budget. Alternatively, when I was an environment head it was the ‘green tape’ 
introduced by the agency that was allegedly responsible for the poor state of 
accounts of the country. So both agencies always considered themselves very 
much the ‘Nigel no-friends’ of the Government. Ironically enough, the tenures 
of CEOs in my position are usually among the shortest in government. The 
average length of tenure of a health CEO is approximately 18 months. The only 
tenure shorter is that of health ministers. In the five years I was the CEO of NSW 
Health I worked with three ministers and all were convinced or had suspicions 
that their appointments were the result of a plot within their own party to 
knock them over. It was a similar story in the environment area. 
So, my starting point for this chapter is: to what extent is political myopia a 
systemic problem and what can be done about it? I wish to begin by questioning 
the suggestion that political myopia is something new and has arisen only 
because of the Global Financial Crisis, and that the myopia problem and lack of 
foresight are linked only to the public sector. I would contend that both of these 
are misconceptions.
The policy sectors of health and environment are interesting because they tend 
to have boom and bust cycles. Both are areas that people care about significantly 
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and are among the top issues that come up as being matters of public concern; 
certainly health comes up normally in the top two or three, while the environment 
ranks normally in the top six, although that can vary depending on economic 
circumstances. They are also policy sectors where political parties tend to seek 
to differentiate their product. Both may rely on great technical complexity 
for their arguments. Both are areas that attract very broad interest and have 
been subject to deliberate media campaigns that seek to sway public opinion. 
Whether it is a story about what damage has been done in the health system or 
an environmental issue, both are very prominent in media circles.
Environment budgets have been taking an absolute battering in recent times, 
even in Canada and Australia, which have had relatively robust balance sheets. 
Both health and the environment tend to vacillate, with periods of cuts and 
austerity followed by systemic failures, scandals and inquiries, which then 
subsequently lead to injections of significant capital.
So, is political myopia a problem? Yes it is. Is it unique to government? I believe 
strongly it is not. Is it a new phenomenon? Again, no. And it is not solely the 
fault or responsibility of politicians. Foresightedness is difficult to achieve; so I 
want to mention some of the experiences that have worked for me in my various 
roles in government.
When studying public policy it is often said that if people do not care about 
an issue then politicians do not need to care either. But I have already argued 
people care for both health and the environment and there are plenty of 
quantitative studies to support that contention—so why do we find political 
myopia in these instances and how can we seek to future-proof their budgetary 
requests? Clearly the public’s expectations are high in these policy areas and I 
would say that certain forms of myopia have developed precisely because those 
expectations have not been successfully dampened.
For instance, I recall a former NSW treasurer who used to open the budget 
committee every time the health minister and I appeared, by saying, ‘I’m short, 
fat, bald and ugly and what’s the government going to do about it? Oh, here 
are the health officials.’ That statement concisely encapsulated a whole range of 
challenging health budget issues, including expectations about a nanny state 
or the very deliberate promulgation of the latest medical advances and latest 
medical technology. It included the belief that one can live forever, one can look 
forever youthful, that there is a silver bullet for every disease or malady. Those 
expectations have not been dampened. In fact they are actively promulgated in 
commercial and social media. So is there a form of myopia attributable to those 
expectations? Yes, I believe so, but we probably all share in those expectations 
and help create them.
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The related issue to address is the question of what assists to perpetuate those 
expectations. One of the things that troubled me most as health CEO was that 
despite the fact that health was one of the few agencies to receive additional 
monies, the growth in demand meant it was still operating in a structural deficit 
at any point in time. But the expectation created in the community was that 
health was getting new money and additional services would be provided, 
and there would be no cutbacks in services. Hence, one of the key issues in 
expectation management was that many budget announcements and political 
processes actually stoked the expectation that there was additional money. That, 
in effect, fed what we used to call in the health area the ‘a-ort-a syndrome’: ‘they 
(the government) ought to do something about that.’
That was probably the biggest issue that beset us most frequently in the 
media. And it was hardest to counter if there had been massive build-up of 
expectation because new monies were apparently being provided. Accordingly, 
I would suggest first that it is easier in many ways to initiate reform, lead service 
configuration changes and lead policy changes where there is an overwhelming 
perception that there is a climate of austerity and the facts support the view. 
The most difficult situations I have had in terms of future-proofing budgets 
and making them sustainable are where changes are made without knowing 
the impact or giving any consideration to the likely impact. Across-the-board 
budget saving targets are illustrative.
The second issue that perpetuates some of the difficulty in future-proofing a 
budget is where policy proposals are devised and initially introduced to the 
community in the form of green or white papers. These are all too often silent 
on the proposed source of funds. Yet, if word gets out, it is normally reported 
in the media that the initiative is already being introduced, whereas in reality it 
has merely been floated as an idea in the traditional Westminster bidding mode 
of cabinet. The process, in effect, increases the risk of a ‘run on the bank’; it 
increases the public’s expectations, and thereby makes a long-sighted approach 
far more difficult.
The third issue is that when treasurers make budget announcements, the tendency 
has increasingly been to announce only the increases in expenditure—which 
may in fact most often be funded by offsets or redirected monies or reinvestments 
from other areas. Yet in making those new funding announcements, treasurers 
neglect to announce the areas from whence the funds are being redirected. So 
people again are given the expectation that there is additional money.
The final point—one I notice is shared with Canadian and British colleagues—
is that there is supposedly a move to provide greater flexibility to directors-
general. Yet directors-general (or CEOs or departmental secretaries, whatever 
the title) are provided with fiscal discipline targets accompanied normally with 
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some quite stringent and counterintuitive directives such as: ‘There will be no 
loss of frontline staff; there will be no closure of services; there will be no bad 
media in my patch. If you get some negative media in my colleagues’ patches, 
that is a bonus.’ Some tight strictures are issued in terms of how the cuts may 
actually be manifested. These are the types of issues that I would describe as the 
challenges I faced in future-proofing budgets, and I am sure many others have 
faced similar ones.
Health has traditionally been somewhat quarantined from cuts because there 
have regularly been some additional monies provided, but to future-proof 
health the equation arguably needs to be changed. Some funding mechanisms or 
payment regimes can have the perverse effect of driving demand. For example, 
a ‘fee for service’ focus rather than an ‘episode of care’ focus has fundamental 
impacts for future health budgets and health outcomes more generally. We 
need to ask how the incentives and funding regimes for new activity are to be 
structured, whether through direct government funding (including transfers 
between the Commonwealth and the States), through co-payments from patients 
to physicians or on the achievement of health outcomes—or to challenge 
expectations that we can all live beautifully forever.
In my health budgets only 2 per cent was directed towards preventative health 
measures while 98 per cent was directed towards chronic and acute services—a 
major imbalance and a poor long-term investment scenario. If we want to ensure 
health expenditures are sustainable and future-proof the policy sector then we 
need to divert money from the acute machinery into the preventative area. Is this 
a feasible long-term strategy? I would argue that it is but readily acknowledge 
that it is not without significant political challenges. I will suggest five things 
that will help make these long-term changes.
First, we need to institutionalise foresighted reporting. In Australia, Ken Henry, 
the former treasury secretary, released a series of seminal intergenerational 
reports that actually encouraged long-term thinking and debate. They put risks 
and opportunities on the policy agenda and have become a major resource for 
the public sector, for industry and also for the media. 
Second, transparent reporting is needed. In my areas of work, some of the most 
incredibly powerful, well-orchestrated interest groups in the climate change 
area and in the health technology area are well cashed to push a particular 
argument to make life quite difficult for ministers or governments. 
In the health sector, the move that made the most significant changes in my 
experience was the creation of a statutorily based, transparently focused 
and independent reporting function—one that is separate from the health 
administration system. The issues need to be reported on independently, 
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regularly and accessibly and be less vulnerable to mistranslation or a bipartisan 
presentation. Such reporting needs to be robust throughout government. We 
take for granted that the Australian Bureau of Statistics reports on the economic 
wellbeing of the country, including social and mental wellbeing. While it is 
sensible to have the accounts of the country pick up the people issues and 
look at the effects on resource use and exploitation, such reporting needs to be 
hardwired into government to make them the backdrop to discussions. 
Third, in terms of the quality and integrity of health services, most health 
systems have now moved to transparent reporting of so-called avoidable events 
that impact on patient safety; however, this was not always the case. The most 
difficult issues that the health minister faced day-by-day were often perpetuated 
by a pattern of not releasing quality and safety data. By totally shifting our 
focus and instituting an independent, regular reporting structure on how many 
people were damaged, injured or subjected to avoidable, adverse events the 
game changed significantly and the information provided was considered to be 
more reliable. That is not to say that this transparency did not put considerable 
pressure on the health minister. I remember after the first such report I said to 
him, ‘You have to go out tomorrow and say, “This number of people have died or 
been seriously injured in the health system”, but then you have to say “We’ve 
also underestimated that number”.’ The minister said, ‘You have to be joking!’ 
The issue was that this reporting introduced a transparency in the health system 
and totally changed the nature of the debate in the media. It provided an insight 
into health care that was more complex than an argument about dollars, which 
always suggests a simple, short-term fix or solution is possible. 
In relation to the media some political circles are lagging behind the population. 
The next generation of voters does not read newspapers, but politicians still 
respond to the Daily Telegraph as if it presents the facts. Actually, the NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, which is part of the NSW Attorney-
General’s Department, is considered one of the most credible and accepted 
resources in relation to true crime statistics, yet, because it is not a newspaper, 
its data remain unread, unknown and largely ignored. So it is necessary to 
hardwire some of the hard research data into the policy backdrop.
Furthermore, citizens show no greater trust of bureaucrats than they do of 
politicians. There is suspicion of officials and their motivations. For instance, I 
could have far more influence in the health debates and in the media by getting 
some clinicians in white coats to present an argument than I ever could by 
making a statement. Pick the right people to proffer your debates. A minister 
fronting the media in relation to a patient safety event immediately politicised 
the issue and guaranteed ongoing and ill-informed press. If a doctor addressed 
the issue and acknowledged ‘this is terrible, I can relate to it personally, it is 
not acceptable’, the issue would die quickly in the 24-hour media cycle. So it 
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is also a matter of being a bit more responsive in the bureaucracy to looking at 
an active role in ‘issues management’ as opposed to having politicians always 
fronting up and then being surprised when they basically roll over.
Fourth, recognise that the bureaucracy has a significant role and one highly 
dependent on both political and public trust. Hilary Mantel’s 2009 book Wolf 
Hall presents an interesting insight into the historical relationship between the 
government and the bureaucracy and I encourage you to read it. It concerns 
the relationship between Henry VIII and Sir Thomas Cromwell. It looks at the 
politics of the royal court, but an underpinning sentiment is the importance of 
trust in the relationship with the bureaucracy.
Members of the bureaucracy have devoted their careers to understanding 
some of the most complex matters and putting forth proposals to future-
proof the department. It is important always to be aware of what is within 
the department’s control and what can be done to promulgate a change in the 
public debate and the potential impact on political capital for the minister or 
government. Westminster bureaucrats too often think it is for the minister alone 
to promulgate the case for change and to play the so-called long game at the 
cost of short-term gains. If I relied on a minister to promulgate the case for 
change it would not have occurred in many instances. Future-proofing budgets 
is ultimately a shared responsibility. Similarly, it would be naive to expect a 
minister to risk sacrificing their career on the basis of bureaucratic advice alone 
without an appreciation of the potential support or criticism for a less myopic 
view. The issue of trust in this situation is quite significant.
The final thing that will reduce myopia is that the line between so-called political 
research and public sector policy research has become greyer—particularly in 
relation to social research. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The investigatory 
work we did in both health and the environment to get a better understanding of 
the fundamental issues that concerned the community, and to use it as a proper 
basis for engagement with the community, was significant in introducing some 
long-sighted strategies the health area needed. Now, those policy challenges 
do not disappear. They are qualitatively different from instantaneous political 
polling of opinions, but it meant that we had to maintain a capacity with health 
to undertake matters that were separate from managing the issue of the day. 
This allowed the department to separate the fact that people needed to have 
long-sighted strategies as their primary focus and that managers needed to 
make decisions about the priority of those people over and above some strictly 
organisational functions. 
In summing up, the whole narrative of austerity makes future-proofing budgets 
a lot easier largely because of the potential impact on public expectations. 
Governments and bureaucracies have developed a holistic focus, and share a 
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common language and a level of understanding and awareness about some of 
the difficulties we face; however, transparency and independent reporting are 
critical even though the organisations that do them may become the subject 
of cuts, too. In the United Kingdom there were reported cuts to their Office 
for National Statistics and to their Office for Budget Responsibility. Areas that 
were clearly given the task of reporting honestly on the situation were in many 
instances having to report bad news. It shows inversely the critical importance 
of those agencies. 
The Honourable Sir Michael Cullen
One of my former Labour colleagues, Mike Moore, would sometimes pose 
a question when we were getting carried away, saying rhetorically, ‘What’s 
posterity done for me?’ That’s a question politicians can ask themselves in many 
respects. It is a question that may suggest why we descend into a kind of myopia 
about what governments can be expected to deliver. But it also implies that the 
core problem is simply related to ‘elected governments’ when the root problem 
probably lies much deeper than that. By that I mean the case can be made that 
politics and governments tend to deal in the short term and struggle to come to 
grips with the long term, but that phenomenon is not confined to, or even most 
evident among, politicians. In fact, politicians who try to deal with long-term 
issues nearly always find themselves in conflict with pressure groups which 
benefit from the status quo and with a largely uninterested public—especially if 
there are more immediate pressures vying for attention, such as economic ones. 
And when don’t such pressures loom large for the ordinary person?
I would like to make two preliminary points. Above all, politicians now face a 
media whose interest barely extends beyond the immediate news cycle, which 
is roughly one hour. Media comment is seldom around the inherent value of 
policies. In many cases it is often hard to find out what the policy is from media 
coverage because its comment is usually about how the policy is going to be 
received by the public, not about what it is and to what extent it has neutered 
the opposition. 
The media’s underlying assumption with any long-term announcement is that 
it is intended to be a diversion from immediate issues; and in any case those 
making the announcement cannot be made accountable for the outcome because 
they will not be there when the outcome occurs or does not occur. Those are the 
attitudes found among the quality end of the media; but there is also a world 
called ‘talkback radio’, which cynically trivialises everything or demands 
instant gratification.
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In other words, it is a little unreasonable in a world of instant comments and 
pervasive cynicism to expect that politicians will be the one group focused 
on the long term—and that they should do what is considered right, take the 
electoral consequences and disappear into the holy glow of a grateful future. 
This ignores reality. All too often what that actually means is their political 
opponents are elected, they then overturn the policies, and, worst of all, your 
own former colleagues abandon these same policy principles because it makes 
them unelectable. That is what is likely to happen over carbon taxation at the 
2013 Australian election.
The other preliminary point to make is: I question the assumption that democratic 
governments are particularly prone to systematic ‘short-termism’. I see not the 
slightest evidence of that in relation to the big questions such as climate change, 
demographic transformation, ecological diversity, indigenous rights, economic 
sustainability or any other planet-saving issue. It would be very hard to argue 
that non-democracies are generally doing better than democratic societies in 
that regard. Rather the evidence tends to point in the opposite direction. China 
is now the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world and, no doubt, India 
will soon follow behind. In so far as democracies tend to be more polluting 
societies, that is simply because they are richer societies.
In democracies there is some evidence that where the electorate’s attitudes are 
based more on rational principles and display greater international awareness 
they also tend to be more open to policies that help future-proofing. And 
that may just be a rather ponderous tautology. The real knotty problem about 
democracy and the prospects for future-proofing is that there is often an 
inherent contradiction between the two. Let me illustrate that with a vivid 
example, which you may appreciate more than some of the audiences ever did 
in my previous job as New Zealand’s finance minister. 
For much of the past 30 years New Zealand’s purist classical liberals and their 
political associates have been trying to use legislation to prevent a social-
democratic government adopting fiscal policies consistent with its principles. 
And that was pretty much the stated purpose of the author of New Zealand’s 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994: it was meant to lock in the conservative policies 
of the then minister of finance in New Zealand for the long term.
Treasury prevented such an outrage against democracy by ensuring that 
once the rhetoric was stripped away, the Act was in fact basically about more 
openness in fiscal intentions. As such it has proved very useful and I was able to 
incorporate it into the Public Finance Act with some amendments.
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The fact is that in democracies the people must be allowed to decide and get 
it right or wrong, or there is no democracy. Obviously, New Zealand Labour 
believes the people got it wrong in 2008 at the election that removed the Clark 
Government but there was no appeal against that judgment.
Such statements about parliamentary sovereignty need qualification in a 
number of ways, not least in relation to fundamental human rights. There are 
things that should not be subject to temporary passing majorities. The search 
for legislative or judicial bulwarks against bad judgment is not just a futile but 
also a profoundly elitist agenda and one for which the left is just as culpable as 
the right on occasions.
Let me not be misunderstood. I am not arguing for a passive acceptance of 
the failure to address the kinds of issues to which I have referred. The current 
weakness of international action on climate change is a clear case of collective 
pusillanimity in the face of a real common danger where defined and obvious 
solutions are conceivable and available. Not quite as bad is the fact that, so far, 
international finance capitalism has emerged from the Global Financial Crisis 
practically unscathed, having successfully socialised the cost of its failures, 
greed and incompetence, at a terrible cost to present and future generations; 
and indeed some are now trying to find ways to blame governments for the 
problem rather than the real authors of it.
So it will be no surprise that my argument is that what can be done that is both 
effective and consistent with democratic processes is relatively limited and may 
be far from sufficient to achieve a refocusing on the long-term big issues. And 
that refocusing will only come about when there is a sufficient groundswell 
of public support for it. The challenge is how best to assist in framing public 
understanding in a way that may generate that support. That is the real challenge 
to be faced.
The first part of the answer is to do better what we do already. Following up on 
one of Robyn Kruk’s points, that means, for example, continuing to increase the 
level of openness about what the government has decided, how they did it and 
why they did it, and extending that to what the government is doing at present. 
It means generating more open and informed debate about the underlying 
principles and realities. In other words, increasing public understanding of 
what the relevant factors are in decision-making may assist in support for better 
decision-making. The one caveat to bear in mind, however, is that unfortunately 
the media tends to sensationalise any discussion about options. That tends to 
lead to foreclosing the options immediately as politicians run to the corner of 
safety, saying: ‘No, we’ve ruled that out because of course if we don’t all hell is 
going to break loose.’ I get quite amused, I must say, when I read the rewriting 
of history on New Zealand’s Foreshore and Seabed Act, which completely misses 
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the way the media reaction to the court decision constrained almost entirely the 
options open to the government of the day in dealing with that issue. We have 
now arrived at a happier place in that regard.
Alongside that greater openness runs a stronger emphasis on articulating the 
long-term fiscal framework and pressures. New Zealand has already been in the 
forefront, having pioneered some of these exercises already. At present Treasury 
is working with a number of us towards the new long-term fiscal framework 
commencing probably next year. But here again we need a more responsible 
approach by the media in not sensationalising the outcomes of such information 
provision; otherwise it becomes counterproductive. 
The third way of framing public understanding to strengthen support for 
longer-term issues in public policy is to adopt a range of measures of social 
and economic performance that encourage long-term thinking. It is now well 
established that the primary measure we use, gross domestic product (GDP), 
encourages resource depletion rather than sustainability and encourages energy 
production and consumption rather than efficiency and conservation. It would 
be fascinating using such different measures to compare Australia’s GDP with 
New Zealand’s GDP, given the degree to which Australia depends upon resource 
depletion. A broader national accounting system may give quite a different 
picture about the comparison of the two countries and the trends over the past 
20 or 30 years. Helping people understand that we are consuming our future at 
an unsustainable rate may assist in support for the kind of paradigm shift the 
world needs.
The fourth is to create, or recreate in New Zealand’s case, an institution with 
power to engage in long-term future thinking across the board and to collaborate 
with like-minded institutions in this area. And rather than sitting in splendid 
but weak isolation, and therefore likely to be staffed by people favourable to 
whatever the current government’s general philosophy is, such a body should 
be hosted in one or more of our universities. In particular, it would be a useful 
counter to the number of bodies which push short-term growth agendas with 
no sustainable long-term considerations. There is no countervailing influence, 
certainly in New Zealand, at the present time, in that regard. 
As a final suggestion, I would argue we are well overdue for a full review of 
commercial legislation, accounting principles and the like to see how the current 
regimes favour ‘short-termism’ and how they could be changed to provide a 
better focus upon the long term. It is not just a matter of detail—for example, 
we are now required to have quarterly profit reporting in the public sector, 
which sees agencies focus upon every quarter’s profit rather than a longer-term 
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picture. But the whole mindset that underlies the way we approach these issues 
in the commercial sector suggests you will probably find at least as much short-
term thinking as you will find in the political sector in societies such as ours.
Recently, I had a debate with Treasury. The standard measure of labour 
productivity calculates the output per worker employed. That sounds 
sensible. The problem is that if you have a strongly growing economy, where 
unemployment is dropping, average labour productivity falls. It looks as though 
you are doing worse economically. Logically, in an economy where workers are 
laid off and mass unemployment is rising, labour productivity numbers will 
go up as a consequence. So in fact if you were to measure labour productivity 
by the output per person in the whole workforce, as opposed to merely those 
in employment, you might get a better statistic on which to base decisions. If 
you have to make a choice between 100 per cent being employed with, say, a 
90 per cent productivity rate and a 90 per cent employment and 100 per cent 
productivity rate, the only reason we would choose the latter rate is because 
Australia, with its higher wages, is sitting opposite us and takes our people. On 
any rational grounds you would choose the 100 per cent employment option. 
Socially it is a far better outcome than having 10 per cent unemployment. It is 
not a stupid example because many European countries were stuck before the 
Global Financial Crisis with high levels of unemployment, but apparently high 
productivity levels. That is not a socially desirable outcome.
That brings it back, then, to my earlier point: ‘short-termism’ is not a unique 
feature confined to politics and is not even at its worst amongst politicians. 
Politicians are doing what they are meant to do. They are responding to public 
demand and to the rewards that are available to them in that regard. If there is 
no reward for thinking long term then politicians are much less likely to do so. 
I know it comes as a terrible shock to some people, but when you are actually 
in government you want to get re-elected to government. Politicians do not see 
their role in life as being to hand over to opponents on some sort of rotating-
turn principle of who should be actually governing the country.
‘Short-termism’, however, is also evident among the general population in many 
countries. I do not know how many long-term issues most people can grasp 
at once and deal with, because when they start adding them up they become 
overwhelming. People say, ‘We’re going to get old; we won’t be able to afford 
health care; we can’t afford the pension; and in any case if you live less than two 
metres above sea level you will be in deep trouble if you’re going to live more 
than another 10 years’, and so on. And for resigned escapists who decry the 
real world, they think: ‘Well, so what?’ People quickly retreat into a kind of 
short-term nihilism if they are faced with too many protracted long-term issues 
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presented in a way in which there are no simple solutions. The terrible thing is 
that in most of these areas there are actually relatively simple solutions if we can 
get the debate framed in an intelligent fashion.
At heart I believe the real challenge is to convince a sufficiently large number 
of people that our patterns of behaviour must change. But do not confuse this 
with the notion that I am preaching a gospel of ‘sackcloth and ashes’ and making 
people feel guilty about the relatively modest affluence most enjoy in our societies 
at present. All too often radical green groups in particular fail to realise the need 
for an approach that is people-friendly and prosperity-friendly. Selling the idea 
to people that we are going to become worse off, or that a shrinking pie will 
be more equally divided up, is a heroic political enterprise that is not capable 
of fulfilment in a democratic society. Behavioural change is the most important 
challenge to be met but we have barely begun the task of doing so at present.
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7. Policy Disasters Waiting to 
Happen: When predictable disasters 
flow from government decisions
Peter Mumford
I must confess that on reflection I did wonder whether, as a practising New 
Zealand public servant, it was a career-limiting move to accept an invitation to 
make a presentation on government decisions as the cause of policy failure. Being 
a public policy advisor, I probably contributed to a number of suboptimum 
regulatory regimes—those that have failed to deliver as expected. So perhaps 
reviewing these failures is a case of me looking in the mirror and seeing who is 
actually looking back. For public servants it is an occupational hazard: you can 
be associated sometimes with the success, but also sometimes with the failure, 
of the policies you have been working on and promoting. 
The policy issue I have chosen to analyse concerns the challenge of creating 
resilient regulatory regimes. My study is informed by a recent case of regulatory 
failure in New Zealand resulting in the so-called ‘leaky building crisis’, but also 
work that Treasury has undertaken on best regulatory practice. The insights 
presented of regulatory failure resulting in the leaky building crisis were 
informed by my own research in this area, which has now been published by 
the Institute of Policy Studies (Mumford 2011). 
Two Lenses: The human face and the policy 
opportunity
I would like to make clear from the outset that for many affected people, New 
Zealand’s leaky building crisis is intensely personal. Their stories—which we 
read in the newspapers quite often—illustrate how people’s lives can be affected 
when the state gets it wrong. If your units of analysis are individuals, families 
and communities, events like the leaky building crisis have a significant and 
dramatic effect, and we need to acknowledge that. For most of us in the public 
policy world, however, failures present a challenge: what went wrong? Why 
did it happen; and how can we ensure it never happens again? How can we 
learn from the mistakes of the past to create a better future? That is the public 
policy challenge that many of us face today.
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The Broader Problem
Turning to the regulatory failure that led to the leaky building crisis, I know 
there will be differences of opinion regarding the villain in the piece. Some will 
put the crisis down to poor workmanship on the job, and some people clearly 
attribute it to poor-quality builders more generally. Others will argue that it 
arose because the state retreated from its core function of keeping people safe, 
relying instead on market disciplines. Both factors are probably relevant. In 
my view, however, the leaky building crisis was first and foremost a failure 
of performance-based regulation as it was implemented in New Zealand. By 
studying the leaky building crisis, we can certainly learn something about 
building regulation, but more importantly we can learn a lot about this novel 
regulatory approach that promised so much but ultimately did not live up to 
expectations. 
Essentially, the leaky building crisis was a symptom of a broader problem. This 
problem (and its solution) can be found in the goal-based, non-prescriptive 
regulatory approaches that were adopted in the 1980s and 1990s in the building 
industry, the occupational health and safety area, and in environmental 
management. Many of these same regulatory approaches continue to be promoted 
around the world today; however, in light of experience their effectiveness 
needs to be evaluated. Accordingly, this chapter is not so much about the leaky 
building crisis per se or even about building regulation generally, but rather it 
is in effect about creating resilient and effective regulatory regimes.
This chapter is structured around three themes: why do regulatory regimes 
fail in general? Why did New Zealand’s performance-based regulatory control 
regime fail? And what can we learn from this failure to create more resilient 
regimes in the future? The main message from this presentation is that some 
novel regulatory regimes can be quite experimental in nature. As experiments, 
they should be carefully monitored, with a particular focus first on what they 
are expected to deliver to society, and second, on the risks to delivery that 
arise out of the specific vulnerabilities of particular regulatory approaches. All 
regulatory approaches are different; they have their strengths and weaknesses. 
We need to know what they are and we need to be aware of their vulnerabilities. 
Why do Regulatory Policies Fail? 
At the outset, we should clarify what is meant by regulatory success and 
regulatory failure. I take a pragmatic approach: regulatory regimes are deemed 
to fail when the promises that were initially made when the regime was put in 
place are not met and, as a consequence, Parliament decides there are sufficient 
grounds to replace the existing regime with a new one. 
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By taking this approach, I am making a distinction between regulatory failure 
and regulatory improvement. Regulatory failure is a systemic failure of the 
regulatory regime. Regulatory improvement results from ideas and analysis that 
point to a better way, but it is not precipitated by a complete loss of confidence 
in the existing regime. 
Much has been written on the sources of regulatory failure—including John 
Braithwaite’s list produced for the OECD on why businesses do not comply with 
the law (Improving Regulatory Compliance, 1993). Braithwaite identified the 
following sources of non-compliance: failure of business to understand the law; 
a lack of commitment by business to the objectives that lie behind the law or 
the rules chosen to secure these objectives (or both); a perception by business 
that regulatory procedures are unjust; high cost of regulation; and enforcement 
including failure of deterrents, incapacitation and persuasion.
Of course, non-compliance with the law by itself does not inevitably result in 
regulatory failure. It is a matter of degree. For example, if some businesses fail 
to understand the law, this suggests the need for a more effective educational or 
enforcement strategy. If, however, most businesses do not know what they must 
do to meet their obligations under the law, not only will the law fail to achieve 
its objectives, but also the whole regulatory approach is called into question. 
Why did this Particular Regulatory Policy Fail?
Parliament adopted a new law in 1991 that introduced a novel approach to the 
regulation of buildings. It was in part a reaction to what was described as a 
building industry that was over-regulated and controlled, and in part a response 
to the newly popular idea that regulatory requirements should be couched in 
terms of aims and performance rather than prescription and detailed rules.
Prior to 1991 the regulatory regime governing buildings in New Zealand was 
highly prescriptive. If you were a builder you would have to go and get the 
manual off the shelf, or perhaps you wouldn’t even need to, because you would 
have been trained in a particular conservative style of building in New Zealand. 
It was a traditional industry with traditional designs and materials, which were 
reflected in numerous and complex local government by-laws. When the 1991 
Act was created, it replaced somewhere between 300 and 400 local government 
by-laws with a single performance statute and performance-based building 
code. So the regime went from highly prescriptive to highly performance-based. 
The idea of performance-based regulation was promoted as a general response 
to the high cost and inflexible nature of prescriptive regulation. In the 1980s 
and 1990s these approaches were pervasive and adopted not just in the building 
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area, but also in the regulation of occupational safety and health, environmental 
planning, hazardous substances, and electricity and gas safety. Here, I cannot 
describe in detail how performance-based regulatory regimes are structured 
in all their many manifestations because all of the regimes in New Zealand 
are a little bit different, but suffice to say they all share one characteristic: 
the requirements that regulated entities must meet (and for that matter that 
regulators must enforce) are couched as high-level goals. 
I can best illustrate this with reference to the requirement in the New Zealand 
Building Code relating to water ingress. The code requirement is that buildings 
must be constructed to provide adequate resistance to penetration by, and 
accumulation of, moisture from the outside. Prior to 1991, homeowners and the 
building industry together with government regulators did not need to worry 
about what was adequate. They could rely on prescriptive building standards 
often based on traditional construction methods, which in turn were embedded 
in the training of designers and builders. After 1991 prescriptive standards 
could still be used to inform practice but now they became what was known 
as ‘acceptable solutions’. Designers and builders, however, now had a choice: 
they could seek approval for new designs and construction methods known 
as alternative solutions. The approval bodies—the territorial authorities—were 
required to decide whether these design and construction methods met the 
Building Code requirements for adequacy based on reasonable grounds. 
From the mid 1990s, territorial authorities approved building designs that 
involved monolithic cladding, a construction method that didn’t require a 
cavity between the cladding and the wall. In addition, joints were secured 
using sealants. Kiln-dried timber, itself an innovation, was typically used rather 
than traditional treated timber framing, and building designs did not include 
eaves. This was a response to market demands for larger houses on smaller 
sections or blocks, as it allowed houses to be built closer to boundary lines. This 
combination of modern design features and building technologies ultimately 
failed. The absence of eaves meant that more rain soaked the cladding. The 
cladding system did not provide adequate resistance to penetration by moisture 
from the outside. Water that penetrated the cladding accumulated because there 
was no cavity to allow it to drain away or dry out. The kiln-dried timber framing 
rotted when the moisture content reached and stayed at a certain level. 
In total, since 1991, at least 42 000 buildings have been affected, and the 
consensus view is that the costs are in excess of NZ$11 billion. The real cost 
is eventually likely to be even higher than that. All of those who had a role 
to play in the building-control regime failed to predict how this particular 
combination of building technologies would perform in practice. The extent 
to which the cladding system would keep out New Zealand’s wind-driven rain, 
the susceptibility of kiln-dried timber to rotting, the very high standard of 
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workmanship required, and the need for ongoing maintenance were not taken 
into account in decisions to purchase, design, approve, build and maintain 
houses. What was deemed adequate by regulators when this combination of 
designs and building technologies was approved later proved to be demonstrably 
inadequate in practice. So, was this a case of intentional non-compliance with 
the requirements of the Building Code? While on the margin there were no doubt 
examples of poor workmanship, on the whole there was no intention to defeat 
the purpose of the law. This was an example of involuntary non-compliance. 
Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory 
Failure
I wish now to explore the role performance-based regulation played in this 
housing crisis, and associate it with the sources of regulatory failure. The New 
Zealand Building Code is performance-based. It sets goals but does not prescribe 
what must be done to achieve those goals. In effect the prime legal requirement 
was clearly stated: buildings must provide adequate resistance to penetration 
by and the accumulation of moisture from the outside. 
While the goal was clearly stated, the law nonetheless created uncertainty, 
as it required judgments to be made about what was adequate, and did not 
provide guidance on who was best placed to exercise this judgment or how 
this judgment should be exercised. This is a defining feature of performance-
based regulatory regimes. They rely on judgment (and for the most part, expert 
judgment) in situations where there are no precedents and often commercial 
pressures. The level of expertise must be commensurate with the complexity of 
the decision that is being taken. The more complex the judgment, the higher is 
the skill level required. 
Returning to Braithwaite’s six reasons for business’s non-compliance with 
the law, which at the extreme will result in regulatory failure, I can find 
two that are potentially relevant to the performance and possible failure of 
performance-based regulatory regimes. The first is a failure of business to 
understand the law. In performance-based regulatory regimes, this can be 
more sharply defined as a failure by regulated entities to understand what 
is required to meet high-level performance requirements in situations where 
there are no precedents. The second is enforcement failure, including the failure 
of deterrents, incapacitation and persuasion. In performance-based regulatory 
regimes I would describe this as a failure by enforcement agencies to evaluate 
the efficacy of new technologies against high-level performance requirements 
in situations where there are no precedents. 
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‘This Must Never Happen Again’: Creating 
resilient regulatory systems
Since the crisis, we often hear it said that ‘this must never happen again’. This is 
a mantra often repeated in the press and in royal commission reports. What can 
we learn from the failure of the building-control system to help us create more 
resilient regulatory regimes in the future? How do we resolve the problems 
of performance-based regulation, which might be described as dependence on 
expert judgment in complex decision-making contexts? 
There are four possible solutions. One is to create more specific and measurable 
performance requirements. Colleagues in the building regulator division of the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment are taking this approach, and 
perhaps the term ‘adequate’ will not be as prevalent in the Building Code in the 
fullness of time. 
A second solution is to ensure these problems do not arise by relying on safe 
precedents. This is the most conservative strategy. In the regulatory jargon it 
would involve reverting to prescriptive regulatory regimes. Research undertaken 
by the New Zealand Treasury indicates that some regulators are adopting this 
approach; effectively, our regulatory regimes and regulators are becoming much 
more conservative across the board; however, while prescription may provide 
certainty, it may also reduce flexibility, constrain innovation, impose excessive 
costs, and in some situations result in a level of regulatory complexity over time 
that either creates a disincentive to comply or focuses compliance on the wrong 
things. In other words, there is a risk—perhaps small, but a risk nonetheless—
we could end up with the worst of both worlds. We may unintentionally produce 
high-cost regulatory regimes that do not achieve the state’s primary objectives, 
be they related to health, safety, environmental protection or consumer and 
investor protection. 
A third solution is to improve the quality of decision-making in situations 
where there are no precedents. We know some people or groups of people are 
better able to predict how novel technologies such as new building systems 
and products will perform in practice. They are described as experts and 
we rely on their professional judgment. Again, research undertaken within 
the New Zealand Treasury indicates that some regulators are adopting this 
approach, and in fact some regulatory regimes—traditional ones—have always 
been based on this approach. Relying on experts is, however, not as foolproof 
as it might first appear. What constitutes an expert has been studied at some 
length, and in some contexts, such as predicting the performance of complex 
and unproven technologies, a particular quality of expert is required. If we 
create regulatory regimes that are reliant on experts, we must be confident that 
experts are in fact available. 
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A fourth, more innovative solution is to treat novel technologies as experiments. 
From the outset, we must accept that we do not know how novel technologies 
will perform in all circumstances of their use. If we had treated a few monolithic 
clad buildings as site experiments, we would have been able to discover early on 
that they had deficiencies and might fail in certain circumstances. We could have 
monitored how they actually performed in the field, and against the inclement 
weather, and in the course of doing so we might have detected a problem in 
a timely manner. A few hundred vulnerable buildings could have been built 
before the serious problems were identified, and we could have avoided the tens 
of thousands of defective buildings that were ultimately built.
All of these are each plausible strategies. They might be employed either 
individually or in combination to resolve what we now know about the inherent 
weaknesses of performance-based regulation, but each of these strategies is 
itself subject to some uncertainty. How will they work in practice? 
The Importance of Monitoring and Best 
Practice
This takes me to my final point: we must not assume a ‘set and forget’ approach 
to the design and implementation of regulatory regimes. At one level we must 
treat regulatory regimes as experiments, and indeed novel regimes such as the 
1991 Performance-Based Building Control Regime was highly experimental. As 
experiments, regulatory regimes must be monitored and evaluated, and corrective 
action should be taken if required. The risk of not monitoring and evaluating is 
that we are surprised when regulatory regimes do not perform as expected and 
occasionally fail. More importantly, the consequences of failure can range from 
unpleasant to catastrophic, as we have found in the building area. 
Avoiding failures completely is the ultimate objective, but minimising the risk 
and impact is also an important goal. If we accept the importance of monitoring 
and evaluating, the question becomes: what do we actually monitor? Health, 
safety and environmental outcomes, or indeed building quality outcomes, are 
important indicators of the performance of regimes. They tend to be after the 
event. 
We also require measures of the health of regulatory regimes that allow us to 
make an assessment along the way. The New Zealand Treasury has developed 
a set of best regulatory practice principles and performance indicators, and 
assessed some 60 regulatory regimes against these.1 The Treasury view is that 
1 The full best-practice regulatory principles paper can be found at: <http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
economy/regulation/bestpractice>.
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regular monitoring against these principles, having regard to the indicators, 
is one important way of tracking the performance of regulatory regimes and 
identifying areas of risk that might require further review. The principles and 
indicators can also act as targets for continuous improvement and design criteria 
for new regimes.
The best-practice regulatory principles are 
• growth-supporting—economic objectives are given an appropriate weighting 
relative to other specified objectives 
• proportional—the burden of rules and their enforcement should be 
proportional to the benefits that are expected to result 
• flexible—regulated entities should have scope to adopt least-cost and 
innovative approaches to meeting legal requirements 
• durable—the regulatory system has the capacity to evolve to respond to 
changing circumstances 
• certain and predictable—regulated entities have certainty as to their legal 
obligations, and the regulatory regime provides predictability over time 
• transparent and accountable—rules development, implementation and 
enforcement should be transparent 
• capable regulators—the regulator has the people and systems to operate an 
efficient and effective regulatory regime. 
Each of the principles is associated with a set of performance indicators. 
My ex-post assessment of the 1991 Building Control Regime indicated that it failed 
against a number of these principles and performance indicators. Hindsight of 
course is a wonderful thing, but our judgment is that if the assessment had been 
made in the 1990s, it would have revealed some latent weaknesses in the regime. 
We would have discovered major misgivings in relation to proportionality. We 
would have uncovered evidence of poor durability. And, third, we would have 
questioned the capability of the regulators to exercise expert judgments on 
novel building technologies. Would such an assessment have reduced the risk 
of building failures? Probably, but we will never know because the assessment 
was never done.
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8. Building and Maintaining Trust in 
Public Institutions: Is this possible?
 Murray Petrie
Discussions of trust, integrity and social norms are a very important part of 
future-proofing the state. In this contribution I will assess New Zealand as a 
high-trust, high-integrity society, and identify some risks to trust and integrity. 
I will also discuss transparency, participation and accountability. The focus 
on transparency and participation has become increasingly prominent both 
internationally and domestically. The initial focus for most governments was 
on facilitating the disclosure of information. Now, it is more focused on active 
public participation in the design and implementation of public policies. I will 
also mention some specific areas for action in New Zealand, and some issues 
for discussion. I believe the case study of New Zealand will have some general 
lessons to be observed by Australia and other related countries. 
A number of available indicators show that New Zealand is rated very 
highly in international measures of transparency and accountability. There is 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. New Zealand has 
never ranked below fourth on that index, and for half of the time the index 
has been calculated, New Zealand has ranked first or equal first. Similarly, New 
Zealand ranks highly against indicators of open government and regulatory 
enforcement. On the Open Budget Index, New Zealand is second of 94 countries. 
In the area of freedom of the press, New Zealand is ranked sixteenth. These 
indicators present a general picture of New Zealand as a country of high-
integrity and high-quality governance. 
Now, what does the rest of the world look like? This map below is a visualisation 
of international Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores. Those parts of the 
world that are in red or dark red are areas where corruption is perceived to be 
widespread or endemic. As indicated, corruption infects a large part of the rest 
of the world, including many countries that we trade with very actively, and 
increasingly so in Asia. 
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Australia is in a similar situation to New Zealand on the CPI. It lies in the second 
decile of the index. It operates a high-trust, high-integrity society in a world 
where corruption is essentially the norm. The relevance of the Australian and 
New Zealand examples is that both countries are designing mechanisms from 
which the rest of the world can learn.
It is important to understand why there is a lack of corruption in New Zealand. 
A large part of the reason for this is that the country has established and 
strong democratic institutions: an independent judiciary, a well-functioning 
parliament and watchdog institutions. It is also underpinned by stable social 
norms in a relatively small and cohesive society. It is, however, probably less 
cohesive than it has been in the past. The other countries that score very highly 
on the index are similarly small, advanced democracies, such as Denmark and 
Sweden. It is interesting, though, that Singapore has entered the top 10 on the 
CPI, having improved drastically in recent decades. 
Let me explain why the issue of trust is such an important one. Trust is not a 
maudlin concept; it is not only a personal issue; rather, it is well known that 
societies with higher levels of trust achieve greater social, democratic and 
economic progress. One trend was evident when I returned to New Zealand 
after the Canterbury earthquakes after working overseas in countries where 
corruption is the norm. I attended a session at the Institute of Policy Studies on 
the Canterbury earthquake, during which presentations addressed questions 
such as how New Zealand’s building standards affected the magnitude of 
destruction from the earthquake, and whether New Zealand needed to revisit 
its building standards. What struck me, coming from working overseas, was 
that in the whole discussion there was no single reference to whether or not 
the standards had been enforced; it was merely presumed they had been. The 
system had integrity. Moreover, there was no reference to the possibility that 
there was any corruption at any stage that exacerbated the damage caused by 
the earthquake. This is a good example of the social and economic value of a 
high-trust, high-integrity society. If one compares the different levels of death 
and damage caused by the Chilean and the Haitian earthquakes, the outcomes 
are staggering. Chile is a serious player, having a high quality of governance, 
while Haiti does not; and when both experienced a similar-sized earthquake 
the devastation was mild in Chile and catastrophic in Haiti. These two cases 
provide very dramatic illustrations of the consequences for societies of building 
or neglecting trust and integrity.
Our various social norms inform the rules of the game about what is desirable, 
permissible or tolerated. They are part of a wider set of mechanisms of social 
control, laws, incentives, information provision, nudging, and so on. They 
should be seen as part of that framework because the formal laws of the state, 
at the end of the day, require supporting social norms. And again, we see that 
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in the examples from other countries: they have nice-looking legal frameworks 
that actually have very little impact and make very little difference on the 
ground because they are not supported by social norms. Voluntary compliance 
of the tax system is a very important example of a social norm that we in New 
Zealand may well take for granted.
There is also a range of social norms that underpins the operation of public 
institutions and the state, such as the constitutional convention of ‘free and 
frank’ advice that civil servants should provide to elected officials or the 
willingness to report wrongdoing. So if we consider this concept of trust 
and the related concept of legitimacy, three different forms of trust are often 
identified. Contractual trust relates to whether people adhere to their agreements. 
Competence trust refers to the faith citizens place in the competence of public 
officials and institutions; and goodwill trust describes the willingness to go 
beyond the minimum prescribed requirements of convention or law.
These are related to the two main dimensions of legitimacy. One is representative 
legitimacy, examples of which are how representative are our parliaments and 
whether we as citizens have the ability to access decision-makers. The second 
kind of legitimacy is performance legitimacy. This is an important element 
of effective public institutions that deliver public services—for example, 
maintaining the rule of law gives them a higher degree of perceived legitimacy.
Trust breeds more trust. The more one interacts with other people, the more 
they will begin to trust each other in economic relationships and personal 
relationships across the community. Only a relatively small number of countries, 
including New Zealand, experience this level of trust. Much of the rest of the 
world is trapped in a state where everybody assumes that everybody is out for 
themselves: why would someone pay taxes if they know no-one else is going to? 
Why would someone trust another person if it is likely they will be swindled? 
Those situations are hard to break out of because people refrain from the 
types of social interactions that might allow them to adjust their opinions. An 
interesting question for societies like New Zealand is whether our apparently 
high level of trust could unravel in the future? And if so, how, and how would 
we know? How might we detect what might be some quite subtle changes in 
the level of trust?
Cass Sunstein (1996), a US legal scholar who later entered the Obama 
administration as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, has argued that social norms can be surprisingly fragile. There can be 
large discrepancies between people’s private judgments and their behaviour 
to conform to the norm. So, while they conform to the norm, privately they 
8. Building and Maintaining Trust in Public Institutions
91
are questioning why they are doing so and asking if there is a way to change 
societal expectations about these norms. Sunstein (1996) points to changing 
norms around smoking as an example.
So what are some of the reasons why we might worry about the state of trust 
and integrity in New Zealand? What are some of the risks of corruption in New 
Zealand? These risks may include globalisation, increased cross-border linkages 
with countries where corruption is the norm, and trade—both export and 
import. One anecdote that illustrates this is where New Zealand exports to high-
corruption countries. Siemens, the large German electronics and engineering 
company, appointed their star export manager as chief executive. He had 
been operating overseas. A couple of years later, the board was horrified to 
find he had started paying bribes in Germany. Siemens had to fire him, which 
was immediately damaging to the corporate image of the company. As such, 
there was a realistic risk that behaviours that are seen as normal overseas might 
become internalised through exports, through inward and outward investment, 
and through increasing immigration from countries where corruption is the 
norm. People have different views about whether it is legitimate or not to pay 
or to accept a bribe.
Money-laundering is another threat to building trust in public institutions. 
Front companies and shell companies have been recently common in New 
Zealand: it is very easy to set up a company in New Zealand, and perhaps 
monitoring mechanisms for impropriety are too lax. Organised crime is an 
increasing problem in New Zealand as it is globally. Professor Bob Gregory, at 
Victoria University, and two colleagues have published an interesting article 
on corruption in New Zealand that asks whether the rapid increase in income 
inequality in New Zealand could change prevailing attitudes around trust, 
integrity and legitimacy in a way that might cause some people to become more 
likely to commit fraud or corruption.
Another point relates to the rebuilding process following the Christchurch 
earthquakes. The earthquakes in Christchurch were a major shock to the 
economy and to New Zealand society. How this relates to the global trends of 
corruption during the rebuilding that follows natural disasters is interesting. 
Transparency International (TI) has done a lot of work in post-disaster situations 
around the world, and found that corruption often increases in these situations. 
Normal procurement practices are often changed because of the perceived need 
to respond rapidly to the size of the natural disaster. Insurance fraud can easily 
increase. So we should be vigilant about this risk in the rebuilding process in 
Christchurch.
The academic Robert Klitgaard (1988) has conceived a definition of corruption 
that is useful when thinking about which specific parts of the public sector are 
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particularly prone to corruption and fraud. He says ‘corruption is the coincidence 
of monopoly and discretion, minus accountability’. That points generally to 
the importance of competition and contestability. It is imperative to remove 
the level of monopoly discretion in the hands of public servants with strong 
regulations. The police, globally, are the public institution to which people 
pay the most bribes. This is verified by Transparency International’s global 
corruption barometer. We are lucky in New Zealand to have a less corrupt police 
force, but it is nevertheless an institution about which the public sector should 
remain vigilant. New Zealand has experienced cases of corruption in a wide 
range of government departments, including the Immigration Department, the 
Customs Department and the Corrections Department. The judiciary, however, 
which is typically a corrupt institution around the world, ranks low on the list 
of corruption in New Zealand.
I consider we are naive about corruption in New Zealand. The country is 
transparent and honest in its domestic and international dealings; this increases 
the possibility for some to take advantage of New Zealand, which is why we 
should support the international conventions that criminalise the payment of 
bribes by private business. It is in our narrow and broader interests to support 
those initiatives. We are probably not very good at identifying corruption 
compared with others who have been doing it for a very long time.
At times, New Zealanders seem oblivious to conflicts of interest. Public lawyer 
Mai Chen, who is a member of Transparency International New Zealand, has 
described how she is at times astounded at how experienced executives are 
oblivious to a conflict of interest. Being a small country is often seen as an 
advantage in terms of trust and social norms and lack of corruption. It can also 
be a problem if we are not alert enough to the fact that we often know the 
people we are dealing with on the other side of a transaction.
There are also some latent weaknesses in our high CPI rating. First, the Corruption 
Perception Index measures only perceptions, not actuality. Moreover, these are 
the perceptions of some experts and businesspeople. Hence, the CPI is really 
attuned to focusing on the interface between the business sector and public 
officials, and whether bribes are expected to be paid to receive government 
services such as getting goods off the wharf, a regulatory approval and so on. 
Apparently, two of the six surveys that make up New Zealand’s score on the 
CPI are by just one expert. This obviously raises the risk of bias. Perhaps more 
importantly, the focus of the CPI is on bribery, not on other forms of corruption, 
such as nepotism or political corruption. Indeed, some New Zealanders do admit 
to paying bribes. In a survey conducted in 2010, 3.6 per cent of respondents 
claimed that they or a member of their household had paid a bribe to an official 
of a public institution in the previous 12 months. This figure surprised a 
number of us. Has corruption in New Zealand increased in the past three years? 
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Seventy-three per cent said ‘yes’. These figures are consistent with some other 
survey evidence. For instance, the State Services Commission has conducted an 
Integrity and Conduct Survey of more than 8000 respondents. Fifteen per cent 
of respondents reported observing illegal conduct in the previous year. Four 
per cent observed giving or accepting inappropriate payments or perks. Five 
per cent observed inappropriate alteration of documents.
The Office of the Auditor-General should be commended for taking the initiative 
and conducting a public sector fraud survey in 2011. Generally, the results were 
pleasing; however, one surprising and worrying statistic was that 23 per cent 
of the respondents said they had seen internal fraud in the past two years. 
Also worrying is the small number of people reporting wrongdoing under the 
Protected Disclosures Act. Simply put, there may be more corruption occurring 
than is being reported. The lack of reporting occurs despite a number of surveys 
showing that New Zealanders express willingness to report unethical behaviour. 
One interesting speculation made in the aforementioned article by Bob Gregory 
and colleagues is that the increase in reporting of corruption might, in some way, 
desensitise people to the undesirability of committing fraud and corruption.
Another area of concern is that there is a diverse range of norms in New Zealand. 
The 1998 New Zealand study of values, which is a bit dated, nonetheless reveals 
some interesting statistics. The survey focused on the ethnicity of respondents 
as a way of understanding differences in their attitudes to norms and values. 
Once respondents were asked to self-identify their ethnicity, a question posed 
was whether it was unjustifiable to accept a bribe. Ninety-one per cent of 
Europeans said ‘yes’, but only 72 per cent of Maori said ‘yes’. On the question 
of whether claiming unentitled benefits was unjustifiable, 83 per cent of New 
Zealanders said ‘yes’, while less than 50 per cent of Pacific peoples said ‘yes’. 
To the question of whether democracy in New Zealand was ineffective due to 
poor decision-making, most New Zealanders said ‘no’; however, 44 per cent of 
those who had only a primary level of education said ‘yes’. So the perceived 
effectiveness of our democracy remained low for certain strata of our society. 
When asked whether the Treaty of Waitangi should be abolished, 47 per cent of 
people in the lowest income bracket said ‘yes’.
The Global Corruption Barometer has measured which institutions in New 
Zealand are perceived as being most corrupt. It is interesting that political 
parties and the national Parliament enjoy widespread cynicism and fairly high 
levels of perceived corruption. This is true at the global level as well. It is also 
true in Australia. The major difference between New Zealand and Australia here 
is the police force. New Zealand’s police force has been measured as being low 
on the global corruption scale. In Australia, conversely, the police are up the top 
of the scale and are seen as being as corrupt as political parties and the national 
Parliament. The major prescriptive issue for New Zealand is to consider what 
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actions it should now take to (re)build trust and integrity and to reduce risks. 
The Government has to be more proactive in fostering positive social norms. To 
combat the increased and often more sensational media coverage of corruption, 
public institutions need to do more to reinforce the fact that most people observe 
the law and that corruption is generally rare in New Zealand.
Some interesting UK evidence reports on the levels of compliance with their 
provisional tax system. The United Kingdom conducted a randomised control 
trial in which they mailed 140 000 letters to provisional taxpayers who had 
failed to make their first payment on time. One reminder letter notified the 
recipient that they had to pay their tax within six weeks or face punishment. The 
alternative letter in this trial included data on levels of voluntary compliance 
with the provisional tax system. Those receiving the second letter, which gave 
data on voluntary compliance in their immediate locality, recorded an increase 
of 15 percentage points in the number of people who paid before the six-week 
deadline. This is an impressive result and it raises the possibility that we need 
to be thinking more about using positive framing and positive reinforcement to 
offset the negative perceptions generated by the increased publicity of illegal 
behaviour.
Increased public participation is an important way of building greater trust in 
public institutions. In advanced democracies this is done frequently, but the 
international norms are starting to move beyond disclosure to focus very much 
on concrete, active, direct participation by citizens, in between elections, in 
policy design and implementation. One relevant example comes from the Global 
Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT). GIFT is a new, multi-stakeholder 
initiative that aims to promote greater transparency, participation and 
accountability. Its stakeholders are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, some global NGOs, plus some governments. A major principle of 
the GIFT initiative is that citizens and all non-state actors should have the right 
to participate directly in public debate over the design and implementation of 
fiscal policies.
Increasing public participation includes practices of informing, which is basically 
disclosure, consulting, involving, collaborating and, finally, empowering. One 
example of a measure taken to increase public participation is social auditing. 
This is becoming popular globally, but particularly in developing and middle-
income countries in which civil society is increasingly involved in monitoring 
the implementation of a government investment project. Civil society could be 
monitoring the delivery of public services by using mobile phone technology, 
since the cost of new communication technologies has radically reduced in 
recent years. Hence, social audits are something we should think about as part 
of the social verification mechanisms in New Zealand.
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Figure 8.2 Pillars of the National Integrity System
Source: Transparency International.
A further example of initiatives to increase public participation is participatory 
budgeting. The Swiss have been doing it for a very long time. Now, however, 
this trend is increasingly occurring at sub-national and local government levels 
around the world, albeit from a low base. In some countries this has allowed for 
the possibility of actually putting together packages of tax increases along with 
specific spending proposals, and, as they are doing in some countries such as 
Brazil, putting aside a small amount of money for citizen decision on how it is 
to be spent.
The creation of independent fiscal councils is another measure to be considered. 
Recent discussion about establishing one of these in New Zealand has become 
more noticeable. We have some real problems around the level of public 
participation in the setting of macro fiscal policy, and how much the public 
debt and the deficit should be and how we should be spending our money in a 
sectoral sense. An independent fiscal council would stand in stark contrast with 
and be a major improvement to New Zealand’s current fiscal review process. At 
the moment, the only monitoring of fiscal policy in the country occurs in the 
single chamber of Parliament and the finance and expenditure committee, which 
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is chaired by a member of the governing party. That committee has a budget to 
access independent advice, but it has never used it to retain advice on fiscal 
policy. Moreover, last year, the finance and expenditure committee received 
just two public submissions on the Government’s budget policy statement; the 
Government does not respond to these submissions. 
Citizen co-production offers a compelling avenue for increasing public 
participation. Again, an anecdote serves to illustrate the benefits of this process. 
There was a retired fireman sitting in a cafe in his home city in California when 
suddenly an ambulance pulled up next door. The paramedics rushed in to a 
restaurant and a group of people followed them in. The retired fireman asked 
the paramedics what had happened, and they told him that a man had just died 
from a heart attack. The fireman is rueful when he is told this, as he had been 
sitting in this cafe next door to the restaurant and he was trained in delivering 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) that could have saved that man’s life. In 
the aftermath of this event, the retired fireman submitted a proposal to his local 
council, which has now been adopted. The council has put together a register of 
everybody in the city who is trained in CPR. They compiled their mobile phone 
numbers. Now, when there is an emergency where it will take the ambulance 
some time to arrive at the scene, the council sends a text message to everybody 
on that list to see if there is anyone in the area who can give CPR. This is a 
good example of the kind of new public participation and co-production that is 
enabled by new technology. 
The previous diagram (Figure 8.2) depicts an analytical framework developed 
by Jeremy Pope of Transparency International Berlin for a National Integrity 
System. Pope, the current Human Rights Commissioner, is strongly associated 
with this framework because he was the founding managing director of TI. The 
idea is that the state of integrity and transparency, and trust and effectiveness of 
government, is associated with how the different pillars in the national integrity 
system function. This includes the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, key 
watchdog institutions such as the auditor-general and the ombudsman, business, 
civil society, the media, political parties and so on. This is a framework that is a 
very useful way to think about assessing the state of integrity and governance.
TI New Zealand is about to commence a new systemic study. It will have been 
nearly 10 years since we did the last one. The study will assess New Zealand against 
international best practices in transparency, participation and accountability, 
and anticorruption. The project has received financial support from the Office of 
the Auditor-General and the State Services Commission, and we are approaching 
other agencies. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is supportive. The 
release of the new study is intended to coincide with the centenary of the Public 
Service Act, which was passed in 1912 and implemented in April 1913. So it is 
a salient time to launch a new focus on transparency and accountability in New 
Zealand. The approach will be collaborative and consultative. The objective is 
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to test New Zealand’s perception of itself, as a country with high 
standards of transparency and accountability, free of and at low risk of 
corruption, and to identify areas where action is needed to strengthen 
transparency, accountability, and participation, and to kick-start the 
necessary changes. (Transparency International 2013).
So what do I think are some specific areas for action? Well, we need to invest 
more resources in diagnosis. The national integrity study is an important 
example; however, there need to be more public surveys about attitudes towards 
compliance and voluntary compliance, as well as towards norms of trust and 
norms against bribery. We need to probe New Zealand’s high rating. New 
Zealand should inquire more deeply about whether it faces risks of corruption 
and fraud.
I would argue that another important feature that is lacking in New Zealand is 
an ethics code for MPs. This would improve the legitimacy of Parliament. New 
Zealand needs more transparency in lobbying. The transparency of political 
parties is also important. I think of financing issues that have been brought to 
the fore in the past five years, but are still not properly settled. The boundary 
between political parties and the public purse needs far more transparency. This 
is partly related to the Official Information Act, which does not apply to the 
administration of Parliament. There needs to be more focus on areas of highest 
risk, utilising the framework of monopoly and discretion, and we need a more 
results-focused public service.
The United Kingdom has been putting a huge amount of effort into this in 
recent years. And again, while I generally do not think an anecdote constitutes 
an argument, I believe this one is illustrative of some of the things we need 
to be thinking about in New Zealand. In the United Kingdom, a leading heart 
surgeon led an initiative, saying ‘we need to publicise the mortality rate of 
patients against individual heart surgeons’. That was agreed within the medical 
profession and was put into place, I think, about two years ago. The mortality 
rate has come down significantly in the United Kingdom since that happened. 
Such initiatives have not been thought about much in New Zealand, and we 
really do need to do that. 
The destruction of the environment is a concern for the public. This stems 
partly from what the Government does, and obviously, also what the private 
sector does. This leads to the regulatory function. We need to think about triple 
bottom-line reporting for government. This discussion has been brought up at 
the global level. One of the principles of the GIFT initiative states: ‘Governments 
should strive to report the economic, financial and environmental impacts of 
what they do’ (GIFT 2012). We need to do a much better job of that in New 
Zealand. We could, again, lead the world, if we take it seriously. 
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Our private sector seems remarkably complacent. Many people within the 
private sector do not know that since 2000 it is a crime to bribe a foreign public 
official. So, if you are offshore and you are an exporter, and you are trying 
to get your goods off the wharf, or whatever it might be, you are subject to 
New Zealand criminal law if you pay a bribe. Some New Zealanders working 
in overseas markets think they can avoid the legal punishments if they use 
an intermediary to pay the bribe; however, that is not the case: they are still 
breaking the law. It is important to conduct more training and raise awareness 
of the role of professional integrity. TI New Zealand is starting to work more 
closely with professional service firms and trying to engage them in raising 
awareness of corruption and bribery in New Zealand. 
In the longer term, introducing mandatory civics education in schools is crucial 
to our objective. New Zealand urgently needs to educate its young people about 
the strong public and democratic institutions that we all take for granted. They 
should understand how our public system, our constitutional arrangements, 
our Parliament, our executive and our judiciary function and interact. 
New Zealand should take more steps to abide by international law on corruption. 
In 2003, New Zealand signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC); however, it has still not ratified it. There are no defensible reasons for 
not doing so. Ratifying the convention would necessitate a small number of legal 
tweaks to New Zealand legislation. The ratification decision has been sitting in 
select committee for a couple of years, and we really do need to take that final step 
and ratify it. Ratifying it would require the Government to come up with a new 
national anticorruption strategy, and to do that in a widely consultative fashion. 
Finally, New Zealand should join the Open Government Partnership. This is one 
of US President Barack Obama’s foreign policy initiatives. The United States and 
Brazil have led this, and the United Kingdom is one of the founding members. It 
is a new club of countries which are committed to open government. There are 
a few low-level entry requirements: the main requirement for members is that 
they have to bring to the table and develop new initiatives that involve civil 
society and the private sector. New Zealand should seriously consider joining the 
Open Government Partnership to look at what is going on in other comparable 
countries such as the United Kingdom. It would be a way of signalling and 
cementing greater transparency and accountability in this and other areas. 
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9. Lessons for Government in 
Minimising Risk: What can the public 
service learn from the private sector?
Bridget Hutter
In my contribution to this collection of essays I will focus on risk regulation—my 
area of expertise. I will also touch upon contingency planning, because there is 
some overlap between these two subjects. 
Managing risks and preventing disasters are increasingly at the centre of 
contemporary debates about governance. And as several contributors to this 
volume indicate, the potential for disaster is ever present. Each year, sadly, some 
of these potentials are realised. Not surprisingly, we have debates about nuclear 
safety in the wake of natural disasters—especially following the great East Japan 
earthquake and subsequent tsunami of 2011. Food scares are quite regular 
around the globe, particularly E. coli outbreaks. Germany suffered a particularly 
bad one in 2011. Then in this region, of course, there are natural disasters—be 
they floods and bushfires in Australia or earthquakes in New Zealand. 
In each of these cases questions are asked about governments and about 
regulators—and in particular, about why they weren’t better prepared. In other 
words, they are usually criticised. This is interesting at one level, because it 
underlines an expectation that we can govern the future and indicates a theme 
in social theory: we have a very modern preoccupation with risk and live in a 
world where risk-management approaches are increasingly advocated as a form 
of governance. 
Social theorists argue that modern societies are characterised by new risk 
environments. These are associated at one level with substantive changes 
in society—for example, the growth of science and technology. Moreover, 
these risks are increasingly global in nature, often traversing national and 
organisational boundaries. Internet risks fall into that category, as do the threats 
of climate change. In addition, often these are what I call ‘manufactured risks’, 
meaning they are the unintended consequences of innovations, science and 
technology to which publics and the environment are involuntarily exposed. 
Once they become such risks, governments have increasingly intervened to 
manage and regulate them. And in so doing, they have exemplified another 
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feature of modern society: new ways of seeing the world that include both an 
orientation towards the future and a belief that we are able to anticipate, control 
and manage risk. This new approach has crucial consequences for governance. 
From this perspective, then, regulation is one manifestation of a very modern 
belief that risk can be anticipated and controlled. Ulrich Beck (1992), a German 
sociologist, talks about a world in which we are increasingly occupied with 
debating, preventing and managing risk, to the point that he coined the phrase 
‘the risk society’. Similarly, Anthony Giddens (1999:3), a distinguished British 
sociologist and former director of the London School of Economics, argues that 
we have a growing preoccupation with the future, which he contrasts with 
former beliefs that were based much more in fate. The aspiration to control the 
future, Giddens argues, is a very modern perspective, so much so, he continues, 
that we also believe we are able to anticipate and do much more about natural 
disasters than we ever previously thought. So Beck (1992), again, writes that 
even natural hazards appear less random than they used to. 
Social and organisational responses to expectations about anticipation and 
management of risk are considerable and can command enormous resources. 
Examples include the creation of specialist risk-management and contingency 
planning departments such as the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingency 
Secretariat and the United States’ Department of Homeland Security, both of 
which were established in the wake of 9/11. The latter commands particularly 
large resources.
Of course the private sector has its own equivalent departments: meta risk-
management departments, compliance departments, and indeed an array of 
specialist staff, risk officers and compliance officers. All of these use a variety 
of formal risk tools and perspectives in a bid to avoid the repetition of previous 
risk events, and also to help identify and manage new risks. The expectations 
placed upon these departments and their personnel may be considerable. 
One relevant example are the findings from the 9/11 Commission, which claimed 
that there had been a lack of institutional imagination on the part of the security 
services. The commission wrote that ‘[a]cross the government there were failures 
of imagination, policy capabilities and management. The most important failure 
was one of imagination. We don’t believe the leaders understood the gravity of 
the threat’ (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
2004). This commission’s emphasis on the need to have imagination is quite a 
hefty expectation, and underlines how great the expectations may have become. 
Social commentators, for their part, tend to be sceptical about the expectation 
that we can anticipate and manage risk. They caution very much about some 
of the anticipatory expectations we place upon our governments and our 
organisations; Anthony Giddens (1999) talks about a plurality of future scenarios 
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and the absence of certainty about which is the most accurate, referring, of 
course, to the generation of the multiple possible things that might go wrong, 
which we may model. Beck refers to the optimistic futility with which the highly 
developed institutions of modern society attempt to anticipate what cannot be 
anticipated. 
And Charles Perrow, a sociologist from the United States, has spent a substantial 
part of his career writing about the ways in which organisations are imperfect 
and cannot provide complete security. In fact, one of his most famous books 
is entitled Normal Accidents (Perrow 1999) to underline the fact that in very 
complex systems it is inevitable that something will go wrong; we cannot get it 
right all of the time. 
Given that my contribution to this volume was to address the limits of future-
proofing the state, I will now explore somewhat why many social commentators 
are so gloomy about the best efforts of those engaged in future-proofing the 
state, and some of the expectations that are placed on them. I will use a number 
of examples. Overall, though, the headline message is that one reason for all 
the gloom is the recognition of the very complex social, political, economic and 
technical decision-making involved in future-proofing the state. 
To start with, what constitutes a risk may not be clear. There may be debates 
and disagreement about what is risky. As Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky 
wrote in Risk and Culture (1982), ‘substantial disagreement remains over what 
is risky, how risky it is and what to do about it’. Though this book was written 
several decades ago, this was true then, is true today, and without doubt will 
be true in several decades. There is always debate about what constitutes a risk, 
how risky it is and what we should do about it. And what we increasingly know 
is that at a technical level, we often do not have the data to really tell us with 
any certainty what the risk may be. 
One example that is increasingly discussed is climate change, where we know 
that the past may not be such a good indicator of what will happen in the 
future. This is particularly so because climate change may be increasing the 
incidence and patterns of natural disasters. So we cannot look at our historical 
data and think that that is going to be a good predictor of what is going to 
happen in future. 
We also have another problem, other than the contestation of scientific 
knowledge: politics has become embroiled with science. Take the example of 
so-called ‘Climategate’, which involved a politically motivated challenge to the 
status of scientific evidence and knowledge about climate change. 
The controversy began in November 2009 when a server was breached at the 
University of East Anglia’s Climatic Research Unit, one of the research centres 
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that constructs various global temperature and precipitation analyses. Two 
weeks before the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change, 160 mb of data were 
copied from that server to various locations on the Internet: more than 1000 
emails and 2000 documents, all relating to climate change research between 
1996 and 2009. Most of the emails were rather technical and rather boring; but 
controversy focused on only a few of those. 
A few emails, it was alleged by climate change sceptics, demonstrated that 
climate change scientists were manipulating data in order to claim that climate 
change was happening. These email correspondences, along with the other 
data, were used to suggest that dissenting scientific papers were not even being 
published—they were being rejected in order to promote the climate change 
cause. Despite the fact that successive inquiries refuted those claims, it was a 
very damaging episode at a time when international climate change talks were 
in progress. 
A second example of a slightly different order is the Eyjafjallajökull volcanic 
ash episode, which Pierre-Alain Schieb alludes to in his contribution to this 
volume. As readers will remember, European air space was closed in April 
2010 for just more than a week, and then intermittently thereafter during that 
European spring. That case was interesting because of the change in attitudes it 
caused. When the volcano first erupted, conventional precautionary advice was 
followed: aircraft should not mix with volcanic ash. 
That was absolutely uncontentious in the first couple of days; but as Europe 
started to close more and more of its air space; as airlines started to lose vast 
sums of money—not just because their planes and staff were grounded, but 
also because of EU legislation that required them to pay the costs of stranded 
passengers—the knowledge base upon which the regulators were deciding that 
aircraft should not under any circumstances mix with volcanic ash began to be 
contested. 
Consequently, airlines started pulling in different scientific experts who would 
challenge the effects and the levels at which aircraft engines were susceptible to 
volcanic ash. The meteorological evidence itself also began to be contested. So 
it was a very interesting case to look at because in a sense it was motivated by 
business interests that were being seriously damaged at the Easter holidays—an 
incredibly important time of year for them.
I raise it here because it is another example of how scientific evidence may be 
contested for other reasons, and sometimes political or indeed business reasons. 
It did result in a relaxation of the regulations quite soon after the event. I am 
currently doing research into how volcanic ash affects aeroplanes, and I have 
discovered that the safe level of ash in which a plane can fly is still contested. 
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In addition to those political and technical problems, future-proofing the 
state also involves some very complicated choices about social and economic 
costs and benefits and how they are distributed. Scarce resources have to be 
allocated—something that is particularly acute at a time such as this when 
there is a recession gripping much of the world. How those scarce resources 
are allocated will centre on very differing views about the role of the state in 
promoting very different interests, and very different conceptions of equality or 
inequality, or indeed freedom or restriction of trade. 
What is the relative value you give to individual or collective goods? What is 
the relative value given to present as opposed to future generations? And what 
value do you place on the environment? Inevitably, there will be ambivalence 
about the answers to those questions. There may also be vested interests 
involved; the playing field is never level. 
Competing interests also exist. Big organisations may be government stakeholders 
who have the power to shape the debate about what is taken to be risky and 
what is not, and how we respond. Consumers and potential victims may have 
less power, of course. What we do know is that all the different stakeholders and 
all the different players will have differing objectives at some point in the policy 
cycle. And these need to be dealt with.
My underlying point is therefore that the decisions being made about the 
future-proofing of the state are political and ethical as much as they are 
technical and ‘objective’. Expectations that it is possible to govern the future 
can lead to strong moral and political imperatives. There are moral imperatives 
to protect publics, but also there are political imperatives to avoid blame; as 
Aaron Wildavsky wrote in his book Searching for Safety (1988:225), ‘a strategy 
of anticipation is based on a fear of regret’. In some areas there are contentions 
that this is of growing importance. And we may actually be encouraged to be 
risk averse because of politicians’ tendency to engage both in the blame game 
and in blame avoidance.
So there may be pressures to act as if we are in control—by producing elaborate 
planning documents, relying on complicated models and trusting in numbers 
when in fact sometimes we should not trust in those numbers if they do not 
have a strong evidence base. The danger, of course, is that it leads to the wrong 
policy choices. Aaron Wildavsky warned about this many years ago in Searching 
for Safety, where he argued for the need to balance anticipation and resilience. 
Anticipation—both in regulation and in contingency planning—can, Wildavsky 
argued, lead to wasted resources because of the high volume of hypothesised 
risk, much of which may be exaggerated or false predictions. The focus must be 
rather on selecting appropriate strategies according to the evidence you have. I 
will dedicate the second half of this chapter to looking at regulation and, to some 
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extent, disaster mitigation. When is it relevant to use regulation and when is it 
irrelevant? To answer these questions I will focus on natural disasters, but we 
also need to take on board other disasters for which we humans are responsible. 
It must first be said, however, that expectations of anticipation and control are 
unusual when it comes to natural hazards. This is often in contrast with the 
literature on human-made disasters, for there is an acceptance that we cannot 
prevent what is going to go wrong, but expect that we might mitigate the 
consequences of natural disasters. 
So how much we are able to mitigate, adapt and plan may be overestimated in 
terms of the expectations that are placed on governments and organisations. Of 
course there are various forms of mitigation that can prove useful; here I am 
focusing in particular on the ways in which risk regulation might be used to 
help mitigate the effects of future disasters; here I am not looking at the later 
stages. 
From this perspective, the forms of mitigation that can prove useful include risk-
avoidance strategies. These focus primarily on land-use policies (hazard zones, 
for example), and they focus in particular on delineating areas where settlements 
are regulated, ranging from hazard zones where no urban development or 
planning is permitted at all, through to development laws. 
Many examples of these strategies are in use around the world. The State of 
California has legislation that requires a Natural Hazard Disclosure Statement 
to be provided by those selling property if it falls within a designated hazard 
zone. In Japan hazard zones have been created in areas related to disasters such 
as landslides, and since 2001, new building developments in hazard zones have 
been restricted. In Japan there have also been attempts to relocate people away 
from hazard areas, and to develop early warning systems. 
In the United Kingdom, too, we have similar examples (such as areas where 
you need planning permission to build), though thankfully natural disasters 
are not common in that country, flooding probably being the exception. In fact, 
despite examples of floods that have been large by UK standards in recent years, 
I am still asked to sign petitions in my hometown from anti-planning planners 
lobbying for development in very well-known floodplains. This causes tensions. 
Of course, some authors actually believe that the damage caused by natural and 
manufactured risks is exacerbated by social and special aspects of twenty-first-
century living, over and beyond the planning laws. Perrow has recently written 
a powerful book (2007) in which he says we routinely allow heavy concentrations 
of economic power, hazards and populations in close proximity to each other, 
therefore enhancing the likelihood that a disaster, whether human-made 
or natural, will have a devastating effect. His example is the 2005 Hurricane 
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Katrina in Louisiana, where both the local population and industrial complexes 
were located in an area of high natural hazards. We saw its devastating effects. 
Around the world, however, we will see many examples where such co-location 
is ongoing and where we are not learning lessons.
Another well-known risk-reduction strategy is risk regulation. Perhaps the 
best-known examples are building codes—especially in earthquake and 
flood zones where the damage is primarily to buildings and infrastructure; 
devastating consequences of code breakdowns follow for populations. Those 
building controls embrace a variety of risk-regulation tools, design engineering 
and construction standards. New building codes are quite commonplace, and 
moreover, we know they are highly effective, especially where they incorporate 
learning from previous disasters. 
Retrospective building upgrades are another example of risk regulation, which 
involves strengthening programs for existing buildings in areas of natural 
disasters. This approach is not common, and unsurprisingly so, for retrospective 
upgrades cost a lot of money. And yet, they do exist. Mexico City introduced 
a major program for retroactive strengthening following the 1985 earthquake 
there, as did California following the 1994 North Ridge earthquake. We 
know that where building codes do not exist, or where they exist but are not 
enforced, the loss of life is often considerably higher than in areas where those 
codes exist and are enforced. And I would underline strongly the importance 
of enforcement. There is no point having the code or a regulation if you decide 
not to enforce it.
Still on the topic of natural disasters, what happens when the disaster reaches 
the point where mass evacuations become a distinct possibility? If we look back 
to the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear meltdown, for instance, the Japanese 
Government actually considered evacuating Tokyo, a city of 30 million people. 
It didn’t happen, obviously, and you would never wish for mass evacuations, 
but would it even have been possible? And should a government even attempt 
to do it?
I think a government should be prepared to do it—what is important is how to 
go about it. Sometimes the reaction is to put in place very detailed plans about 
what to do if X happens. The problem is that disasters rarely repeat themselves 
in precise ways. But we have to be prepared, which is why we emphasise 
resilience. We have to be prepared for the unexpected to happen and for things 
not to happen in the ways we expect. So we might have plans; but sometimes 
those plans are so detailed and they rest on so many assumptions that they may 
actually be quite dangerous. For this reason we need to think very carefully 
about what those plans look like, which is why the emphasis on resilience and 
de-centring and incorporating local populations is so important. 
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It is important not to rely on natural scientific evidence only, but also on social 
science evidence. And increasingly these two forms of evidence are being 
brought together. One example comes from a recent conference in Japan. An 
academic there had the most beautiful model about what would happen when 
a tsunami was going to hit Japan: there would be sensors out to sea that would 
alert people to the problem; alarms would also go off in the city, prompting 
affected citizens to move to higher ground. What was not in his model, however, 
was any understanding of how people behave when they hear an alarm: they 
don’t calmly get out of their house and go to safer ground. They worry about 
their possessions, they worry more about their family, and they even worry 
about their pets. They don’t move in ways in which you expect them to. And 
sometimes when these alarms go off they can cause panic. 
In fact, one of the unintended positive consequences of the 2005 London 
underground bombing was that initially people thought this was not a terrorist 
attack, but a power failure. Consequently, people didn’t panic; they thought, 
‘Oh, the underground electricity system must have broken down. We have to 
get people off the trains because a couple had crashed because of the electricity 
going.’ And people left in a very orderly manner. If people had known or realised 
the truth, there might have been panic in evacuating that space.
Another crucial point I would like to underline is the importance of information. 
Governance decisions depend upon information: information about the likelihood 
of a disaster occurring, and about the probable damage that might occur. And 
the knowledge base upon which that policy is formulated is crucial. We need 
to be aware of the limitations of our data. Historical data, as I have already 
indicated with reference to the climate change example, may be insufficient. In 
this way, historical data may not be a good predictor of what is to come. 
There may also be significantly less information available than we suppose. 
Sometimes policymakers—but especially the media and the general public—do 
expect that we are able to do things that we are in fact not able to predict. And it 
is important to take account of that. It really depends on the sort of risk and the 
sort of disaster you are involved in: there obviously will be some confidence in 
the location of a volcano, and we have a fair idea where flooding might happen, 
but it may be much more difficult to locate with very much certainty the location 
and occurrence of hurricanes and wildfires, for example. 
Take the example of Hurricane Gustav in 2008. Its trajectory and force, which 
occurred in the same area as Katrina, proved very difficult to predict. Nearly 
two million people fled the Louisiana coastline in anticipation of a category 
three to four hurricane. By the time it reached Louisiana, however, it had been 
downgraded to category two. So those two million people need not have moved. 
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In hindsight, it raised questions about the policy decision to evacuate and how 
seriously the next hurricane warnings in Louisiana would be taken. There is a 
danger, of course, they might be ignored. 
In the Australian context, similar difficulties have emerged with respect to 
bushfires and alarms for bushfires: you may have a risk of an alarm of a bushfire 
that doesn’t then happen—something that can shake confidence. This point 
takes us to what is an important topic: the risks of risk governance, which may 
be quite considerable.
Gustav is an example of a false positive, but we also have false negatives. We 
have alarms or a failure to alarm that may shake public and policymaking 
confidence in both science and the scientific community. There are examples in 
the United Kingdom that also affect confidence in governments. It can also lead 
to the waste of valuable resources, which was one of Wildavsky’s key arguments. 
It is worth noting here that when we talk about these issues, particularly around 
resources, with respect to developing nations, the sorts of decisions being made 
are sometimes much starker than we realise. When we in the developed world 
have a recession it’s quite comfortable compared with many parts of the world. 
And when you discuss natural disasters with respect to some poor nations, the 
amount of investment you have to put into future-proofing the state imposes a 
much starker decision. 
Of course, there may be unintended consequences of this risk anticipation. 
There may be risk aversion, fuelled by concerns about blame attribution. 
Sometimes measures designed to protect populations from natural disasters can 
become a source of danger in themselves. They may offer false reassurance, or 
they might fail, and in so doing, increase vulnerability. A case in point is the 
system of levees in Louisiana whose failure can cause unexpected and possibly 
larger flooding than would otherwise have occurred.
These strategies may also reduce the ability of organisations and societies to cope 
with the unexpected, which is why there is much discussion of resilience—meant 
to be a more flexible and evolved way of responding to disasters. There may also 
be value conflicts. The classic example here is of course security. Anybody who 
has recently visited Heathrow Airport will be aware of the incredible level of 
security travellers are subject to. They have to allow several hours in order to 
get through the airport—on a bad day, sometimes even longer. Those security 
measures are in place, of course, because of the threat of terrorist attacks. 
And there are big debates about how worthwhile that security is and whether 
it may contravene human rights. In fact, at Heathrow’s Terminal 5 the plans for 
security initially put in place were much more stringent than those that now 
exist because of protests and legal fights about the right to take passengers’ 
fingerprints and photographs, let alone the added time en masse that it takes 
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everyone to get through the airport. The fact is if that security was removed and 
something went wrong, you would get a very clear notion of what the blame 
game would look like.
So there are problems in terms of what we put in place. Security at Heathrow 
may be a harsh example, but harsh examples are important to get to the bottom 
of what the issue is. Hence, the important message is to look very long and hard 
at the evidence you have and how robust it is before formulating policy. And 
though transnational cases are sometimes very useful, transnational effectiveness 
varies tremendously. Ultimately you must learn your own lessons from your 
own disasters; but it can also be very useful to share information. It gives you 
an idea of what the prerequisites might be for future-proofing the state.
Effectiveness, too, varies. What we do learn from looking at global disasters, 
however, is that one prerequisite is a stable government and good governance 
systems. Enforcement, as I have already mentioned, is crucial. Corruption can be 
a major obstacle, as recent earthquakes in Turkey and China have demonstrated. 
In Sichuan in 2008 engineering and construction quality were major factors 
contributing to many thousands of deaths, especially of schoolchildren.
Central–local relations are also key to securing good governance. The central 
government of any state cannot achieve this on its own. It has to do it in 
partnership with local communities and local governments and business. Buy-
in to the legitimacy of what is being done is crucial, as is the recognition of tacit 
knowledge, particularly tacit local knowledge. 
Brian Wynn (1992), for example, has written a helpful academic paper showing 
that in the post-Chernobyl meltdown phase the UK authorities paid scant 
attention to the local tacit knowledge of sheep farmers in the Lake District 
who thought their sheep were not behaving normally, perhaps because of 
radiation fallout. The central authorities just didn’t think this was possible; the 
farmers were in fact correct. As Wynn demonstrated, paying attention to local 
knowledge that may not be highly formal or scientific has actually been found 
to be rather important. 
Increasingly, then, future-proofing the state is a multiparty activity. In the 
United Kingdom recent coastal and river defence schemes have involved the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the relevant 
environment agency, the regulator, local authorities and the insurance industry. 
The insurance industry plays an increasingly important role of course, and 
there are a number of different schemes in which the insurance industry can 
partner with governments in terms of trying to deal with mitigation measures, 
incentivising people to invest in mitigation measures and helping facilitate 
post-disaster recovery. The way these scenarios pan out when the insurance 
9. Lessons for Government in Minimising Risk
113
sector is called upon to act may, however, be very different to those that were 
previously anticipated. Again, this highlights the need to learn from events that 
have already happened. 
Not wishing to end on a gloomy note, I want to emphasise that there are 
important benefits to be gained from risk regulation, other measures and the 
mitigation of natural and other disasters. These benefits can be considerable, 
but they need to be used strategically. It’s crucial in deciding policy options 
to look at the quality and the accuracy of the information you have about the 
levels and the location of risks. Where levels of certainty are high then more 
detailed risk-regulation measures and planning are possible and can be put in 
place. But where they are not, you may simply be wasting resources and giving 
false assurance. At a macro level, it is important to understand that we can place 
far too much faith in our ability to govern the future. We need to keep an eye on 
our limitations and expectations. 
And although the state is an important player in future-proofing, we need a mix. 
We need to empower different participants in the regulatory process, including 
national and local governments, and businesses and local communities. If this is 
achieved, future-proofing of the state will be a cooperative endeavour with an 
emphasis on governance rather than on government. 
Note
This chapter is based on a transcript of the author’s presentation to the 2012 
ANZSOG Conference.
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10. Risk Responses, Emergency 
Management and Community 
Resilience in the Aftermath of the 
Recent Victorian Natural Disasters
Neil Comrie
This contribution focuses on risk responses, emergency management and the 
development of community resilience in the context of two natural disasters 
in Australia: the 2009 Victorian bushfires and the 2010 Victorian floods. My 
contribution arises from experience as a police officer of 35 years’ service, 
including eight years as chief commissioner of Victoria Police and on-the-
ground practical experience; also relevant is my experience of reviewing the 67 
recommendations arising out of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, 
and with reviewing the 2010 Victorian floods. From my perspective, I would 
argue that in recent years our capacity to deal with natural disasters has been 
tested more than at any point in the history of the Australian nation; however, 
while natural disasters are damaging events, they also provide an opportunity 
to learn.
Following these two major natural disasters in Victoria—the bushfires and the 
floods—there has been some critical analysis of our preparation and planning 
before the disasters and our subsequent responses to them and recovery. 
Consequently, we now have a substantial body of recent evidence we can 
use to inform our decision-making for the future. And there are two broad 
conclusions we can draw from the many reviews that have been conducted: 
first and foremost, we cannot always prevent or avoid major emergencies; and 
second, we realise they will continue to occur in the future. We can, however, 
reduce the risk and mitigate the damage of these emergencies through improved 
planning, preparation and coordination of response. And an important lesson 
that comes out of the two major events in Victoria is that the State Government 
must overhaul the flawed approach to managing emergency resources that has 
prevailed across all relevant agencies.
My most significant argument here, however, is that our communities must be 
equipped to be better able to survive and recover from disasters. Changes in 
legislative policy processes are needed, but it is clear that the most important 
improvement we can make to existing emergency management is to ensure our 
communities are more capable of looking after themselves. I will try to explain 
the rationale for these comments below.
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Many lessons are to be learnt from the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. 
The most important issue to arise from the royal commission is the need for 
everyone in the community, from the individual right through to government, 
to play a role and take a share of the responsibility for dealing with emergencies. 
We have known for some time that probably the best means of emergency 
prevention is the education of adults and children. In fact, it was suggested 
some decades ago that fire prevention be made a part of the curriculum in every 
school. This was the finding of the Stretton Royal Commission after the 1939 
Black Friday bushfires, in which 71 Victorians lost their lives. Now 73 years 
after this recommendation was made, and after the tragedy of the 2009 fires has 
been digested, it appears that education about bushfire safety will finally be 
included in the national curriculum. 
I undertook the Victorian Floods Review in 2011, which turned into a protracted 
investigation into the factors associated with the floods. A large body of evidence 
was gathered from extensive community consultations. We visited all of the 
flood-affected areas in Victoria, held public meetings, spoke to those people 
directly affected by the floods, met with the local governments in those areas, 
received 150 written submissions, and undertook operational debriefings with 
all of the agencies involved in responding to the floods and which had extensive 
consultation with stakeholder agencies. Out of all of these consultations, the 
major issue of concern that emerged was that our communities were largely 
unaware of the risks they faced; consequently, they were ill prepared and 
incapable of looking after themselves in the face of adversity.
Evidence of a lack of community resilience included a poor understanding of 
their risk environments, despite the fact that people were living on floodplains. 
In many cases, they had no idea they were at risk of flood. Hospitals and 
community centres were built on floodplains and, as with the hospital at 
Charlton, were basically destroyed by the flood. Moreover, flood-mitigation 
plans were inadequate: people living in those locations were given no prior 
warning by the authorities that they lived on floodplains. There was little local 
planning or preparation for a response to an event of that nature. The structures 
for local responses were poor: they were disorganised and therefore extremely 
ad hoc. Two findings from the consultations were particular to some smaller, 
often isolated towns. First, emergency services found it difficult to access these 
areas. Second, emergency services personnel who happened to reside in the 
towns were forced to divide their attention between looking after their own 
properties and families on the one hand and trying to do their job on the other. 
The reality was that because of this isolation most people had no real idea of 
what they should do to look after themselves.
People did not know where to go for advice and knowledge about what should 
happen, and in many instances they simply were unaware of who was in 
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charge and who was able to give directions. There was also poor capacity for 
mitigating the flood once it struck. In some cases, elementary procedures were 
adequate, but many people did not know how to fill sandbags or how to stack 
them. Despite their best efforts, in a lot of instances when the sandbags were 
placed in rows, they were washed away because they were not placed properly. 
Simple processes such as sandbagging often go unnoticed by policymakers, but 
the Victorian floods demonstrate that we must consider the need to provide 
education in the basics of disaster mitigation.
There was also confusion resulting from inaccurate and untimely warnings. A 
new facility called Emergency Alert, a telephone-based warning system that 
sends SMS information messages to local residents, was not in place for the 
Black Saturday bushfires of February 2009, but it was for the 2010 floods. 
Yet, emergency managers still had a lot of work to do because in a number of 
instances the warnings sent out were unclear and confusing. In some instances 
people were not sure whether information was a warning or simply advice; they 
became confused about what it was they were being told. Perhaps the most 
concerning aspect, from my perspective, was that many people were completely 
reliant on the emergency service organisations to give them some support 
and direction when they found themselves in trouble; successful disaster 
management requires that people who are threatened by the disaster have some 
autonomous capacity to resist its effects.
So what do we make of that lack of resilience and why has it occurred? 
The evidence indicates that many people felt they had been completely 
disempowered from the process of looking after themselves in an emergency, 
that the Government had centralised all the resources and the authority to deal 
with those situations. This created an expectation that, in the face of adversity, 
the State authorities would save residents—even at the last moment. Many of 
the respondents we spoke to in the community said the State Government had 
dictated to communities on emergency management rather than working with 
communities on such management. There is absolutely no doubt that apathy and 
complacency had developed in the communities affected by the Black Saturday 
bushfires and the Victorian floods. One relevant example about community 
apathy was demonstrated 12 months after the Black Saturday bushfires in 
Victoria, when the Country Fire Authority of Victoria (CFA) conducted a survey 
of communities affected by bushfires. Even though 173 people had lost their 
lives in this disaster, 80 per cent of the respondents to the survey said they 
would still wait to see whether there was smoke and fire on the horizon before 
they left their homes—by which time it is too late to leave. We have a serious 
problem trying to deal with community apathy. And the real problem is that the 
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more government does for people, the more they expect of it. Government has 
created and encouraged a relationship in which the community is dependent on 
it and is unable to fend for itself. 
After the review of the Victorian floods, one of the recommendations I made in 
the report was that Victoria should establish a network of community resilience 
committees to develop and administer community resilience plans based on an 
‘all hazards’ approach and tailored to the specific needs of each community. 
The ‘all hazards, all agencies’ maxim is one of the core issues Victoria needs to 
address. The term means that a flexible integrated arrangement is in place between 
the relevant emergency agencies so that an integrated response is forthcoming—
regardless of the agency emergency officers serve in or the particular hazard they 
are confronting. In Victoria we are going through a major reform program because 
some of the inherited shortcomings of the previous emergency response regime 
have been identified. The legislation in Victoria for the Metropolitan Fire Brigade 
and the CFA was created in 1958. Apart from a few adjustments, the legislation 
clearly reflects its age. It created a set of silo structures where the critical firefighting 
agencies each have separate boards; from a governance viewpoint they are required 
to make sure the organisations deliver against the legislation, but they can do so 
with little regard for agencies in neighbouring areas or other sectors. Ideally, when 
faced with major disaster events such as widespread bushfires or floods, all the 
emergency services agencies, irrespective of their primary role and responsibility, 
have to come together and work as a collective; however, with separate, disparate 
communication systems, different equipment that is not interchangeable and 
with cultures that are quite different, a range of barriers prevents the concept 
of cooperative response. I hope the ongoing review of the legislation, including 
a white paper consultation process, will provide some overarching policy and 
structure that will drive that sort of philosophy. 
More importantly, one of the key things is to train our people in an environment 
in which they understand each others’ roles and are trained to work together 
from the outset. Let me use the examples of the police and military services, 
although similar examples are found in most of the emergency professions. To 
become a police officer or a soldier, basic training equips the new trainees to do 
the basic functions in those services. Afterwards, as officers, they specialise in 
whatever it might be, perhaps detective work or the artillery or as engineers. 
All emergency management workers should go through the same fundamental 
training and emergency management and then specialise in a firefighting team 
or a State emergency service. That should do two things: it would ensure shared 
consistent training at the fundamental level; and it would act as a barrier to 
some of the distinctive cultural problems that exist and inevitably develop over 
time. So when people come together in a major event they already know each 
other because they have trained together, and the cultural barriers disappear 
quickly in that environment.
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Shared basic training does not necessarily mean, however, identical arrangements 
across all towns and regions. One of the issues that became apparent when we 
inspected the sites of the floods and talked to communities was that a one-size-
fits-all plan is not feasible. And so I recommended that the emergency service 
organisations should be required to consult and engage with local community 
resilience committees in the preparation, planning, response and recovery 
phases of emergency management.
It was interesting that while we were doing the flood review, the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) released the National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience, which reiterated many recommendations about shared responsibility 
made by the bushfire royal commission.
In undertaking research and compiling our report on the flood disaster, it became 
evident that the idea of community resilience was not a new one—resilience 
models have been established around the world, including in New Zealand, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. These models inform the 
community that immediate assistance by emergency service responders may 
not be readily available and that they should be prepared and able to cope 
on their own for up to three days. All these models include information on 
understanding the risk that natural disasters pose to the community, on making 
an emergency plan and assembling an emergency supply kit. One example that 
prevails in New Zealand schools is that the threat of earthquakes is a dedicated 
topic addressed early in the curriculum. It is not clear why such models have 
not been replicated elsewhere.
Further, during the course of our investigative review, the Queensland 
Government, which had managed its own emergency response to Cyclone Yasi 
at the same time as the Victorian floods, launched a new website called ‘Harden 
Up Queensland’. On the front page of that website is the following statement: 
‘Weather events are getting more severe and when a major weather event hits 
you cannot rely on government and volunteer organisations to help. You need 
to harden up by preparation, awareness and helping others.’
That was a courageous stance for the Government to adopt because, prior to that in 
Australia, a ‘softly, softly’ approach to informing people of their responsibilities 
and power to resist disasters had prevailed. The Bligh Queensland Government 
was really the first State government I had seen stating directly to people that 
they had to take some responsibility of their own during natural disasters.
Across Australasia we must now formulate a multi-pronged approach to 
achieving community resilience to natural disasters. The first step is for 
governments and emergency service organisations to realise that they cannot 
protect our communities in all circumstances. We have to disabuse people of the 
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notion that emergency service organisations will save them at the last moment; 
to pretend otherwise is not only deceptive but also dangerous, because it will 
cause people to become complacent and stay in their homes until it is far too 
late to evacuate before the oncoming disaster. The royal commission into the 
Black Saturday bushfires found that in several cases people died because they 
stayed in their homes too long. We must also ensure that our communities are 
informed of the characteristics and capacity of their emergency services. For 
example, it would be worth publicising that in regional Victoria, more than 90 
per cent of our emergency service organisations are staffed by volunteers who 
have other responsibilities.
Governments must also invest in good forward planning, which should include 
specific, practical, risk-related policies that can be implemented to reduce loss 
of life and community damage. We need realistic integrated flood plans that 
are based not on artificial municipal boundaries but on the footprint of the 
floodplain itself. Floods ignore artificial jurisdictional boundaries. Our State and 
municipal authorities need to revisit their flood-mitigation plans. We also need 
to plan infrastructure with the risk of flooding in mind. One of the problems here 
is that our forebears deliberately built along rivers so they could have access to 
water. Towns lie on floodplains; farmers farm on floodplains for the fertile soil. 
Hence, we cannot claim that all the consequent risks can be eliminated, but if 
the areas of highest risk are identified this can be built into future planning 
strategies to deal with them. 
In relation to the risk of further fires, we need to better use our existing 
infrastructure. The Fire Services Commissioner in Victoria appointed after 
the bushfire royal commission is now looking at a strategy in which all public 
buildings in fire-prone areas such as schools and public halls in the future will 
be built to a specified standard, permitting them to be used as community fire 
refuges. Because of the high cost of retrofitting buildings or trying to adapt 
buildings in high-risk areas the Victorian Government decided to buy back some 
land where homes were burnt and other properties damaged; this is to prevent 
rebuilding in fire-prone areas. The central authorities are working through this 
process, but some councils have other pressing needs and agendas, including a 
rate base that they are trying to protect. In a couple of instances, new estates are 
being developed almost adjacent to those areas where the Government is buying 
back land—a truly bizarre phenomenon. Strong decision-making must come 
to the fore; retrospective correction is very difficult but taking a hard line and 
making decisions to ensure we do not repeat those mistakes again are necessary 
to reduce the chances of future disasters.
Another important element in community resilience will be to include private 
enterprises in planning. There is a real challenge here for communities to pick up 
where they have privately owned infrastructure that impacts on the wellbeing of 
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the whole community. In Victoria the owner of an electricity substation located 
on a floodplain had no protective measures in place to keep electricity flowing to 
the community. That is why it is important for the community resilience strategy 
to identify such potential risks (even when it involves private installations) and 
to try to put some strategies in place to plan for them in ways that involve not 
exclude the private sector. My assessment is that if the private sector is engaged 
early enough and its members understand the community priorities they tend 
to become more involved more quickly than if they just see it as an inconvenient 
cost factor that will disappear in due course. It is just part of that process of 
involving every stakeholder in the planning process so that communities can 
have contingencies in place should an event arise. 
We also have to make a long-term commitment to address the apathetic culture 
demonstrated by many in our communities and raise the level of awareness of 
their role in combating natural disasters. In other policy areas we have been able 
to do this. For instance, significant cultural change has taken place on Australian 
roads through things such as the Victorian Transport Accident Commission 
advertisements, which have been major contributors to the reduction in the 
road toll; and the QUIT campaign has seen a significant reduction in cigarette 
smoking throughout Australia. Long-term social education programs like these 
are critical to developing a strong sense of community resilience for natural 
disasters. We need similar campaigns to focus on community preparedness.
I have argued strongly that I do not think we need to create a whole new 
separate community structure to achieve this, because in every country town 
in Victoria there are pre-existing community service organisations looking for 
opportunities to serve their community. Lions clubs, Rotary clubs and Country 
Women’s Association branches are among a wide range of organisations 
which, if appropriately engaged, would be a powerful force in building this 
community resilience.
We need to facilitate the education of communities so we can empower them. 
We need to work in conjunction with them, rather than directing them when 
disasters strike. We need to encourage communities to discover their own 
learning about resilience in preparation for natural disasters. Moreover, local 
governments must play a much more active role in emergency management 
than they have in the past—this is certainly the lesson from the Victorian 
natural disasters.
In conclusion, we still need to make a whole range of structural policy and 
legislative changes. In Victoria the Government has started to do this by 
commissioning various green and white policy papers on this issue. These will 
propose a range of options for the development of a new emergency management 
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environment. In my view, the most effective and significant improvement in 
emergency management will flow from strong and resilient communities that are 
not absolutely dependent on emergency services at times of crisis.
Communities that have involvement in and ownership of plans for their own 
safety have a much greater capacity to look after themselves. Moreover, this 
actually presents governments with additional opportunities to use those 
arrangements for other community capacity building. In Australia over the 
past few decades, a lot of social and community structures that existed in small 
country towns have declined. This absence of social capital militates against 
governments effectively communicating with local communities. Reflecting on 
the aftermath of disasters, like the Victorian fires and floods, and thinking about 
future emergency management systems provide an opportunity to build those 
community social structures again.
The major challenge for government and its agencies, however, is to have 
the courage to relinquish the long-established practice of central control of 
emergency management and to devolve it to local communities. For some that 
will be a very difficult challenge, but from the Victorian perspective it is obvious 
that maintenance of the status quo is not a viable option, for as Margaret Mead 
once said: ‘Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful concerned citizens can 
change the world. Indeed it’s the only thing that ever has.’
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11. Understanding Resilience and 
Reducing Future Vulnerabilities in 
Social-Ecological Systems
Brian Walker 
I begin this contribution by examining what resilience means and then 
considering the implications for future vulnerabilities. The use of the term 
‘resilience’ has risen markedly in recent years in response to growing awareness 
and uneasiness about looming shocks. They include global and regional financial 
crises, climate and weather shocks, pandemics, social unrest, regional wars and 
refugees, among others. These are rising in frequency. The frequency of such 
events worldwide is reminiscent of Winston Churchill’s famous volume The 
Gathering Storm: we have that sense of the gathering storm and wonder what 
we can do. Will we be able to cope? That question is worrying many people, 
and that may suggest why we find the term resilience so much in use today. So, 
will we be able to cope?
Two recent surveys of the Australian media have checked thousands of sources 
for every occurrence of the word ‘resilience’ to look at what it meant, and they 
show how its use is rising and how very different are two common uses. The first 
one suggests the view that if authorities try to help people too much they do not 
bother to look after themselves, while the other is exactly opposite, expressing 
a hope that the concept of resilience does not erode into a justification for 
denying help to communities. So, there are two ends of a continuum about what 
to do and how much to help people. Nevertheless, this term has greatly different 
meanings in the minds of many people. In essence resilience is a framework for 
understanding how persistence and transformation coexist in living systems. 
In Chapter 5 of this volume, Peter Ho has talked about ‘complex systems’; I call 
them ‘living systems’, but ‘complex adaptive systems’ is what they are.
Complicated systems and complex systems are different. Complicated systems are 
relatively simple in the sense that they have linear dynamics; they are entirely 
predictable. If you prod something and you know about it you can predict 
what will happen. Predictability is not possible in complex adaptive systems 
because they self-organise. Its parts themselves are capable of change. They can 
change their own behaviour and therefore they can adopt different things; their 
unpredictability has to be taken into account. I was told of a wonderful example 
of trying to enhance salmon fisheries in British Columbia where the industry 
thought: ‘If we could just get more young salmon down to the sea then more 
salmon would come back to spawn and we would have more salmon.’ So they 
enhanced production in the nurseries and put lots of young salmon in the rivers 
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that went down to the sea; but on the way down to the sea these fingerlings 
went past another type of fish that had never eaten salmon because they ate 
other things. But when an enormous volume of little salmon fortuitously came 
by they switched their predation behaviour and ate the salmon, so fewer salmon 
actually made it to the sea. A complex system had become totally unpredictable. 
Complexity is a change in the behaviour of the system because the system self-
organises in response to changing circumstances.
So the definition of resilience is the capacity to absorb disturbance, to reorganise 
so as to retain essentially the same function, structure and feedbacks, to have the 
same identity. ‘Identity’ is what brings the world of psychologists and the world 
of ecologists together. Psychologists talk about people losing their identity when 
they go into a catatonic state or shift mentally, while we talk about ecosystems 
having a different identity—they change from one kind of operational system 
to another, not just another phase of the same system.
In layperson’s terms, resilience is the ability to cope with shocks and to keep 
functioning in a similar way. The addition of ‘feedbacks’ is a key idea because 
the feedbacks in a complex system determine its self-organising capacity. The 
Resilience Alliance1 has compiled a database of what we call ‘threshold shifts’ or 
‘phase shifts’ in systems. In each case where we have been able to gather enough 
data we have identified a threshold crossing that shows a change in a critical 
feedback; so understanding the feedbacks, especially across domains and scales, 
is an essential part of resilience thinking. 
Resilience has three critical components. There is ‘specified resilience’: the 
resilience of one thing relative to another, which has to do with threshold effects. 
Then there is ‘general resilience’, where no particular part of the system or 
particular shock is identified because it has more to do with the total adaptive 
capacity of the system. And third, there is ‘transformability’, the capacity for 
transformational change to a different kind of system. I will now deal with each of 
those components to deepen our understanding of the way resilience can operate.
Specified Resilience
Specified resilience is about thresholds or tipping points or critical transitions—
they are referred to in many different ways. The commonly assumed response of 
the equilibrium or stable state of a system to a change in its controlling variables 
suggests no threshold effect, as shown in Figure 11.1 (a). Its trajectory might be 
curvilinear or linear but the change is continuous. In fact, there are four kinds 
1 The Resilience Alliance is a research organisation of scientists and practitioners from various academic 
disciplines exploring the dynamics of social-ecological systems. See <www.resalliance.org>. 
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of possible responses, as shown in Figure 11.1, including a step change in (b) 
and two nonlinear types of change in (c) and (d). These involve what are known 
as hysteretic effects. In these two cases, as you increase a controlling variable 
the stable state of this system moves gradually and then jumps up. If you then 
decrease the controlling variable it does not drop down at the same point as it 
jumped up. It needs to decrease a long way further down. The crucial point here 
is that this allows alternative stable states for the same amount of the controlling 
variable. So the state of the system can exist in either of two states for the same 
amount of the controls on the system. 
Figure 11.1 Kinds of Thresholds (Tipping Points)
Source: Author’s summary.
An example of a step change is a landscape where the controlling variable is the 
percentage in its natural habitat, and the state of the system we are interested 
in is the number of fauna species that persist there. For instance, if one were 
to start clearing a landscape the fauna would gradually decline but then suffer 
a sudden drop. Many published papers from different parts of the world show 
that about 30 per cent landscape cover is a critical level (it varies depending on 
the pattern and the area, but there is a sudden, critical change at some level). 
There is another one at about 5 per cent so there are a number of step changes. 
It is not a smooth change.
An example of the kind of changes in Figure 11.1 (c) is algal blooms in lakes, 
where the lake suddenly becomes eutrophic (full of algae and foul smelling). 
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The controlling variable is phosphate in the sediment at the bottom of the 
lake. The state of the system is the amount of phosphorous in the water, which 
determines the amount of algae. The chemistry is quite complicated, but it has 
to do with the solubility of phosphate under different levels of oxygen. As the 
algae increase, they die and then sink to the bottom where oxygen is used up in 
decomposing them. When there is no oxygen in the water phosphorous becomes 
very soluble and is released from the sedimentary mud in large quantities and 
the algae numbers suddenly shoot up. The amounts of phosphorous in the water 
and sediment have to be brought way down before water phosphorous (and 
therefore algae) can return to the pre-jump level.
The fourth kind, in Figure 11.1 (d), is an irreversible threshold, where the 
system never comes back to the pre-jump level. An example of this is topsoil 
salinity. Catchment salinity is a big problem in Australia and the controlling 
variable is the depth of the water table below the surface; salt in the topsoil 
is the state of the system. As the water table rises, because of clearing the 
landscape, it brings salt with it. When the water table reaches a critical level—
about 2 m below the surface for most soils—capillary action pulls the water 
up to the surface and brings the salt up with it. Salt disperses clay—making 
it soapy—and the water will not seep back down again. After the water table 
drops again, it takes a great deal of rainfall to eventually leach the salt down, 
so the topsoil stays salty. Effectively once the system passes that threshold it is 
in an irreversible salinised state.
All four of these kinds of thresholds or tipping points occur in all kinds of 
systems. Fortunately, many of them are smooth, as in Figure 11.1 (a). But if any 
of the other three occurs in a system it is important to know about them because 
they define the critical boundaries within which that system has to operate—or, 
if not, it will soon look very different and have a different identity.
The thresholds I have described exist in ecological systems but they also 
occur in social systems. In economic systems there is a debt-to-income ratio 
that everyone knows about; it has a very strong threshold effect and once you 
increase debt beyond a threshold level it is very difficult to get below that debt-
to-income ratio again. There are many examples of research on threshold effects 
of behaviour in crowds, such as riots; also in fashions and fads where they 
suddenly take off. Some systems do not have a hysteretic effect in the return path 
but crowd behaviour does. For example, with a rioting crowd if the threshold 
level of rioters is below a certain number the riot dies away if the provocation 
ceases; however, once over the threshold (seemingly around 20 per cent), the 
riot takes off and continues even after the provocation is removed. 
Social, ecological and biophysical systems exhibit nonlinear threshold behaviour, 
which results in alternating stable states of systems (or alternating stability 
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domains). One could ask: what variables reached threshold levels or tipping 
points in the ‘Arab Spring’ political outbreaks in the Middle East recently? 
What was building up? One proposition may be that the threshold was brought 
much lower than before due to social media: mobile phones enabled it to take 
off at a much lower level of provocation than would have been required earlier. 
This is an interesting idea because it reinforces one of the next three points I 
want to stress. 
First, a threshold occurs where there is a change in feedbacks, and feedback 
effects can be counterintuitive; they can be quite puzzling, as illustrated by the 
following example.
Salvinia molesta is a weed from South America that filled lakes in northern 
Queensland. After some tests, a little weevil (Cyrtobagous salviniae) was 
introduced from South America (where salvinia originates), which eats only 
salvinia, and it cleared the lake. Papua New Guinea also has lakes with the same 
salvinia problem and when the weevil was introduced there nothing happened. 
An Australian scientist studied this and discovered that the weeds actually needed 
to be fertilised to grow even more. What he found was that the protein level in 
the weeds was just below the critical amount needed for the weevil to breed; the 
protein level had to be raised. Nitrogen fertiliser was added; the protein level 
went up and the weevils took off and bred and controlled the weed. What was 
interesting is that once that had happened and the weevil numbers increased 
above a threshold number of their own, the effect of grazing on the weed was to 
increase its protein level, and so it never needed to be fertilised again as long as 
the weevil numbers remained high enough to control the salvinia. 
The second point is that thresholds interact and can move—they are not 
necessarily constant. As an example, coral reefs can be healthy or stressed. They 
can exist in the normal coral state as well as a macro-algal state, and various 
others, the worst being slime. The two controlling variables determining these 
states are the amount of fishing, particularly of herbivorous fish, and extra 
nutrients flowing onto the reef. The nutrients promote algae, while grazing by 
herbivorous fish reduces algae, so if you go above a certain threshold of fishing 
and extra nutrients the reef goes from the coral state to the macro-algal state. 
Even if the fishing is reintroduced, it stays in the algal state unless something 
else intervenes that can get rid of the algae. 
A point I underline in this example is that the threshold level is not fixed. Climate 
change has an effect on the threshold positions. The threshold is lowered by 
climate change, carbon dioxide and the acidification of the water. So the effect 
of climate change is to reduce the resilience of the reef to fishing and nutrient 
inflow. It will take less fishing pressure and fewer nutrients to flip a coral reef 
into the algal phase as climate change increases because that threshold, like 
most, is not fixed but can shift and change. 
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The third point about thresholds is that they occur across scales and domains 
that can have cascading effects; by domains I mean the ecological, the economic 
and the social subsystems. In the Goulburn–Broken catchment in south-eastern 
Australia 10 thresholds were identified by researchers, together with the local 
people, that occurred at three spatial scales—farm to landscape scale, landscape 
to catchment, state to nation—and in three domains: the social, the economic 
and the biophysical. These 10 thresholds have cascading effects. So once a 
threshold is crossed it can cause the crossing of another threshold or it can 
reduce the likelihood of crossing another threshold. 
So from a resilience perspective, a linked social-ecological system is viewed as 
a set of interacting thresholds across domains and across scales, subjected to 
external shocks—price shocks, changes in markets, climate, diseases and so 
on—and, depending on the shock, one or more of these thresholds are likely to 
be crossed, which can set in chain a cascading effect. That represents a different 
way of thinking about systems other than trying to optimise some particular 
part of them. 
General Resilience
General resilience, involving adaptability, is the capacity of all parts of the system 
to cope with many types of shocks. Many different studies show that having 
high diversity, and especially what we call response diversity, is important 
for conferring general resilience. It is often mistakenly called redundancy. In 
systems where economic efficiency is important redundancy means where there 
are two ways of doing something it is preferable to get rid of one and keep 
only the one that is doing the job best. Scientists do not see that as undesirable 
redundancy. Rather, they say if a system has several elements that do the same 
thing but in somewhat different ways, that confers response diversity. If one 
element is knocked out the other one can begin to do it. So if five species in a 
forest can fix nitrogen and something happens to one of them the other four 
can take up the slack. If there is only one legume species (nitrogen fixer) and a 
disease wipes it out the whole function of nitrogen fixation will be lost. 
Being modular in structure and not overly connected is another contributor 
to general resilience. An overly connected system means problems and 
diseases can be transmitted rapidly through the system as a whole, while 
having no connections at all implies isolation. A modular system indicates 
enough connectedness to exclude isolation, but not so many connections that 
defences collapse.
General resilience is enhanced by the ability to adapt quickly and effectively 
to change. Having tight feedbacks is one aspect of this: when the length of 
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contributing components in a feedback loop increases, it decreases the resilience. 
If it takes six steps instead of three to record and respond to something, resilience 
is lost. Also, being open, allowing immigration and emigration (ecologically or 
socially) enhances resilience. And having reserves is necessary, whether physical 
reserves like seed banks or social reserves like memory. Several years ago when 
the massive tsunamis hit South-East Asia, those communities which did best 
had old people nearby who remembered that when the water goes out people 
should run away from the water. Such social memories conferred resilience. 
Other important qualities of general resilience applying particularly to human 
systems are fostering innovation and novelty/experimentation. Social systems 
are more resilient when we promote innovation and experimentation, but so 
much of the way our systems work reduces the potential of these attributes.
The final attribute I will mention is having overlapping institutions and 
polycentric governance. We are talking here of building social capital through 
leadership, trust and strong integrated networks. The work of Elinor Ostrom 
has shown how they enable long-term persistence, as opposed to having highly 
efficient, non-overlapping and single systems of governance. Ostrom, as a 
founding member of our Resilience Alliance, found some wonderful stories 
about small, long-term irrigation and forestry systems that have persisted for 
500 years or more. What rules enabled that system to persist over time? These 
rules are incredibly interesting. Ostrom (1990) identified boundary conditions 
of the rules that have to be in place. What happened with many of them is 
that they evolved under a variable, uncertain environment and coped. Spanish 
agriculture (a persistent system) has now been opened up to the European Union. 
Spaniards now must allow cheaper oranges from elsewhere into their region and 
they can sell their water outside their region. This has entirely changed the 
rules that enabled that system to persist—globalisation has disrupted the rules. 
We still have to think of it as a complex adaptive system and also need now to 
think: ‘How is the world changing?’ Or, to put it differently: ‘What are the rules 
for changing the rules?’ Rules are going to change, so the issue is whether we 
can put in place rules to change our own rules so that we can transform through 
time instead of becoming an economic basket case.
I will now emphasise four additional points about general resilience. First, 
resilience is not about avoiding change. Trying to keep a system constant 
reduces resilience. If you never burn a forest it becomes increasingly prone to 
dying as a result of fire. The only way to make a forest resilient to fire is to burn 
it occasionally because otherwise the species capable of coping with fire will be 
outcompeted, will disappear and the forest will lose the ability to handle a fire.
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Next, making a system very resilient in one way at one spatial scale can cause it 
to lose resilience in other ways or at other scales. There is a trade-off. A social-
ecological system cannot be understood or managed at only one scale; there are 
trade-offs when resilience is applied in practice.
The third point is that general resilience is neither good nor bad. Often people 
talk about resilience as obviously good; however, undesirable states of systems 
can be very resilient, such as dictatorships and saline landscapes. Resilience 
is a property of a system. A very resilient ‘bad’ state is incredibly difficult to 
deal with and a system that was once considered desirable can become very 
undesirable through changes in external conditions to which it has adapted.
And finally, most losses in resilience are the unintended consequences of 
narrowly focused optimisation, mostly stemming from failure to recognise cross-
scale and cross-domain feedbacks. 
It comes down to the trade-off between specified and general resiliencies, which 
are both important. The ‘rule of hand’ states that at any one scale there are no 
more than three to five controlling variables that are really important at any 
time. If there were many variables the system would exhibit chaotic dynamics 
and wouldn’t persist over time. It would eventually degrade until it became a 
simpler system. The handful of really important controlling variables defines 
the boundary conditions that limit the system so it keeps functioning as it is. 
It is necessary to understand what those variables are and that’s where you 
should put your money. The way to get at those is to do a ‘feedbacks’ kind of 
analysis. You need to think that if you change this then what feedback loops 
follow? What controls the dynamics when you change any one part of it? This 
eventually simplifies down to a handful of controlling variables that define the 
axes of the system in which its behaviour remains. If, however, you put all your 
money on one variable, saying ‘water depth is really an important controlling 
thing so we should put all of our money into controlling that, keeping it below 
that threshold’, and if in doing that something else that is important is changed 
and you haven’t really thought about it, you could come unstuck. You might 
end up with a massive disease outbreak because of a consequence of that action 
that had nothing to do with water depth. So you must constantly bear in mind 
general resilience. How do you remain generally resilient when you cannot 
predict what shock might occur and what the uncertainties are, and where the 
possibility of transformation is?
So although there is some trade-off between general and specified resiliencies you 
can prioritise because in each case you can identify where the weaknesses are. 
I run resilience assessment workshops with catchment management authorities 
and I find the easiest issue to come to grips with when they start working on 
specified resilience is to identify where the thresholds are. We use a process 
called state and transition models, which ask: ‘What states can the system be 
11. Understanding Resilience and Reducing Future Vulnerabilities in Social-Ecological Systems
131
in?’ It can be in one of several states. This requires another question: ‘How does 
it get from one to the other?’ When you ask those questions people bring their 
knowledge and indicate what needs to happen for it to go from one state to 
another. So you can start by looking for a threshold level to get to grips with a 
particular part of the system. For general resilience, however, it is much fuzzier. 
Transformability
Being able to adapt and being generally resilient will undoubtedly be very 
important in what we do in the future for our society, for ecosystems and for 
social-ecological systems. But when does further adaptation simply amount to 
digging the hole deeper? The first rule about holes is that when you are in one, 
stop digging. Getting past the state of denial is not easy. I have heard irrigation 
farmers in areas of the country that are drying out say: ‘No, we just need to get 
a bit more efficient.’ Their adaptation is to dig the hole deeper, making it much 
harder to shift to something else, as they probably will have to do.
So, if a shift into a bad state has occurred or if one clearly is going to happen then 
the only option is transformation, which is the third big property or concept 
of resilience: the capacity to become a different kind of system, a new way of 
living or making a living. This is not just another phase of the same system but 
a system that is defined differently.
In most of the world today the rates of change (social, ecological and climatic) 
demand a process of continuous transformation, not adaptation; that is a deeply 
uncomfortable idea because most people hate fundamental change. Adaptation 
people can do, though it is hard, but they hate fundamental change. So if 
communities are told they can no longer be irrigation farming producers, but 
must do something else, they will fight tooth and nail. Yet fundamental change 
is being demanded of us because the rates of change occurring in the world 
today require it. 
Transformability has three determinants. The first is preparedness to change—
getting beyond the state of denial is the most difficult stage. The second 
determinant is options for change. What new trajectories are possible? This 
emerges from support for experiments, for novelty, for continual learning to 
identify the options. The third is the capacity to change; even if a good option 
can be identified can it be adopted? The capacity to change is largely about 
the levels of capital: human, financial, knowledge and natural capital and 
higher-scale support, such as appropriate institutions. Higher-scale support 
includes governance, but governance, which is so important, is often lacking 
or disappointing.
Future-Proofing the State
132
So if we look at the options for change it is especially important to support 
creativity and identify new options. An idea that comes out of transition 
theory in The Netherlands is about ‘safe arenas’. A group of social scientists is 
trying to transform five stressed policy areas in The Netherlands. They say The 
Netherlands cannot keep doing what it is doing in terms of energy, transport, 
old age, agriculture and water. The country has to change fundamentally. To 
change energy in The Netherlands requires getting all the stakeholders together, 
including the major energy company, which is likely to prevent anything it 
dislikes because it is the big, powerful player. So this group of social scientists 
proposes creating safe arenas for experimentation that are protected from the 
dominant regime, allowing people to do unusual things. Many of those will fail, 
but those that succeed will start to become mainstream and then you will get a 
trajectory shift. 
It is also important to encourage change rather than help prevent change. All 
too often help from government seems to be help to keep doing the same thing. 
When people want to do something different they are told: ‘Oh no, you can’t use 
money for that. The money’s dedicated to do this and you can’t use it to do that.’ 
So government effectively prevents communities from doing anything novel.
Resilience and transformability are not opposites. In Australia’s Murray–
Darling Basin it is now clear there is not enough water in the system to meet the 
water allocations communities were originally given (even in a wet period), so 
in order for the whole basin to support viable, sustainable, long-term farming 
communities with high wellbeing, parts of the system have to transform. Not all 
of the existing communities can keep doing what they are doing—and of course 
the tough question is: ‘Who has to change?’ 
The questions that apply to these communities, spatial areas and even nations 
are: ‘Where is there a need to build the resilience, and where is there a need for 
transformational change?’ If as a society we can distinguish between adaptation 
and transformation, and try not to build resilience everywhere, we will make 
considerable progress forward. 
Almost every time we have done the exercise the weakest part is in the 
governance. Achieving transformational change depends on the kind and 
strength of governance that is in place. I keep coming back to that. Often, those 
responsible for it are the root of the problem. I met one very perceptive person 
working in one of the catchment management authorities who was complaining 
about the intransigence of the levels above her—and many of them were 
intransigent. She then said perceptively: ‘But hang on: you know, when we 
get the power to do something we don’t want to distribute it down either, we 
want to keep control.’ There is a kind of urge at every level to keep control and 
power, to consolidate power and not to distribute it. A distributive governance 
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system allows a decision to be made at the level at which it is most appropriate. 
That level may change over time and depending on context. Under certain 
circumstances you should make it at a higher level, at other circumstances at 
a lower level; but keeping it always fixed is not going to work and will be 
particularly consolidating because then there is the natural tendency for control 
to creep upwards.
Current global governance efforts are largely failing because national self-
interest and the silo structure of international agencies suppress and mask the 
secondary feedback effects of sub-global activities. This issue is of great concern 
to people in the Beijer Institute in Sweden and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, 
where we have been trying to look at how the planet is functioning at the 
moment. We see as a major problem the inability of international institutions 
and agencies to connect in a collaborative, self-organising way. Changing the 
planet’s current unsustainable trajectory will require a process of continuous 
transformational change, not adaptation, and a new social contract; and that 
needs to be informed by a resilience perspective of what is happening. 
So, to conclude: how do we operationalise a resilience perspective? Well, there 
is no single recipe. Applying resilience amounts to putting a resilience lens over 
what is already being done and whatever planning or management frameworks 
are being used. This is the challenge ahead.
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12. Improving Resilience through 
Environmental Scanning in Western 
Australia
Nicole Eastough
The public sector’s resilience to change is dependent at least in part on its capacity 
to anticipate change and its preparedness to respond. This is the case whether 
change occurs gradually and progressively or as major shocks. In the public 
sector, environmental scanning is a technique for identifying prospective policy 
challenges—and opportunities—that might arise from current and emerging 
issues and trends. It attempts to answer questions such as: how do we identify 
relevant issues and trends? How do we present these as snapshots? How can 
we translate that information into flexible strategies and priorities and prepare 
decision-makers for change? 
The WA Department of Treasury introduced an environmental scanning process 
in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis that hit Australia in late 2008. A 
new strategic policy unit was created to ‘make space’ to provide advice on longer-
term and crosscutting policy issues. Part of its remit was to start producing 
regular environmental scans. The unit developed its first environmental scan 
in 2009 on a fairly small scale. The approach was refined with two subsequent 
environmental scans conducted in 2010 and 2011, with a broadened consultation 
base within Treasury and across State public sector agencies. 
This case study describes how environmental scanning has been realised in the 
WA Department of Treasury, and is designed to encourage public sector officials 
to consider current and emerging trends and how they might impact on their 
agency, or the public sector more broadly. Specifically, this case examines 
• the definition of environmental scanning used by the WA Department of 
Treasury 
• the approach to environmental scanning and the methodological considerations 
adopted by the Department of Treasury
• the scanning mechanisms to identify relevant issues and trends
• approaches to undertaking strategic analysis of those issues and trends 
• how the results of environmental scans can be used to inform public policy.
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Defining Environmental Scanning 
The WA Department of Treasury’s approach to environmental scans was initially 
informed by reviews of definitions, approaches and formats for environmental 
scans undertaken in other Australian jurisdictions and internationally. This 
informal desktop study suggested that the key features of environmental scans 
were that they were outward looking, focused on change or possible change, 
considered the policy implications, explored the opportunities and challenges, 
and emphasised the issues that were most relevant to the organisation. 
Over the past four years the WA Department of Treasury has developed its own, 
more prescriptive definition of environmental scanning that encompasses both 
the process and the use of such scans. First, environmental scanning is a formal 
and systematic exploration of the external environment to identify potential 
opportunities, challenges and likely relevant future developments that could 
or should inform government policy deliberations. Second, as a discipline, 
environmental scanning guides the development of flexible strategies and 
priorities that prepare the government and its decision-makers to respond 
quickly to change. This is an assertion of how the products of environmental 
scans might be used.
Environmental scans encompass both the potential for crises, which may include 
large-scale disasters, and softer, progressive processes of change. In this context, 
the essential nature of environmental scans is that they are
• formal and systematic investigations
• have an external focus
• investigate likely relevant future developments
• inform government policy deliberations 
• provide for flexible responses to change.
The department’s intentions in producing environmental scans were to use 
them to
• raise awareness of key strategic issues, particularly crosscutting issues that 
might impact on Western Australia’s public sector, either in the short term 
or over the longer term 
• inform the development of strategic plans and operational work plans, and 
policy development within Treasury 
• prepare the Government to respond quickly to change.
Scans have also proved a useful means of introducing new staff to a ‘big picture’ 
view on key issues and trends that affect the public sector and more specifically 
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Treasury business. A further benefit is that they can pinpoint areas of risk, and 
at the same time develop scenarios to test the impacts of change in external 
parameters or policy conditions.
Conducting an Environmental Scan
Comprehensive Project Planning
An environmental scanning process can be as large or as small a task as the 
agency’s resourcing will allow. Ideally, it is a task for a team of investigators, 
not for an individual in an ivory tower. Comprehensive scans need input from 
people with a broad range of views and experience. It is vital to draw on the 
diversity of talent, knowledge and experience within both the agency and the 
public sector more broadly to identify relevant issues and trends. 
Given the potential breadth of scope, environmental scans need tight project 
management, covering their scope, approaches, time frames, consultation 
mechanisms, format, team resourcing and the communication strategy. In the 
WA Department of Treasury, initial planning and brainstorming began in April–
May 2011 with dedicated staff taken offline while the State budget was being 
finalised. In-depth research and analysis were undertaken in the aftermath of 
the budget. Dedicated resources for the project consisted of three staff, with 
additional input and advice from other areas within the department and from 
other agencies.
Several internal and external workshops were held to invite internal senior 
officers to share their views, and for key government agencies to present and 
discuss their agencies’ strategic issues. Approximately 25 to 30 State Government 
agencies participated in the 2011 process. The process was initially expected to 
take about four to six months, but the time frames were extended to monitor the 
immense volatility and uncertainty in global economic conditions at the time 
of drafting. When taking into account the time involved to communicate the 
environmental scan, the entire process took close to a year. 
Identifying Issues and Trends 
Environmental scanners typically employ diagnostic techniques of the external 
environment. The WA Treasury chose to adopt ‘STEEP’ as an instrument to 
identify issues and trends. STEEP seeks to identify changes in society, changes 
in technology, changes in the economy (perhaps better phrased as the economic 
outlook), environmental change and political change—hence ‘STEEP’. From our 
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perspective, the particular choice of technique (for example, whether STEEP is 
chosen over other techniques such as ‘PEST’, ‘PESTLIED’, ‘PESTEL’, ‘STEEPLE’ 
or ‘SLEPT’) is largely arbitrary, as the success of the technique in identifying 
relevant issues and trends is contingent on access to and engagement with a 
diverse pool of people who are willing to share relevant ideas and expertise. 
The key difference between these environmental scanning techniques and 
a ‘SWOT’ (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis is that 
the environmental scan is focused on the external environment, including 
issues that can be largely outside the control of the public sector, and does not 
specifically examine the agency’s capacity to respond to change. Examples of 
the types of public sector issues and trends that may be drawn out of facilitated 
group discussions using STEEP or a related technique are provided below.
Societal Change
In public policy there are no hard and fast rules about what should be provided 
by government, to what standard or at what price. Expectations change over 
time, differ between generations and are influenced by the availability of services 
and awareness of new or alternative services that may not be available locally. 
Expectations can be highly political and emotive, and are difficult to manage. 
For individuals, preferences to use public or private services can be influenced 
by the capacity to pay, the ease with which they can access services and 
differences between the two sectors in the range of services provided and their 
respective service delivery models. 
Societal change is largely due to demographic developments, through population 
growth, population ageing, immigration and regional residential variability 
across the State or country. Other changes in society can occur through the 
comparative living standards and evolving relations between the indigenous 
populations and the broader community. 
These demographic changes can result in changes in community expectations 
about the quality of services provided or receiving access to them, security of 
the services and rates of utilisation. It can also raise operational delivery issues, 
workforce issues and equity of services between metropolitan and regional and 
remote communities. 
Changes in lifestyle trends and behaviours can have a significant influence on 
demand for and utilisation of services. Such trends may include prevalence 
of chronic health conditions, prevalence of smoking and alcohol use, health 
behaviours or the risks of outbreaks of disease. 
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Technological Change
New technologies can decrease our reliance on labour to perform specific tasks, 
to address imbalances between the supply of and demand for limited natural 
resources, and to satisfy society’s expectations of communication, entertainment 
and service delivery. Advances in technology can change the way people work 
by automating processes or reducing processing time (such as through using 
wireless devices), and the use of robotics in some services and industries. The 
adoption of new technology can also reduce labour and other costs through 
more effective service delivery. Other technological advances can offer the 
potential to respond to societal values (for example, renewable energy sources) 
or to challenge existing values (for example, attitudes to genetically modified 
crops).
Rapid growth in the use of social media and the availability of the web 2.0 
technologies are challenging the traditional ways governments communicate 
with the public, opening up new possibilities of providing access to data and 
information, and mediums or platforms to consult over policy areas or legislation.
Economic Outlook
Considerations of the economic outlook over the short to medium term may 
take account of common economic indicators such as inflation, interest rates, 
employment growth, unemployment rates, household debt and forecasts for 
economic growth. More strategic economic concerns may include considerations 
of which sectors of the economy are performing more strongly than others, 
levels of sovereign (government) debt, indications of structural change in the 
economy, trends in the terms of trade, and economic trends occurring in major 
trading partners.
Longer-term considerations may be challenges to managing government debt, 
increasing productivity and developing a more competitive economy. This may 
also include consideration of supply constraints such as levels of investment 
in research, science and innovation, regulation and support for business and 
agriculture, infrastructure adequacy, housing availability and affordability, and 
skills and employment.
Fiscal issues at present tend to focus on the provision of fiscal stimulus measures 
announced by various governments in response to the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, and fiscal consolidation measures to either wind back fiscal stimulus or 
manage sovereign debt. 
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Environmental Change
Consideration of environmental issues and trends requires a balance between 
observed and projected changes to the environment (for instance, rainfall 
patterns, salinity measures, sea levels, drought) and the relative risks of major 
environmental events, including major weather events (such as cyclones or 
floods), seismic events or bushfires.
Strategic considerations include the risk of conflict between heritage and 
conservation interests, resource development interests and urban land-use 
interests. These issues may arise from population growth and housing demand, 
proposals or trends to develop resources in prime agricultural land, and trends 
in foreign ownership of or investment in domestic assets and land. In turn, 
these factors will have implications for planning in terms of transport networks, 
the rate of urban infill, water allocation and management, and economic 
infrastructure.
Political Dynamics
The public sector has a close relationship with politics and government, and it 
can be difficult to isolate the political dynamics from the ordinary machinery of 
public administration. The challenge is to step back from the day-to-day issues and 
relationships between the public sector and government and to observe broader 
trends. Political factors that may be relevant include: government stability, which 
parties are in power across the country, government relationships with the media, 
opportunities and interests in government to introduce and progress reforms, the 
relative balance of independence versus the responsiveness of the public sector 
to government priorities, and broader geopolitical trends elsewhere.
In a federation such as Australia the stability and effectiveness of relationships 
between different levels of government, including the equity of distribution of 
financial resources between and across levels of government, can be significant 
influences on the effectiveness of service delivery. It may also be important to 
consider recent trends in reforms to accountability frameworks, the extent to 
which they centralise or decentralise decision-making, their influence on fiscal 
flexibility and financial accountability, and the longer-term implications for 
State sovereignty.
Strategic Analysis
At the simplest level, an environmental scan can be limited to identifying a list of 
issues and trends of relevance to the agency. Some environmental scanners may 
also undertake a simple risk-assessment exercise to indicate the relative risk of 
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each issue. From a policy perspective, scans are of increased value when some 
additional form of strategic analysis is undertaken on the issues and trends, in 
terms of categorising information, gathering supporting evidence, identifying 
and considering the potential policy implications, and constructing a narrative 
of change. 
Strategic analysis is the meaty part of the environmental scanning process. It is 
an iterative process that does not require a big team but does need people who 
are strategic thinkers, who can take responsibility for a cluster of issues, and who 
can sift them for relevance. It demands experience in isolating the intangibles 
from group discussions, transforming them into tangible facts, figures, charts 
and observations, and drawing out the policy implications.
Categorising Information
Categorising information is a matter of reviewing and clustering issues and trends 
identified through workshops and consultation. Mind mapping can be a useful 
tool to help organise information and identify related themes. This might need 
to be done in several stages at different levels of complexity. It is the process of 
categorisation that contributes to the development of the structure and underlying 
messages of the environmental scan; however, attempts to mind map every issue 
raised through extensive consultation can be counterproductive. There will be 
many interdependencies and interrelationships between issues and trends, and 
it is likely that a complete mind map will resemble an inky blob of spaghetti. 
It is therefore often better to prepare very simple, high-level mind maps, or to 
produce detailed mind maps for narrowly focused selected issues and trends. 
Categorising information is more a process of achieving consensus than of finding 
the ‘perfect’ themes, and should be undertaken with a view to identifying 
about five to nine themes that are clearly relevant to the agency. In the case 
of the WA Department of Treasury, there was a heavy bias towards economic 
and financial themes. The 2011 environmental scan consolidated the identified 
issues and trends to eight key drivers of change, which were the State’s economic 
outlook, global economic uncertainty, fiscal consolidation trends, urban and 
environmental change, technological change, health and wellbeing, societal 
expectations, and demographic change.
Gathering Evidence 
Environmental scans are typically reliant on secondary quantitative and 
qualitative data sources. The scope of potential sources is necessarily broad, 
with a first priority to access professional expertise from within the agency, 
including people, corporate records and data sources. Other potentially relevant 
sources of data include
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• published and unpublished data from line public sector agencies (reports, 
reviews, budget statements, annual reports, online statistics and unpublished 
data collections)
• government statistics and reviews from sources such as the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, the Productivity 
Commission, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Bureau of 
Agriculture, Resource Economics and Sciences
• other sources of government information (media statements, Hansard debates, 
reports from inquiries and audits)
• testing local trends against other jurisdictions, using sources such as the 
OECD, IMF, World Bank and the Productivity Commission. 
These sources need to be tested for relevance and credibility in terms of their 
authority, accuracy, reliability, validity, bias and timeliness. The Productivity 
Commission’s suggested methodological considerations and principles for 
evidence-based policy should not be overlooked in determining whether 
isolated data and information constitute sufficiently robust evidence to be 
included in the environmental scan (see Banks 2009). 
It can be useful to test ‘public sector thinking’ against the views of others, 
including industry bodies and/or community stakeholders and representative 
bodies, academia, employee representative groups and think tanks. The choice 
of consultation will vary with the scope of the environmental scanning exercise 
and the agency’s relationship with potential stakeholders. Media coverage of 
issues, including press releases from other agencies or jurisdictions, can alert 
scanners to new developments, different perspectives and recently published 
new data.
Drawing out the Implications, Opportunities and 
Challenges
The third stage of strategic analysis is to review the accumulated evidence and 
identify the key policy implications. Where and why might the public sector 
need to respond to the issues and trends? What are the risks and uncertainties? 
What are the potential positive impacts (opportunities) of the observed and 
predicted trends? What are the potential negative impacts (challenges)? 
Does the government have a role to intervene, or is the rationale for current 
interventions still valid? This review forms the basis of a discussion of the 
implications, opportunities and challenges presented by the issues and trends 
that are included in the environmental scan. 
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Constructing a Narrative
The final task is to construct a narrative. The environmental scan should tell a 
story of change, using a mix of quantitative data and qualitative information. 
The role of the scan’s narrative is to provide depth, focus and context, and a 
platform for policy debate. It needs to set out the opportunities, the downsides 
and the risks. It should use an accumulation of evidence to lead the audience to 
the policy implications, opportunities and challenges and directions for further 
policy development. 
If an environmental scan is to be used to inform policy development, it needs 
to present issues, supporting evidence and the implications in the form of a 
narrative that persuades the audience that policy change may be needed. Its 
arguments must be supported with judiciously selected evidence. It must 
synthesise what might otherwise appear to be randomly selected data to give it 
meaning and coherence. 
Appealing to the Audience
Environmental scans can be lengthy documents intended to communicate 
vast quantities of information. The layout thus needs to be designed both to 
attract the reader’s attention and to communicate information succinctly. In 
presenting information on issues and trends, it may be useful to focus first 
on presenting and explaining data and research findings. Discuss the policy 
implications separately. Stand-alone pages, with a message on each page, can be 
very effective. Message-based taglines are more effective as headings than single 
words, and can be threaded to integrate isolated data and observations into a 
broader narrative from page to page.
There needs to be a strong focus on making very complex issues relatively easy 
to digest. The text should be condensed to the key points, and visual impacts are 
important. At least one image, graph or chart on every page (provided they are 
clearly related to the text) helps to both engage the reader and communicate key 
points. Infographics are resource intensive to develop but effective to present 
information. A defined colour scheme can be an effective aid. 
As environmental scans may be informed by a vast range of information, 
particularly secondary sources, which may be subject to change, it is essential 
to reference sources. It is useful to both hyperlink the text and include academic 
referencing to encourage readers to refer to the original source information to 
pursue more extensive policy research. 
It is advisable to incorporate a disclaimer. Environmental scans are not predictive 
documents, use material from an extensive range of secondary sources, don’t 
necessarily cover a particular period or horizon, and the data cited may be 
current only for a (sometimes brief) window of time. 
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Using Environmental Scans
Environmental scans, as high-level, broad documents, are not an ideal vehicle 
for delivering formal conclusions and policy recommendations. They cannot 
provide government with immediate solutions to the complex, interdependent 
policy problems they describe. Rather, environmental scans should encourage 
thinking, discussion and further policy work. They should allow frank and 
balanced sharing of a broad range of issues within the public sector. 
In view of this, and depending on the format and scope of the environmental 
scan, it is important to consider whether scans should be classed as confidential 
documents. Public debate is an important feature of policy development, but 
environmental scans may be too broad in scope, and the future too unclear, to 
engage the public and the media effectively. A more appropriate opportunity 
for public engagement may arise from tightly scoped green and white papers 
that focus on selected issues identified in environmental scans. If a scan is to 
remain confidential, the communication strategy for an environmental scan still 
needs to encompass the key audiences of agency staff, stakeholder agencies and 
government. 
Copies of environmental scans should be circulated to agencies which participated 
in the consultation process. Stakeholder agencies may also be invited to receive 
briefings or presentations, with opportunities to present highlights and key 
issues to small groups of agency chief executives. This assists in providing 
agencies with the ‘bigger picture’ view and developing relationships for input 
into future scanning work and policy reform. 
Ministers or cabinets may wish to be briefed on key messages in the environmental 
scan. For instance, some of the key findings from Treasury’s 2011 environmental 
scan that had the potential to impact on the State’s financial position over the 
budget and forward estimates period were brought to the attention of the 
Economic and Expenditure Review Committee as part of the broader scene 
setting for the development of the 2012–13 budget. At the agency level, 
environmental scans can be integrated with strategic and operational planning 
to help define the agency’s forward work program and resource allocation. For 
individuals, they are also an opportunity to develop insight into the ‘bigger’ 
picture of the complexity of policy.
Environmental scans can, and should, be used
• to raise awareness of issues and trends, especially longer-term trends
• to identify crosscutting policy issues that impact on multiple portfolios and 
require a coordinated policy response
• as a mechanism to engage with stakeholders and other agencies
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• to pinpoint and highlight areas of risk and opportunity for the sustainability 
of public sector finances
• to identify opportunities for scenario analysis with high-risk issues
• to inform policy development.
Informing Policy Development and Reform
Environmental scanning is a part of the complex pathway of policy development 
and reform. As indicated above, while they are very useful to identify issues, 
and involve some limited policy analysis, they are too broad and high level in 
scope to present informed recommendations for change.
Based on the experience of the WA Department of Treasury, in terms of further 
work it is important to dig beneath some of the higher-risk issues and to 
monitor them closely. It is not realistic to expect an agency to have the capacity 
to conduct in-depth policy analysis on every issue raised in an environmental 
scan. Rather, the scan should be used to help pinpoint significant areas of risk 
that demand attention, to allow just a couple of key issues to be focused on at 
any point in time.
In taking these priority issues forward, it is worth giving consideration to some 
of the drivers of good policy reform processes, such as 
• establishing a sound case 
• bringing intellectually sound design to the policy reform 
• being ready for and using windows of opportunity for reform as they are 
presented 
• securing strong political commitment to reform 
• building a broad base of support and consensus for reform. 
It should be remembered that an environmental scan may raise many issues and 
trends that are relevant to the agency but are not the agency’s primary policy 
responsibility. The forward view is to engage other agencies to isolate the issues 
and trends that are important to them, and within their remit (which could 
include crosscutting policy issues common to multiple agencies), and to work 
collaboratively in the next stage of the policy process. 
Conclusion
The WA Department of Treasury’s approach to environmental scanning is formal 
and systematic, outwardly focused and examines change that is relevant to the 
WA public sector. Some of the lessons to be learned from this experience are 
that environmental scanners should be encouraged to gather information from a 
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wide range of sources, and to incorporate consultation and awareness raising as 
vital components of the process. They should think strategically. They should 
construct a narrative that leads their audience to see opportunities for further 
policy development, and that has the potential to manage policy challenges 
before they become crises. Their product—the environmental scan—should 
be used as a platform for debate rather than to communicate predetermined 
policy positions. 
Environmental scans explore the potential to improve public sector resilience in 
a softer setting of change, and should give the audience an appreciation of the 
connections between public policy issues. Understanding these connections, 
and how change in these connections influences government policy, is integral 
to the public sector becoming more resilient to change.
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13. Environmental Scanning Processes 
in Queensland’s Department of 
Transport and Main Roads
Adam Rogers
I write this chapter not as an expert in environmental scanning, but in my role 
as a user of the outputs of an environmental scanning approach implemented in 
the Department of Transport and Main Roads in Queensland.1 This chapter will 
investigate the kinds of future influences that might shape the direction taken 
in delivering a transport system. It focuses on three key areas of environmental 
scanning and its relationship to transport strategy: how we use environmental 
scanning to inform policy development; how we build capability; and how we 
use it to build capability for scanning and future thinking.
The department’s environmental scanning function focuses on the sigmoid 
curves of ideas and strategies as applied to transport. Sigmoid curves represent 
the natural growth and death of an idea, product, concept or system. So, for 
instance, think of the horse and cart, the most common form of transport in the 
1800s. We started domesticating horses, we took them as far as we could go, got 
the most out of them and then something else came along: the automobile. The 
use of horses began to decline as the use of automobiles increased. We look at 
this phenomenon in terms of: ‘Well, where are the things we do poised on the 
curve?’ We ask: ‘Are they part of the old way of things or are they a new idea 
that has come along?’ We use a scanning process to help us fill the gap in the 
middle, first to examine where we are on the curve, and second to try to identify 
what has not yet gained our attention that we might need to respond to.
The environmental scanning processes were adapted to the structure of the 
department and our business model. Essentially, there are three main areas 
of our business: planning, programming and delivery. The department uses 
several key questions to guide its projects: what does the Government want 
to achieve from transport? What systems do we need? How do we manage the 
systems we already have? What planning do we need to do for future avenues? 
How do we choose the areas in which to invest? Program development is really 
about: ‘OK, we made a choice. Now, when are we going to do it? How are we 
1 The process described is the one that was in place within the Queensland Department of Transport and 
Main Roads leading up to the July 2012 ANZSOG annual conference. As such, this chapter reflects that point 
in time and may not reflect current practice or direction.
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going to do it? How are we going to deliver and finalise it?’ Ultimately, our 
business model centres on our scanning process, which occurs in the short term 
(a process covering one to four years) and in the long term (a 10-year process).
Transport is a huge issue in Queensland, particularly in the south-east, but 
also in regional and rural areas. The State has a vast network of roads, many of 
which are remote, but they carry the heavy burden of handling the movement 
of produce, resources and tourism.
The journey of the Department of Transport and Main Roads towards 
environmental scanning began in 1999 when it was two separate departments: 
Queensland Transport and the Main Roads Department. The two directors-
general agreed that the departments needed to look at the future of transport for 
Queensland and to envision the State’s changing transport needs between 2000 
and 2025. The two departments coordinated a project called ‘4-seeable Futures’, 
released in 2000, which planned for the eventuality of four hypothetical 
scenarios.
The first scenario was that of the ‘Super City’: the transformation of the Gold 
Coast, Sunshine Coast and Brisbane into one conjoined mega-city. The second 
scenario was that of ‘Coastal Bloom’: the establishment of a series of medium-
density urban centres up the State’s east coast. The third scenario was that of 
the ‘Carbon Crunch’, and the fourth, ‘Global Bust’. Since 1999 all four of these 
scenarios have transpired to some degree. They were literally foreseeable futures 
that were foreseen.
In the initial phases of environmental scanning we also examined unconventional 
approaches to transport. For example, the department examined research into 
flying cars. There was some incredibly good analysis done; however, the only 
attention this research received was a banner headline on the front page of The 
Courier-Mail: ‘The Transport Department Predicts Flying Cars in Brisbane.’ Of 
course, this resulted in some sensitivity about doing these sorts of exercises and 
caused a bit of pain for the senior management of that time. 
The big question with this sort of analytical process is how to implement it 
and how to use it within the agency. Arguably this research did not end up 
being used that effectively in the agency because there was no real plan to do 
something meaningful with it.
Ten years later the Departments of Transport and Main Roads joined into one 
agency in recognition of overlapping roles and responsibilities, especially in 
relation to road building and transport network planning. The new, larger 
department adopted a wider lens in its approach; it no longer considered roads 
to be the only solution to a transport problem, and it had a more long-term 
strategic vision. As a result, the agency decided to have another look at the 
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forecasting environmental scanning process; rather than doing it in a stand-
alone report, the agency built in some capacity to keep it on the agenda all the 
time in order to refresh thinking about it. 
The first steps of the department’s environmental scanning model focused on 
the influences on transport as a way of understanding the needs of the transport 
system. From there, the department formulated a transport system vision that 
implemented its strategies, specific plans, investment process, program, activities 
and evaluation. Environmental scanning was embedded in that process. It also 
incorporated the shorter-term, one to four-year corporate cycle. In effect, the 
agency said: ‘We need to do environmental scanning. It needs to be embedded 
in the way the department works and thinks about its place in the world.’
In 2009, when the new department completed its environmental scan, it analysed 
the greater environmental trends that had arisen over the past decade, such as 
world energy use. We also looked at various future time scales. We formulated 
objectives for the near term (up to 2020), the medium term and the long term (up 
to 2070). This initial scanning process was not about answering the questions 
or deciding what to look at. It was merely to highlight the issues. Some of 
the questions we looked at were quite useful: what are the most important 
infrastructure platforms of the twenty-first century? What does sustainable 
transport look like? What are the policies and strategies that support it? If our 
transport system is a product of the way we live how will we need to change to 
reflect the way we will live? How might our concepts and language change? For 
example, what does it mean when organisations like IBM talk about enterprise 
ecosystems? We considered the sorts of language and systems currently used, 
and which ideas, concepts and principles are at their use-by date. These were 
the kinds of questions that were in people’s minds.
There are a few other tools we use: the environmental scan and the annual 
opportunities and challenges scan or ‘scanning radar’. We do ‘one-pagers’, each 
of which is a very simple analysis. A small team in one of our branches finds 
interesting media snippets and does a ‘one-pager’. This addresses questions 
such as: what’s the issue? What’s the time frame involved? What are the 
opportunities and impacts on the agency? Where do we think it might affect 
our various business groups? What are we doing? This is circulated to an email 
group within the agency. The ‘one-pagers’ are for departmental use only but 
we do have something called an ‘eCompass’ with a broader distribution. This is 
how we have embedded the process into our planning cycles. This also relates 
to the three areas I referred to at the beginning: how do we use environmental 
scanning to impact strategic planning? How do we impact policy development? 
How do we impact capability building? 
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When we undertake a ‘scanning radar’ exercise, we use a diagnostic methodology. 
It’s a simplistic representation of the key impacts in a particular area that we are 
interested in and lists the key issues according to seven scanned categories. 
We look for changes such as economic shifts and changes in technology and 
infrastructure. We then attribute them with a level of impact—high, medium 
or low. It’s a simple way of showing where things are going. They are then 
summarised onto a radar diagram, which lists the seven categories. 
We did this scanning exercise recently with our senior leadership team: the 
director-general, the deputies and all the general managers of the different 
divisions. We highlighted what things are changing, where the shifts were and 
the opportunities and challenges the researchers saw as coming out of their 
analysis. We then asked the senior leadership team: ‘Where do you think these 
opportunities and challenges fit on the sigmoid curves? Are they a part of the 
old way of doing things? When do you think they will impact us? How well 
prepared do you think we are for responding to the challenges that might 
come?’ Similarly, we asked of the other changes that emerged: ‘If we haven’t 
started thinking about them, when are we going to and are we ready to respond? 
Are they a part of the new way of doing things?’ Using the old ‘post-it’ note 
process, the senior leadership team plotted the most important challenges and 
opportunities they saw. The direct output of this scanning process went into 
our corporate plan. Each of the business divisions is required to respond in 
their business planning process to the strategic challenges and opportunities.
Informing policy development is the next thing. The scanning radar identified 
some issues in terms of what is happening in the freight space. Online shopping 
and intelligent transport systems are really driving changes to the way logistics 
firms use their trucks, move their freight around, how they load and unload 
and what sort of freight there is. The scanning team went to the Queensland 
Transport Logistics Council, a private sector body, to work through some of 
the issues that have been identified in the scanning and to get some industry 
input into our Queensland Freight Strategy. This was based on the changes that 
were likely to occur in the future. This is just an example of how environmental 
scanning is informing a Statewide strategy and helping us to engage with our 
constituencies a little more closely. This was quite useful. 
The main question the department faces with scanning is: how do we translate 
it into direct action? It can seem too blue-sky, too airy-fairy. How do we actually 
make it work for people? Part of the process of educating our own people is to 
work with industry to see the practicality, connections and implications for 
them.
The third aspect is about capability building. We have a voluntary scanning 
reference group across the agency so people from every division who are 
interested in future thinking can be kept up-to-date with all the developments. 
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We use them to shape the scanning process each year. We run staff workshops. 
When we have done the radar we present it to the staff workshops, saying: 
‘Here is the radar; this is what it’s telling us; these are the things we need 
to look out for as they might impact on us over time.’ We also present it to 
senior management workshops. We have also done presentations to different 
divisional teams as they go through their business planning process. We have 
run various master classes where we get the foresight consultant in to workshop 
ideas and findings from the environmental scanning with various groups in the 
organisation. We are really trying to build that constant level of interaction and 
interest within the agency.
Outside the agency we play a part in various external networks around 
scanning. There is the Queensland future scanning network and the national 
one. We are working with agencies like CSIRO and the National Transport 
Commission. CSIRO in particular was interested in what we thought about 
some of the transport implications of mega trends. We produce the eCompass, 
which is the public version of all the latest trends and tips. This is distributed 
across the public sector and to various private sector individuals who have 
expressed an interest. 
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14. Resilience in its Historical and 
Contemporary Contexts
David Kirk
This contribution focuses on the concept of resilience as it is understood and 
used in a wide range of contexts. As a trained medical doctor, I graduated from 
the Otago Medical School in 1985. I therefore have some understanding of the 
resilience of the human body and mind. I also have experience as a professional 
rugby union player. My sporting experiences have given me insight into the 
resilience of sports teams. 
I have a reasonable understanding of economics from later study in Oxford and 
am therefore able to say something about resilient economic systems. Some of 
you may also know I worked in Wellington in the office of the prime minister 
Jim Bolger for more than three years. In its second term, his government had 
a one-seat majority but survived the term, so I have some insight into the 
resilience of governments. 
Most of my working life, however, has been in business management. I have 
worked in the oil and gas industry, in the pulp and paper business, in printing 
and media services, in newspaper and magazine publishing and in a wide range 
of Internet-related businesses. I am currently involved in the film entertainment 
business, the e-commerce business, the funds management and broking business, 
and I am the co-founder and managing partner of a technology investment firm. 
I therefore am able to say something about the resilience of firms and industries 
from firsthand experience. 
I will begin by discussing the resilience of political institutions and processes. 
It is important, however, to understand that my belief about resilience is that it 
is, in all contexts, a function of redundancy and optionality.
Political Philosophy and the Configuration of 
Political Institutions
There are two long periods and one short period in the evolution of the political 
institutions and processes of which we are the inheritors (this is, of course, a 
simplification, but a necessary one given the limited scope of this chapter). The 
documented development of Western liberal political tradition began in Greece 
about 500 or 600 years before the birth of Christ and continues today. 
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This first period is what we call Antiquity. There is no defined end to this 
period but it is not uncommon to consider the emperor Justinian’s closure of 
the Neoplatonic Academy in Athens in 529 AD—because he considered its 
teachings to be inconsistent with Christianity—as the date marking the end 
of Antiquity.
The political institutions of the Greek city-states, of Alexander’s empire and 
of the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire operated effectively, and 
proved themselves resilient, for a little more than a millennium. There was, 
of course, a great deal of disorder and change in the detail of the governance 
arrangements during this period, but it was a period in which art, philosophy, 
commerce, science and culture generally developed consistently and spread 
widely. It was therefore a long period in which political and administrative 
processes broadly worked to the benefit of the peoples of Europe. 
The second long period in the development of Western political institutions and 
processes also lasted about 1000 years. This was the period we call the Middle 
Ages. The Middle Ages was a period in which Christianity was the dominant 
impulse in art, science, military matters and politics in all of Europe, from the 
cold north to the Mediterranean and extending east to Constantinople and the 
reaches of the Byzantine Empire. 
During the Middle Ages, God’s will determined all. Only God was not around 
to interpret His own will, so that difficult task fell to the Pope and his armies 
and to the kings and their armies. Life for everyone else was short, unpleasant 
and subject to sudden disaster. A noble family’s squabble might result in the 
razing of your house and confiscation of your fields, or if you were at court 
quickly shifting alliances could result in your head appearing on a spike one 
fine morning. But no-one was allowed to consider the ghastly unpredictability 
of life in the Middle Ages as in any way arbitrary. It was, after all, God’s will. 
The sole source of goodness and authority was infallible and He had a plan and 
the Pope and the kings knew what that plan was: it was for them to rule. The 
doctrine of the divine right of kings and the ceding of temporal power to popes 
and other high ecclesiasticals, whose playbook was Scripture and personal 
revelation, worked to provide stable and reasonably resilient governance so 
long as the people were not completely starving and the authority’s armies 
were strong. Religious faith was a source of personal and institutional resilience 
through the Middle Ages but it was also the source of much instability. Political 
instability in the Middle Ages was chronic because no-one really knew whose 
side God was on. Anyone who made a claim of divine inspiration and could 
raise an army devoted resources to war. Agreeing to differ was not an option. 
There could only be one divine truth and only war would determine who had it.
14. Resilience in its Historical and Contemporary Contexts
155
The poor serf or impoverished city-dweller at least had the hope of salvation 
in the next life. And Scripture made it fairly plain that the winners on Earth 
were likely to get their comeuppance in the next world. Schadenfreude, even 
if it was postponed, worked wonders as a spiritual salve in the Middle Ages. 
Dante Alighieri gave the best literary expression to the sentiment that must 
have fuelled the resilience of all of downtrodden Europe throughout the Middle 
Ages. This is from The Inferno:
And so we passed along from bridge to bridge,
With other talk, whereof my Comedy
Cares not to tell, until we topped the ridge …
So not by fire, but by the art divine,
A thick pitch boiled down there, spattering the brink
With viscous glue; I saw this, but therein
Nothing; only great bubbles black as ink
Would rise and burst there; or the seething tide
Heave up all over, and settle again, and sink.
And while I stood intent to gaze, my guide,
Suddenly crying to me, ‘Look out! Look Out!’
Caught me where I stood and pulled me to his side …
And then behind us I beheld a grim
Black fiend come over the rock-ridge at a run …
On high-hunched shoulders he was carrying
A wretched sinner, hoist by haunch and hip.
Clutching each ankle by the sinew-string.
‘Bridge-ho!’ he bawled, ‘Our own Hellrakership!
Here’s an alderman of St Zita’s coming down;
Go souse him, while I make another trip …’
He tossed him in, and over the flinty cliff
Wheeled off …
Down bobbed the sinner, then up in writhing knot.
 (The Divine Comedy: Inferno, Canto XXI)
The third period of political organisation and philosophy is relatively short. 
Observations of the natural world from which could be discerned cause and 
effect led to explanations of natural phenomena according to the laws of nature. 
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Predictions from these natural laws proved to be accurate and the authority of 
the Scriptures and God began to unravel. It did not matter that the Inquisition 
extracted a recantation from Galileo; it was a demonstrable fact that the Earth 
revolved around the Sun and so it would ever be.
It took nearly another century to conclude the process, but man-discovered 
laws governing the physical world were the natural precursor to man-created 
laws governing the constitutional and political worlds. 
The ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688, the American Declaration of Independence, 
the proclamation of the rights of man, the doctrine of the separation of powers 
and all the institutional forms established as a result of these constitute our 
modern Western political systems. 
All of the understandings of modern democratic government were in place by 
the end of the eighteenth century but that does not mean it was straightforward 
to give these understandings stable institutional form. Take France for instance. 
France is often considered the source of modern democratic ideas and impulses; 
however, the implementation of these impulses has proved to be problematic in 
France. In a nation in which rhetoric is sometimes inclined to exceed rigour, we 
should perhaps not be surprised that after the revolution came Napoleon and 
then an alternating stream of republic, empire, restoration, empire and then two 
more republics before the fifth and current republic emerged in 1958. 
Germany declared itself a republic only in 1918 and in the east of the continent 
it was not until 1992 that the Russian Federation came into being and democratic 
processes and institutions were established. 
It is only now, at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, that we have, in most of Europe and in a variety of 
the colonies and other countries that the European powers occupied in the 
nineteenth century, the ‘best’ form of government. I put ‘best’ in inverted 
commas because we ought to ask why it is we consider the political institutions 
we currently have to be the best.
First, I think it is because we gradually invented them and everyone always likes 
best those institutions of which they feel they have some ownership. Second, it 
is because they are extant and have survived and no-one likes to think they live 
in a second-best world or under second-best conditions. 
Third, and this is a better reason, it is because others are actively choosing 
them. Eastern Europe has recently chosen, in a variety of forms, representative 
democracy. Even Russia has chosen representative democracy. Unfortunately, 
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the leaders of Russia and the very rich have chosen not to implement the system, 
but they have it nominally. Closer to home Timor-Leste and Burma are choosing 
Western-style political institutions and processes.
The fundamental reason why, finally, after 2500 years, we think we have arrived 
at the right combination of political processes and political institutions is, 
however, because these processes and institutions are consistent with our idea 
of the best political philosophy, which is a messy and shifting trade-off between 
individual freedom and a belief in human equality. 
But if we look back to earlier times we can see that this consistency was always 
a feature of political regimes. Political processes and political institutions are 
always consistent with the prevailing ideal political philosophy. I would go so 
far as to say that, if they are not, they have no resilience at all.
Ancient Sparta had a different political philosophy to Athens. Athens had a 
different philosophy in the time of Pericles than in the time of Alexander. The 
philosophy of the Roman Republic differed from the philosophy of the Roman 
Empire. But while there were stable governance arrangements there was always 
an alignment between the political, and we could say just as easily ethical, 
philosophy of the people and those arrangements.
In the time of Marcus Aurelius (who died in 180 AD), the dominant personal 
and therefore political ethic in the rulers of the Empire was Stoicism. Courage, 
wisdom, temperance and justice were the chief Stoic virtues and lawmaking 
processes and their application were supposed to be consistent with these 
virtues.
In his Meditations, Marcus Aurelius summed up the Stoic’s approach to the new 
day thus:
Begin each day by telling yourself: Today I shall be meeting with 
interference, ingratitude, insolence, disloyalty, ill-will, and selfishness—
all of them are due to the offender’s ignorance of what is good and evil. 
But for my part I have long perceived the nature of good and its nobility, 
and the nature of evil and its meanness … therefore none of these things 
can injure me, for nobody can implicate me in what is degrading. 
Well, that at least proves that not as much has changed in 2000 years as we 
would like to think!
The same consistency is true of the Middle Ages. Political institutions and 
processes were consistent with the ethical, and in this case religious, beliefs 
of the people. Middle Agers, if we can apply that term to a millennium as well 
as populations, believed God was the source of all authority and therefore His 
representatives should have authority on Earth. 
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A more modern example is communism, which lasted in Eastern Europe 
for about 70 years. It was another attempt to build political (and economic) 
institutions and processes consistent with a political philosophy. In essence 
communism is a throwback to a medieval religion-based system, only the God 
of the Middle Ages is replaced in theory with the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and in practice by a common-or-garden dictator and a sophisticated police state. 
I have often wondered if the mistake they made was to leave out some promise of 
life after death. I think it was the atheism that got them in the end. After all, if 
the economic system does not work to make life comfortable for the people and 
there is no hope of a better life after this, there is not a lot to lose by rejecting 
what you have. 
The Characteristics of Resilience
The aforementioned historical overview is relevant to the modern governance 
problem of resilience. An important question to ask ourselves is what reasons 
do we have to believe that our current system of governance is resilient? After 
all, the ancient systems lasted 1000 years and those of the Middle Ages about 
the same time, whereas we moderns have been struggling along for only a few 
hundred years. 
The first point I will make is that no system is resilient when people are starving. 
This is the extreme case, but more generally the point is that no system is 
resilient when the economy is failing to improve the livelihoods of the majority 
of the people. 
I chose the phrase ‘failing to improve’ because an important part of the personal 
philosophy of the modern age is the notion of progress. This is partly a Christian 
concept—we are all progressing towards salvation or damnation—and partly 
an Enlightenment concept. Science in particular has given us the capacity to 
understand and modify our world. This has not always been for the better, 
but much technological advancement has made life more interesting and more 
comfortable for us. And successive generations being better entertained and 
better fed and living longer have ingrained in us the belief that progress is good. 
At its most basic, and therefore at its most politically powerful, progress is about 
getting richer. There are two ways in which people in a certain country can get 
richer. One is that the whole country can get richer and they, like the proverbial 
boat on the rising tide, can rise with the general wealth accumulation, and the 
second is even if the whole country is not getting richer, so long as you can get 
a greater share of what is available you can be richer, albeit not now in concert 
with others but at the expense of others.
14. Resilience in its Historical and Contemporary Contexts
159
I have already answered the question regarding what produces resilience in a 
person, a business, an economy or a political system. If an economy is growing 
strongly it is increasing its redundancy (its spare capacities). Redundancy 
might be captured by the private sector as more plant and equipment, or higher 
retained earnings and less debt, or it might be captured by the public sector 
in the form of improvements in the quality of services or an improved fiscal 
position. In any event, the point is there is a greater capacity for the system 
to either invest in further growth creation (and so continue to get richer) or 
distribute the available wealth to people who are not ‘progressing’—that is, 
those who are not getting richer. 
This capacity either to invest or to distribute, of course, relates to optionality 
(the creation of further choices). Redundancy almost always contributes to the 
creation of optionality. In this way you can see that redundancy and optionality 
are not separate but are related elements in understanding resilience.
Resilient political systems must improve the livelihoods of the majority of the 
people if they are to survive. This is true in the medium term, but I accept that 
in the short term people will put up with a great deal of hardship and not throw 
out the political system. This is true largely because the collective prevailing 
political philosophy, which in our modern case is a belief in freedom and a 
form of equality, continues to be consistent with the political institutions and 
processes of the country. It is just that the politicians are useless. And there is a 
mechanism for dealing with that. 
The heart of the resilience of representative democracy are periodic elections, 
and periodic elections are of course an optionality. This optionality only has 
value, however, if it results in some change for the better. We can chop and 
change our governments as much as we like but, if the next lot is as bad as the 
last lot and the one after that is no better, sooner or later something has to give. 
These are the circumstances in which democracy has been shown to fail in the 
past and a new form of government has been tried. 
I am not saying that any of the major Western democracies is in danger of being 
overthrown any time soon but I do say that the United States and Europe in 
particular have precious little redundancy and that the value of the option of 
periodic elections is far lower today than it has been in the past. I am saying that 
representative democracy in the United States and Europe is far less resilient 
today than it has been at any time since the 1930s. 
It is often not easy to recognise the signs of a lack of resilience. Consider, for 
example, the question of whether Germany today is more resilient that Greece. 
The popular response would be that Germany is obviously more resilient than 
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Greece. Greece, after all, is nearly bankrupt. It is a country burdened with huge 
public sector debt, dependent on Europe and particularly the powerful and 
resilient German economy for loans to prevent economic and social collapse. 
Germany, on the other hand, appears to be the strongest state in Europe. The 
Germans pay their taxes on time, work hard, save their money and have a secure 
and resilient political system. German governments function effectively. German 
leaders are tough and resilient.
But we make a mistake if we conclude from the current situation in Europe that 
Germany is more resilient than Greece. I do not believe we have the evidence to 
draw any conclusions on this. This is because we cannot judge resilience until 
we apply the same stress to the two systems and the two peoples.
What if German banks had borrowed heavily in short-term loans from overseas 
banks and were subject to demands for repayment within 90 days? What if 
German banks were, as a consequence, failing? What if the unemployment rate 
in Germany was 33 per cent and what if the tax take was to fall so precipitously 
that German States did not have the money to pay unemployment benefits? And 
what if industrial production in Germany was to be just 40 per cent of what it 
had been three years previously? What then? Well then perhaps we could judge 
relative resilience.
But, in fact, we don’t have to ask ‘what if?’ at all. The conditions I have described 
were exactly the conditions that prevailed in Weimar Germany in 1932. Thirteen 
years later, five million Germans were dead or missing and the country was a 
divided, occupied, smouldering wreck. 
Of course I am not saying the same outcome would occur if the same stresses 
were placed on the German institutions and people today. There is no evidence 
for or against that proposition. But perhaps we need to give the Greeks more 
credit for their resilience and forbearance than we do. It is correct to conclude 
that public protest, even smashing things and lighting fires, is better construed 
as a contributor to Greek resilience than to Greek fragility.
Why? Because rioting to the Greeks is an option available to them by which 
they can express their frustration at the ineffectiveness of the political system 
and the governments it has produced.
The political system in Greece failed because governments were elected to do 
stupid things. They spent too much; they created an unsustainable pension 
system; they created an ineffective tax system. You might reasonably say it 
was not the Greek Government but the Greek people who were to blame. They 
elected these stupid governments. 
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But all electorates are uninformed. All electorates are gullible. All electorates will 
vote for what they believe is in their short-term interests. It is human nature. It 
is the responsibility of those who seek election to put in front of the electorate 
sustainable policies. Any fool can dupe someone into electing him to office. Only 
a wise and courageous politician can hold his course when things go badly.
The Greeks themselves can reach back thousands of years to their own proud 
heritage to understand what it takes to be a real leader in difficult times. 
Thucydides quotes Pericles, explaining his policies at a time when the war with 
Sparta is going badly:
It is a policy which entails suffering, and each of you already knows 
what this suffering is; but its ultimate benefits are still far away and 
not yet clear for all to see. So, now that a great and sudden disaster has 
fallen on you, you have weakened in carrying out to the end the resolves 
which you made.
When things happen suddenly, unexpectedly, and against all calculation, 
it takes the heart out of a man; and this certainly has happened to you, 
with the plague coming on top of everything else. You must remember 
that you are citizens of a great city and that you were brought up in 
a way of life suited to her greatness; you must therefore be willing 
to face the greatest disasters and be determined never to sacrifice the 
glory that is yours. We all look with distaste on people who arrogantly 
pretend to a reputation to which they are not entitled; but equally to be 
condemned are those who, through lack of moral fibre, fail to live up to 
the reputation which is theirs already. Each of you, therefore, must try 
to stifle his own particular sorrow as he joins with the rest in working 
for the safety of us all. 
Resilience and the Political Ethic of the Populace
So I make the point that the resilience of political systems rests finally on the 
political ethic of the people. Political stability rests on the redundancy a nation 
has in the belief and commitment of its people to the political ideals the system 
is designed to embody. 
The redundancy in belief and commitment to the political ethic upon which 
Western political institutions were founded is now low in many Western nations. 
This sinking store of ethical legitimacy of Western governments is the result of 
profound changes in the economic and social conditions in these countries. 
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In the United States, for instance, it seems that every week there is some 
commentary on the death of the American dream. The United States is a more 
unequal society than Australia or New Zealand, but the majority of Americans 
have accepted this inequality as the price of liberty. They have been told 
inequality is the Siamese twin of the opportunity to improve their own situation 
and they have believed this because, at least anecdotally, it has been true. Many 
people are now beginning to believe that the dream of owning a home and 
sending their kids to college is beyond them. And yet they see income inequality 
growing. The same is true in a less virulent form in Australia and New Zealand.
In Europe the resilience of individual states has been severely undermined by 
their lack of financial redundancy. They have simply run out of money. This 
has been compounded by the lack of optionality these states face as a result 
of their membership of the euro monetary zone. They cannot devalue their 
currency; they cannot manage their own monetary policy. Without redundancy 
and optionality, there can be no resilience.
Let me conclude this section with an analysis of the resilience of the political 
institutions in the three periods: Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the modern 
period.
The prevailing ethic in antiquity amongst the ruling classes was one form or 
another of personal virtue. In the Middle Ages the ethic was Christian virtue 
and in the modern period the ethic is, as I said earlier, a transient trade-off 
between freedom and equality, the result of which at any one time is a collective 
conception of a just society. 
The political institutions of antiquity and the Middle Ages adapted and adjusted 
themselves to remain consistent with the political expectations of the people for 
more than 1000 years. It is important to clarify here that I refer to ‘people’ as the 
group who had the capacity to influence the political process.
This excludes, for instance, women, slaves, the faraway peoples in Antiquity, 
the disenfranchised and very poor of the Middle Ages. But the Ancients and the 
Middle Agers were undone in the end because their systems lacked optionality. 
The ethic of personal virtue, however much redundancy was built into it by 
the acceptance of all sorts of religious affiliation and personal philosophy, could 
not compete with the appeal of Christianity—the promise of life after death. 
Christianity outsourced virtue. God sent His son to die so that mankind could 
be saved and that trumped anything the ancient world could come up with. 
A thousand years later, political institutions based on divinity collapsed because 
their system could not adapt to the newer, manmade laws and institutions.
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Representative democracy seems to have a good deal of built-in optionality. 
Like the ancients’ systems, it is based not on one core idea. It is, instead, 
founded on the flexible interplay of two ideas, liberty and equality, which are 
themselves flexible notions. But unlike the ancients, whose ideas of virtue were 
founded in superstition, ancestor worship and pure thought, the modern ethic 
is a derivative of empiricism and, at least in part, of the scientific method. Our 
modern systems are pragmatic and, if we can muster the numbers, always open 
to change within the limits of the majority’s conception of a just society. This 
endows much resilience. 
Conclusion
Finally, then, I will furnish a few brief examples of resilience as a product of 
redundancy and optionality from my other areas of experience. I work from the 
equation that resilience equals redundancy multiplied by optionality.
The human body has a great deal of redundancy. We have two lungs, two 
kidneys, two eyes, two legs, two arms, 10 fingers. And we have much, much 
more tissue in each of our major organs than we require for simple life support. 
The brain is the most significant option-generating device in the human. We 
can think our way around all sorts of problems. We can learn new things and 
endlessly adapt. The human is the most wildly successful creature ever and the 
most resilient creature the world has ever seen, largely because it has massive 
redundancy and option-generating capability. 
The best sports teams are the teams that can do two things: they can play a given 
style of game better than their opponents and they have ‘something in reserve’ 
when it is needed to get them over the line. And two, they have the capacity to 
play multiple styles of game depending on the prevailing weather, the strength 
of the opposition and the attitude of the referee, among other things.
Resilient business organisations require plenty of redundancy. There are no new 
ways to go broke: running out of cash remains the only one. Low debt, high 
margins and diversified sources of revenue are hedges against inevitable market 
downturns, new competition and regulatory change. But these redundancies 
merely delay the inevitable. If companies are not able to adapt to the new 
conditions, using up their redundancy to create new options for growth then 
they will not survive. New geographies, new products, new customers and 
whole new businesses are all important optionalities that firms must have or 
develop quickly when they are needed. 
Take one example: I joined the newspaper publishing business as the CEO of 
Fairfax Media in late 2005. I was late. The online classified advertising businesses 
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that are thriving today in Australia at the expense of the big metropolitan 
newspapers were already established. I invested heavily in diversifying Fairfax’s 
revenue, most notably by buying Trade Me, New Zealand’s biggest online 
auction and classifieds website, for what was thought at the time to be a wildly 
expensive price of NZ$750 million; however, after Fairfax purchased Trade Me 
in 2010, the business had by then doubled in value.
The optionality I contributed to building into Fairfax has made the company 
more resilient, but it came at the expense of redundancy as I used up the balance 
sheet headroom. Ultimately, though, I had little choice. What I did has helped 
the company, but there remains no guarantee the business will survive in its 
current form. It is a competitive world in which we seek to survive and prosper, 
and we need to build resilience to do that. 
Part 3: Managing Crises
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15. Managing Crises Long Term: 
The challenges of preparedness and 
response
 Paul ’t Hart
The Heat of Crisis
The summer of 2011–12 was dry and hot in much of Australia. Coming on 
the back of the continuing drought of the previous five years, it left large 
parts of Victoria desperate for water. The long-term outlook of the Bureau of 
Meteorology was that the warm weather in most of Australia would continue 
in future Australian summers. In the summer of 2011–12, extreme fire risks 
existed in most of the south and south-east of the continent. The recorded 
temperatures between Monday, 25 January and Tuesday, 2 February 2012 were 
extreme, rising to 42ºC or above in and around Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne 
and Adelaide on most if not all days of the week.
Summer is always a busy period in Melbourne, with a number of high-level 
events in progress or soon to begin. Various Australia Day festivities and small 
events throughout the city are held, culminating in a fireworks show in the 
centre of the city. The Australian Open tennis championships at the Rod Laver 
Arena take place between 18 and 31 January and attract more than 700 000 
fans overall—up to 70 000 on a popular day. The ‘Big Day Out’ music festival 
was scheduled for 26 January 2012 at Flemington Racecourse, with an expected 
turnout of 50 000. Most importantly, Melbourne was about to host the meeting 
of the G20 leaders at the end of the month, to be held at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in 
the central business district. Various national and international activist bodies 
intended to stage protests. Intelligence briefings suggested a small but hardcore 
group of activists planned to penetrate security perimeters and/or otherwise 
disrupt the summit. 
On 25 January, various fires broke out in the Dandenong Ranges just east of 
Melbourne after a major thunderstorm that inflicted heavy lightning, but 
virtually no rain, passed through southern Victoria. The combination of 
extremely dry conditions, high temperatures and strong winds fuelled these 
fires. The smoke blew towards inner-city Melbourne, covering it in a thick haze. 
At 1 pm it appeared that various fires around the community of Healesville 
joined and threatened to jump containment lines on the eastern side of the 
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town. Community concern and media attention were intense, partly in light of 
the still fresh memories of the tragic events of 2009 and the harsh judgments 
about the State’s disaster preparedness and firefighting performance delivered 
by the bushfire inquiry. 
During the night, new fires emerged on the north-eastern outskirts of Greater 
Melbourne, a densely forested area. Some fires blazed out of control and moved 
westwards. Hundreds of people were evacuated and two dozen homes were lost. 
The Chief Health Officer advised the Victorian Government that the combination 
of extreme temperatures and the blanket of smoke covering large segments of 
the city constituted a major hazard to public health, particularly among the 
elderly and the very young. Public announcements to this effect were made. 
He later advised the Government to consider imposing school closures if the 
hot weather persisted and also mentioned the risks these conditions posed to 
participants in large outdoor Australia Day and other events. 
During the late afternoon of 26 January reports came in from the Big Day Out 
about an alcohol-fuelled altercation that escalated after security personnel 
attempted to break up a large group of young men moving around the grounds 
harassing festival-goers. When a uniformed police officer became involved, he 
was beaten unconscious by a group, which brought in other uniformed and 
undercover police on duty, who allegedly responded in a heavy-handed manner 
as paramedics attempted to extract the injured (including the police officer, 
who was hospitalised). News of the incident spread fast through the plethora 
of graphic footage from the camera phones of festival-goers caught up in the 
violence, along with accusations of police brutality and rumours that the brawl 
was fuelled by ethnic tensions. 
There was intense media coverage of the fires, which had wrecked 45 homes so 
far, and possibly killed a group of missing hikers. The fires were still burning 
in force on Melbourne’s north-eastern fringe—triggering public debate about 
the risks associated with holding the G20 summit in Melbourne under these 
conditions. Furthermore, the incidents during the Big Day Out led some 
media outlets to question whether the police were capable of dealing with 
G20 protesters. On activist websites, calls for retaliation against ‘police pigs’ 
gained a lot of support. Behind the scenes, some of the advance parties of the 
G20 delegations sought assurances that the situation could be controlled. The 
head of the US Secret Service contingent was particularly adamant, and the US 
Ambassador conveyed his concerns discreetly to the foreign minister.
Later in the day, the first international leaders arrived in Melbourne ahead of 
the weekend’s summit. A joint press conference involving the British, Canadian 
and Australian prime ministers was scheduled for 5 pm at the Grand Hyatt 
Hotel. In the early afternoon, the temperature had reached 44ºC, stretching the 
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power system beyond capacity because of heat-related increased demand. Prior 
calls to the public to moderate consumption did not have the desired effect. 
At 4.31 pm the system suffered a major malfunction when a fire broke out in 
a substation, cutting off supply to most of the CBD and other inner-city areas. 
Almost immediately, hundreds of calls for emergency assistance from people 
trapped in elevators in extremely high temperatures clogged the switchboards 
of security firms and emergency services. 
The blackout affected the Grand Hyatt just prior to the press conference. Backup 
generators did not function properly and the UK Prime Minister was trapped 
in a lift for 20 minutes before security could safely access the elevator shaft. 
Exploiting the initial confusion caused by the blackout, a small number of 
protesters managed to enter the security zone around the building, just as press 
conference attendees were ushered out of the building. The press conference 
was cancelled as power remained off and the temperature inside the hotel 
quickly rose. The media nevertheless managed to file their reports, featuring 
the blackout, trapped leaders, the failure of the backup generator and questions 
of security ahead of the major summit on the weekend at the same venue. 
Traffic chaos ensued as the late-afternoon rush hour began with traffic lights not 
working. Emergency services reported great difficulties reaching urgent cases 
as a result. The power company said that given the extensive damage to the 
substation and the high demand for power throughout the city and the State, 
it did not expect to be able to fully restore power within the next 24 hours. 
Some limited capacity could be available by nightfall, but might cover only 25 
per cent of the affected area. The Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry estimated the costs to businesses of the CBD blackout would run 
into more than A$200 million per day. It approached the Government asking to 
ensure that top priority be given to restoring power in that area. Likewise, the 
Australian Open organisers demanded power for the event to be guaranteed. 
Ambulance services and hospitals reported they were in danger of being 
overstretched. Moreover, ambulance workers as well as police reported an 
increasing number of cases of heat victims in their own ranks. In parallel, 
medical authorities in the States of Victoria, New South Wales and South 
Australia affected by the heatwave reported steep increases in the number 
of deaths in the previous 36 hours. There were conflicting reports about the 
numbers involved, because it was not immediately clear how many people died 
on account of the heat. The reports ranged from 10 to 30 per cent increases in 
fatalities. The most common demographic of people who died in this period was 
old people—usually those living alone in residences without airconditioning. 
In an impromptu statement, the Prime Minister said he had been fully briefed on 
the seriousness of the situation, but he nevertheless had full confidence in the 
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emergency services’ capacity to handle the fires and the heat-related problems, 
as well as guarantee security for the G20. He mentioned that as a precaution, 
additional personnel and equipment might be flown in from interstate. He also 
called on citizens to look after their neighbours, to make sure vulnerable groups 
(the old, the very young and the infirm) were sheltered from the heat and had 
plenty to drink. He offered ‘any and all’ Commonwealth assistance to State 
authorities.
The next morning, news bulletins and front pages moved on from the incidents 
at the Grand Hyatt. They instead were full of graphic pictures of the dead being 
removed from derelict apartments and old people’s homes in the three capital 
cities most affected. Talkback radio was awash with callers desperately seeking 
help, claiming they could not get through to the emergency services. They were 
mostly elderly citizens living alone or their relatives fearing the worst after not 
being able to reach them. Other news outlets reported ‘extraordinary scenes’ 
of panic purchasing of bottled water and soft drinks by nervous crowds at 
supermarkets around the capital cities. Local breakfast TV ran an interview with 
a disaster expert asserting that Melbourne in particular might be heading for a 
‘catastrophe’ of historic proportions. Comparisons were drawn with Chicago’s 
1995 heatwave, when the city became ‘an urban heat island’, killing more than 
750 people, and with the French and Italian heatwaves of 2003 and 2006, which 
were estimated to have caused more than 15 000 and 3000 deaths respectively. 
In each of these instances, severe criticism was directed at alleged government 
negligence in emergency preparedness and response. 
Clearly, the signs of ‘collective stress’ were becoming stronger, and not just in 
Melbourne. There were increasingly vehement allegations on websites and local 
radio that critical electricity supply as well as police and emergency services 
resources were ‘diverted away from ordinary citizens in need’ to protect ‘a 
talkfest for politicians’. 
The G20 summit nevertheless unfolded without major incident, and the level 
of protest against it came out well below expectations. The reasons for this were 
grim: the heat and the fires created bigger, more acute problems to worry about. 
Early public estimates were that more than 1900 people across the three States 
died prematurely on account of the heat. Relentless live coverage of bodies being 
carried out of homes and offices produced a sense of shock and subsequently 
anger in the community. The occurrence of multiple power outages in three 
jurisdictions as well as the long duration of the power outage in Melbourne 
raised questions about the resilience of the power grid, and State and Federal 
governments’ roles as regulators. 
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Thinking about Crisis Management
This scenario—a fictionalised but all too plausible combination of several 
real events—shows how even in otherwise prosperous, peaceful and stable 
communities ‘business as usual’ can give way to critical conditions of disaster, 
conflict and breakdown. When this happens, something akin to ‘un-ness’ reigns 
supreme: citizens and policymakers alike face unplanned, unwanted, uncertain 
and unpleasant prospects and choices. Crises act as pressure cookers: they arouse 
interests and emotions to higher levels of intensity. The more threatening, 
surprising and acute they appear, the stronger is the collective stress they elicit. 
They defy normal structures and routines of collective problem solving. They 
test the resilience of communities and their governments. They raise intense and 
awkward questions for policymakers. How could this happen? Why didn’t we 
see this coming? Who is to blame? How do we move on from here?
We should therefore ask how governments, organisations and leaders prepare 
for and perform under the intense pressures generated by crises; however, we 
should not assume that crises are simply bad news for leaders, whose crisis 
management is focused purely on damage limitation, both operationally and 
politically. Crises may also provide leaders with unique opportunities to discard 
old policies and commitments, kickstart new ones, reform public organisations 
and reshape the political landscape by forging new coalitions. To understand 
the complex challenges of crisis management, we should also look very strongly 
at the social-psychological dimension of crises in a society. We should approach 
crisis management not just as an elevated form of practical problem solving, but 
also as a profoundly political activity with intense strategic implications for the 
positions of elites and institutions. 
Moreover, we often think of a crisis as a sudden event, an approach that might 
inadvertently lead us to take a rather myopic view of just how long and dynamic 
a crisis might turn out to be. This is because the shocks and effects of the initial 
crisis will accumulate, not just in 72 hours or a week, but across a month, or 
two or three months. That’s how crises escalate. And then the long shadow they 
create can last for years. 
Consequently, the people who study crisis response ask, ‘Although much initial 
focus has always been on this first stage, what happens when the proverbial shit 
hits the fan?’ The study of this subsequent stage—how crises actually impact 
on institutions over a much longer period—has been relatively neglected, in 
planning effort and preparedness effort, and in research. I will try to cover this 
topic in my chapter. 
What really sets a crisis apart from business as usual? There is significant consensus 
in the literature that from the perspective of government or the management 
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of organisations which must respond to these events, it is the combination 
of three situational characteristics that makes crises particularly tricky. First, 
the idea that something really bad is going on, or might happen, generates a 
significant level of collective stress and requires a large-scale, multidisciplinary, 
unconventional and possibly interjurisdictional and intersectoral response. 
Second, there’s a sense of time pressure: policymakers feel (rightly or wrongly) 
that something must be done about the threat or damage right now or very 
soon. So this leaves them no time for conventional processes of public problem 
solving such as research, broad consultations, lawmaking or incremental reform 
paths. The third crucial component is that many aspects of the crisis are deeply 
uncertain, as are the possible consequences and ramifications of one’s own past 
and present actions in relation to the events. In other words, the unknown 
unknowns can be a large part of the picture in a crisis.
So from a policy or managerial perspective, leaders need to take highly 
consequential decisions in a context in which they do not have all the numbers, 
they can’t delegate the issue to a commission, and can’t get the experts to study 
it for a few months. They have to act much faster than governments normally act. 
And often that acting involves doing quite unpleasant things, or disappointing a 
lot of people, or making tough decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. 
That’s what makes crisis management tough from an operational and tactical 
point of view. 
If, however, we also look at crises from a more strategic point of view, the picture 
shifts somewhat. Crises generate a form of hyper-transparency: everybody, 
including the entire media, is focused on the issue. There is an explosion of 
tension and scrutiny of what the relevant policymakers and organisations are 
doing during the crisis and what they have done or failed to do in the lead-up 
to it. The idea, then, that some things are natural disasters and the evaluation 
of our response to them is going to be determined by the response alone is 
becoming increasingly remiss. Natural disasters are almost immediately being 
reframed as regulatory failures one way or the other—for example, questioning 
why inundated houses had been built on a floodplain, or why earthquake-
ravaged buildings had not been better equipped to deal with such a natural 
disaster. So there is an immense concentration of scrutiny of behaviour during 
and before the crisis; momentum builds for a move away from this discredited 
state of affairs to something new and better. And quite bluntly, there’s a lot of 
pressure on people in high positions to fall on their swords one way or another. 
So from a more strategic political point of view, this is also a reality that people 
will factor into their actions. 
A crucial point to remember here is that it is the strategic crisis after the operational 
and tactical one—the crisis after the crisis—that will go far to determining the 
long-term consequences of the disturbance, and the subsequent long-term 
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policy and institutional implications. It means that a trade-off is created during 
what is essentially the post-acute stage of a crisis: a trade-off between the need 
to learn (everybody pays lip-service to this idea of learning) and the strategic 
reality of managing the blame that is going around. 
If we juxtapose operational-tactical and strategic thinking about how to 
respond to a crisis two logics of action emerge. The first is the logic familiar to 
most readers, and which is written in all official planning documents, however 
aspirational or fictitious they might be. Citizens are cast as victims in this kind 
of perspective. The media is considered part of the communication picture. 
They report what’s going on, they can be your ally in getting messages across, 
and so on. Crisis management then happens on site—it happens in line agencies, 
in coordination centres and so on, and the key stakes are to control the physical 
damage and to have community resilience and rebuilding kick in as smoothly 
and energetically as possible. 
But there is also the other logic of action in which a crisis unleashes powerful 
emotions—blame games, if you like—in which citizens have a voice, become 
advocates for positions and will form interest groups which can be vocal, well 
connected and influential. Such a situation can arise when the media has axes 
to grind, and when stories about the crises are fitted into ongoing political 
narratives about good guys and bad guys. Take UK prime minister Gordon 
Brown’s handling of the Global Financial Crisis as an example. For a short 
while in late 2008 the British media typecast Brown, who had just taken over 
from Tony Blair as Labour prime minister, as the wise and heroic international 
statesman crafting a global solution to an unprecedented financial catastrophe. 
But when solutions proved elusive and painful, the media reverted back to the 
story frame they had already imposed on him, which was that of a no-hope 
prime minister, one who even had been asleep at the wheel in his long years as 
chancellor when the risks of bad debt were building up throughout the British 
financial sector. 
Key crisis-management arenas are also somewhat different in this strategic 
perspective: they are partly the media, including the social media; they involve 
parliament and inquiries—in other words, the more political arenas where the 
action is. And obviously the key stakes are political and institutional: elite 
careers, programs and organisations are at a critical juncture. A crisis can be 
enormously consequential politically, both in terms of threats and in terms of 
opportunities. Think of the famous photo of Margaret Thatcher riding a tank 
at the time of the Falklands War, which transformed a weak prime minister 
into an unassailable prime minister for many years after the conflict ended. 
Conversely, think of Thatcher’s later successor Tony Blair, whose decision to 
commit British armed forces to the Iraq War proved to be a significant factor in 
his political undoing. 
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Perhaps even more poignant was former US president Jimmy Carter’s response 
to the Iran Hostage Crisis (1979–81), when 52 staff members were held hostage at 
the US Embassy in Tehran for 444 days. Carter met with his advisors every day 
for those 14 months at 7 in the morning to discuss what could be done, before 
any other business of government was conducted. The hostages were released 
the day Carter’s term in office ended, and the experience was widely considered 
to have broken the man. If you compare photos of Jimmy Carter taken the day 
he took office with those taken on the day of Ronald Reagan’s inauguration you 
see a stark contrast. There were many reasons for this, but a significant one was 
the emotional toll of Carter’s involvement in the hostage crisis, and particularly 
his micromanagement of it. 
All these cases demonstrate that the stakes are high. A leader can be the hero, 
the villain or the victim of a crisis, politically speaking. The same goes for public 
institutions. For example, the Roman Catholic Church has taken a big hit over 
recent years on account of the widespread incidence of long-term, covered-up 
child molestation in Catholic institutions such as foster homes. It was damning 
evidence of an institutional lapse of morals too big to ignore, forcing a 2000-year-
old institution into public contrition, damaging compensation battles and—
hopefully—critical self-examination. 
Key Leadership Challenges 
Up to this point I have principally been providing context. For the remainder 
of this chapter I will focus on what I consider to be the five key recurring 
challenges of responding to crises once they have emerged. My colleagues 
and I have identified these challenges from comparative analysis of a couple of 
decades of crisis responses—whether it be to disasters, terrorist events, riots 
or some other crisis. In so doing, we have tried to ignore the specifics of those 
various types of crisis scenarios and instead tried to look at the commonalities 
from the perspective of strategic and tactical management of these events (Boin 
et al. 2005, 2008). 
The first challenge is making sense of the crisis. If uncertainty is a big part of the 
picture, making sense of what is actually going on—and updating that diagnosis 
in the face of dynamic developments—becomes a key challenge. 
The second challenge is that those in management positions must make 
decisions—particularly strategic decisions—about the overall direction, nature 
and limits of the response. 
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The third one is the need to marshal organisational capacity both within the 
public sector and beyond it to address the crisis. And it is critical that this 
is done more quickly, and at a much larger scale, than that at which these 
organisations had previously operated. 
The fourth challenge is what we call meaning making: persuading the public, 
other actors and the media of one’s own interpretation of what is going on, what 
can be done, how people can increase their own safety, how we should deal 
with questions of accountability, and how we should deal with questions about 
the future. 
And finally there is adaptation. This refers to the idea that we need to move on 
from the crisis and look beyond it to reflect and draw lessons. And here ‘renewal’ 
is a more appropriate term than ‘rebuilding’, because the term rebuilding (or 
even ‘recovery’) suggests a return to the status quo that existed before the crisis, 
which is a fanciful and unrealistic proposition in the face of consistent evidence 
that crises always act as catalysts for change at one or more levels. I will now 
elaborate on each of these five challenges in turn.
Sense-Making
This first challenge refers to the initial comprehension of a crisis—the moment 
encapsulated in the photo of George W. Bush learning of the 11 September 
attacks, sitting in a school with his chief of staff whispering in his ear. Of that 
moment Bush has said he was calculating not just what to do about 9/11, but 
also what kind of impression it would make on the public if the American 
President left a class full of schoolchildren. It was a controversial decision, but 
it illustrates the kind of dilemma that crisis managers face: in real time, starting 
to think about what is going on, what it means and what can be done about it.
In fact there are several ‘sense-making’ dilemmas that arise during a crisis—for 
example, the dilemma of speed versus accuracy. If there is a seeming imperative 
to act very quickly, how long are you going to wait until you get a richer picture 
of the situation? Are you going to take immediate action and run the risk that 
it is ill directed or suboptimal? But if you wait too long to respond, there is 
the risk the action may not be meaningful. This is a recurrent dilemma. An 
example of this was Jimmy Carter during the Iran Hostage Crisis. By constantly 
meeting with the families of the hostages, Carter lost the ability to maintain a 
cold, analytical picture of the situation. Though such an approach may have 
been a very noble thing to do, you’re not the US President to be noble; you’re 
there to be clear-headed. And if you place yourself so deeply into the emotion of 
a crisis it becomes very difficult to engage in that kind of dispassionate analysis. 
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Where do you get the expertise you need? There is a tendency for people to 
draw on the old hands, the experienced people, those who have been there 
before. This can be a very good thing; we have to respect experience and the 
professionalism it brings. Quite often, however, it is also beneficial to call upon 
people who have not traditionally been part of the crisis-management picture, or 
who are not known specialists in the area or part of the same old network. How 
do you create space in your organisational setup for bringing in and amplifying 
these so-called ‘soft voices’? How does this tacit knowledge (which is often local 
knowledge) find its way to the centre of the decision-making process during a 
crisis? 
What do we know goes wrong in sense-making? I will mention two things. 
One is myopia—that if the present becomes so all-consuming because buildings 
are collapsing and people are dying, etcetera, it is extremely hard for decision-
makers to not just address pressing concerns, but also keep perspective on 
what’s going to happen in one week, two weeks, three months, or a year. If you 
don’t organise this long-term plan it won’t happen. And even prime ministers 
and other senior crisis managers lapse into an operational or, at best, tactical 
stance and ignore the strategic stance. 
I have observed this myself in various cases where I was in the command 
centre during a crisis. One example was on 4 October 1992 when El Al flight 
1862 crashed into the Groeneveen and Klein-Kruitberg flats in the Bijlmermeer 
neighbourhood of Amsterdam. All the local politicians and local administrators 
who meant anything were put into a crisis centre where they could govern 
without a counsel looking over their shoulders. In these situations all the 
bureaucratic politics disappear because everybody is motivated to ‘do the right 
thing’. And these people grow comfortable in this space where they are all of a 
sudden at the top of a pyramid. In normal life they are at best a node in a network 
and they have to bargain to have an impact on governance. But in a crisis you 
can suddenly be government, and you know best, and you’re surrounded by 
basically your trusted and liked sources. It can be very difficult for information 
from outside that bunker to penetrate the reality that these people are forming 
with one another. 
How do we improve sense-making in a crisis? There are many recommendations 
I could cite from the literature but I will highlight one here: the power of 
harnessing the wisdom of the crowd. As I previously mentioned, there is a 
danger of governments listening only to themselves in the context of a crisis, 
whereas now with social media and other forms of new technology we have a 
unique opportunity to gather rich pictures straight from the community level, 
filter it and use it. 
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For example, in a bushfire situation the firefighters and the people directing 
the firefighters usually have no idea how bad things are in affected locations. 
With this kind of logic transformed into a communications design, it would 
be possible to know a lot more in real time about what is going on if you can 
somehow get the individual citizen to become a co-producer of information that 
the crisis responders can act upon. 
Sense-making should not be limited to the crisis itself, either, but should extend 
to institutions or aspects of your society that are brought under the microscope 
as a result of a crisis. Often we allow the strategic aspects of crisis management 
to be taken over by small politics, so it becomes more about the politics of 
managing tough accountability questions, saving skins, protecting paradigms 
and so on. But what you are then missing is the opportunity a crisis presents 
to learn something about your own society and about your own institutions 
that you didn’t already know. This might cause you to rethink the design of 
that society and the design of that institution. It may sound lofty, but every 
major crisis reveals something you didn’t already know. In this way, crises are 
potential teachers. 
Take the El Al flight 1862 incident as an example. It took an airplane coming 
down in Amsterdam for city authorities to realise they had no idea who was 
actually living where in their city. Surely it would have been easy to answer 
some simple questions: who had died when the plane crashed? Who was 
living in the Groeneveen and Klein-Kruitberg flats at the time? But not in a 
multicultural neighbourhood like Bijlmermeer, with its high concentration of 
refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal aliens. 
Consequently, the authorities had to go to the public and say, ‘Look, we’ve been 
digging in the rubble for three days, we’ve found 10 bodies, there are about 100 
apartments obliterated by this airplane, we don’t know where you are, if you’ve 
survived this. If you happen to be illegal in this country and you are somehow 
victimised, please come forward.’ And in doing this, they used very careful 
language, hinting that those victims without official papers would be allowed 
to stay in the country.
The next day, 1500 people showed up at City Hall. This case illustrates how 
a crisis can teach you about the adequacy of your registers, and about public 
communication; the challenge is to draw out those lessons and be open to them. 
Such an approach is taken by so-called high-reliability organisations (HROs). 
They study operators of power grids, nuclear facilities, airlines and so on, 
because they approach every incident as a possible teacher, and they don’t rest 
until they find out what those lessons are. But you can only do that if you make 
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the learning process safe from the politics of blame. And so a strategic approach 
to crisis is on the one hand to deal with those accountability issues while not 
allowing it to be the only game in town.
Decision-Making
Consider now the challenge of decision-making. Once it has been established 
that there is a crisis, what next? There are some tough choices that can be made 
during this stage, and some potential dilemmas. Are we going to play this down, 
are we going to play it up? In a major case of child sex abuse in Amsterdam in 
2011, the authorities had to decide whether they would limit their information 
to the parents of those 67 children affected, or whether they would also inform 
the rest of the world. They had to make a calculated guess. Obviously if you 
inform the rest of the world, particularly the rest of Amsterdam, you’re going 
to create collective behaviour and collective emotions that will be very difficult 
to control. If you’re not informing them, but you are informing 67 parents who 
are then going to talk to their families and friends, word is going to come out in 
an uncontrolled fashion and you may look like you’ve been trying to suppress 
information. The authorities in Amsterdam quickly realised they could not 
contain information regarding this case, so they acted on the presumption it 
would be a big deal, and prepared a large response accordingly. 
The role of insurance companies can also present a dilemma for decision-
makers. What, for example, if the insurance industry doesn’t do its bit—or 
what government and citizens consider to be its bit—in assisting victims of 
crisis? Is government going to step in? This would be costly, and would set a 
precedent for the next crisis. So how do public policymakers decide whether 
or not to act? And how do professional public servants make sure that during 
the initial shock following the outbreak of crisis, their political executives don’t 
go running around making heartfelt promises that the experts know cannot be 
kept later?
Such a situation arose on 28 September 1994 when the ferry MS Estonia sank 
in the Baltic Sea, with the loss of 852 lives. Most of the dead were Swedish 
nationals, and immediately following the tragedy the acting prime minister of 
Sweden, Carl Bildt, promised the next of kin they would get their relatives’ 
bodies back. A few hours after Bildt made this commitment, however, his 
navy told him this would be extremely difficult to do. It is this kind of impulse 
generosity that crisis managers might have to think twice about, even at the risk 
of seeming callous and indifferent.
What can go wrong in terms of making those decisions? I have already covered 
quite a few, but I haven’t mentioned lack of disagreement. Group-think can 
be a real issue, especially in a bunker situation where policymakers and their 
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advisers face something very unpleasant and the world out there has no idea 
what pressures are on them. Outside advice does not necessarily come through 
to the ‘inner circle’ handling the crisis. It’s a physical and an emotional setting 
that is conducive to tunnel vision and group solidarity. And it shows: we know 
from comparative research that more crises are mismanaged because of excessive 
consensus at the top than because of a lack of consensus there (Janis 1989; 
Schafer and Crichlow 2010). 
A lot of the lack of consensus occurs below the top; agencies fighting each other 
can be a problem all on their own—something I will discuss later. But at the 
top it is more often this consensus, or assumed consensus, that isn’t questioned 
under the pressure of the circumstances and the stress of the situation that leads 
to mismanagement.
What, then, are sensible things to do to improve crisis decision-making 
capacity? Those in crisis-management positions must think hard about the 
balance between their ambition and their generosity: the positioning of the 
government as the purveyor of solutions and the purveyor of around-the-clock 
care for everybody versus a restrained policy posture that emphasises self-
reliance and that limits the government’s liability and involvement in the crisis. 
Clear limits of involvement must be set because it is better to do that quickly, 
clearly and consistently rather than at a later stage when expectations may have 
already been raised. 
Another way to improve decision-making is the realisation—and there is 
consensus about this among researchers—that you cannot aspire to control 
tactics and operations from the centre, whatever that centre might be. You need 
to have a far-reaching form of delegation and mandate to empower localised 
units to respond as they believe is best. Moreover, you have to rely on their 
professionalism, which is easy to do if you have invested in pre-crisis training 
and communication. But whenever we see a large and dynamic crisis being 
micromanaged by the centre of the centre, paralysis, misjudgments and a lack 
of tailor-made solutions ensue. 
Organising Response
Consider the US response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 as an example of how not 
to organise a response. It is a story of complete breakdown of intergovernmental 
relations, from the local to the State to the federal level. It’s the classic case of 
how not to coordinate a major disaster response. 
What, then, is the right way to organise a response? Is it best to coordinate by 
writing plans and, when the disaster strikes, applying the plan and seeing if it 
works? Or is it better to rely on improvisation because the situation calls for a 
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move beyond the plans? This second option is facilitated by having relationships 
cemented by pre-crisis planning and processes of exercise and joint operations. 
How much centralisation is necessary? What should be centralised and what 
done locally? Is coordination about coordinating the machinery of government 
or about coordinating the collective effort of the affected society? Of course it 
should be the latter. 
Why, then, is it that most of the coordination processes that my colleagues and 
I study tend to be of a myopic, government-centric nature, which fail to harness 
the resources of NGOs or the private sector? One only need consider Hurricane 
Katrina, where some of the major corporations, particularly supermarkets, had 
an impeccable logistical operation and were able to provide more direct care to 
the community than were the entire government operations. And yet they were 
never part of the official crisis response. This was a great shame and it shouldn’t 
happen, but it happens all the time. 
And finally, how much of our organising energy do we concentrate on that 
immediate acute response phase and how much on planning ahead to the 
recovery phase? My rule of thumb is that 80 per cent of the time the energy is 
focused on the response phase. Recovery is always the stepchild of a lot of the 
pre-crisis planning and coordination efforts. And yet, the recovery phase is the 
one that will ultimately stick in people’s minds. After all, any heroism of the 
response phase will be quickly forgotten if you’re still waiting for shelter five 
months after the crisis occurred.
What traps should be avoided? One is that if people involved in the crisis 
management meet only in a crisis setting trust doesn’t immediately build up 
among strangers. Trust builds on familiarity with who the person is, what their 
organisation represents, what they can do, what their operational logic is, and 
so forth. I cannot emphasise enough the importance of bringing about that 
familiarity by organising preliminary crisis-response exercises. This needs to an 
ongoing, very broadly organised process so that the people who will be thrown 
together to manage a crisis are on familiar terms long before the crisis. And it 
needs to be done every one or two years.
Finally, if you tolerate turf wars the way they were tolerated in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina, you are setting yourself up for nastiness. And so, despite 
everything I have argued in favour of a decentralised response, somewhere 
in the centre of the centre managers should still be observing the quality of 
interaction that’s going on. And if they see infighting taking over, there needs 
to be a short, sharp and unmistakable intervention to stop it. 
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Meaning-Making
The fourth key challenge to crisis management I will highlight is meaning-
making. How do you regulate public distress? The 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
disaster was an interesting case from a meaning-making perspective. The world 
did not get to see the Japanese Prime Minister for the first eight days of the 
crisis. The public face of the Government’s meaning-making effort was a cabinet 
secretary. The man was competent, but the public nevertheless began to wonder 
why their leader was so eerily absent from the story (though he was frantically 
active behind the scenes to the point of attempting to micromanage not just the 
governmental response but also that of the private energy provider Tepco which 
operated the Fukushima plant).
The example raises interesting questions about the choices governments 
make about who will be the public face of the crisis. Usually the head of the 
government is assigned this role—which may or may not be a good idea. In 
Queensland, Premier Anna Bligh’s political capital was very low at the time 
of the 2011 floods; but she managed to do the meaning-making so well that 
suddenly she experienced a political comeback, if only briefly. I suspect there 
were some personality and stylistic issues involved in the decision to keep the 
Japanese Prime Minister in the background immediately following Fukushima. 
But there may also have been a strategic calculus at play. Prime Minister Kan’s 
political stock was low at the time and plenty of bad news had to be delivered; 
perhaps the Government thought it should hold the prime minister in reserve 
for when there was some good news to tell. The problem with Fukushima was 
there was never any good news. And after a few days people started to wonder 
who was actually leading the country. 
The Japanese Prime Minister was not the first national leader not to communicate 
publicly to citizens that something bad had occurred. It took Mikhail Gorbachev 
seven days to acknowledge the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown incident; Vladimir 
Putin arrived at the site of the Kursk submarine disaster nearly a week after 
it had occurred. Even in the limited democracy setting of Putin’s Russia, not 
showing up—he had to be dragged to the Kursk scene—was a public relations 
fiasco. It’s not just about what you say; it’s also about where you say it, when 
you say it and with whom you engage. They are all part of the meaning-making 
process. 
One must also be wary of letting the experts do all the talking. At the time of the 
Chernobyl incident, we had a radiation expert on Dutch television reassuring 
the public that radiation levels were only 10 000 times higher than normal. 
This may have been reassuring in his mind, but not necessarily in the mind of 
the public. But he couldn’t conceive of that because he’s not a member of the 
public—he’s an expert.
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Another difficult issue surrounding meaning-making is what we in the industry 
call the ‘creeping crisis’—whether it be some form of slow environmental 
degradation, a possible pandemic about to emerge or another slowly unfolding 
crisis. I occasionally attend the lectures of Dutch epidemiologist Hans Lusthaus, 
who never fails to scare me by pointing out that at any one time five or six 
potentially lethal pandemics are bubbling away under the surface. How can 
meaning-making be done in such scenarios? You don’t want to run the risk of 
succumbing to ‘cry wolf syndrome’: going out with all guns blazing, alerting 
people to the enormous danger they’re in, only to have the supposed danger not 
materialise quickly, which destroys your credibility. 
Consequently, building up a solid evidence base is a critical part of the sense-
making process. This enables you to convince the public that although they 
may not be able to see buildings burning or people dying right now, there is 
a high probability that they will be able to in a certain amount of time. If you 
don’t have that evidence base, shut up. 
If you do have that evidence base, what is the strategy to persuade governments, 
corporations or whoever is in charge that something is ‘rotten in Denmark’? Is 
it best to use really powerful hyperbole and perhaps even go public so as to 
surround those potentially affected by the crisis with information? Or is it better 
to inch them slowly towards awareness that there’s a big problem going on? 
I will always remember Peter Shergold, then the secretary of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and head of the Australian Public Service, describing 
to one of my student audiences the way in which he incrementally persuaded 
John Howard that he should do something about climate change in the latter 
years of his prime ministership—a challenge, given that the former prime 
minister was at best not interested in climate change, at worst a climate change 
denier. The approach Shergold took was to casually slip little bits of information 
that pertained to climate change into his daily meetings with Howard. ‘Oh, 
Prime Minister, have you noticed that the CEO of this mining corporation is 
now saying we should do something about climate change?’ Slowly Howard got 
annoyed, but he could also not deny what was going on; he eventually agreed 
to create a taskforce to look into the issue, with Shergold as its chair. This was 
a sensible strategy, and perhaps in retrospect a more sensible strategy than Al 
Gore going to Hollywood and scaring us in 2007 with An Inconvenient Truth.
Meaning-making presents some dilemmas. Do you project certainties or do 
you also project your uncertainty? If you have unknown unknowns, do you 
tell the public you have them? And again, a lot of the research suggests that 
governments err on the side of not informing the public about things they don’t 
know to prevent the public from panicking. The problem with this argument 
is that there is no academic evidence to suggest the public panics. In fact, 
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the evidence suggests the contrary: the public does not panic. It’s a form of 
governmental, paternalistic bias that the public can’t handle bad news. It’s a real 
source of concern. 
How, then, do we improve our meaning-making capacity? These days it’s 
crucial that you have not just the resources but also the skills to sustain real-
time multimedia communication for a very long time. Many governments are 
making good progress in this area because in a way it isn’t difficult to acquire the 
relevant hardware, media people and so on. Yet I don’t want to play this down: 
it’s a necessary but not sufficient component of a resilient meaning-making 
capacity. 
It is also important to have people involved in the meaning-making effort who 
have an understanding of human behaviour in extreme situations—people who 
understand the social-psychological perspective and not just the economic or 
physical infrastructure perspectives. Quite often people with this experience 
are not harnessed to the task, with politicians instead devising their public 
communications strategy on the basis of the advice of either politically focused 
media advisors or economists—both groups liable to making stupid and 
crude assumptions about human behaviour. I could cite many examples of ill-
conceived public communication because the socio-psychological expertise is 
not around the table.
A final point to make about meaning-making is that it is not a one-sided show 
that the government can run. Other actors in the political context of crisis 
management are engaging in their own meaning-making. My colleagues and 
I use the term ‘framing contest’ as a way of describing what happens as we 
move from the acute stage towards investigations. It becomes a contest between 
different frames of interpreting what went on, why it went on, who is to blame 
and what we can learn from it. So as part of that contest, you have to really 
work on your credibility; you have to be careful not to say or do anything that 
undermines your credibility even further than it will have been undermined by 
the sheer fact that the crisis has happened on your watch. 
Adaptation
Only weeks after Hurricane Katrina had destroyed coastal areas of Louisiana 
and Mississippi, Hurricane Rita entered the Gulf of Mexico. When the projected 
trajectory of Rita included Houston (the fourth-largest city in the United States), 
the Texas authorities quickly ordered an evacuation. The lessons of Katrina had 
been learned! In the chaotic evacuation, more than 100 people died. Hurricane 
Rita changed course and never reached Houston. 
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The extent to which lessons are learned after a crisis (if they are learned at 
all) is one of the most under-researched aspects of crisis management (Birkland 
2006). A crisis or disaster holds huge potential for lessons to be learned about 
reforming contingency planning and training to enhance resilience in the event 
of similar episodes in the future. In an ideal world, we might expect all relevant 
players to study these lessons carefully and apply them in order to reform 
organisational practices, policies and laws. In reality, there are many barriers to 
lesson drawing.
Organisations tend not to be good learners, certainly not in the aftermath of 
crises and disasters. One crucial barrier is the lack of authoritative and widely 
accepted explanations of the causes of the crisis or disaster. Potential factors 
encompass individual, organisational, technological and societal shortcomings, 
all of which can be subject to many different interpretations and assumptions 
about their significance. Yet even if explanations could attract common 
agreement, many organisational factors such as an excessive focus on core 
goals at the expense of ‘looking for trouble’ can act as barriers to preventing 
future crises and improving coping capacities in the event that they do occur. 
Most public service organisations are focused strongly on delivering front-line 
public services, rather than on scenario planning and crisis training. Worst-case 
thinking is rarely high on agendas.
In addition to cognitive and institutional influences on learning lessons after a 
crisis, the political and social aspects can also be crucial. A dominant political 
depiction of a crisis as the product of failures of prevention or lack of foresight in 
contingency planning can set the agenda for rethinking policies, processes and 
organisational rules. Other players in the lesson-drawing game, however, might 
attempt to use the political reform rhetoric to advocate very different types of 
reforms from those put forward by leaders. Therefore, the stakes are high for 
leaders in their capacities to steer lesson-drawing processes. The key challenge 
is to ensure that in the wake of a crisis, they have a dominant influence on the 
feedback stream and that existing policy networks and public organisations 
follow the leader’s desired pathway.
Despite complex barriers to post-crisis learning, crises also present opportunities. 
They can create windows of opportunity for policy reform, institutional 
overhaul and even leadership revival (Boin et al. 2008, 2009). The 2001 foot-and-
mouth disease crisis in the United Kingdom led to the abolition of an insular and 
backward-looking agricultural department. Barack Obama’s victory in the 2008 
US presidential elections was helped by a perception that he was better placed 
than his rival John McCain to lead the country’s economic revival. A word of 
caution is necessary here. Leaders need to be careful of ‘knee-jerk’ reactions 
that are high on symbolic value because they create the impression of swift and 
decisive reform action, but are not based on considered deliberation or sound 
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rationale. Sweeping reforms and the rapid replacement of key officials in response 
to a crisis or a critical inquiry report may help create the impression that a leader 
is ‘in charge’; however, such action may severely limit the capacity for genuine 
lesson drawing, and may create new vulnerabilities or reinforce old ones. 
Table 15.1 Components of Crisis-Response Capacity
A. Sense-making capacity
1. Absorbing surprise, shock and uncertainty
2. Exploiting experience without being captured by it
3. Mobilising and utilising comprehensive expertise
4. High-velocity and continuous monitoring and updating
5. Safeguarding the long-term view
B.  Steering and synthesising capacity
1. Delivering strategic direction
2. Empowering operational agility
3. Forging concerted action across jurisdictions and professions
4. Safeguarding consideration of values and ethics
C. Meaning-making capacity
1. High-speed, all-channel public communication
2. Acknowledging and channelling public emotions
3. Mobilising pro-social community behaviour
4. Maintaining authority in the face of criticism
D. Consolidation capacity
1. Proactive recovery planning
2. Balancing solidarity and restraint in service provision
3. Resilient response–recovery transitions
E. Adaptive capacity
1. Proactive management of external accountability demands
2. Safeguarding institutional self-reflection
3. Exploring and exploiting learning opportunities
4. Fostering collective memory and a culture of awareness
Source: Author’s summary.
Three Paths to Improving Crisis Management 
In this chapter I have listed a broad catalogue of factors that together constitute 
what one might call the strategic capacity of a crisis-response system (see Table 
15.1). Trying to put this into practice involves a broad and long-term capacity-
building agenda, but let me highlight the three most important factors. First, it 
is important to open up crisis-management planning. By this I mean taking it away 
from the monopoly of experts, operational agencies and specialists. Obviously 
they are pivotal in a crisis situation, but if we are to take community resilience 
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seriously, surely the community—in whatever form—should be part of the 
planning process rather than being relied on only when government meets its 
own limitations.
Second, it is imperative to focus on the crisis after the crisis—the so-called 
recovery phase. This requires focusing on the adaptation process of learning 
the right lessons rather than becoming obsessed with fighting the last war—
something the average inquiry report is often overly concerned with. Because 
while it is important to be prepared for the last war, it is even more important to 
be prepared for a whole range of possible wars you have to fight in the future. 
My final recommendation is to upgrade the capacity to learn from a crisis rather 
than simply engage in the blame game. This requires embracing the best 
practices available (which are extremely well documented) from so-called high-
reliability organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Doing these things will go a 
long way towards creating a culture of learning in an organisation that routinely 
has to make extremely dangerous decisions in the context of a crisis. 
There is evidence to suggest that crisis-response capacity will become even 
more important in the future as the nature of crises changes. Two rather 
sweeping developments demand our attention. First, crises are becoming 
increasingly interconnected and trans-boundary in nature (Boin and Rhinard 
2008; Helsloot et al. 2012). Contemporary crises such as pandemics and mega 
computer viruses transgress functional, geographical and time boundaries that 
used to keep crises and disasters more or less contained. We are facing crises that 
escalate across policy domains and countries, combining long incubation times 
with long-term effects. Such crises are harder to manage through conventional 
means and strategies.
Second, the political-administrative capacity to deal with such crises has been 
gradually eroding. The current downsizing of the state, the inheritance of two or 
more decades of New Public Management insistence on leanness and efficiency, 
and the fragmentation of the political consensus about ‘bottom-line’ issues of 
safety and security—are all phenomena that can be easily exaggerated, but it is 
hard to see how they contribute to the type of political-administrative capacity 
required for dealing prudently with the crises of the era.
Many things may change, but one thing that will remain the same is the call for 
leadership that follows the onset of a crisis. It is time that crisis management is 
viewed as an integral and crucial dimension of leadership, in both the public 
and the private sectors. 
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16. The Public Service in the 
Aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis: Future-proof or future shock?
The Honourable Bill English
I wish to give a reasonably broad, high-level view of the way the New Zealand 
Government is currently thinking about public service, as well as to offer some 
of my own thoughts that are going to continue to influence us. The first point is 
that all organisations, public or otherwise, are dealing with a number of what are 
increasingly appearing to be permanent changes. I will highlight three here. The 
first is debt reduction in the developed world, which is a generation-long project. 
We really have no idea of what the ongoing dynamics of this are, because we have 
never done it before, and no-one else has done it under the circumstances the 
developed world currently faces. This makes constraint permanent.
Ubiquitous data and free information form a second, greater force. Traditionally, 
the power of government was as a holder and controller of information. That has 
gone. Not only can anyone (including nine-year-olds) now access information for 
free, they can do it immediately. Moreover, citizens no longer think governments 
should hold information as power over people in the way they used to accept. 
A third feature I see as a permanent change is the ongoing shift of wealth, 
power and therefore influence from our traditional markets and allies to the 
Asia-Pacific region and other emerging economies.
In this context, the New Zealand and Australian public services are in a unique 
position to harvest ideas for change—a change that is inevitable. On the one side 
we have the developed world, which has begun and will continue to undergo 
for a couple of decades radical experimentation and crunching the costs of its 
public services. This process has only just begun; those who think the current 
debate is only about austerity are wrong, as debt levels are still rising across the 
developed world. All they are really doing in these countries (particularly the 
Eurozone) is shuffling around their balance sheets. The image I have in my mind 
is of staff in an emergency department standing around a bed discussing how 
much adrenalin to pump into an ailing patient. The approach they are taking is 
far from a cure.
And while on the one hand much of the developed world is going through 
radical experimentation, on the other hand the developing Asia-Pacific 
economies and other emerging economies want more consumption-led growth, 
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and are therefore developing an appetite and a need for public services which 
they don’t have. This makes us ideally positioned both to harvest the ideas from 
the more radical experiments from economies that are under more pressure than 
Australia and New Zealand and to on-sell our expertise on public service to 
emerging economies, who will want them. In such emerging economies there is 
scope for massive and rapid growth in the provision of effective public services.
We are entering an age of experimentation on a scale we haven’t seen since 
World War II and its aftermath. What does the government of little old New 
Zealand think about this? Our approach is to try to create sufficient stability 
so as to get even more change. By this I mean that it is hard to make change in 
large, sophisticated organisations with customers who are sensitive to service 
levels when you are working from a short-term budget process. In such systems 
there is often confusion surrounding the divisions of responsibility, and a lack 
of focus on what you are trying to achieve.
Consequently, we have taken the opportunity over the past few years to make 
a number of changes that are part of what I call the ‘responsibility model’. 
Under the responsibility model, organisations themselves—not treasury, not 
the minister of finance, not central agencies—are responsible for making change 
and delivering services within fiscal constraints. They are in the best position 
to do this, because they know best what they are doing. Politicians and central 
agencies often don’t know, and their culture tends to be one of watching what’s 
happening, compared with the people who actually have to do it. In other words, 
according to the responsibility model, your destiny is in your own hands and 
how you handle pressures is up to you—although of course we have a whole 
public service and it can provide support. 
There are a number of features we put in place to try to create the sense of 
stability and responsibility that we believe leads to better long-term decision-
making. The first is to avoid the temptation of rushing in and grabbing savings 
in an irrational and random manner, which is actually the long-term habit of 
treasuries. This is because treasuries have to meet a target, so they simply go and 
get the money—something that preoccupies everybody about their short-term 
survival and decision-making, and prevents them thinking about the longer 
term and the real fiscal drivers. 
That, then, is my first point: focusing on the longer-term fiscal costs, accepting 
deficits in the shorter term with the view that if we think very hard about what 
we’re doing, two, three or five years down the track we can actually be spinning 
out hundreds of millions of dollars of spare cash, not just the NZ$20 million 
that is preoccupying us now. After all, the long-term focus works best when we 
know what we’re trying to achieve.
There are a couple of critical aspects to this approach. One is that we are trying 
to get the strength of having targets without the weaknesses. The second is 
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that our results are focused on communities and populations, not government 
departments. This is because people don’t live in government departments. They 
don’t measure the success of public services by the success of a government 
department; they measure it by looking around in their street and their suburb 
and the particular public service they happened to use yesterday. This point—
relating to where people are rather than where we are—is critical. For while 
the parliamentary accountability system is about tracking a dollar, not whether 
something works, we have to also keep track of the real world.
To focus on results, another thing we have done is break the annual budget 
cycle and move consciously to four-year budget plans. A recent survey of chief 
executives suggests that this is now leading to the right kind of conversations 
about the longer-term effects they are trying to achieve, and about the sectoral 
relationships they need across government to achieve those results.
Another factor we have been looking at is what I would call judgment not 
process. By this I mean that leadership in the public service should ultimately 
be about judgment, not about going through all the right processes. After all, 
as we move into a more adaptive environment, we don’t have time for all the 
processes; we need people who are willing and able to quickly take a position 
and make a judgment in tough situations, rather than waiting around for the 
next budget cycle or whatever.
The changes we have put in place are starting to have some effect, and we have 
unashamedly taken a long-term view—longer than an electoral cycle and the 
life of one government. Ideally, government departments would not take part in 
our budget cycle, because they would have their own four-year revenue track 
and their own plan, allowing them to just go off and do it. We would simply 
keep an eye on them—something that would probably free up half of senior 
management’s time, from what I can see.
That, then, is what we are trying to do to create stability. But what are the 
implications for the kind of change that is going to actually happen, not just 
at the macro level but also within public services? There are four I would like 
to propose.
The first is that the usual political boundaries don’t apply anymore—not in New 
Zealand anyway, and not, I suspect, across the world. What do I mean by that? 
The other day I read one official’s report, which kept referring to the political 
risks of a particular proposition. But it was wrong because it was based on 
what everyone used to talk about five years ago, but not today. I would argue 
the public today is much less susceptible to lobby groups and self-interest; the 
public today is much more interested in politicians and public servants just 
getting on with their jobs. They are much less worried about whether they were 
consulted, and they are not nearly as concerned about sacred cows. 
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That doesn’t mean that everything is up for grabs, but the sense of caution and 
risk management built into public servants from the time of plenty is now quite 
outdated. In fact, we are finding, as politicians, the only constraints on getting 
things done concern our own internal processes, not the public’s attitudes 
or aversion to risk. The public is not marching in the streets against change, 
because they know change is necessary. They’ve been doing it in their homes, 
they’ve been doing it in their businesses. They think central government is just 
catching up with it, and they know local governments are about another two 
years behind, but that eventually they will get there. 
In that context, the public is very focused on the economy. They want their 
public service to work well—they actually expect that—but they also want 
their public service to focus on growth. And I know this is a radical idea for 
some, but as we write our regulations and our policies we need to know that 
the people to whom we are applying them—who actually pay for us—have as 
their top priorities: one, job security; two, a job for their teenager; and three, 
a bit more income, so they can increase their savings and pay off their debt. 
Everything else comes after that. We have quite some way to go for that strong 
focus on economic opportunity to filter right into every corner of the New 
Zealand Public Service. 
The whole world is headed in this direction. I have been in discussions in 
the past year where countries like Canada and Japan, whose governments of 
all political persuasions have been for generations opposed to free trade, are 
starting to advocate free trade. Why? Because they need a growth story for the 
middle class, and there’s nothing much else around that is working. Our public 
in Australia and New Zealand is where the public of most of the developed 
world is right now—that is, they know the world has changed, they expect 
us to behave in different ways that reflect their much deeper sense of economic 
insecurity in doing what we can to reinforce a sense of security. 
The second implication of the changes that are occurring is that policy is now 
a commodity. My twelve-year-old son can print off world ‘best practice’ policy 
from the OECD website in 10 minutes flat if you asked him to. He doesn’t need 
a degree, he doesn’t need highly trained policy thinking; he can get this kind 
of information now from anywhere for free. What matters now is not the ability 
to sit around and think about high-level policy; what matters now is a detailed 
understanding of how policy applies to a particular setting and how to make it 
work. Our public services in Australia and New Zealand have some way to go 
to realise this. They need to ask themselves the question: why would someone 
pick the best thing to do? This process is often largely accidental in the public 
service at the moment.
Why would public servants get out of bed in the morning and try really hard to 
make something work? How do they tell whether it’s working, and if we found 
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out it wasn’t working, would we do anything about it? The answer to that last 
question has traditionally been no. Instead, we go and find another good idea 
and put it on top of the one that’s not working, and if that doesn’t work, we 
go and find another one. The result is that over 30 years we accumulate a very 
expensive failure. After all, if we’re going to fail, let’s do it at low cost. Policy, 
then, is a commodity, and the critical knowledge that has to be built in our public 
services should be centred on the institutional arrangements that are going to 
make policy work. The public is not going to tolerate us spending money on stuff 
that doesn’t work; five years ago they would have, now they don’t, and what’s 
more our lenders are not going to lend us money for stuff that doesn’t work. 
So if we want to maintain service levels for the public, we must flush out what 
doesn’t work, and often that requires a change in our institutional incentives, 
and some basic institutional economics. To do this we need to determine what 
incentives people face and what signals are out in our public service market 
to tell people how to behave. We need to better understand the institutional 
arrangements that are about success, and this has become a current focus of the 
New Zealand Government. 
A third implication of this world we are going to change is that other people can 
help us. In New Zealand and to some extent in Australia, we have had a period 
where the political climate discouraged any further privatisation. Until 2008 we 
had a Labour government in New Zealand which put a huge premium on who 
did the job. Their view was that the public service had to do it, because they are 
apparently the only ones who care, and those other nasty people who are not in 
the public service are going to rip you off, make excessive profits and not care 
about anything. By taking this approach, the Government cut itself off from a 
vast pool of knowledge, particularly knowledge about something that everyone 
is coming to understand now: how to manage risk.
In the public service over the past 20 years, risk has effectively meant avoiding 
embarrassing media stories. In the next 20 years, by contrast, it will mean whether 
you can manage the operational and financial risks of the vast expenditure and 
the vast capital expenditure that we control. But we don’t have those skills: 
governments are terrible at managing assets. Given that there are people out there 
who have spent billions of dollars building up investment and the intellectual 
property of managing assets, why don’t we use some of their knowledge? 
Similarly, we don’t know much about how social programs impact on communities, 
or whether much of what we do undermines the natural collectivism of the non-
governmental community. Consequently, we better work with those people who 
do understand it. After all, while they don’t have public policy degrees and are 
not paid a lot, they do know a lot about the places in which they live and how 
the dynamics of those places work, and we need to see them as equal partners. 
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In New Zealand, we have had a fantastic little experiment in this recently with 
something called the ‘Social Sector Trials’. The idea is simple: we go to six small 
towns with problems with youth and find someone—essentially anyone who 
will turn up—and tell them that they control the government spending related 
to the services supporting youth; they make the decisions. In mid 2012, after 
just 12 months of this experiment, we had a presentation to cabinet of these 
young people from small provincial towns—none with a population of more 
than 10 000—telling us what they had achieved with about NZ$100 000 and 
some control over other government spending. It was fantastic. 
The presenters had a fully blended grip of all the public policy issues associated 
with the financing, delivery and effectiveness of services for quite a difficult 
part of the community. They gave exemplary presentations and descriptions of 
what they were doing. This kind of capacity is everywhere, and public services 
have to learn how to use it, because most of our approaches don’t work when we 
ignore that capacity in communities and in families. Outsiders can help us, and 
in fact unless you are working with other people, you probably have it wrong.
If, as a public servant, you are still living in a bubble where you believe ‘the 
public service cares and they are the only ones who know what they are doing’, 
you are wrong, because I haven’t come across a single example in the past three 
and a half years where that’s the correct diagnosis of the situation. I have come 
across many examples where by reaching out, viewing society as a network not 
a hierarchy and acknowledging that other people know stuff we don’t know, 
we have been able to make fantastic advances in the quality and the economy 
of our services. 
And this of course leads to a different kind of leadership. We are in the same 
situation as much of the private sector, although we can’t move as quickly to 
change it, where a lot of our skill sets come from the time of plenty. How to get 
in the minister’s office door, how to crank out more cash, how to manoeuvre 
the strategy out there—all these skills are now redundant. Such approaches 
may have been applicable at the time, but that is no longer the case. Instead, 
the kind of leadership we particularly need is the kind of leadership that allows 
disruptive talent to emerge, and by this I don’t mean chaos. 
I mean, instead, that we are after leaders who, in spite of pressures associated 
with the financial squeeze, can have fresh analyses, think laterally and have 
a different set of relationships than were previously needed to succeed in an 
organisation.
If we rely only on incremental adaptation then changing technology and 
increasing public demand are going to squeeze our capacity, push the anxiety 
levels through the roof and the morale through the floor so that in the end 
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someone else will have to come in and do the job. There are a lot of other aspects 
of leadership that are very important in the public sector; it involves quite 
specialised skills, but is easily disparaged by those outside the public sector. 
The people who come in, however, find it’s a good deal more complex. The 
public service is not a business, but we must have room for disruptive talent.
In New Zealand across the board, we are implementing a range of significant 
changes: our defence forces are going through probably the biggest reorganisation 
of any defence force in the developed world; we’re making significant changes 
to our law and order system, which means we’re closing prisons for the first 
time in a generation; we’re looking at welfare reform, which has aspects that 
are quite unique, and are already changing our thinking about our welfare 
population. In addition to these changes we have another massive challenge that 
we haven’t made much progress on yet: the affordability of social housing—the 
Government’s single biggest asset. We are also attempting to change the way we 
deal with information and privacy, and we expect to make some real progress in 
these fields over the next three or four years.
The reason we have been able to get as far as we have without significant 
disruption, and the reason we have confidence we can get quite a long way 
further, is that we think most of the talent we need in our public service is 
already there—it just needs to be given a clearer sense of direction. To do this 
we need to nurture a culture that allows different talent to come to the fore. 
A good illustration of this was demonstrated following the 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake. In the first week after the disaster, I got to see New Zealand’s public 
service adapt to a high-stress situation that demanded rapid action across a 
number of issues that were not simply complex, but also of a nature we had not 
dealt with before. A small group of people did a magnificent job of this in the 
early stages, and that level of excellence has been maintained. 
We are fortunate in New Zealand to be able to undertake our own radical 
experiments; it is a place where you can break all the rules. And I hope that 
much of what I have covered in this chapter will serve as lessons for what you 
should do when you’re allowed to break all the rules. We hope to harvest the 
product of that experiment and spread it across our public service, because 
we think that’s the only way we are going to be able to achieve better public 
services when we have less resources to do it with. 
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17. Disaster Recovery: The particular 
governance challenges generated by 
large-scale natural disasters
Bruce Glavovic
I will share some of my reflections on disaster recovery by drawing on lessons 
learnt from recent international experience. I will focus attention on post-
Hurricane Katrina recovery experiences. Since 2005, I have spent a lot of time in 
Louisiana, for periods of anywhere from two to six weeks at a time on an annual 
basis, in order to track the recovery process and learn from their experience. 
I have also conducted fieldwork in Indonesia and the Maldives after the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami; and have been studying the recovery experience after 
the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan. My goal is to learn from 
these large-scale disasters to understand the nature of risk better, how to build 
more effective institutions for risk reduction and post-disaster recovery and, 
ultimately, how to build more resilient and sustainable communities. 
I will introduce the notion of a political ecology of recovery and frame this 
concept in the context of the ‘wicked problem’ of post-disaster recovery that 
presents society with ‘wicked choices’. Drawing on examples from disaster 
experiences around the world, and in particular the post-Katrina and Canterbury 
earthquake recovery experiences, I will argue that recovery presents a distinctive 
governance challenge that goes far beyond ‘fixing levees’ (in the context of the 
New Orleans levee failure) or bridging fault lines (in the Canterbury context). 
The topics I will cover include reflections on disaster narratives and what 
they teach; the complex challenges of leadership and governance in the face of 
disaster risk; the political ecology of recovery; responding to and recovering 
from disasters in ways that build resilience to future shocks; and finally a word 
or two about future-proofing society. 
Hurricane Katrina
You will have seen the graphic televised images of the impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina on the people of New Orleans and their plight in the face of the dismal 
response and protracted recovery process. I am sure you are all aware of the 
many challenges faced by people in this region. Hurricane Katrina was not a 
‘natural disaster’. It was a natural hazard event that became a human-induced 
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catastrophe because of failings in the design and maintenance of the levee 
system that was compounded by the response failure in the aftermath of the 
flooding of New Orleans. This multifaceted failure continued into recovery. 
The immediate drivers of the disaster have historical roots that go back more 
than 200 years of well-intentioned efforts to ‘wrest the city from nature’ 
(Colten 2006). The Mississippi River was channelled, levees were constructed, 
navigation channels cut through the wetlands and resources exploited as if they 
were infinite. The construction of the levee system opened up the possibility 
for suburban development in former swampland. The wetland ecosystems that 
sustain livelihoods in the region and act as a natural defence against coastal 
storms have been degraded and transformed over time. To compound matters, 
more and more people live in harm’s way as people move into suburban 
developments that depend on the levees to keep out floodwaters. Over time, 
these choices have resulted in more and more people being exposed to natural 
hazard events like hurricanes. To make matters worse, New Orleans and the 
Mississippi Delta have a disproportionate share of people living in poverty. As 
a consequence, the region and New Orleans are fractured by layers of social 
vulnerability that were exposed by Hurricane Katrina. 
Attention is usually focused on the story of the storm or the post-storm response 
narrative. Freudenberg et al. (2009) persuasively argue that a critical narrative 
predates the landing of Katrina: choices were made to locate people in places 
exposed to storms and flooding. They argue that a ‘growth machine’ of self-
interested property developers, business tycoons and public officials secured 
public funding to undertake projects that profited a few in the short term but 
have caused extensive environmental degradation and spiralling disaster risk as 
people moved into low-lying suburbs on former swamplands. 
Burby (2006) describes the paradoxical consequences of endeavours to reduce 
moderate risk—for example, through levees that safeguard people from low-
level frequent events such as river flooding—but that generate a false sense 
of security, encourage intensified development behind the levees and result in 
catastrophic consequences if an event exceeds design standards. This is often 
referred to as the ‘safe development paradox’. 
Early settlers stayed on relatively high ground but with the expansion of suburbs 
into low-lying areas behind levees, the flood risk increased exponentially. New 
Orleans was flooded in the aftermath of Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and, despite 
improvements to the levee system, it failed again in 2005 when Katrina struck. 
Now repaired and improved, it provides category three protection; but this is 
insufficient to protect the city from a breach by a category four or five storm. 
Tragically, New Orleans will flood again when a category four or five storm 
strikes the area—we just do not know when it will happen. The people of New 
Orleans and the wider gulf region thus face waves of adversity from coastal 
storms and hurricanes.
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There are other waves of adversity that face the people of this region. The 2010 
BP oil-spill disaster devastated the wetland ecosystems of the Mississippi Delta 
and has had profound negative impacts on coastal livelihoods in the region. To 
exacerbate matters, the region is a global hotspot for climate change impacts, 
particularly sea-level rise, and consequently the waves of adversity will be 
magnified and intensified in years to come.
Choices made in recovery have profound implications for exposure to these 
coming waves of adversity. Future disasters are inevitable if pre-event exposure 
and vulnerabilities are entrenched in post-disaster recovery choices. 
Mitch Landrieu, who was lieutenant-governor of Louisiana in 2005, made a 
statement in 2008 that captures the essence of the recovery challenge: 
The challenge is to keep and secure those things that are good: our food, 
our music, our architecture, our people, our faith and our families, our 
love of life and our love of country. And at the same time, [to] discard 
that part of our culture that strangles us: crime, bad schools and the 
inability to move beyond race.
In 2010, Landrieu became mayor of New Orleans, a place with an amazing 
array of ‘good things’: the birthplace of jazz, incredible cuisine, amazing 
architecture—a city that resonates with ritual and culture. It is, however, also a 
place that has a longstanding slew of social, economic and political challenges—
including deep poverty, social inequity and racism. As Landrieu points out, 
the recovery challenge boils down to discarding that part of our culture that 
strangles us. Confronting the root causes and drivers of social vulnerability lies 
at the heart of reducing disaster risk and enabling recovery—a theme I will 
build upon. Hurricane Katrina and disasters in general expose the skeleton, the 
‘bones’, of society: the good and the bad. Working out how to secure that which 
is good and discard that which strangles is a critical but complex undertaking. 
Many lessons have been learnt from Katrina. You might remember the televised 
images of people looting, and the reports of rape, pillage, plunder and mayhem; 
but it has subsequently been shown that many of these media reports were 
based largely on rumour and unverified sources that resulted in misinformation.
Yet we do not hear enough about the stories of Katrina’s heroes: the people who 
brought their boats into the city to rescue people, who broke cordons to get 
through to the needy, the incredible role played by the US Coastguard, and 
many more stories of heroism and altruism. It is the same in every disaster. The 
first responders are local people, and beyond that response there are those who 
dedicate themselves to the recovery process, working tirelessly through very, very 
difficult circumstances, often with their own homes and families disrupted. It is 
important not to lose sight of these stories of selfless commitment and dedication.
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A series of studies and reviews reveals the systemic failure of the post-Katrina 
response, some of which persisted into recovery. There are many lessons that 
have been learnt. One review described the post-Katrina response as a systemic 
failure of initiative (US House of Representatives 2006). Another contribution in 
this book speaks of the need for imagination in disaster situations. You could say 
the same thing about post-Katrina New Orleans. Analysts and reviews describe 
a failure in leadership at every level of society—from the White House down 
to the lowest level of government, and in key domains of civil society and the 
private sector. Of course, it is not as simple as that because there are examples 
of success and effective leadership despite the fraught circumstances. So it is 
important to acknowledge that Katrina is not a simple, ‘everyone did a bad job’ 
story. It is a much more complex, nuanced narrative.
Particular attention needs to be focused on the pre-Katrina story to understand 
how to avoid recovery choices that put people back in harm’s way and, 
fundamentally, how to confront the poverty and marginalisation that were 
endemic in New Orleans and the region; together these constructed the human 
catastrophe that was precipitated by Katrina. 
Another recovery insight is the ‘speed versus deliberation’ dilemma: the 
conundrum of trying to progress a speedy recovery by making quick decisions 
so that a level of ‘normalcy’ can be restored and meeting the countervailing need 
to create opportunities for meaningful dialogue and deliberation to ensure that 
wise public choices are made that will be enduring and robust (Olshansky 2006). 
Resolving this dilemma has been very challenging in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
One of the tragic consequences of failing to resolve it has been the decision to 
allow rebuilding in places that are low-lying and exposed to future flooding. In 
short, the pre-event exposure and social vulnerabilities that characterised the 
pre-Katrina narrative have been entrenched by recovery choices so that a future 
disaster is a dismal inevitability. Post-Katrina demographics and socioeconomic 
conditions have changed. Many long-term New Orleans residents have left 
the city permanently. In some areas there is no tangible evidence of Katrina 
while nearly a decade later other areas are little changed from the immediate 
aftermath of the hurricane and flooding. Despite massive recovery efforts, social 
vulnerability in the city and wider region persists. Exposure is entrenched and 
disaster risk is escalating in the face of climate change. There are always winners 
and losers in disasters and in the recovery process. A key Katrina lesson is the 
imperative to address the needs of marginalised and socially vulnerable groups. 
Another lesson is the need to anticipate and plan for waves of adversity that 
are likely to occur over time and subject the people of this region to multiple 
shocks. For those living in the bayous of Louisiana, there is no levee protection 
and they are dependent on the wetlands for their livelihood. But their way of 
life and, indeed, their lives are exposed to waves of adversity as they have had to 
weather a succession of events in recent years, including Hurricane Katrina, the 
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BP oil spill, the Global Financial Crisis, several other hurricanes and the prospect 
of flooding by the Mississippi River. To make matters worse, these waves of 
adversity will intensify in the future in this era of climate change. These waves 
of adversity are not unlike the series of earthquakes and aftershocks that have 
devastated the people of Greater Christchurch and the wider Canterbury region.
So, the challenge is: how do we fix the levees—not just the physical ones, but 
the levees of society—to build more resilient and sustainable communities? This 
is a ‘wicked problem’ that presents society with a set of ‘wicked choices’.
The Canterbury Earthquake
I will now make some observations about Canterbury, based on a series of 
interviews I have conducted with key informants involved in the recovery 
process since late 2010. Here, like Katrina, you could argue that there are 
villains and there are heroes. There were people who stole, though I do not 
think we saw anything like the level of villainy in Canterbury as was seen in 
New Orleans. But we have seen many, many heroes in Canterbury, as we did in 
New Orleans and the wider gulf coast.
The story of leadership and initiative is quite different in Canterbury than the 
Katrina story. By all accounts the response worked very well in Canterbury 
and that is a real credit to those in positions of responsibility for the response. 
I understand from my key informant interviews that many dimensions of the 
recovery are going well. There is also room for improvement. So, does practice 
make perfect? I have heard some interesting commentaries. For example, a 
scholar from the University of Canterbury has argued that the university may 
not have responded as well in the major February event as it could have because 
it relied on practices learned in the September 2010 response that may not have 
been appropriate for the February 2011 circumstances. So that is ironic. 
There are many stories emerging about our understanding of seismic risk and 
choices made to build on ground prone to liquefaction. We have learned about 
the notion of a ‘class quake’, as people describe how some lower socioeconomic 
neighbourhoods in Greater Christchurch were more exposed and vulnerable to 
seismic impacts and have borne the brunt of suburban damage. The dilemma of 
‘speed versus deliberation’ in decision-making is an obvious reality in Canterbury.
A key challenge in the Canterbury recovery, as in major disasters elsewhere, 
is how to avoid entrenching pre-event exposure and vulnerabilities that 
inexorably lead to future disasters. The Government has made some bold 
decisions about not allowing rebuilding to take place in localities prone to a 
high risk of liquefaction. Not allowing rebuilding in ‘red-zoned’ areas is very 
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different from the decision to allow people to rebuild anywhere—regardless of 
flood risk—in New Orleans. These ‘red-zone’ decisions were controversial and 
contentious. And there are winners and losers in Canterbury as a result of these 
decisions, but it took bold leadership and a focus on societal resilience, equity 
and sustainability to avoid putting people back in harm’s way.
Inevitably, there are winners and losers in disasters and part of the recovery 
challenge is to support and enable those worst affected, and to avoid deepening 
the misery and hardship that many face. This has been especially challenging 
in Canterbury because the earthquake series has caused shock after shock after 
shock, quite literally. The people of the region have faced waves of adversity as 
they seek to recover and they need to build layers of resilience. 
The recovery challenge in Canterbury thus boils down to bridging fault lines—
not just geomorphological fault lines, but also societal fault lines. For example, 
bridges need to be built between civic, business and political leaderships. 
Bridging societal fault lines is, however, a wicked problem and presents wicked 
choices that must be made—and made well.
Lessons Learnt
So, what have we learnt from disaster narratives? Simply put, social 
vulnerability must be confronted—as was graphically exposed in Katrina. You 
cannot stop a hurricane or an earthquake, but we can do something about 
reducing social vulnerability—and this is pivotal for reducing disaster risk 
and enabling recovery.
Recovery is complex precisely because it involves much more than the physical 
dimension; it is overlaid with social, economic and political dimensions. There 
is no simple end point and it is certainly not a return to ‘normal’, or to what 
existed previously (International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction 
2005). Recovery begins when the community repairs or develops social, 
political and economic processes, institutions and relationships that enable 
it to function in the new post-disaster context (Alesch et al. 2009). That is 
the challenge. The hard part of recovery is rebuilding the human and societal 
architecture that underpins every community. The physical and economic 
infrastructure is important and is difficult to repair after a disaster; but it is 
much easier to repair physical and economic infrastructure than it is to repair 
the social and cultural infrastructure. 
One way to frame the recovery challenge is to recognise that there are ‘domains 
of uncertainty’ that need to be ‘shrunk’ (see Figure 17.1). After a disaster 
uncertainty intensifies and expands. Reducing this proliferation of uncertainty 
is a key challenge for the recovery process. Domains of uncertainty include, 
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first, uncertainty about seismic risk. The September 2010 earthquake took place 
on an unknown fault. The region has experienced a series of earthquakes and 
aftershocks since then, moving east towards the coast and offshore. A lot of work 
has been undertaken to better understand and reduce uncertainty about seismic 
risk in the region. It is not possible to finalise insurance decisions, for example, 
as long as there are aftershocks and uncertainty about when they will diminish. 
Consequently, as long as there is uncertainty about seismic risk it is very hard 
for people to make critical livelihood decisions—such as whether or not to 
repair their homes and businesses, or whether or not to relocate. Uncertainty 
about seismic risk thus compounds a second domain of uncertainty: livelihood 
uncertainty. A third domain of uncertainty is uncertainty about recovery 
governance. Shrinking this domain of uncertainty is critical for instilling 
confidence and building trust to progress recovery. 
Figure 17.1 Domains of Recovery Uncertainty
Source: Author’s summary.
The Government came in early to try to provide clarity about how to govern 
the recovery, enacting legislation to set up the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA) to lead the recovery process in partnership 
with local government in the region. Despite these measures, however, and 
notwithstanding the good intentions and hard work of many politicians and 
government officials, there has been widespread and persistent uncertainty about 
the recovery governance process. Many of those I have interviewed lacked basic 
knowledge about the recovery governance process and expressed frustration 
about the perceived confusion and lack of clarity about who is responsible for 
different aspects of the recovery. A particular concern has been uncertainty 
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about how citizens and business can contribute meaningfully to the recovery 
effort. Many have found it difficult to connect with CERA and local government 
recovery efforts. Many have felt excluded and marginalised from the process—
notwithstanding the many efforts by CERA and local government to consult the 
public. Many would like to see more opportunities to contribute and collaborate 
in what they consider to be ‘their recovery’. Any complex, large-scale disaster 
confronts this third domain of recovery governance uncertainty. The sooner 
recovery roles and responsibilities are clarified, and opportunities created for 
authentic public participation in the recovery process, the faster this domain 
can be ‘shrunk’, but as long as it persists it ‘squeezes’ the domain of livelihood 
uncertainty and people continue to feel they are in limbo. In sum, the recovery 
challenge is to reduce each domain of uncertainty.
We live in a time of escalating disaster risk, with an exponential increase in 
the number of people living in places prone to natural hazard events. Disaster 
is unavoidable in the context of exposure to natural hazards and historical 
patterns of vulnerability (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002). Key international 
organisations are focusing increasing attention on reducing disaster risk: 
prevention is better than post-event cure and it pays dividends in the long 
term (UN-World Bank 2010). Disaster risk, resilience and sustainability are 
fundamentally interconnected and there is a compelling need to make sense 
of the relationship between these concepts. Among other things, there are 
complex interrelationships between sudden shock events, like a hurricane, and 
slow onset disasters, like climate change. Resilience and sustainability are about 
building the capacity of present and future generations to, among other things, 
cope with large-scale natural hazard events, and anticipate and adapt to a future 
characterised by change, uncertainty and surprise. Post-disaster recovery opens 
up opportunities to chart pathways to a more resilient and sustainable future.
I submit that recovery is community (re)development in a pressure-cooker 
situation. The stakes are higher and the circumstances are much more pressurised 
than in typical pre-event situations. Extremely important and complex social 
choices have to be made. Fundamentally, recovery is democracy in action 
under dire circumstances. It is about empowering local people—and some of 
the comments New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, made are pertinent: how 
should central government engage and work with local government and local 
communities? An empowering recovery process is compelling but complex; it 
is a wicked problem that compels us to rethink how we make social choices in 
pressure-cooker situations.
I would like to provide a rudimentary contrast between ‘simple’, ‘complicated’ 
and ‘complex’ contexts or situations. One could argue that baking a cake is a 
simple undertaking. Sending a person to the Moon is more complicated. Raising 
a child is a complex task. So, what institutional arrangements and leadership 
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qualities enable us to deal with these very different circumstances? In short, 
the implications for the kind of leadership and organisational characteristics 
required under these different circumstances are very, very different. That is 
not to say that disaster situations are always simple, complicated or complex. At 
different points in time circumstances vary from simple to complex.
In the response phase, there are probably half a dozen priorities: save lives, 
rescue people, secure buildings, and so forth. It is a relatively high-danger 
situation in which the response is made in a complicated set of circumstances 
that requires leaders to marshal resources, stabilise the situation and buy time. 
The archetypal ‘alpha male’ personality is the ideal leadership model. In fact, 
many females perform this role better than many men, so this is not a gendered 
comment. The traditional notion of an alpha male—a commander in control of 
his troops supported by a command-and-control organisational culture—works 
really well in these circumstances.
Transitioning into recovery is a very different reality. Recovery is a much more 
complex task; it involves building safe, resilient and sustainable communities. 
It is about empowerment. It is about making social choices in the face of deep 
uncertainty and ambiguity, so the appropriate leadership style is that of a 
nurturing female, where empowering, collaborative and adaptive ways of 
working are dominant.
The concept of risk lies at the heart of recovery choices and resilience and 
sustainability more generally. But prevailing risk discourse needs to be deepened 
and extended. Risk is typically defined as the probability and consequences 
of a hazard event (after Knight 1921)—or measurable uncertainty. But not all 
risk problems can be reduced to measurable uncertainty. There are situations 
that are dominated by ambiguity, which is when people disagree about how to 
frame options, context and so on, resulting in contending legitimate viewpoints 
about a particular social choice. Ambiguity cannot be resolved by a probability 
and consequence analysis. Some risk problems might be characterised as being 
dominated by unmeasurable uncertainty when the nature of the problem is 
effectively unknown and credible probabilities cannot be assigned. Other risk 
problems are best described in terms of ‘ignorance’—where we lack knowledge, 
education or awareness of the problem. Andy Stirling (2010) from the United 
Kingdom distinguishes knowledge about possibilities from knowledge about 
probabilities, and categorises risk, uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance into 
four domains (see Figure 17.2). 
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Figure 17.2 Risk, Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Ignorance
Source: Author’s summary, after Stirling, 2010.
Importantly, different approaches and ways of working are needed to deal 
with each different risk problem. There is a tendency to try to reduce all risk 
problems to ‘measurable uncertainty’ and to rely on traditional assessment and 
treatment options for dealing with problems that cannot be resolved using these 
approaches. But ignorance, ambiguity and unmeasurable uncertainty cannot be 
resolved using probability–consequence calculations. Fortunately, there is an 
array of available approaches that can and should be used to deal with different 
classes of risk problem. It is imperative to match the assessment and treatment 
approaches to the particular risk problem under consideration.
Recovery is thus much more than rebuilding physical infrastructure and analysing 
all risks as if they can be reduced to measurable uncertainty. Yet such framing 
tends to dominate prevailing recovery governance thinking and practice.
Recovery governance needs to be reframed to suit the more demanding tasks 
of recovery. Governance is more than government. Governance is about making 
social choices and raises the question: how should key actors in government 
work together with key actors in the private sector and civil society to resolve 
societal problems? There is an important role for key actors in science and the 
media in recovery governance; and, together with other governance actors, they 
draw upon and develop vital institutions and relationships to navigate through 
the wicked problem of recovery. What constitutes appropriate modalities of 
recovery governance will vary from place to place. The challenge is to construct an 
architecture of recovery governance that engages and empowers those in recovery; 
this is a monumental but crucial challenge for all in pressure-cooker situations.
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Figure 17.3 Actors and Institutions of Governance
Source: Author’s summary.
Recovery governance needs to be an empowering and collaborative process that 
provides a solid foundation for addressing the pivotal questions of what kind of post-
disaster community is desirable; how do we live with risk, uncertainty, ambiguity 
and ignorance; and who should make the critical recovery decisions? In short, I 
submit that there is a compelling need for deliberation, a non-coercive communicative 
process that encourages reflection, not only on the technical details, but also on the 
values, preferences and interests that underpin recovery. Recovery governance thus 
needs to be reframed as a deliberative process. This is not merely a philosophical 
reframing of recovery governance; it has important practical implications for how 
key actors and stakeholders in recovery negotiate their shared future. 
My reflections on large-scale disasters and the recovery narratives of Katrina 
and Canterbury in particular have prompted me to explore political ecology as 
an arena of scholarship that is relevant to the challenge of recovery governance. 
For those who do not have a background in ecology, the term comes from 
the Greek ‘oikos’ (house) and ‘logos’ (study of), and means the study of the 
house or household (‘household’ being extended to include entire estates by 
medieval times). Ecology is the scientific study of the relationships between 
living organisms and their natural environment. Political ecology introduces the 
political dimension into the study of social-ecological systems, and it recognises 
that issues of global change, resilience and sustainability are essentially political 
issues. Political ecology is the study of the politics of environmental change that 
shape socioeconomic power relationships in society, which may be driven by 
natural and/or human-induced phenomena and development interventions. It 
is therefore constructive to think about a political ecology of recovery, which 
recognises the politics of recovery, the connection between people and places and 
the socioeconomic power relationships that are fundamental to understanding 
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recovery as a process to empower local communities in the aftermath of disasters. 
A political ecology of recovery is the study of the politics of recovery that shape 
post-disaster socioeconomic power relationships impacted by natural hazard 
events and recovery interventions.
This framing of recovery governance has important implications for 
understanding the nature and role of science in post-disaster situations. The 
physical sciences have a vital role to play, and among other things to help reduce 
uncertainties such as the nature of seismic risk. The social sciences also have a 
tremendously important role to play, a role recognised by key players in the 
Canterbury recovery. The kind of science that is most relevant for answering 
urgent questions in a post-disaster situation is not, however, ‘normal’ or 
traditional science, which is appropriate when decision stakes are relatively 
low and a high degree of certainty prevails. In domains where there are high 
levels of system uncertainty and decision stakes are high, a different kind 
of science needs to be engaged. Funtowitz and Ravetz (1991) introduced the 
concept of ‘post-normal science’, which is an appropriate modality of science 
in circumstances in which facts are uncertain, values are in dispute, stakes are 
high and decisions are urgent. Post-normal science is especially relevant for a 
post-disaster situation (see Figure 17.4).
Figure 17.4 Post-Normal Science 
Source: After Funtowicz, S. O. and Ravetz, J. R. 1991. ‘A New Scientific Methodology for Global 
Environmental Issues’, in R. Costanza (ed.) Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of 
Sustainability (New York: Columbia University Press).
In post-disaster circumstances—fraught with uncertainty and high decision 
stakes—an extended peer community needs to be engaged in post-normal 
17. Disaster Recovery
211
science, including those affected by the disaster and willing to participate in a 
process of shared learning and understanding. Such participants can contribute 
to the process of scientific learning and also bring local, tacit knowledge to the 
table. An extended peer community is vital, not only for good process but also 
for good outcomes in a post-disaster situation.
One of the challenges of undertaking post-normal science in recovery is 
‘speaking truth to power’. Key informant interviews in post-Katrina New 
Orleans revealed that a number of scientists found themselves marginalised 
from key decision-makers and access to research grants ostensibly because they 
were critical of some of the recovery choices made. They were not necessarily 
critical of the individuals making those decisions but their research exposed 
flawed decisions. Many difficult choices have to be made in the course of the 
recovery and some of those choices stand up as being good decisions in the 
fullness of time; others, perhaps, will not stand up so well. So, in presenting 
their findings, some scientists and academics found themselves ostracised, and 
their ability to provide constructively critical input to the recovery process was 
marginalised—arguably to the detriment of recovery. This experience brings to 
the fore the need to develop a new social contract for science (Lubchenco 1998) 
in which the role of science is not simply to produce ‘reliable knowledge’ but 
for science and society to co-produce the knowledge required to navigate the 
uncertainty and the high decision stakes of the post-disaster setting.
So, to begin to bring this to a close, I want to highlight some of the conundrums 
and challenges revealed by the disaster narratives I have recounted and the 
spectrum of wicked choices that needs to be faced. 
First, we tend to focus on the ‘readiness’ and ‘response’ phases of the hazard 
cycle, but we need to extend these efforts out into the ‘reduction’ and ‘recovery’ 
stages (to use the four rs of the New Zealand hazard cycle). Second, we need 
to go beyond the physical and economic dimensions of recovery to engage the 
social, cultural and political dimensions. Third, as important as the technical 
details are, attention needs to be focused on the ethical or moral dimensions of 
recovery. The last dimensions are fundamental for resolving the ‘speed versus 
deliberation dilemma’—the fourth set of wicked choices. There are no simple 
or easy answers; post-disaster recovery poses a wicked problem and presents 
society with many wicked choices. Fifth, the question arises of whether recovery 
governance should be top-down or bottom-up. Should government establish a 
centralised agency to take charge of the recovery process? If so, how can those at 
the local level be empowered to recover? Invariably there are no easy answers and 
there is no panacea. Sixth, another conundrum is the issue of ‘insiders’ versus 
‘outsiders’; according to some there is antipathy to outsiders driving recovery 
in Canterbury. In post-Katrina New Orleans, there was strident objection to 
academics who came in from elsewhere to do research but were experienced by 
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local people as syphoning off information from disaster victims, were never seen 
again and thus did not contribute to the recovery process. But outsiders can and 
do make invaluable contributions to recovery efforts. Seventh, another issue that 
arises in post-disaster situations has been described by some as the ‘opening up’ 
and ‘closing down’ of bureaucracies. The post-disaster pressure-cooker situation 
means that recovery agencies have to manage the tension between focusing all 
their energy on getting on with the manifold urgent tasks at hand versus setting 
aside time and effort to learn from past experience and reflect critically on what 
they are doing and how well it is working and, where appropriate, making 
adjustments to improve future practice. Eighth, the conundrum of rights versus 
responsibilities arises: whose recovery is it and can government ‘do’ recovery on 
behalf of disaster-struck communities? How does one reconcile local, regional 
and national interests in large-scale disasters? What are the responsibilities 
of current generations for the safety, resilience and sustainability of future 
generations? The conundrum of rights versus responsibilities thus has both 
geographical and temporal implications. Ninth, to what extent does the recovery 
entrench ‘business as usual’ practices or move towards transformative change? 
Should recovery efforts address the structural or embedded systemic problems 
that lead to marginalisation and social vulnerability? Can a post-disaster window 
of opportunity be opened to build back better, safer and more sustainably or will 
it stimulate exploitative practices that are ultimately antithetical to recovery? 
Will the choices made be ones that are expedient or will they leave a legacy that 
future generations will appreciate? Tenth, and finally, the imperative to expedite 
and operationalise an efficient and cost-effective recovery must be reconciled 
with the imperative to adopt reflexive practices that stimulate learning-by-doing 
and build resilience and sustainability.
In order to future-proof society, we need to recognise that society will continue 
to face waves of adversity, and the challenge is to build resilience in the face of the 
financial and social realities that Prime Minister Key describes in his contribution 
to this book. Risk, uncertainty, ambiguity and surprise are the ‘new normal’. 
They will not go away, but will accelerate, intensify, deepen and proliferate in 
an era of global change. We live in a world that is complex and contested; and 
we face protracted, wicked problems that generate wicked choices. Deliberation 
is fundamental to understanding risk, resilience, sustainability and the political 
ecology of recovery. Recovery governance needs to be reframed as a deliberative 
governance process that is reflexive, collaborative and empowering. This is a 
challenging endeavour for individuals in the organisations that are charged with 
recovery because there is so much pressure on them to meet such compelling 
immediate needs. But the need to reframe and engage in new modalities of 
recovery is clear from post-disaster narratives around the world. 
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Finally, we face a series of complex, contested realities in post-disaster situations. 
Dealing with them requires deliberation and collaboration. Community 
wellbeing lies at the heart of recovery. We need a deeper understanding of 
what constitutes community and, recognising the heterogeneous and contested 
nature of community, we need courage to engage in new modalities of disaster 
risk reduction and recovery governance. We need political leaders, and leaders 
in business and civil society and science, to show courage by engaging in 
deliberative and reflexive practices in partnership with local communities to 
enable their recovery. 
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18. Missing the Opportunity to 
Promote Community Resilience? The 
Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry
Jim McGowan
The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCOI), established in 2011, 
was given broad terms of reference for its investigation. It included: floodplain 
management, State and local government planning, mining industry issues, the 
performance of private insurers, the emergency response and dam management 
matters. In adopting a regulatory approach to disaster management, however, 
it regrettably ignored, or was unaware of, recent intergovernmental policy 
developments, particularly the strategic intent of the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) of building individual and community resilience. 
Moreover, it did not address the most significant and pressing policy issues for 
disaster management in Australia: the imbalance in the allocation of government 
resources to response and recovery through the Natural Disaster Relief and 
Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA), and a genuine commitment to increase 
investment in prevention and mitigation strategies. It might also be argued that 
the inquiry’s dependence on greater and more prescriptive regulation in its 
recommendations potentially conflicts with the agreement to reduce ‘red and 
green tape’ made at the COAG meeting of 12 April 2012.
The Queensland Disaster in Context
The QFCOI’s interim report of August 2011 argued that:
The floods of December 2010 and January 2011 strained the resources of 
a state more used to coping with drought than floods. The consequences 
were shocking; no one believed that people could be swept by a torrent 
from their homes and killed … that nine motorists could be drowned 
in an attempt to negotiate floodwaters; that some towns could be 
completely isolated for weeks, or that every last citizen of others would 
have to be evacuated; that residents of cities like Ipswich and Brisbane 
could lose everything they owned in waters which wrecked thousands 
of homes. (QFCOI 2011:6)
Then, on 3 February 2011, north Queensland communities were subject to the 
fury of Tropical Cyclone Yasi, the largest and most intense cyclone to cross the 
Queensland coast in living memory.
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The cumulative impact produced Queensland’s most serious and geographically 
extensive series of natural disasters that occurred sequentially over four 
months. Together they impacted on more than 78 per cent of the State. Thirty-
five people died and the cost to individuals, businesses and the State has been 
conservatively estimated at A$7.5 billion.
Reviewing Disaster Management Performance
In the aftermath of any natural disaster (or indeed any significant event), it is 
both good public policy and good practice to debrief and review the preparation 
for and response to that disaster. In particular, it is important to identify what 
worked, what did not work and what could have been improved in order to 
better prepare for the next event. In most cases, these reviews are relatively low-
key internal processes gauging the response of agencies: police, fire, the State 
Emergency Services (SES) and other emergency services staff and volunteers. 
Other service agencies such as local governments and utilities companies (for 
example, electricity, telecommunications and water suppliers) whose services on 
the ground are critical during a natural disaster usually adopt a similar approach.
In Queensland, the disaster management framework has institutionalised this 
review practice with the local, district and State disaster management groups. 
After Cyclone Larry in March 2006, annual cyclone and storm season workshops 
were initiated along the Queensland coast as part of the preparation for each 
cyclone and storm season and involved the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), State 
government agencies and local authorities.
Given the significance and tragic impact of the flooding events in Queensland 
in 2010–11, however, a major and external review was expected. There are 
commonly two options: 1) an external and public review panel led by an eminent 
person(s); or 2) a formal commission of inquiry utilising royal commission or 
judicial powers.
The eminent-person model was exemplified by Mick Keelty’s review of the Perth 
Hills bushfires in 2011, by Neil Comrie’s Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings 
and Response in Victoria and by the Brisbane City Council’s panel headed by 
former Queensland governor Peter Arnison to investigate in the aftermath of 
the Brisbane floods in January 2011. Generally, the eminent-person model is 
focused on lessons learnt and the recommendation of improvement strategies.
The more formal commission of inquiry processes were adopted by the Victorian 
and Queensland State governments in the case of the 2009 Victorian bushfires 
and 2010–11 floods in Queensland. This is understandable given the significant 
loss of life and acute consequences of these events.
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Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 
2011
On 17 January 2011, just four days after the floods swamped Brisbane and 
Ipswich, the Queensland premier Anna Bligh announced the establishment of 
the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCOI). The inquiry (QFCOI 
2011:251–3), led by Supreme Court Justice Cate Holmes, was given broad terms 
of reference including
• the preparation and planning for the flooding by governments at all levels, 
emergency services and the community
• the supply of essential services during the floods
• the adequacy of forecasts and early warning systems, with particular 
reference to Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley
• compliance with, and the suitability of, dam operational procedures for 
safety and flood mitigation
• land-use planning to minimise flood damage
• the performance of insurers in meeting their claims responsibilities.
The commission presented an interim report on 1 August 2011, which generally 
focused on the operational and planning requirements to better prepare for the 
2011–12 storm and cyclone season. The final report, presented on 16 March 2012, 
made 177 recommendations, 119 of which centred on floodplain management, 
State and local government planning and building controls and related issues, 
and mining industry planning and environmental issues. Five recommendations 
related to the performance of private insurers, 12 to the emergency response and 
the balance of 41 to dam management matters (QFCOI 2012:12–29).
Intergovernmental Policy Developments: 
Resilience and shared responsibility
The focus of the commission’s recommendations—emphasising greater local 
and State government responsibility and more prescriptive regulation—is at 
odds with the February 2011 COAG-approved plan, the National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (NSDR). The NSDR (COAG 2011:2) represents a whole-of-
nation resilience-based approach to disaster management, which recognises that 
a national, coordinated and cooperative effort is needed to enhance Australia’s 
capacity to withstand and recover from emergencies and disasters.
The emphasis on resilience is founded on a far broader policy approach to 
emergency disaster management. It relates to strategies to build community 
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and personal resilience so that communities and individuals are better prepared 
to mitigate the impact of natural disasters, respond to them and recover more 
effectively from them. In simple terms, resilience to natural disasters can be 
compared with an infection or virus. The healthier, fitter and more prepared an 
individual is, the quicker and more complete their recovery is likely to be.
It is a major disappointment that the Queensland floods commission provided 
no policy support for the NSDR or engagement with its approach. In contrast, 
the Comrie Victorian Floods Review (VFR) into the 2010–11 Victorian floods 
formally acknowledged the importance of the national resilience strategy. It 
stated up-front in its executive summary:
[T]he VFR is of the firm view that the most effective means of making 
our communities safer is to build their resilience to natural disasters 
… [The NSDR] is an important reference document in this regard and 
the VFR offers strong support for the objectives of the strategy. (Comrie 
2011:5)
Shared Responsibility
In building community resilience to disasters, a strengthened regulatory and 
planning framework is an important element, but there is much more. ‘Shared 
responsibility between governments, communities, businesses and individuals’ 
(COAG 2011) is central to an effective resilience strategy. Resilience necessitates 
a focus on an ‘all hazards, all agencies’ approach in which risk information and 
responsibility are shared across the community.
In its final report, the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2010:303) 
commented that ‘shared responsibility’ translated to ‘increased responsibility for 
all’, including State agencies and municipal councils, communities, individuals 
and households, and that they all need to ‘take greater responsibility for their 
own safety’.
The Queensland floods commission has not recognised this nationally endorsed 
policy intent in its approach or its recommendations. As noted by the Monash 
Injury Research Institute in its Review of Recent Australian Disaster Inquiries 
(Goode et al. 2011:25): ‘the concept does not come across explicitly throughout 
the [interim] report … The shouldering of responsibility by individuals and 
communities is ambiguous … When taken together … the recommendations 
advocate shared responsibility only in the sense that responsibilities of different 
agencies are clarified.’
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Prevention as the Major Policy Gap
The serious gap in disaster management policy in Australia is the lack of 
integrated policy and funding frameworks focused on ‘all hazards’ and on 
building resilience. This involves developing effective, practical strategies 
to limit the impact of disasters with more effective integration of policy and 
programs across the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery phases 
of disaster management. Governments should perhaps approach disaster 
management as they do counterterrorism, where up-front resources are 
expended on preparation and prevention, and lessons learned in response and 
recovery are integrated back into both operational response planning and the 
prevention and preparedness phases. Each phase should provide feedback loops 
to improve performance, policy development and resourcing priorities. These 
feedback loops are currently weak in disaster management, as evidenced by 
the disproportionate allocations between the response and recovery phases and 
the prevention and preparation phases. In short, the latter are badly neglected.
A simple ‘risk and impact’ model comparing how we prepare against terrorism 
with how we prepare for natural disasters demonstrates significant differences 
in approach, creating a major policy gap and funding distortions. Table 18.1 
captures three aspects of the different policy management approaches to such 
disasters: the calculated risks, the possible impact of a disaster and our relative 
investment priorities. In the case of counterterrorism policy, the investment 
priority is in the preparation and prevention phases, yet the risk is relatively 
low. In the case of natural disasters, which are arguably inevitable in Australia 
and far more common, the allocation of government resources devoted to disaster 
management is heavily weighted to response and recovery.
Table 18.1 A Risk and Impact Model of Disaster Management and 
Investment Priorities
Potential threat Risk calculation Most likely 
impact
Investment priority through 
policy
Terrorism threats 
(human-induced)
Low (perhaps 
medium on 
occasions)
Localised to 
widespread/
extensive
Investment mainly in 
preparation and prevention
Minor to 
catastrophic
Natural disasters 
(physical 
phenomena)
High (repeated 
events almost 
inevitable)
Localised to 
widespread/
extensive
Investment overwhelmingly 
in response and recovery
Minor to 
catastrophic
Source: Author’s summary.
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Ferris and Petz (2012:38) summarise the present policy imperative for disaster 
management thus:
With a disaster landscape where the past might no longer be indicative 
of the future, policy makers and mitigation specialists will need both 
foresight and guidance from ever more sophisticated climate models to 
take the necessary decisions to prevent and prepare for future disasters. 
This might require major investments in disaster mitigation measures and 
upgrading infrastructure as part of a climate change adaptation agenda.
The QFCOI: A missed opportunity
The allocation of resources to response and recovery through the NDRRA has 
grown exponentially in response to disaster events, from about A$40 million in 
2003–04 to A$600 million in 2009–10, and to about A$1.9 billion in 2010–11. 
The estimated costs of the 2010–11 flooding and cyclone events in Queensland 
are reported to be in excess of A$7.5 billion. As a consequence of the serious 
financial impact, the Federal Government resorted to a 1 per cent levy on taxable 
income in 2011–12 to assist funding the Queensland recovery.
The commitment to, and investment in, prevention and mitigation, however, 
has been miserly in comparison, despite evidence of the economic returns and 
resilience benefits that can be expected from such investments. Research in the 
Australian context by the Bureau of Transport Economics in 2002 showed that 
flood mitigation can provide a 3:1 return on investment through the avoidance 
of response and recovery costs (Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics 
2002). In the United States there is further research that claims a 5:1 average 
return on flood-mitigation investment (Rose et al. 2007:103).
The Natural Disaster Resilience Program (NDRP) is the funding source for grants 
to councils and other bodies ‘for emergency management activities intended to 
build resilience and to minimise the impact of natural disasters in Australia, 
including the priority areas [of] disaster mitigation, support for volunteers and 
consideration of the impact of climate change’ (Attorney-General’s Department 
2011). It expresses a grand vision—but the funding is mere crumbs!
By way of stark comparison with the NDRRA’s costs, the entire NDRP funding of 
A$145.9 million was allocated over the five-year period from 2009–10 to 2013–
14. In Queensland this program translates to a total of A$44 million across five 
years, with equal contributions coming from the Queensland and Australian 
governments. The financial imbalance is staggering when one considers that 
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in the same year, when the estimated cost of repairing the damage caused by 
flooding and cyclonic events was A$7.5 billion, Queensland’s allocation of 
NDRP funds for disaster mitigation was just A$9 million.
Regrettably, too, there are examples where roads, bridges and other critical 
infrastructure have been repaired using NDRRA funds only to be swept away 
in the next flood. Previous policy was simply to restore these assets; this is 
short-sighted and ultimately more expensive. More recently, there has been 
some acknowledgment that this infrastructure needs to be rebuilt to mitigate 
future risks. This approach is referred to as ‘betterment’ or ‘Building Back 
Better’ (Queensland Reconstruction Authority 2011:7). Despite a policy change 
to accommodate ‘betterment’ projects under the NDRRA in 2007, practical 
examples are rare, perhaps non-existent, and a significant injection/redirection 
of funds is needed to give effect to this aspiration.
The former Commonwealth attorney-general and minister for emergency 
management Robert McClelland (2012:1) has gone on public record to question 
whether the allocation of some of the individual hardship grants of A$1000, 
which were made regardless of assessed impact, would not be better used for 
preventative measures:
The trouble is that politicians at all levels tend to focus (and want to 
be seen) after a disaster occurs because that’s when it has most media 
attention … [and] there is a lot of money that goes into post-disaster 
compensation payments … I have consistently said we need to evaluate 
how efficient these payments are, these $1000 compensation payments. 
Firstly to streamline them so that we target them to those who are most 
in need, but secondly to look at shifting a substantial amount of that 
money into preventative measures.
He pointed out that A$840 million was provided in A$1000 payments to people 
affected by the 2010–11 floods and Cyclone Yasi. Just 10 per cent of that A$840 
million would have resulted in a tenfold increase in the funds for disaster-
mitigation programs in Queensland!
The president of the Local Government Association of Queensland supported 
McClelland’s stance and called for a review of the disaster funding priorities, 
indicating that government investment ‘in infrastructure offered better 
protection from flood, fire and cyclones’ (Bell 2012).
It may be that the State and federal budget processes are what actually frustrate 
other policy attempts to change the relative allocations. Robert McClelland 
(2012:1–2) speculated that:
Part of the problem is your pre-disaster expenditure is a budget line 
item. In circumstances where spending that money upfront is going 
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to save money downstream but at a time when the Government is, 
understandably, trying to achieve a balanced budget, they don’t want 
budget line items that involve … not insubstantial expense.
This policy impasse ought to be resolvable. The evidence in support of a 
change in government policy with significantly greater injection of funds into 
mitigation and adaptation initiatives is overwhelming. The QFCOI could have 
made a significant and influential contribution to the public policy debate, but 
it did not.
Stuck in the Regulatory Mode
The QFCOI’s report identified that regulatory failures relating to local government 
land-use planning and dam management, for example, contributed to the scale 
of the disaster. That is not in question. What is open for debate, however, is the 
prescriptive nature of the proposed regulatory requirements.
It is hardly surprising that a royal commission/commission of inquiry 
would present a case for greater regulation. It is the ‘nature of the beast’.1 
Such commissions are legal constructs in which the key players are highly 
experienced and well-credentialed lawyers. This was the case with the QFCOI 
as it was with the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. Legal training dictates 
such commissions will take a forensic, inquisitorial and sometimes adversarial 
approach to the examination of evidence, frequently in pursuit of guilt or a 
scapegoat. The end game seems to be to find those responsible, fully or partially, 
for the human tragedy and economic costs of events.
Moreover, governments which establish royal commissions/commissions of 
inquiry are largely obligated to accept the recommendations of the body 
they establish. The community would expect no less. Consequently, the State 
Government’s commitment to implement whatever recommendations were made 
was widely expected.
The QFCOI opted for a very prescriptive set of regulatory recommendations 
with multiple subsets of formal requirements, rather than a risk-based 
approach based on principles of floodplain management and planning. Its 
recommendations relevant to planning, building controls and the mining 
industry will involve much greater regulation at the State and local government 
levels. Its recommendations relating to flood studies and land-use planning 
led the commission to suggest that the Queensland Government should be 
1 See the Australian Journal of Public Administration (Vol. 69, No. 4, December 2010), especially contributions 
by Allan Holmes and Susan Pascoe.
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responsible for these actions, but if it did not accept these responsibilities then 
local councils should. The rationale for this approach is unclear, but does seem 
inconsistent with the detailed and prescriptive nature of many of the other 
recommendations. This lack of clarity is likely to result in ongoing arguments 
over which level of government should bear the costs of the implementation 
of these recommendations. Many local councils are simply not in a financial 
position to meet these additional costs. Future blame shifting between tiers of 
government following incomplete implementation of these recommendations 
seems inevitable.
To give one example, one of the QFCOI recommendations proposed an extensive 
flood study of the Brisbane River catchment, with the commission describing 
in detail the required methodology and contents of such a study almost in a 
checklist fashion. In this and other recommendations, the report recommends the 
specific criteria for sophisticated flood modelling that are unlikely to be evident 
in any existing flood models or maps in Queensland or nationally. In passing, 
the QFCOI noted that a review of ‘best practice principles’ for flood modelling 
has been initiated by the National Emergency Management Committee through 
the National Flood Risk Advisory Group (NFRAG), a group of technical experts 
from Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology and a range of relevant 
professional disciplines. Yet the QFCOI (2012:14) seemed to believe its expertise 
in the area outweighed that of these expert bodies. It argued that ‘in the event 
the [NFRAG] review does not adequately account for Queensland conditions, the 
Queensland Government should produce a document that provides appropriate 
guidelines for floodplain management in the Queensland context’.
This presumably meant that the QFCOI wanted a document produced consistent 
with its recommended prescriptive methodology.
Better Governance and Accountability?
More legislation and additional regulation are not on their own synonymous 
with greater accountability. Governments already have strongly documented 
governance arrangements and large and complex accountability regimes. The 
potential consequence of the Queensland commission’s approach is that by 
focusing on process accountability, documentation is measured as an outcome 
rather than the performance of local authorities and government agencies.
By definition, greater regulation will increase costs, which would need to be 
met by the local and State governments through higher taxes and rates or by 
increased costs to developers and the building and construction industries. 
Inevitably these higher charges will be passed on to households and businesses. 
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Further experience would indicate that greater regulation increases complexity 
and consequently impacts on the time frames for the completion of projects 
subject to those regulations.
In this context, the April 2012 COAG meeting committed to a process to 
streamline the regulatory burden:
COAG agreed to consider concrete measures to lift regulatory 
performance, including reducing complexity and duplication and 
increasing transparency and accountability … COAG agreed the new 
agenda … [which] will be supported by a National Productivity Compact: 
Regulatory and Competition Reform for a more Competitive Australia. 
The Compact … will set out a high-level statement on principles for 
effective regulation and reform. (COAG 2012)
If we are serious about better governance and accountability, Boin and ’t Hart 
(2010:367) have already challenged the effectiveness of the regulatory approach 
that was the basis of the QFCOI report. They have argued that ‘the oft-observed 
importance of “hardware” (formal structures; technical equipment; legal 
frameworks) is overrated. It distracts attention from the often more salient 
and cost-effective, yet symbolically powerful “software” factors (leadership, 
training, network building, organisational culture).’
Hence, they suggest that ‘[i]nstead of going down the structural reform path, it is 
more helpful to identify a select set of administrative principles that have served 
policy-makers well in organising and managing a crisis response network’.
An alternative approach consistent with ‘building resilience’ and with COAG’s 
chosen direction would be higher-level principles to cover land-use planning, 
and floodplain modelling and mapping based on appropriate risk management 
to encourage confidence and a more mature relationship between industry and 
government. Governments need to reduce direct control and aim for increasing 
returns to the economy through lower implementation costs, increased industry 
productivity and direct measurable accountability. Our capacity and resource-
constrained local councils need to focus on strategies to mitigate their future 
risks during natural disasters. Under this approach, some of the resources 
earmarked for a prescriptive regulatory framework could be redirected to 
prevention and preparedness initiatives.
The issue of concern, however, and a potential consequence of the QFCOI’s 
approach is that this becomes process accountability where the measure 
of accountability is the documentation not the performance of relevant 
agencies against their land-use and disaster management plans. Performance 
accountability, in contrast, would shift the emphasis to an assessment of the 
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outcomes and performance, rather than focusing on formal processes that 
are voluminous, resource intensive, not linked to performance objectives or 
measures and often separate from the business of the local authorities.
A further issue is the relatively narrow range of expertise in the areas of flood-
risk modelling, mapping and associated floodplain management, particularly 
at the local government level where it will matter the most. Currently this 
expertise is largely confined to a small number of specialist engineering 
companies and individuals. We might wonder how much relevance the 
sophisticated and detailed flood modelling and mapping will have to the 
owners of land and businesses and smaller infrastructure providers who really 
only want to know what the risks are to their properties in a range of scenarios. 
In practical terms, this would be on the basis of previous reported events and 
possible peak flood levels.
Interestingly, a number of governments in the region (Victoria, New Zealand 
and Queensland) in the aftermath of major disasters have established statutory 
reconstruction authorities with very wide-ranging powers based upon 
the mantra of ‘whatever it takes’. In practical terms these authorities have 
focused exclusively on recovery efforts. To enable more effective post-disaster 
coordination, these recovery authorities have been given powers to override 
existing State and local government planning instruments and regulations. It 
can be anticipated that this approach will be replicated after each major disaster.
Paradoxically, the capacity of these recovery authorities to override existing 
planning instruments and regulations stands in stark contrast with the 
philosophy embraced by the QFCOI, favouring stronger and more prescriptive 
regulation.
Other Missed Opportunities
Notwithstanding the acknowledged effectiveness of Queensland’s response 
capability, there are areas that still need to be improved. Weaknesses remain 
in the situational awareness and intelligence-gathering capability and the 
information and communication systems of State agencies and local councils.
The interoperability of the communications systems of police and the emergency 
response agencies remains problematic. This issue was similarly exposed in 
the Victorian natural disasters; however, unlike the Comrie review (2011:8) 
into the Victorian floods, it was disappointing that the QFCOI made no specific 
recommendations in relation to information and communications systems. Instead, 
it included a statement of support for ‘the move towards interoperability between 
Queensland’s public safety agencies, both in narrowband communications and 
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through the establishment of a whole government wireless network’ (QFCOI 
2012:399). The cost of this, however, would be substantial. In the current 
fiscal environment, a specific recommendation would have provided a much 
stronger case for giving priority to investment in this network, which would 
enhance public safety objectives for the emergency response agencies in their 
normal operations.
The assumptions underlying disaster management planning remain too narrow. 
Queensland’s preparatory thinking has been informed by previous experiences 
where significant flooding, storm and cyclonic events have occurred (for 
example, Cyclone Larry in 2006). Experiences in other States and from overseas 
have further honed these capabilities. Still, the flooding of 2010–11 exposed 
deficiencies in local planning and preparation and the variability in the 
capacities of different councils, as recognised by many councils themselves and 
reinforced in the QFCOI’s interim report.
Moreover, international experiences, from hurricanes like Katrina or earthquakes 
in Haiti, Japan or New Zealand, or the tsunamis in Aceh, Sumatra and Samoa, 
and the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, should alert policymakers and emergency 
management agencies that our planning assumptions have been too narrow (see 
Boin and ’t Hart 2010:360). Training (including scenario-based exercises) must 
focus not only on particular skills, but also on the roles and relationships of 
those involved in the disaster management system.
The Challenge Ahead
The NSDR creates an imperative for all the actors involved in emergency and 
disaster management (governments, businesses, individuals and communities) 
to move beyond the traditional emphasis on response and recovery towards 
activities and initiatives that will build resilience to natural disasters and other 
emergencies. Frequent and severe natural disaster events occurring with some 
frequency—such as bushfires, floods and cyclones—underscore the salience of 
the policy directions endorsed by COAG.
‘Disaster resilience is a long-term outcome, which will require long-term 
commitment. Achieving disaster resilience will require achieving sustained 
behavioural change’ (COAG 2011:3).
The challenge to our national, State and Territory leaders, though, is obvious. 
They need to embrace the necessary behavioural change. It is time for the 
aspiration of building resilience to be supported through policy changes and 
resourcing priorities. COAG cannot advocate for a resilience-based approach to 
disaster management and then continue to deny the reality that the critical policy 
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gap with the NSDR is the failure of successive federal and State governments 
to recognise and address their funding responsibilities. Local communities and 
individuals urgently need assistance to reduce their exposure to natural disasters 
by investment in mitigation and adaptation initiatives. The missed opportunity 
of the QFCOI to contribute to these important policy debates is lamentable.
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19. The Role of Post-Disaster 
Institutions in Recovery and 
Resilience: A comparative study of 
three recent disasters
James Smart
Dealing with natural disasters and their after-effects is among the most difficult 
tasks governments face. Their harm is pervasive, affecting the financial, social, 
environmental and human welfare of a country. Managing them often requires 
coordination between local authorities, businesses, neighbourhood groups and 
volunteer organisations; but effective management can reduce a disaster’s long-
term impact.
Governments are concerned with four areas of disaster management, commonly 
known as the four rs. First, they can reduce societal vulnerability and build 
resilience through reduction of known risks. Second, readiness is established 
by building and maintaining capability. Third, these capabilities are marshalled 
to respond to immediate human needs. Fourth, recovery alleviates immediate 
societal suffering and improves citizens’ long-term prospects by building 
resilience against future disasters. 
This chapter places its focus on the fourth area, recovery and resilience, but an 
effective recovery owes much to the other areas. Good institutions provide the 
adaptive capacity that lets communities recover from natural disasters, which 
is particularly clear when three natural disasters in Australia and New Zealand 
are reviewed 
• Victoria’s bushfires in 2009
• Queensland’s flooding from 2010 to 2011 
• Canterbury’s earthquakes from 2010. 
These cases demonstrate the importance of flexible management, evidence 
of institutional learning before and after disasters, the role of community 
engagement, response to insurance issues and the building of resilience.1 
1 The full working paper on which this chapter is based, including all references, is available on the Institute 
of Governance and Policy Studies website: <http://igps.victoria.ac.nz/publications/publications/show/334>.
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Why Disaster Response Matters
Effective government-led responses often require changes to service delivery 
and the agencies that deliver them. Existing agencies may be improperly 
equipped for the tasks that confront them, but implementing changes can take 
time. Governments unable to respond with the swiftness demanded by citizens 
can quickly increase societal uncertainty and pessimism. Individuals and 
businesses may leave the area and financial intermediaries may no longer provide 
insurance and loans. Declining institutional quality presents greater challenges 
to governments already unable to drive the recovery process. Changes to those 
institutions that reinforce community capacity are vital to restore functionality. 
They should be able to learn from their operational environment, integrate 
experience and adapt accordingly.
Disasters are exacerbated by policy failure (Birkland 2006). Retrospective 
inquiries that examine policy choices during disaster response are often 
instructive, but may also encourage catharsis and relieve perceived injustice 
among affected people (Bovens 2007). If their recommendations are taken 
seriously, lessons learned can inform community decision-making during 
recovery and reduce the effects of future disasters.
As with other crises, optimising the level of resources for disaster recovery is 
hard. Physical destruction and its proportionality to the economy are unhelpful 
as metrics to policymakers. Two dynamics are important in the short run. First, 
capital stock is usually required to produce goods and services. Output will be 
lower if capital is destroyed, though rebuilding capital will increase output. The 
net effect of these dynamics is ambiguous; their timing will differ. 
Reconstruction is likely to be uneven and much delayed after the initial loss. 
The mixture of outputs will differ, as seen in labour markets. A destroyed 
bakery will be unable to produce bread, but may employ a builder to replace its 
building. This sudden change in the required skill mix could push the economy 
up against structural limitations, such as the number of trained builders.
The economic impact of disasters is hard to predict during the event, with two 
competing narratives. Medium-term growth could be lower if structural limits 
to reconstruction are reached, and if a disaster increases the perceived risk of 
investing. Medium-term growth could be higher if new capital is superior in 
quality to old—one prevailing effect in climatic disaster recovery (Skidmore and 
Toya 2002). On average, ambiguity appears to triumph. Carvallo et al. (2011) find no 
significant effect on the long-run economic growth of disaster-affected countries.
Most important in this analysis are the human costs, both direct and indirect. 
The scale and effectiveness of the response have long-term implications for 
recovery. Seventeen years after Hurricane Iniki hit the Hawaiian island of 
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Kauai in 1992, the island’s population had not recovered from post-disaster 
emigration (Coffman and Noy 2009). The fiscal cost of reconstruction borne by 
governments can lead to major challenges beyond the immediate disaster time 
frame, particularly if pre-disaster debt is high and capital flight is a genuine risk 
(Noy 2009). Governments facing these issues may not have the capacity to help 
communities recover.
Major disasters often result in high stock costs, giving insurance an important 
recovery role. Insurers may assume that the risk of a high-cost event in the 
near future is very low but the probability of a disaster is difficult to integrate 
into actuarial models. Individual destructive events expected to occur with a 
very low probability impose high, near-simultaneous costs after a disaster. The 
concurrent timing of these tail events often results in higher than anticipated 
losses for insurance companies, risking their solvency (Kousky and Cooke 2009).
Ideally, insurance markets help smooth financial costs over a lifetime and 
improve individual welfare; so individuals who neglect to take out insurance 
will face relatively higher costs after a disaster. Governments may be tempted 
to intervene through direct assistance, but some individuals may see such 
assistance as a quasi-permanent replacement for private insurance. Insurance 
take-up could be discouraged and dependency on the state would grow—
behaviour known as moral hazard. 
Reconciling the desire to assist risk-takers and the cost of moral hazard is a 
Samaritan’s dilemma. Complex recovery efforts frequently highlight a lack of 
consensus on values (Hischemoller and Hoppe 1996). It is not clear whether the 
immediate suffering of citizens is a greater issue than future welfare loss created 
by moral hazard. These problems demand political solutions, but building 
consensus requires time. Governments may be unwilling or unable to provide 
that time, to the detriment of new social rules and expectations that develop.
Responses in Victoria, Queensland and New 
Zealand
Australia and New Zealand are both developed economies, sharing a 
British heritage with similar political and legal institutions, most notably 
the Westminster parliamentary system; however, their constitutions have 
important differences. Australia’s provides defined roles and responsibilities for 
Federal and State governments, while local governments provide a third tier of 
designated responsibilities and roles during disasters. New Zealand has no level 
between central and local (or regional) government. Local governments raise a 
modest level of revenue, mostly through property tax, concentrating most of 
New Zealand’s disaster response capacity in Wellington.
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Disasters have affected both countries since 2009. Bushfires burned across Victoria 
for more than a month in early 2009, particularly affecting rural communities. 
For three summer months in 2010–11, heavy rains brought extensive flooding 
to Queensland, compounded by damage from Cyclone Yasi. Meanwhile, since 
September 2010, New Zealand has been faced with a series of seismic events in 
the Canterbury region, including a severe earthquake on 22 February 2011. All 
three disasters were followed by large-scale government responses.
Table 19.1 Scale of Disasters
Killed Estimated damage 
(US$billion)A
Affected 
people
Victorian bushfires 173 1.3 (0.1 % of GDP) 9954
Queensland floods 35 15.9 (1.1 % of GDP) 200 000
Canterbury earthquakes 185 16.5 (9.8 % of GDP) 301 500
Note A: CRED defines estimated damage as direct (for example, damage to infrastructure, crops, housing) 
and indirect (for example, loss of revenue, unemployment and market destabilisation). 
Sources: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). n.d. <www.cred.be>; International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 2011. Australia: Article IV Consultation. Country Report No.11/300, June; World 
Bank 2011, Queensland: Recovery and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of the 2010/2011 Flood Events 
and Cyclone Yasi (Washington, DC: The World Bank); Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery 
Authority (VBRRA) 2011, Legacy Report (Melbourne: Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery 
Authority).
Australia
Australia’s State governments are responsible for emergency services, public 
schools, infrastructure and policing. The Commonwealth Government collects 
the most significant source of public revenue: direct taxes. State revenue largely 
comprises other taxes, particularly property taxes. State expenditures are far 
larger than revenue, resulting in high levels of fiscal imbalance, compensated by 
large grants from the Federal Government.
Federal and State governments negotiate funding arrangements after disasters. 
The National Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) specify 
four funding categories of emergency assistance. These are individual relief 
(Category A), restoration of public assets (Category B), a community recovery 
package (Category C) and acts of relief or recovery that alleviate damage in 
‘exceptional’ circumstances (Category D). Federal assistance is dependent on the 
scale of the fiscal cost of relief. For Categories A, B and C, if the first threshold 
is passed the Commonwealth provides 50 per cent of State expenditure.2 For 
2 That is, 0.225 per cent of the State’s total general government sector revenue and grants in the financial 
year two years prior to the relevant financial year.
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expenditure exceeding the second threshold, the Commonwealth provides 75 
per cent in excess of the second threshold.3 For Category D, the Commonwealth 
has discretion over the rate of its assistance.
The Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series includes a book on 
‘Community Recovery’. Community recovery focuses on five environments: 
social, built, economic, financial and natural. It argues that successful recovery 
is dependent on understanding the context, recognising complexity, using 
community-led approaches, ensuring coordination of all activities, employing 
effective communication and acknowledging capacity limits.
Victoria
Bushfires quickly spread and rapidly intensified, devastating several communities 
across Victoria on 7 February 2009. Worst affected were the towns of Kinglake 
and Marysville, both in Murrindindi Shire. With 173 deaths and 4300 buildings 
destroyed, it was the worst bushfire in Victorian history (VBRRA 2011).
By 10 February, the Victorian Government set up the Victorian Bushfire 
Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA) to coordinate reconstruction. 
An order-in-council, a mechanism that lets the executive modify existing 
legislation, established the authority, which would act as a unit under the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet. The expected lifespan of the Victorian 
Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA) was not widely 
publicised, so as not to detract from the authority’s work (VBRRA 2011). The 
authority was given broad terms of reference; policies were formed by a new, 
dedicated committee in the Victorian cabinet.
The authority’s main function was to coordinate the Victorian Department 
of Human Services (DHS) and other Victorian service-delivery departments 
by delegating specific services under the recovery plan. The VBRRA worked 
with all levels of government: Commonwealth Government agencies, Victorian 
Government, local councils, especially the Murrindindi Shire Council, and non-
governmental organisations.
The early establishment of the VBRRA increased the tempo of recovery, but 
this advantage would have been lost if staffing requirements were not quickly 
satisfied. Fewer than 20 staff comprised the initial start-up team sourced from 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Victorian Government departments. In 
March 2009, Christine Nixon, who had been the chief commissioner of Victoria 
Police during the time of the fires, became head of the VBRRA.
3 That is, 1.75 times the first threshold. 
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Approximately A$1 billion was made immediately available for the recovery 
(Department of Treasury and Finance 2009). The Federal Government funded 
A$266 million under the NDRRA, while private donations to the Victorian Bushfire 
Appeal Fund totalled A$395 million (Victoria Bushfire Appeal Fund 2012). The 
total budget for the VBRRA over its life was A$21.2 million, the majority going to 
Victoria’s service-delivery agencies.
The strategic recovery framework was developed from both Australian and 
international experience. In line with best practice, the recovery plan focused 
on local communities, with four broad headings. The ‘people’ heading included 
rebuilding community assets, such as recreational facilities and halls, temporary 
housing and counselling. ‘Reconstruction’ involved community and State-
owned buildings, infrastructure and provision of building advice to residents. 
‘Economy’ combined a number of support packages for business investment 
stimulus. ‘Environment’ aimed to restore the natural environment to its pre-
bushfire condition, protect endangered animals and stabilise land.
The VBRRA (2011) cited evidence that community involvement could improve 
individual health and wellbeing. The authority conducted 29 community 
meetings, attended by approximately 4400 people. These meetings gave 
the authority legitimacy and established clear recovery requirements. The 
authority encouraged the formation of community groups, Community 
Recovery Committees (CRCs), to develop recovery plans for their areas. While 
the VBRRA would provide guidance and templates for CRC planning, CRCs 
established priorities and wrote recovery plans, which the VBRRA combined 
into a Statewide recovery plan. Nearly 800 CRC projects were funded.
The rebuilding of Marysville showcases the recovery process undertaken in 
Victoria (VBRRA 2009). The Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund disbursed A$29 
million in grants to Marysville within eight months. Temporary housing was built 
for the local community, while a Rebuilding Advisory Centre provided advice 
to residents on rebuilding homes. Residential reconstruction was accelerated 
by the Victorian Government’s amendment of the Victorian Building Regulations 
so destroyed homes could be rebuilt without planning permits. The residential 
building standards were changed so new structures could withstand a severe 
bushfire event. A temporary marketplace provided businesses with interim trading 
facilities. Around 600 people contributed to the town’s Urban Design Framework, 
identifying immediate needs such as regenerating commerce and locating a petrol 
station, and ‘catalyst projects’ that would stimulate economic recovery.
After 7 February, the Premier of Victoria announced the formation of a royal 
commission to investigate the causes of and immediate response to the disaster. 
The commission’s terms of reference required it to improve the resilience of 
Victoria to future bushfire events. It was chaired by Bernard Teague, a former 
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judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. On 31 July 2010, the commission 
delivered its final report, with 67 recommendations. They spanned Victorian 
bushfire safety policy, emergency management and fireground response, to 
planning and building, land management and the organisation of fire services. 
These recommendations affected State institutions (for example, the Country 
Fire Authority) and State regulations, and access to Commonwealth resources 
(for example, aerial resources owned by Emergency Management Australia 
and the Department of Defence). In areas of high fire risk, the commission 
recommended a ‘retreat and resettlement’ plan for affected communities.
A pressing issue was the distribution of donations received through the 
relief effort. These funds were distributed through DHS at the direction of an 
independent advisory panel; however, there was no consensus on whether the 
uninsured should receive more from the fund than insured homeowners. Some 
insured homeowners questioned whether the uninsured deserved greater pity. 
One argued, ‘I think we should all get the same’.
Insurance status did not affect fund payout eligibility for damaged and destroyed 
homes; however, payouts were partially dependent on the circumstances of 
the applicant. For destroyed homes and contents, payouts were a maximum 
of A$45 000, with an additional A$40 000 depending on need. For damaged 
homes, payouts were a maximum of A$35 000, of which A$20 000 was based on 
need. Other payouts were available, such as transitional support, psychological 
support packages and support for exceptional hardship and severe injury.
The VBRRA was intended as a temporary institution to direct immediate 
recovery needs. The Victorian Government intended the authority’s life to be 
approximately 18 months, but it was lengthened to two years. To plan for its 
closure, transition risks were identified, mitigation plans were put in place and it 
was ensured that permanent government departments could enact the recovery 
plan. One risk was the expiration of staffing contracts that might disrupt the 
work of the authority in its final months, but this was alleviated through staff 
retention and planned redeployment. The VBRRA was officially disbanded on 
30 June 2011.
Prior to the VBRRA’s closure, there were concerns that the pace of reconstruction 
was slow. Two years after 7 February, 41 per cent of homes had been rebuilt; 
some expected recovery to take up to five years. Stelling et al. (2011) conducted 
a number of interviews with informants and focus groups in the Beechworth 
region. Communities felt they had been brought together and their networks 
were strengthened after the fires; but they also believed that over time these 
bonds would weaken as community members left, and resentment stemming 
from some decisions taken during and after the fires lingered. Nevertheless, 
Future-Proofing the State
236
community resilience against future event appears to have been built. 
Participants in the study believed their communities were far better prepared 
for bushfire events than before 2009.
Queensland
In 2010, the Southern Oscillation climate pattern saw the strongest La Niña 
pattern since 1976, bringing above-normal wet weather to Queensland. Flooding 
began in December 2010 and increased on 23 December. Cyclone Tasha, a 
category one cyclone, brought further rain and damage on 24–25 December. By 
the end of the rains, more than 99 per cent of Queensland was declared ‘disaster 
affected’. Cyclone Yasi, a category five cyclone, compounded flood damage in 
northern Queensland on 3 February 2011. 
In 2006 Queensland had experience of recovering from meteorological disasters 
when Cyclone Larry caused A$1.5 billion of damage in the north of the State. 
Recovery was steered by a task force, led by General Peter Cosgrove, former chief 
of the Australian Defence Force. General Cosgrove was also an internationally 
recognised logistics expert, whose arrival in the area instantly lifted morale. 
Recovery was generally successful.
The Disaster Management Act 2003 was amended in 2010 following a review of 
Queensland’s disaster management arrangements (Government of Queensland 
2011). The State Disaster Management Group (SMDG) is the key policy and 
decision-making body for Queensland’s disaster management. Recovery required 
Statewide coordination and management of large resources. The amendments to 
the 2003 Act let the Queensland Government establish a designated recovery 
authority to prioritise agency response and recovery funding. 
The initial change to institutional settings came soon after the December 
flooding, and was at first similar to the Victorian experience. The State 
Government established a Flood Recovery Taskforce and a special cabinet 
committee to coordinate responses. The task force was headed by Major General 
Mick Slater, then commander of the Australian 1st Division, in Brisbane. The 
choice of military leadership echoed Queensland’s task force in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Larry, enabling transfer of operational lessons from that event. 
Enabling legislation soon followed. On 21 February 2011, the task force was 
absorbed into a new statutory authority, the Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority (QldRA), with the passing of the Queensland Reconstruction Authority 
Act (QldRA Act). The QldRA had clear functions. It decided recovery priorities, 
worked closely with communities, collected information about property and 
infrastructure, shared data with all levels of government, coordinated and 
distributed financial assistance, and facilitated flood mitigation.
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The QldRA board comprised Major General Slater, two members nominated by the 
Australian Government,4 one nominated by the Local Government Association 
of Queensland5 and three with expertise and experience in engineering and 
planning.6 The authority’s chief executive was Graeme Newton, formerly of 
Queensland Water Infrastructure. The board reported directly to the Premier of 
Queensland, Anna Bligh. 
The QldRA estimated the rebuild cost at A$6.8 billion (QldRA 2011a); 75 per 
cent would be provided by the Federal Government under the NDRRA and 25 
per cent would come from the State Government. Road reconstruction took 70 
per cent of the QldRA’s budget, with the majority of the residual going to grants 
aimed at primary producers, small businesses and non-profit organisations.7 The 
QldRA reconstruction framework was based on six lines: human and social; 
economic; environmental; building recovery; roads and transport; community 
liaison and communication. Six subcommittees in these areas were established 
with unique concepts of operation.
The QldRA was directed by its enabling legislation to ensure ‘Queensland and 
its communities effectively and efficiently recover from the impacts of disaster 
events’ (QldRA 2011a:47). Its powers were broad, having power to acquire land, 
carry out works and implement development schemes for declared projects. It 
could also close roads, overrule council development decisions and decide the 
fate of damaged infrastructure.
The QldRA had recovery and reconstruction phases. Recovery would be 
completed by 30 June 2011 and reconstruction by the end of 2012 (Government 
of Queensland 2012). The QldRA’s operations were to be transferred to other 
agencies after two years.8 The recovery effort made substantial progress 
in the first six months (see Table 19.2). Most of the work repaired damaged 
infrastructure, while the QldRA focused on the capability of affected areas 
to withstand future flooding by building resilience, improving damaged 
structures and incorporating local government in the rebuilding effort in all 
six reconstruction areas. More specific plans included storm tide-prone area 
reconstruction (QldRA 2011c) and improvements to electrical infrastructure 
(QldRA 2011d).
4 Brad Orgill, head of the Building the Education Revolution Implementation Taskforce, and Glenys 
Beauchamp, secretary of the Department of Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government.
5 Brian Guthrie, former CEO of Townsville City Council.
6 Kathy Hirschfeld, a former oil executive; Steve Golding, former director-general of Main Roads; and Jim 
McKnoulty, a local government planning expert.
7 Provided by the Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA).
8 Section 139 of the QldRA Act.
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Table 19.2 Damage Impact and Recovery Statistics
November 2010 – March 
2011
As at September 2011
Roads 9170 km of Queensland’s 
road network affected
8482 km of Queensland’s 
road network recovered
Rail 4748 km of Queensland’s rail 
network affected
4596 km of Queensland’s 
rail network recovered
Bridges and culverts 89 State-owned bridges and 
culverts with major damage
89 State-owned bridges and 
culverts recovered
Schools 411 Queensland schools 
affected
411 Queensland schools 
operating 
National parks 138 national parks closed due 
to natural disaster
123 national parks 
reopened
Premier’s Disaster 
Relief Appeal
More than A$276 m donated, with more than A$251 m 
distributed to individuals
Personal hardship and 
assistance grants
More than A$121 m in grants paid to small businesses, 
primary producers and non-profit organisations. More than 
A$12 m in concessional loans to small businesses and 
primary producers
Sport Flood Fight 
Back Scheme
More than A$13 m in funding for infrastructure and/or 
equipment to assist organisations to re-establish sport and 
recreation services
Source: Adapted from QldRA (2011b). 
The QldRA exercised its powers most visibly in reconstructing Grantham, a 
town west of Brisbane. Declaring it a ‘reconstruction area’ in April 2011, the 
authority created a ‘development scheme’ for the town, in consultation with local 
residents.9 The scheme enabled the QldRA to override planning instruments, 
plans and policies made under any Act. In May 2011, the Lockyer Valley Regional 
Council purchased 937 ha of land on higher ground and offered a ‘swap deal’ to 
Grantham residents. By December 2011, the Grantham Reconstruction Area was 
in effect, with the QldRA arguing the scheme would sweep away ‘regulatory 
hurdles’ that would otherwise hinder progress.
The flooding led to a significant rise in insurance premiums. One estimate 
suggested average home and contents premiums rose by 12 per cent, with flood-
affected areas seeing average increases of up to 41 per cent (Insurance News 
2011). Some homeowners were surprised to discover they were not covered for 
flood damage. Because insurers lacked a common definition of a flood event, the 
Federal Government subsequently mandated a standard definition for flooding 
for all insurance policies. 
The Federal Government provided approximately A$5 billion of the 
reconstruction fund, some 50 per cent of the total, imposing a flood levy on 
individuals with incomes of more than A$50 000. One senator cited moral 
9 Per sections 62–5 of its enabling legislation.
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hazard as a reason for initially withholding his support because the Queensland 
Government’s insurance fund did not have reinsurance. His eventual support 
was conditional on mandatory insurance for State governments against disasters 
and States losing access to NDRRA funding if insurance cover for State assets 
was deemed inadequate.
In June 2011, the World Bank (2011) reported on the Queensland reconstruction 
effort, concluding that it met many good-practice standards, while commending 
the QldRA on its ‘build back better’ focus. It argued that the response saved lives, 
quickly provided funding to individuals and communities, and management of 
the recovery and reconstruction was effective.
New Zealand
New Zealand has two institutions designed to deal automatically with disaster 
recovery. First, the Earthquake Commission (EQC), a crown entity, provides 
partial insurance for natural disasters. The EQC is funded by levies on home 
insurance and purchases cover with reinsurance companies. After a natural 
disaster, the EQC pays out the first NZ$100 00010 of damage suffered on 
insured houses, with private insurers covering the residual.11 Prior to the first 
Canterbury earthquake, the EQC’s assets were approximately NZ$6 billion (EQC 
2010). Second, Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM), a ministry, 
coordinates the initial response after a state of emergency is declared.
CDEM can declare two types of emergency. A local emergency empowers 
only subsidiary groups in the affected area to respond. A national emergency 
provides response powers to all CDEM groups simultaneously, and was not used 
before 2010. 
The first Canterbury earthquake struck at 4:35 am on 4 September 2010. It was 
New Zealand’s most damaging earthquake since the 1931 Napier earthquake, 
but caused no reported deaths because the Christchurch city centre was largely 
deserted. A local emergency was then declared. The event caused damage of 
approximately NZ$5 billion. Insured homeowners were eligible to lodge damage 
claims with the EQC immediately.
Fears that existing legislation would slow the recovery process encouraged the 
Government to expand its powers. The Government faced few constraints on 
its capacity to amend legislation or intervene in the affairs of specific localities. 
A local MP, Gerry Brownlee, was appointed Minister for Earthquake Recovery. 
Within two weeks, legislation was passed in the form of the Canterbury 
10 Plus goods and services tax.
11 The EQC’s cover does not apply to businesses.
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Earthquake Response and Recovery (CERR) Act. It provided for orders-in-
council for the recovery. Brownlee argued this power was necessary to remove 
bureaucracy and speed up the recovery process.
On 14 September 2010, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission 
(CERC) was established under the Act to enable better coordination between 
local and central governments. CERC advised on potential orders-in-council to 
the minister. CERC had seven commissioners, three of whom were the mayors 
of Christchurch City, Selwyn District and Waimakariri District; one was from 
Environment Canterbury, the regional authority, and three were appointed by 
the minister. CERC’s life was limited to about 18 months, after which it would 
disband and orders-in-council applying to Canterbury would expire.
This response was severely challenged by the earthquake of 22 February 2011, 
resulting in 185 fatalities, most due to building collapses. The earthquake’s 
proximity to the city caused more damage to buildings than the September 
earthquake and liquefaction damaged land to a far greater extent.12 Consequently, 
the Civil Defence Minister declared a national state of emergency. The second 
earthquake scaled up the challenge facing the Government. The EQC determined 
that the February earthquake was a new event,13 enabling homeowners to claim 
against new damage suffered. The Government set aside an additional NZ$5.5 
billion for reconstruction costs as part of the 2011 budget.
Because the orders-in-council were scheduled to expire in April 2012, the 
CERR Act was replaced with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (CER) Act. 
This legislation provided much wider and more significant powers. The Act 
and associated orders-in-council extended the period in force to 2016 and 
the Minister for Earthquake Recovery was empowered to ‘suspend, amend 
or revoke’ a number of local council plans and ‘suspend or cancel’ resource 
consents granted under the Resource Management Act. These powers enabled 
a recovery strategy to be developed by November 2011 in conjunction with 
Christchurch City Council, Selwyn and Waimakariri District Councils and 
Environment Canterbury. 
The most important change was the establishment of a new government 
department: the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). The Act 
gave CERA strong powers and a budget of NZ$25.5 million for the first two years. 
Roger Sutton, previously chief executive of a regional electricity distribution 
company, was appointed to head the authority.14 CERA decided reconstruction 
12 Liquefaction is the surfacing of liquefied sand and water from below the ground due to shaking during 
an earthquake.
13 Prior to the February earthquake, there had been four such ‘new events’ including the initial September 
earthquake.
14 CERA was immediately active, with deputy State Service commissioner John Ombler as acting chief executive.
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priorities, expropriated land with compensation, entered premises with notice 
to undertake works and closed roads. It also used its power to demolish and 
dispose of buildings. 
The authority took control of public works from CDEM on the expiration of the 
national state of emergency on 1 May 2011. CERA coordinated the drafting of the 
recovery strategy for Greater Christchurch, which complemented Christchurch 
City Council’s draft recovery plan for the CBD. The recovery strategy, released in 
October 2011, referred to 15 plans along four lines of reconstruction: economic, 
social, natural and buildings. Each plan would involve several stakeholders, 
including central and local government bodies, non-governmental organisations, 
such as the region’s principal iwi, Ngāi Tahu, and business organisations. 
Damaged housing was an immediate concern for CERA. Many residents 
questioned rebuilding on land that had suffered liquefaction. Geotechnical 
information needed refreshing after the earthquake. The risk of significant 
aftershocks deterred rebuilding in the short term and reluctance by insurance 
companies to offer new policies compounded the issue. CERA’s response was 
to divide the city’s land into several areas. Most areas were designated ‘green’, 
with lesser degrees of risk for future liquefaction, which allowed for rebuilding; 
however, land repair in ‘red’ areas would be ‘prolonged and uneconomic’. The 
Crown would compensate residents in red areas for loss of their homes at the 
council’s last valuation of their property.15
Continuing seismic activity seriously impeded recovery operations. After 
September 2010 the concentration of earthquakes shifted eastward, with 
several damaging more buildings. Liquefaction continued to cause problems 
near the Avon River, despite many areas being designated by CERA as suitable 
for rebuilding. By 8 February 2012, the EQC recognised 15 different events, 
allowing affected insurance holders to claim against new damage; however, the 
region has not suffered further damage comparable with that of the September 
2010 or February 2011 earthquakes.
Seismic uncertainty depressed the supply of insurance, throttling quick home 
and business reconstruction. Alan Bollard and Mike Hannah (2011) argued that 
the CERA changes, land remediation and reassessment of damage on buildings 
complicated the insurance process, as geotechnical and policy uncertainties 
have discouraged insurers from increasing their exposure to Canterbury.
Excessive claims from the February 2011 earthquake resulted in one domestic 
provider, AMI, requiring nationalisation. Other insurers anticipated higher 
15 This was 2007 for Christchurch, and 2008 for Waimakariri.
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reinsurance costs, increased their premiums and sought to minimise exposure 
to the rebuild. Bad loans and the risk of business disruption created uncertainty 
for banks and other financial institutions.
The earthquakes placed immense pressure on the EQC’s capacity. Additional 
claims by individuals were made as already damaged homes suffered more damage 
from aftershocks. Cowan and Simpson (2011) argue liability estimates and loss 
allocation were complex because no existing models were calibrated for events 
of this type and liability for land damage was difficult to estimate. Furthermore, 
the EQC had to meet complex legal requirements, and it coordinated more than 
a dozen agencies from the private sector and government to meet geotechnical 
demands. On 11 October 2011, the Government announced that the insurance 
levy used to finance the EQC would be tripled.
Monetary and fiscal policy responses were swift. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ) decreased its official cash rate by 50 basis points in the immediate 
aftermath of the February earthquake. Public finances were put under pressure 
by the earthquakes. Earthquake-related public expenditure was approximately 
NZ$13.6 billion in the 2010–11 financial year16 (Bollard and Hannah 2011). The 
earthquakes coincided with increases in government debt stemming from the 
late 2000s economic downturn. In response, the Government has set a target of 
returning to budget surplus by 2015.
The Government established a royal commission of inquiry to investigate 
buildings that caused injury on 22 February 2011, especially the CTV Building 
and PGC House, and those that failed after being deemed safe following the 
September 2010 earthquake. Furthermore, the Government is investigating the 
adequacy of current legal and best-practice requirements. In October 2011, an 
interim report with geotechnical and building design recommendations was 
released, and the final report was due for release in late 2012.
After the November 2011 general election, the National Party formed a coalition 
government with several minor parties. CERA compiled a Briefing to the Incoming 
Minister summarising the recovery process and future challenges. It identified 
seismic uncertainty as a major issue in recovery of the CBD and the primary 
cause of landowners delaying decisions to repair or rebuild. It acknowledged 
that ‘managing the pace and timing of its contribution to the recovery is the 
single greatest risk CERA faces’ (CERA 2011). It also noted that CERA’s work 
program might require increased future funding and defended the recovery 
process to date, arguing that economic activity and employment were above 
expectations and that the foundation was set for recovery.
16 Year ended 30 June 2011.
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Discussion
The three cases show points of similarity and difference. While each government 
created recovery agencies to coordinate the recovery, they had different functions 
and powers. They were tasked with community engagement yet citizens were 
empowered to make decisions to different degrees. The cases display clear 
evidence of institutional learning as recovery progressed and the complexity of 
insurance issues after disaster.
Choice of Agency Type
The recovery agency in Victoria was not complemented with legislative powers, 
an apparently deliberate strategic decision that let the Government coordinate 
recovery quickly. The bushfires took place over a relatively short period 
compared with the disasters in Queensland and Canterbury. The marginal 
benefits of waiting for new legislation to be drafted, passed and enacted 
justified the immediate establishment of a recovery authority. It is also clear 
that there was considerable goodwill for the VBRRA in the initial stages of 
recovery. In contrast, Queensland and Canterbury experienced repeated events 
that exhausted the institutions initially set up to cope with them. Recovery 
authorities with more and greater powers were deemed necessary in those cases.
Queensland and New Zealand designed recovery authorities with strong powers 
that circumvented existing regulations. Queensland’s institutional response was 
specifically cited in a New Zealand cabinet minute proposing the creation of 
CERA. The agencies’ powers are remarkably similar, but there are important 
differences. CERA is a government department while the QldRA was created as a 
statutory body. The QldRA had a board and its minister was the premier rather 
than a portfolio minister. In New Zealand, Brownlee had the advantage of being 
a senior minister in cabinet, indicating more direct control and influence over 
the recovery process.
Although both agencies faced big challenges, they faced very different issues. 
With the exception of small towns, the QldRA’s funding was primarily focused 
on the restoration of services and rebuilding infrastructure, while respecting 
established use of premises. Christchurch, facing more complex recovery 
demands, granted authority to the Minister for Earthquake Recovery to change 
resource consents granted under the Resource Management Act. 
An effective command structure requires leadership capable of rapport 
with the affected community. All three cases reveal a similar preference. 
An outstanding example for the Australian responses to draw on was the 
Queensland Government’s appointment of General Cosgrove, former chief of the 
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ADF, to lead its response to Cyclone Larry in 2006. In 2011, the Queensland 
Government appointed high-level ADF officers to head recovery coordination. 
Military involvement signals an effective response to a traumatised community 
and managing the logistics of recovery. In Victoria the appointment of a public 
figure gave the VBRRA significant capital, which was important given the lack 
of enabling legislation. In New Zealand, Roger Sutton became a high-profile 
figure in the immediate response phase.
Community Engagement
All three approaches involve the public in decision-making; yet public 
participation does not always diffuse power from government to citizens. 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation describes eight ‘rungs’, ranging 
from non-participation to ‘citizen power’. In Hirschman’s (1970) framework of 
‘exit, voice and loyalty’, participation that does not empower citizens may lead 
them to exit the process, impoverishing decision-makers’ information base.
The VBRRA acknowledged that community-led recovery was difficult when 
individuals were still undergoing personal recovery, and it was not until later that 
the model changed from ‘token’ consultation to creating partnerships with CRCs. 
The VBRRA adopted most of the projects identified and prioritised by CRCs.
In New Zealand, the CER Act mandates the minister to appoint a community 
forum and ‘have regard’ to their information and advice. This has not been 
sufficient to build consensus on complex issues in Christchurch. Ostrom (1986) 
outlines a consultative institutional model with several rules under which the 
participatory game is played. When authority rules constrain decision-makers, 
a more effective process is likely. Merely having regard to a forum’s information 
and advice concentrates power with the central government. Boundary rules 
specify how participants are selected. Unlike Victoria, where the membership 
of CRCs was self-selecting, Christchurch’s sole community forum, with only 38 
members, was appointed by the minister. The pay-off rules distribute cost and 
benefits to participants. The draft CERA recovery plan for Greater Christchurch 
received 304 submissions and it is unclear if it was influenced by other means 
of community participation. Community forum minutes record that participants 
reported an ‘attitudinal problem’ within Christchurch City Council that left 
them feeling disempowered (CERA 2011).
It is unclear if the participatory process has built consensus. Hisschemoller and 
Hoppe (1996) describe a lack of consensus on knowledge, norms and values as 
an intractable controversy. Controversies come into existence if viewpoints of 
certain groups or interests are not taken seriously by policymakers (1996:49). 
They become serious if there is considerable policy and geotechnical uncertainty. 
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Community engagement was mandated in the CER Act to develop the recovery 
plan for Greater Christchurch. It is unlikely that the time frame was sufficient to 
build consensus on some of the more complex issues facing the region.
Queensland’s Grantham land swap was also contentious. Some residents preferred 
to remain in the flooded valley despite the known risks; however, residents 
were not compelled to accept the deal offered by the Lockyer Valley Regional 
Council. In Christchurch, issues were acute when compulsion was used. This 
ranged from dissatisfaction over building restrictions to unhappiness with the 
land zoning of homes. Such intractable controversies are a serious obstacle that 
New Zealand has yet to overcome.
Institutional Learning and Adaptive Change of Rules
The VBRRA Legacy Report (2011) outlines a number of lessons arising from the 
authority’s operations. Aligning the recovery body with the highest level of 
government provides authority. Statutory powers can speed up progress on 
unanticipated issues, especially if they cannot use other government agencies’ 
existing powers. Broad terms of reference, though necessary in complex recovery 
situations, generate uncertainty. The recovery body must be flexible as recovery 
moves from immediate issues towards more enduring, long-term issues.
The QldRA appeared to take on some of these lessons. First, the enabling 
legislation clearly defined its functions and gave it considerable powers. Second, 
its board reported directly to the Queensland premier. Third, the QldRA had 
clear steps to move from recovery to reconstruction before transitioning to other 
agencies. Permanent government agencies were involved in subcommittees in 
the six areas of reconstruction, and their priorities were decided by the QldRA.
Creating CERA was the clearest adaptation in New Zealand. Establishing the 
department outside Wellington indicated government recognition that in a crisis 
it is important to be close to the people affected. CERA (2011) made explicit note 
of lessons it had learned from local and international experience, including: 
building the capacity of the community-led response, devolving decision-
making to the local level, focusing on those most affected by the disaster, and 
ensuring government agencies worked in a holistic, joined-up way. 
Insurance Issues and Building Resilience
Moral hazard was a clear problem in Victoria and Queensland. In Victoria the 
high level of donations made distribution a complicated process. In the end, 
the uninsured did not receive special treatment, though increased need among 
those individuals may have led to greater access to funding. This approach has 
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far less potential to distort individual incentives than alternatives. Queensland’s 
floods highlighted moral hazard among intra-governmental actors, with the 
Federal Government resorting to compulsory State disaster insurance. 
New Zealand’s permanent disaster institutions adequately coped with the issue 
of moral hazard for home insurance. The EQC reduced risk exposure for private 
insurers without encouraging homeowners to neglect taking up insurance. The 
Government refused to extend the EQC’s coverage to those without insurance 
and has not yet offered compensation for uninsured red-zoned land. It is not 
yet clear if moral hazard issues will result from the nationalisation of AMI. 
Nevertheless, the reduced supply of private insurance in the Canterbury region 
has slowed the pace of recovery. 
All three cases show a clear commitment to mitigating the risk of future disasters. 
Inquiries investigated the causes of and response to the disaster, the failure of 
buildings and infrastructure, and delivered recommendations to reduce the risk 
of reoccurrence. Victorian building codes were strengthened and the capacity 
of standing institutions for disaster response was increased. Queensland’s issues 
relating to flood preparedness were delivered quickly. In New Zealand, the royal 
commission’s interim report delivered recommendations that informed early 
decision-making on rebuilding and repair work in Christchurch. 
Conclusion
Despite differences in the three approaches to disaster recovery there are 
similarities. Institutional responses dealt with the disaster effectively and 
quickly, and avoided the feedback loop between poor institutions and higher 
crisis levels. While it is too early to judge the success of the recovery effort 
in Christchurch, large-scale unemployment, homelessness and poverty have 
been avoided. Despite parts of the CBD remaining closed to the general public, 
Christchurch continues to function relatively well.
In its evaluation of the Queensland recovery effort, the World Bank (2011) 
highlighted a number of features important in good recovery practice. First, 
the recovery effort built on planned responses to disaster. Second, governments 
introduced specific agencies to deal with recovery. Third, they showed a 
commitment to community engagement, particularly in longer-term strategic 
planning. Fourth, all worked with local government in recovery planning. Fifth, 
relief and recovery arrangements were already in place, with the World Bank 
specifically citing the NDRRA. Sixth, the recovery effort attempted to ensure 
that mitigation of risk was incentivised and moral hazard was avoided. Seventh, 
technical advice was provided to individuals trying to rebuild. Eighth, efforts 
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were made to understand policy failures that exacerbated the disaster, and 
to recommend changes to mitigate future risk. Many of these good-practice 
principles are also evident in the Victorian and Canterbury recovery efforts.
Successful institutions are constrained by their context, ever changing in a 
crisis situation. Governments showed an ability to learn from past experiences 
and as the recovery process moved ahead. Where institutions, both public 
and private, struggle to cope with the demands disasters impose on their 
capacity, it is important that these institutions are supported to maintain the 
tempo of recovery. Optimising the level of resources that are used in recovery 
and reconstruction is hard, and an under-resourced recovery can create new 
problems that last for years after the disaster. Early engagement and ensuring 
that the demands on government are kept to a manageable level are the clearest 
lessons of the three cases. 
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20. Governing the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery, 2010–2011: 
The debate over institutional design
Rachel Brookie
The sequence of earthquakes in Christchurch shattered its residents’ 
preconceived notions about the location and magnitude of such events. By 
March 2012, Canterbury had endured more than 10 000 aftershocks, of which 
more than 3000 were noticeable. The quakes not only shook infrastructure, 
buildings and people, but also governance arrangements and institutional 
design for recovery. 
This chapter first describes the relevant impacts of these events. Second, it 
briefly examines literature on the governance of response to and recovery from 
major disasters and on community engagement in disaster recovery. Third, it 
describes and clarifies the country’s existing framework for disaster response 
and recovery before the quakes. Fourth, it evaluates the evolving governance 
arrangements created to manage the recovery from the quakes. Finally, it 
discusses the inadequacies in institutional design and lessons highlighted by 
the quakes. 
This chapter argues that the existing statutory framework for long-term 
recovery was inadequate. The governance arrangements created after the 
quakes addressed a number of concerns, but also generated problems. Future 
arrangements must provide an institutional framework that addresses both 
immediate response and adequate statutory and policy support for long-term 
recovery.1
Background: A series of unfortunate events 
Canterbury was struck by three major, and hundreds of minor, earthquakes 
between 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011. They resulted in liquefaction, 
damage to buildings and infrastructure, and the third major quake took 185 
lives.
1 A longer version of this chapter was originally published as a working paper. It is available on the IPGS 
website: <http://igps.victoria.ac.nz/publications/files/27b07e4270b.pdf>.
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In March 2011, the Government predicted the repair work would cost NZ$20 
billion (Bollard and Ranchhod 2011). Others argued the figure could reach NZ$30 
billion (NZPA 2011). In December 2011, Treasury estimated the combined cost of 
the two largest earthquakes to be equivalent to about 10 per cent of GDP (Bollard 
and Ranchhod 2011). While all sources emphasise uncertainty surrounding their 
estimates, the Treasury Budget Policy Statement 2012 (Treasury 2011) stated that 
rebuilding Canterbury was the biggest economic undertaking in New Zealand’s 
history, having a severe impact on government finances. 
Two large aftershocks on 13 June 2011 caused further damage. Canterbury was 
faced with 124 km of damaged water mains, 300 km of damaged sewer pipes and 
50 000 road surface defects. More than 1200 central city buildings were severely 
damaged and more than 100 000 residential houses require repair or rebuilding 
(CERA 2011a). 
On 23 December 2011, 11 quakes of magnitude 4.0 to 6.0 resulted in further 
damage and liquefaction and added about NZ$300 million to the Government’s 
operating deficit. By mid January 2012, Canterbury had experienced 9500 
quakes, an average of one quake of more than magnitude 3.0 every four hours.
This ranks as one of the most costly natural disasters for insurers worldwide 
since 1950 (Doherty 2011). As at December 2011, the estimated total net cost 
to the Crown was NZ$13.5 billion (Doherty 2011). The Earthquake Commission 
(EQC), the New Zealand Government-owned provider of national disaster 
insurance to residential property owners, has received 156 670 claims as a result 
of the September 2010 quake, 156 543 claims as a result of the February 2011 
quake, and by February 2012 received 434 797 claims for all seismic events. 
In summary, in mid January 2012, 500 days after the first quake, 892 buildings 
had been demolished and NZ$2.78 billion in EQC claims paid out (Greenhill 
2012). As at 10 February 2012, the EQC reports there have been 15 major 
earthquake events that allow insurance holders to make a claim. Continued 
seismic activity has constrained recovery activities.
Looking at the Literature
Defining Response and Recovery
The most important terms in the disaster literature are summarised as the four 
‘rs’—reduction, readiness, response and recovery—and are defined in the National 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Plan.2 James Rotimi (2010) 
finds that the response phase is the emergency or crisis period that ends when 
2 These definitions are available in James Smart’s Chapter 19, this volume.
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there are no more search and rescue operations and all safety evaluations are 
completed. Recovery involves initiating activities after impact and extending 
them until the community’s capacity for self-help is restored. Rotimi (2010:34) 
describes recovery ‘as the totality of activities, carried out at the post-impact 
stage at some point after the initial crisis time period of disasters, to progressively 
reinstate damages made to every facet of a community’s environment’. It starts 
at day one of the emergency and ends when the community’s capacity for self-
help is restored. The response and recovery phases overlap. 
Literature on the Governance of Major Disasters
International literature shows that the recovery phase shares many principles 
with the other ‘rs’. As with risk reduction and response, recovery requires an 
approved government policy, an enabling national system, appropriate tools and 
advocacy among all the actors including civil society. Decentralisation, links 
between local and national governments and a holistic approach to managing 
disasters are also needed.
The United Nations Development Programme document Post-Disaster 
Recovery: Guiding Principles (UNDP 2006:10) sets out appropriate institutional 
arrangements for recovery. Roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined 
within a country’s broader risk reduction, disaster preparedness and contingency 
planning processes. Experience suggests recovery and reconstruction efforts are 
best mounted on existing institutional frameworks and, if necessary, enabled 
with faster mechanisms for recovery. If a new structure for recovery is to be put 
in place, its objective should be achieving cohesion, coordination and consensus 
among different disaster stakeholders. The new structure should focus on: 
The definition of recovery/development policies, priorities and 
strategic guidelines, formulation/implementation/oversight of recovery 
proposals, monitoring of progress, establishing a permanent dialogue 
and consensus space with civil society, opposition parties, private 
sector, international cooperation agencies, donors and lending agencies, 
maintain transparency, accountability and good governance in the 
process as well as a strategic communications and information campaign. 
(UNDP 2006) 
The document also states that the main challenge in devising an institutional 
arrangement for recovery and reconstruction is to find a rapid implementation 
mechanism that does not undermine the existing institutional framework or 
affect ongoing good-governance mechanisms. It also notes that in the aftermath 
of a major disaster, implementation capacity is a major recovery planning issue.
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Local authorities often lack the capabilities and resources to address adequate 
preparation for disasters and to deal with their short and long-term implications. 
Therefore, local authorities may require central government support, and substantial 
linkages must be established between local and national levels—this includes 
support with resources and efficient coordination achieved by collaboration.
Literature on Community Engagement in Disaster 
Recovery
Community involvement in recovery activities contributes beneficially to the 
success of long-term recovery. Engaged communities can identify ‘workable 
solutions to the range of problems recovery presents, sharing and delegation 
of duties, securing community “buy in” to the process, and building trust’ 
(Vallance 2011:20).
Some writers argue that community participation by ‘deliberative methods’ is 
more practicable in the recovery phase than in the response phase. Community 
panels, citizens’ juries, deliberative polling, consensus conferences and 
planning cells3 promote high levels of community engagement in decision-
making, bring communities together to achieve understanding of an issue or 
problem and find common ground that will ideally lead to a decision. Successful 
deliberative processes depend on three elements: influence—the process should 
have the ability to influence policy and decision-making; inclusion—the process 
should ideally be representative, inclusive and encourage equal opportunity 
to participate; and deliberation—the process should provide open discussion, 
access to information and movement towards consensus (Millen 2011). Such 
methods facilitate trust in governance, whatever the decision-making structure 
may be. They can improve effective communication and recovery outcomes as 
they engage local knowledge. This results in appropriate, detailed, contextual 
plans and policies. Millen argues deliberative methods should be embedded in 
recovery and community engagement processes.
Effective engagement, which aims to facilitate communities owning their own 
recovery, is a crucial element, integrating social, economic and environmental 
goals and ideals. 
3 For further information on deliberative methods, see Millen (2011).
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The New Zealand Disaster Response and 
Recovery Framework
The Response and Recovery Framework Prior to 
September 2010
This section will outline the New Zealand disaster response and recovery 
processes—including legislation, policies and agencies—that existed prior to 
the Canterbury earthquakes.
The National CDEM Strategy sets out the New Zealand vision to encourage 
resilience, where communities understand and manage their hazards. This 
approach centres New Zealand’s emergency management system on the 
community—the first level of response in the event of a disaster. 
The Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 takes an ‘all 
hazards, multi-agency approach’ across the four rs. The Act and the CDEM 
strategy, plan and guide set out the structure for the management of the four rs.
The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is 
responsible for disaster response and recovery at a national level; however, 
planning for and implementation of disaster response is led at a local level 
through CDEM groups, which are partnerships between local authorities, fire, 
police, health services, government departments and lifeline utilities (such 
as water and power providers). CDEM groups coordinate planning programs 
and other activities for civil defence and emergency management, providing 
the basis for the integration of national and local civil defence emergency 
management planning and the alignment of local planning with the national 
strategy and plan. 
Local authorities in CDEM groups must prepare for and be able to respond to 
disasters. CDEM groups, through local authorities, implement emergency 
response activities at the local level through Emergency Operations Centres 
(EOCs), normally located in council buildings. The Central Government 
intervenes when an event exceeds local capacity. 
New Zealand, unlike most other Western nations, does not have specific stand-
alone organisations that manage disasters. Nor is there a national body for 
disaster risk reduction that combines all sector coordination and collaboration. 
Instead, the disaster management system is based on day-to-day organisational 
responsibilities and planning together with other agencies to coordinate 
an approach to disasters. It is highly devolved: local authorities and their 
communities lead the response and recovery. 
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In a large-scale disaster, coordination is managed on a continuum. The CDEM 
group works at the regional level, while the Officials Committee for Domestic 
and External Security Coordination (OCDESC) synchronises the whole-of-
government disaster response and recovery at the national level. The OCDESC 
comprises chief executives of government agencies and relevant officials and is 
administered by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Figure 20.1 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s 
‘Focus on Recovery’
Source: Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM). 2009. Section 25. Recovery 
(Wellington: Government of New Zealand).
When a state of national emergency is declared, the control of emergency 
management operations by the director of CDEM is supported by a range of 
enabling powers. Powers may include: evacuating and entering premises, 
closing roads, giving directions, requisitioning powers, carrying out inspections 
and undertaking works to make roads and structures safe. The director also 
controls the exercise and performance of the powers of CDEM groups and 
group controllers. Such powers may be exercised only during a declared state of 
emergency, after which the provisions that enable response and some recovery 
activities cease to apply. 
Recovery
The MCDEM’s ‘Focus on Recovery’ outlines a holistic framework for recovery, 
which centres on the statement that recovery is best achieved when the affected 
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community exercises a high degree of self-determination. It encompasses the 
social, built, economic and natural environments, integrating recovery activities 
with the community at the centre. 
The environments are represented by task groups charged with recovery. Sub-
task groups may be set up for larger-scale recovery. Task groups are coordinated 
by a recovery manager. Communication and regular meetings between the 
groups and the recovery manager are crucial. Information derived from these 
groups should be communicated to the media and all agencies (MCDEM 2009b).
 As the scale of the recovery and level of complexity increase so does the 
institutional response. The civil defence ‘national recovery management 
structure’ demonstrates the recovery task groups being undertaken in parallel at 
local, regional and national levels. These are coordinated at the readiness phase, 
so all actors know how to respond when an emergency occurs. In practice, 
central government is involved with a local response—for example, MCDEM 
officials are designated to assist by liaising with relevant government agencies. 
The director of CDEM coordinates the recovery. This includes advising 
the Minister of Civil Defence of needed government assistance, providing 
information to the OCDESC, and preparing and implementing a ‘recovery action 
plan’. The director coordinates activity through a national recovery manager, 
who will, where necessary, establish a National Recovery Office to ensure activity 
is coordinated and the recovery function is implemented. Other tasks of the 
National Recovery Office include: coordinating agencies, determining priorities 
and major areas of recovery, formulating recovery policies and strategies, and 
monitoring recovery activities.
Under the Act, recovery activity is focused on CDEM groups, but the Act 
empowers the MCDEM to manage recovery if the minister is satisfied the CDEM 
group cannot manage on its own. A recovery coordinator may also be appointed 
to manage the work of agencies and ensure that government assistance and 
actions are coordinated. The recovery coordinator, appointed for up to 28 days, 
will be responsible to, and funded by, the Director of Civil Defence. 
In an emergency the CDEM Group Recovery Manager coordinates the recovery 
activity in the region. The Local Recovery Manager, who may be appointed 
indefinitely, coordinates the recovery activity in a particular local authority area 
with the CDEM Group Recovery Manager. Tasks and responsibilities for all of 
these actors are outlined in the guide to the National CDEM Plan (MCDEM 2009a).
Community Engagement
CDEM community engagement best-practice documents acknowledge that 
effective recovery programs depend on the number of competent people 
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involved. CDEM documents explain that the context of the disaster provides 
for the designation of the level and process of engagement. The response will 
depend on the nature of the task, the type and impact of the disaster, and the 
affected community (MCDEM 2010). While effective engagement in disaster 
recovery management includes public meetings, community representation and 
inclusion of representatives from community organisations in decision-making, 
public participation in New Zealand after disasters generally takes the form of 
consultation—a low level of public engagement. The EQC, a crown entity, is also 
involved by providing natural disaster insurance cover to those who have home 
and/or contents insurance. Funded through a levy, the EQC covers up to NZ$100 
000 for damage to dwellings, and up to NZ$20 000 for damage to contents. 
Private insurers pay the residual amount. The EQC also provides limited cover 
for damage to residential land. Land cover is unique internationally. 
Disasters and recovery involve other legislation and regulations in New Zealand. 
The Building Act 2004 governs the construction of new buildings and alteration 
and demolition of existing buildings. The Resource Management Act (RMA) 
1991 designates management of the environment. 
Criticism of the Pre-Earthquake Recovery Framework
New Zealand has effective, modern and well-resourced emergency services for 
dealing with small-scale localised emergencies, but has significant gaps and 
deficiencies with respect to dealing with nationally significant disasters. 
Rotimi (2010), indicating that practical problems in legislation could constrain 
recovery, focused on the inadequacy of statutory powers to coordinate recovery. 
Only months before the first quake, he outlined deficiencies in the recovery 
legislation and supporting framework.
1. The CDEM Act addresses recovery only during the state of emergency. 
2. There are likely to be resource shortages during recovery. 
3. Institutional capacity mandated in recovery activities is concerning, and 
local councils’ duties and obligations during an emergency and recovery are 
unclear. 
4. The CDEM Act covers only the first 28 days of a recovery, and is confusing 
about responsibility for reconstruction/recovery. The powers of the appointed 
recovery coordinator should extend beyond a declared emergency period. 
5. It is difficult to understand who coordinates reconstruction and how this is 
done. 
6. A strict implementation of the EQC Act could prevent property owners 
from receiving damage compensation—for example, the EQC may refuse 
compensation if a building is on land notified as subject to natural hazards. 
20. Governing the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, 2010–2011
259
7. Strict application of the RMA would slow recovery and consent applications 
would overwhelm local councils’ capabilities. 
In summary, in an emergency, the existing model for disaster recovery in New 
Zealand envisaged that the MCDEM had extra short-term powers to enact 
response and early recovery activities. Long-term recovery was not supported 
by legislative powers. Local authorities—through CDEM groups—would have 
to lead the recovery. 
Rotimi concluded that though the statutory basis for the coordination of 
recovery activities was under government review, it was inadequate. 
Looking at Recovery
The following sections outline the debate surrounding, and the results of, the 
governance arrangements following the earthquakes.
September 2010: A local emergency
A state of local emergency was declared initially by the mayors of Christchurch 
City, Selwyn District and Waimakariri District. It permitted actions unavailable 
in normal circumstances, including suspending normal and essential services. 
In Wellington, the MCDEM activated the National Crisis Management Centre 
(NCMC) where the National Director of Civil Defence coordinated the response 
to the earthquake. CDEM groups in Christchurch, Waimakariri and Selwyn 
implemented response activities and were expected to lead the recovery. 
The EQC received 156 670 claims for damage to houses and land. Unsafe 
buildings were cordoned off and an overnight curfew was established for parts 
of Christchurch City. Up to 75 per cent of the city’s power was disrupted by the 
quake, but 90 per cent had been restored on the same day. Citycare4 connected 
as many water connections in three days as it would normally do in a year. 
Gerry Brownlee was appointed the minister responsible for the Christchurch 
earthquake recovery, leading a cabinet committee on Canterbury reconstruction 
to coordinate the Government’s response. On the day before the state of emergency 
ended, the Government introduced the Canterbury Earthquake Response and 
Recovery (CERR) Bill. It would enable the Executive to use orders-in-council5 
to amend almost all legislation, if needed, to respond to and recover from the 
earthquake. The Bill also established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
4 A provider of maintenance and management services across New Zealand’s infrastructure.
5 An order-in-council is made without the approval of Parliament, allowing legislative changes to be made 
and assented to quickly. 
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Commission (CERC) to advise ministers about proposed orders-in-council and 
to liaise between central and local governments. The Canterbury Earthquake 
Response and Recovery (CERR) Act was passed with multi-party support and 
without select committee examination.
The CERR Act allowed amendments to legislation that were required to ensure 
‘that the Government has adequate statutory power to assist with the response to 
the Canterbury earthquake’ until the state of emergency was lifted (Government 
of New Zealand 2010). When the state of emergency was lifted all special powers 
accorded to the MCDEM would expire and routine procedures would resume.
CERC was established, consisting of the three local mayors, a regional council 
(Environment Canterbury) representative, an engineer and the former director-
general of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as chair. 
The Recovery from the September Earthquake
Within two days the CDEM recovery mechanisms were up and running. Leaders 
had been appointed for the social, built, economic and natural environments, 
reporting to a designated coordinating executive group (Dalziel 2011). Despite 
this, and despite the wideranging powers the Act provided, local people within 
months complained that the recovery process had stalled.
Lianne Dalziel, a Christchurch MP, attributed slow progress to inadequate 
processes, undue haste and lack of rigorous scrutiny during the creation of the 
Act and CERC. CERC, intended only as an advisory group, created confusion 
over to whom the leaders of the recovery functions were reporting and who was 
in charge of the overall recovery. The Christchurch City Council (CCC) did not, 
as recommended in the CDEM recovery plan, appoint a recovery manager to 
focus on coordination and communication, nor did it develop recovery planning 
processes (Dalziel 2011).
Before the earthquake, Christchurch City mayor Bob Parker faced a serious 
challenge to re-election and voters expressed dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the council and its chief executive. After the earthquake Parker 
displayed exactly the communication skills needed to reassure the citizens and 
was re-elected.
In October the recovery phase was under way and the CDEM framework called 
for leadership, coordination and steering from the CCC, which should at the same 
time resume ‘business as usual’. The CCC resumed business-as-usual processes, 
which effectively stalled recovery activities by, for example, not fast-tracking 
consents for rebuilding. Many argued there was no visible engagement from the 
CCC with the public over how recovery should be handled, and it left the EQC 
and CERC to take charge. 
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In contrast, the Selwyn and Waimakariri district councils placed community 
engagement at the core of all decision-making and communication (Dalziel 2011). 
Before the quake they had active and well-funded community boards. Shortly 
after the earthquake, a hub office for Waimakariri was set up, with agencies 
involved in the recovery establishing offices there. This enabled the recovery 
agencies to know the situation on the ground and residents to get information. 
Waimakariri community engagement was seen as successful. In comparison it 
took until mid November 2010 for the CCC to hold the first ‘community meetings’, 
by which time the lack of communication angered residents. With CERC lacking 
capacity for action, and the CCC failing to develop recovery plans, the recovery 
process ground to a halt. By the time of the February quake, residents, MPs 
and business owners demanded the Minister for Earthquake Recovery use his 
powers under the CERR Act to speed up the recovery. 
Rethinking the Framework for Recovery Following the 
February 2011 Earthquake
A state of local emergency was again declared immediately after the earthquake 
on 22 February 2011. Then, on 23 February, New Zealand’s first state of national 
emergency was declared. This empowered the Director of Civil Defence to 
direct the response on a national basis, mostly from Christchurch. National and 
international teams joined the local CDEM groups in the search for survivors. 
With the CBD cordoned off and damage to homes and infrastructure across the 
city, the state of national emergency remained until 30 April 2011. By then, the 
Government had implemented new governance arrangements to meet the scale 
of the disaster. Whole hillsides had slipped away, liquefaction reappeared and 
many roads were impassable. 
Lessons had been learned after the September earthquake: recovery was a 
long-term activity that needed to commence quickly, and could not be just 
about infrastructure—social and economic contexts were equally, possibly 
more, important. The Government also considered lessons from international 
experience, where status-quo arrangements were insufficient to cope with 
major disasters and a new authority was needed to lead the recovery effort. The 
Government noted no single existing central or local government agency at that 
time had the powers to manage the recovery, nor was the CERR Act framework 
sufficient for long-term recovery. 
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) was introduced, 
and passed by Parliament under urgency on 14 April, after a one-day select 
committee process. The Act extended the Executive’s power to modify 
legislation through orders-in-council to five years. It disbanded CERC, replacing 
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it with the Canterbury Earthquake Review Panel as the advisor to the minister. 
It created a new government department, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority (CERA), to report to the Minister for Earthquake Recovery. CERA was 
to lead and coordinate the recovery efforts of the three councils, Environment 
Canterbury, central government departments and crown entities, infrastructure 
providers, business, construction firms and the local community.
CERA had the power to decide reconstruction priorities, compulsorily acquire 
land, enter premises, undertake works and demolish and dispose of dangerous 
buildings. CERA, given a five-year mandate, began operations with the Deputy 
State Services Commissioner as interim head. On 13 June, the former head of the 
electricity distribution network Orion took over as CEO. The 2011 budget allocated 
NZ$25.5 million over two years to set up CERA. An additional NZ$5.5 billion was 
committed over six years for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Fund.
The cabinet paper Proposed Governance Arrangements (Government of New 
Zealand 2011a) noted that departments are the default option for the governance 
of functions and powers requiring a high degree of ministerial control, 
including where there is exercise of the significant coercive powers of the state. 
Officials argued that the departmental form would have ‘a leadership structure 
that is able to act decisively and quickly and be closely aligned with the 
Government’s priorities’ (Government of New Zealand 2011a). Officials decided 
against establishing an advisory board, which would impact on the clear line of 
accountability from the CEO to the minister.
CERA was given nine months to create a recovery strategy as a road map for 
effective, timely and well-coordinated recovery for Greater Christchurch. The 
CCC was tasked with developing a recovery plan for the Christchurch CBD, to 
be signed off by the minister.
The Minister for Earthquake Recovery has extensive powers to coordinate 
activity needed to effect the recovery and oversee policy and legislative 
process. Under the CER Act, a four-person independent review panel advises 
the minister.
The CER Act also mandated a community forum to provide information and 
advice to the minister on earthquake recovery matters, meeting at least six times 
annually. International experience reinforced the importance of community 
engagement during the recovery, and the forum would give the opportunity 
for the minister ‘to encourage meaningful participation by community 
representatives in the process’ (Government of New Zealand 2011a). While the 
Act suggested 20 members, the minister appointed 38 from a cross-section of 
the Canterbury community, representing business and ethnic interests, as well 
as residents’ associations and groups. An eleventh-hour change in Parliament 
made CERA subject to the Official Information Act. 
20. Governing the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, 2010–2011
263
Key Issues: Governance
Despite cabinet papers citing international best practice of instituting a layer 
of governance between the authority and the politicians, CERA was made a 
government department. The Government considered an alternative option to 
set up CERA as an independent crown entity. Crown entities normally have 
an arm’s-length relationship with ministers but cabinet preferred a strong 
relationship between the minister and CERA and strong coordination across 
portfolios and agencies embodied in the departmental form (Government 
of New Zealand 2011a). Additionally, it seems likely that cabinet wanted the 
whole process directly driven by a minister, given the political and fiscal risks 
involved; however, this approach raised the risk of political priorities driving 
aspects of the recovery rather than the needs of the affected communities.
Professor Bruce Glavovic, the Massey University holder of the Earthquake 
Commission chair in natural hazards planning, expressed concerns that instead 
of following best practice CERA was ‘untried, untested’; New Zealand was 
‘inventing their own recipe’ (McCrone 2011).
Although the CDEM mechanism was bypassed by the introduction of CERA, 
the CER Act mirrors the ‘holistic’ approach advocated in the MCDEM literature, 
being centred on the four environments mentioned earlier.
Reflecting on Rotimi’s Concerns
Several of Rotimi’s concerns about the adequacy of the statutory and regulatory 
framework to manage disaster recovery have been realised. Government inaction 
before the earthquakes has now been addressed for Canterbury only by CERA.
First, the problem that the CDEM Act enables statutory powers only for short-
term recovery, during the declared state of emergency, was addressed by CERA, 
which empowered recovery activities for five years.
Rotimi’s second concern—that there are likely to be shortages of resources during 
recovery—is hard to determine at this early stage of rebuilding. The reality is 
that extensive rebuilding is just beginning. The Government has acknowledged 
that there are skills shortages in the construction industry. Third, Rotimi 
suggested the institutional capacities of local councils in recovery activities 
would be insufficient. These concerns, evident in Christchurch post September 
2010, have arguably increased since February 2011. The CCC’s institutional 
capacity has been diminished by flawed relationships, ineffective processes and 
political infighting. The communication procedures and management of the CCC 
have become a major issue, generating significant protest action.
There were calls for the councillors to be replaced with government-appointed 
commissioners. At the end of February 2012, the CCC was operating with a 
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crown observer to help the council address governance issues and ensure it 
functions well enough to support the recovery. The crown observer introduced 
another layer of central government involvement into the governance of council 
business, but was made with the agreement of the council. 
Rotimi’s fourth concern—of confusion over who should take charge during 
reconstruction and recovery—has been addressed by the clear reporting lines 
provided in the CER Act. All roles and responsibilities designated after the state 
of emergency was lifted are available on the CERA and CCC websites. The CCC 
is responsible for the Central City Plan, which was well received by the public. 
CERA is responsible for the recovery strategy document, policy, planning and 
the majority of work in Christchurch to date: demolitions. CERA also has overall 
control of the direction of the recovery, for which the most important decisions 
are made by the Minister of CER and cabinet. The CER Act gave the minister 
the ability to suspend, amend, cancel or delay any council plans and policies, 
which must be consistent with CERA’s recovery strategy and be signed off by 
the minister.
The role of the CCC in the recovery effort with CERA could have been neglected. 
In its comment on the draft recovery strategy of October 2011, the CCC was 
‘concerned that appropriate governance arrangements have yet to be established 
to ensure that recovery activities are integrated and well-coordinated and that 
decisions are made with the right level of input from others’ (CCC 2011). The CCC 
acknowledged CERA had the lead role; however, the CCC did not think it was 
appropriate that the council did not have a governance role in the preparation 
of the draft strategy (CCC 2011). 
Fifth, Rotimi’s concerns about the coordination of recovery activities have been 
addressed by CERA, which is responsible for coordination and planning for 
infrastructure, economic recovery and the welfare rebuild. Again, the CCC 
(2011) had concerns, calling for greater clarity about how recovery work and 
decisions should be coordinated in CERA’s recovery strategy, and asked that the 
affected local authorities be involved in the development of each recovery plan. 
This tends to support media reports and blog comments that some residents 
feel the major recovery actors are not communicating and coordinating their 
activities with one another and so are hindering recovery.
The coordination of reconstruction has been addressed by the EQC awarding 
Fletcher Construction a bulk contract for rebuilding approximately 50 000 
moderately or seriously damaged properties. This means residents do not have 
to compete for the services of a limited number of building contractors, but now 
compete for attention within the Fletcher organisation. 
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Rotimi’s sixth concern, about the inadequacies of the EQC Act, has been 
realised. The EQC Act had not envisaged multiple events within such a short 
time (Cowan and Simpson 2011). As at 10 February 2012, the EQC had dealt 
with 15 claimable events. 
In September 2011, the EQC and the Insurance Council sought a declaratory 
judgment in the High Court as to whether EQC liability would be limited to 
NZ$100 000 for claims relating to an aggregate of events, or whether its cover 
would reinstate after each major quake. The court found that EQC cover (and 
therefore its liability of up to NZ$100 000) would reinstate after each major 
quake. This decision provided certainty, but it also added a large amount of 
liability to the Government. 
Due to the unforeseen ‘widespread and locally catastrophic liquefaction’ (Cowan 
and Simpson 2011), EQC liability for restoration of the land in Canterbury has 
become much more complex, involving complicated engineering and legal 
considerations not anticipated when the EQC Act was passed. Decisions about 
zoning and the future designation of properties have become much more difficult 
and time-consuming.
There has been concern at the slow rate of EQC settlements. As at mid February 
2012, 85 794 EQC claims from all events, including aftershocks, had been resolved. 
Insurance has been the most urgent and significant issue holding back the 
progress of recovery. The continual sequence of aftershocks has made rebuilding 
decisions much harder. The susceptibility to risk of liquefaction in some areas 
added to this uncertainty. 
EQC cover applies only when property owners are insured, and there are 
problems with the availability and pricing of earthquake cover as well as 
concerns about slow payouts from private insurers. Insurers able to arrange 
reinsurance cover are finding that costs have increased as much as four or five 
times (Grant 2011). As the increased cost to insurers is largely being passed on 
to consumers, earthquake insurance may become increasingly unavailable and 
unaffordable. 
The quakes have wiped out the NZ$6 billion reserve of the Natural Disaster 
Fund, which underpins the EQC. The Government provided back-up financial 
support for AMI when it seemed the costs of the quakes might exceed AMI’s 
reinsurance and reserves. Business interruption insurance has been crucial for 
many businesses’ survival, but for most businesses this insurance ran out on 22 
February 2012. 
Seventh, Rotimi was concerned that a strict application of the Resource 
Management Act would slow the recovery. The RMA was amended by orders-
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in-council under both the CERR Act and the CER Act. These orders eased 
time frames for approval of consents by councils and introduced a range of 
amendments to address specific problems, such as faster resource consent 
processes to allow repairs to electrical system damage. Rotimi noted that 
consent applications would overwhelm local councils’ capabilities during any 
post-disaster recovery. While it is unclear if this has happened, the CCC (2012) 
announced an additional 69 full-time staff to deal with consent issues. The real 
surge on consents will occur when rebuilding starts in earnest.
CERA has responsibility for zoning of land designated as ‘green’, ‘orange’, ‘red’ 
or ‘white’. As at June 2011, the residential green zone contained around 100 000 
homes that, subject to some further investigation about liquefaction risk, could 
begin the repair/rebuild process. Repair/rebuild of about 10 000 homes in the 
residential orange zone was on hold pending further assessment. The residential 
red zone contained about 5000 homes, many built on land prone to liquefaction, 
where remediation was judged likely to be ‘prolonged and uneconomic’. In June 
2011, the Government announced it would offer to buy out red-zoned insured 
residential homes at recent rateable value. The cost of the buyout was estimated 
to be between NZ$485 and NZ$635 million, which would come out of the NZ$5.5 
billion earthquake recovery fund. As at February 2012, some homeowners were 
yet to hear the fate of their properties. 
Community Engagement
Community engagement was at the centre of recovery policies before the quakes; 
however, the structure of CERA, combined with a faltering CCC, might overlook 
the opportunity for higher levels of community engagement. This section will 
consider the potential for, and progress of, community engagement in disaster 
recovery in Canterbury.
CERA’s structure was initially criticised for being top-down, centralised and 
bureaucratic, in contrast with the ideals of the recovery management being 
bottom-up, decentralised and community led. CERA’s arrangements were 
described as having the appearance of community engagement but the reality 
of ministerial control. CERA’s draft recovery strategy supports the holistic 
framework for recovery advocated by the MCDEM, which places the community 
at the centre of all the task groups. Weak implementation, however, could 
undermine international lessons about the value of community engagement in 
recovery.
The Christchurch community forum design may compromise effective 
engagement, as its members may struggle to represent the views of the city’s 
400 000 people. Confusion about how the forum can influence the minister 
and what its role is generally—according to the CCC (2011), its role is unclear 
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in the draft recovery strategy—diminishes the Government’s assertion that it 
would encourage meaningful participation by community representatives in the 
recovery process. 
The scale of community consultation by the CCC has improved recently. The 
community contributed 106 000 ideas to help inform the direction for the draft 
plan, generated from various initiatives and conversations. The CCC worked 
closely with Ngāi Tahu, Environment Canterbury and CERA during the 
development of the draft plan; however, there is still some criticism that the 
CCC is not generating higher levels of community engagement. 
The community forum’s 3 November 2011 meeting notes indicate that the 
CCC understands its people less than Waimakariri or Selwyn councils (CERA 
Community Forum 2011). This is probably a function of the CCC’s size, but also 
reflects the perceived unwillingness in the CCC to delegate to the community.
A community’s recovery may demand more engagement than would normally be 
expected; however, it was not clear whether the views expressed in eight CERA 
community workshops influenced the preparation of the recovery strategy. 
While there was a commitment in the draft strategy to engage and collaborate 
in the recovery, the draft recovery strategy does not define how this will occur. 
Submissions on the strategy suggest CERA should more proactively encourage 
community engagement at every stage—planning, implementation, monitoring 
and review—and at levels beyond consultation. 
Much of the literature supporting community engagement seems to ‘assume 
that the state will be both willing and able to accept post-disaster input from 
communities who are themselves willing and able to participate in the recovery 
process’ (Vallance 2010:20). This assumption may not be valid. Vallance (2011) 
suggests recovery authorities struggled to connect adequately with affected 
communities for some time in Canterbury. In early February 2012, only 79 
written comments on the draft central city plan had been received (The Press 
2012). The reasons for the difference between these numbers and the 106 000 
ideas generated for the creation of the same plan and the number of protestors 
who demonstrated over the pay increase for the council’s CEO are matters for 
further study. Community engagement is, however, more suited to the recovery 
phase than the response phase. It has yet to be seen whether the recovery will 
truly benefit from comprehensive community engagement.
Discussion
New Zealand has four options to govern future large-scale disasters. First, the 
pre-quake legislative arrangements could be reinstituted. Second, a CERA-
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style model could be replicated. Third, significant amendments to the pre-
quake framework could be made. Fourth, there could be a new and completely 
different model for disaster management and recovery.
The difficulties with the first two options have been indicated above, and the 
fourth would be difficult at the design and legislative stages. The pre-quake 
framework had many strengths, with most weaknesses related to the recovery 
phase. So there is a good case for amending the pre-quake framework for 
recovery after exceptional events. 
Amendments to the Framework for Recovery
CDEM
New provisions should be added to the CDEM Act to support long-term recovery 
management after a state of emergency has been dissolved. Rotimi (2010) notes 
that this would require a more proactive role by the MCDEM. Furthermore, 
recovery planning and management should be strengthened across all involved 
sectors.
That enabling powers for long-term recovery were not considered prior to the 
quakes was an oversight. This must be addressed with due regard to democratic 
and constitutional norms. 
The position of a national recovery coordinator to facilitate recovery planning 
and management initiatives should be made permanent (Rotimi 2010) to reflect 
the important, long-term nature of recovery management after a disaster.
In large-scale disasters central government intervention may always be necessary, 
as city councils probably lack the capability and resources to meet needs in the 
years following a disaster. A small permanent agency, having recovery powers 
like those of CERA, could be considered. This could involve extending the role 
of the MCDEM into the recovery phase; however, any such agency is likely to 
be inactive for long periods and could attract problems when clarifying who 
pays for localised disaster recovery. The MCDEM and other agencies involved 
in recovery could have a scale-up plan that would be triggered in a Canterbury-
scale scenario.
If local authorities are to manage long-term recovery, they may require extra 
powers to enable recovery activities. Furthermore, if there is substantial damage 
to council-owned land and investments, as well as population flight, how will 
councils fund the recovery?
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The events in Christchurch indicate that disasters will overwhelm councils. 
Rotimi (2010) recommends the development of memoranda of understanding 
between agencies. These should outline how recovery can be achieved through 
collaborative efforts. 
Rotimi recommends greater alignment of the CDEM Act with the RMA and 
Building Act so all recovery-related provisions and activities avoid conflicting 
implementation of recovery tasks. The amendments to legislation provided by 
orders-in-council provide policymakers with a number of potential areas that 
will need to be aligned and addressed. Some of these issues were considered in 
evidence provided to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission.
Any change to legislation should take best-practice literature into account. 
The current devolved model of recovery assumes local authorities know 
their communities best, which gives the best opportunity for community 
engagement; however, Christchurch shows that the institutional capacity of 
local authorities after major disasters will be overwhelmed, which is likely to be 
true both for institutional capacity in general and their ability to engage with 
their communities. Also, opportunities for higher-level engagement may be 
discouraged. There are calls in Christchurch for recovery actors to move beyond 
tokenistic approaches to community consultation and embrace higher levels of 
community engagement. If people do not feel involved in the future of their city 
then those who can might leave. 
A significant focus of disaster management is on planning for recovery, but how 
do you plan for the unexpected? This question should be studied. Institutional 
arrangements ought to be flexible enough to deal with a large range of disasters 
of different scales, as well as with emergent policy issues. 
The people of Christchurch will largely have to work within the institutional 
arrangements that currently exist; however, they should be able to have a 
substantial say in their future. 
Resource Management Act
The RMA’s procedural requirements and other provisions for wide consultation 
might hinder fast recovery. Rotimi proposed the scale of consultation and 
public notification be limited to permit a speedy approval process. Procedural 
requirements can delay essential works, as the complete collapse of seven 
previously damaged heritage buildings in the February quake showed. Approval 
to demolish them required an engineering report and resource consent, which 
would take months. In February the facades of the buildings collapsed, killing 
12 people. Demolition of buildings is now allowed if they pose an immediate 
danger to human safety. Heritage protection remains an issue for legislators, 
especially in balancing the need for public consultation with the need for safety. 
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The RMA should be amended but procedures should not hinder the purpose 
of sustainable management of resources. The Government intends to amend 
the RMA to give greater weight to managing the risks of natural hazards. This 
should include a review of consents given to land that is prone to issues like 
liquefaction.
The EQC
A 2009 review of the EQC suggested it was not prepared for a major national 
disaster. Furthermore, there was widespread confusion about what its role would 
be, with the Government expecting agencies like the EQC to be more ‘directly 
involved in the response and recovery than their mandate and capability allows’ 
(Heather 2011). This led to the EQC having more contact with private insurers, 
and in case of a major quake aiming to settle 80 000 claims in 12 months.
The EQC was overwhelmed by the scale of the Canterbury quakes. In February 
2012, there were huge disparities between the approaches of private insurance 
companies and the EQC in assessing the damage to homes. For example, private 
insurers’ policies say that they will reinstate the property ‘as new’. The EQC Act 
provides that they will reinstate the property ‘substantially the same as when 
new’. This disparity could mean the difference between repair and demolition 
(Wright 2012).
Changes to the EQC Act should address these issues. The EQC should plan for 
multiple events and large numbers of claims. Its financial viability will also need 
to be examined. The EQC levy paid annually by homeowners has already tripled. 
EQC advice to the incoming minister in November 2011 suggested changes, 
including removing contents insurance cover, introducing variable premiums 
depending on house size or hazards risk, automatic adjustment of premiums 
and payout caps, and increasing the excess on claims.
With the costs of damage rising, the viability of the EQC model will become 
difficult, especially given the government guarantee to meet the EQC’s 
shortfall. As the cost of insurance in disaster-prone areas becomes increasingly 
unaffordable, it is likely more people will choose not to insure their homes and 
EQC cover will not apply. In this situation, the problem of moral hazard arises, 
particularly if the public expects the Government will take on residual risk. 
Additionally, as outlined earlier, provisions in the EQC Act allow for cover not 
to apply to high-risk land or notified earthquake-prone buildings. A stricter 
application of the Act in the future may be harsh, but fiscally necessary. 
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Conclusion
An evaluation of the pre-quake framework for recovery now confirms that the 
legislative support for long-term recovery was inadequate. The new governance 
arrangements following the quakes had flaws. The legislation addressing 
recoveries in both cases were rushed because the Government was dealing with 
disasters of unprecedented scale. 
The disasters raise several wider implications. How is the cost of the Canterbury 
quakes and the role of government altering expectations and incentives for the 
future? Will we become less insured and does this effectively increase the fiscal 
risk for governments? Will local governments expect future recovery projects 
will be centrally planned as Canterbury is? How will the ‘shelf plan’ for the 
next major event balance collaboration with executive management? How does 
that affect the democratic deficit in local government? How important is it to 
have an effective legislative framework in place when future governments will 
be able to legislate to meet the needs of the disaster?
The role of councils leading long-term recovery needs further evaluation. While 
councils may theoretically provide the opportunity for effective community 
engagement, their capability to lead recovery is questionable. 
New Zealand’s framework for recovery needs to be future-proofed. Though 
we cannot prevent most natural disasters, we can try minimising their impact 
and create governance arrangements to maximise recovery. The process for 
learning from disaster and recovery should consider not only institutional 
understandings, but also citizen expectations of what should be done better 
next time. Crucially, we must find ways to imbed learning from disasters into 
institutional memory.
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21. Seismic Shifts: The Canterbury 
earthquakes and public sector 
innovation
John Ombler and Sally Washington
The Canterbury earthquakes had a huge impact on government services. The 
scale of the 22 February 2011 event meant that many public servants could not 
access their damaged buildings, forcing many to work remotely from home or 
co-located in buildings that remained functional. Some departments deliberately 
redeployed staff to help where they were needed most, including to work with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and in the community. The tenacity of 
those public servants and their commitment to serving the public, despite their 
own personal and family disruptions, were commendable. Sometimes the choice 
of where to work in the early days was determined on the basis of where there 
was functional plumbing. 
Government departments with a presence in Canterbury were asked to document 
the impacts of the earthquakes on their staff and operations, and how they had 
responded to that disruption. Putting all those responses together produced a 
tome of A3 sheets that revealed some innovative approaches to public service 
delivery and design. When these examples were presented to ministers, they 
asked for more of the same, not only in Canterbury but also nationwide. 
The earthquakes showed the agility and resilience of the public service in times 
of crisis. This will help our ability to be ready and able to respond to future 
crises. They also provided a ‘perfect storm’ for innovation. The innovative 
responses to the disaster revealed some new ways of working that offer lessons 
about how to improve public service design and delivery, not only in response 
to a disaster but in a business-as-usual context. The Canterbury innovations 
provide live demonstrations of what New Zealand’s Better Public Services (BPS)1 
program is trying to achieve. 
This chapter discusses the Canterbury innovations and the lessons they offer for 
public service design and delivery. We argue that building innovation capability 
is an important component of future-proofing the state. 
1 For a description of the Better Public Services program, including the Prime Minister’s 10 Result Areas, 
see: <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/better-public-services>.
Future-Proofing the State
278
The Canterbury Innovations Project
The State Services Commission (SSC) took the lead on a project to ensure the 
public sector took full advantage of the lessons from the Canterbury innovations. 
Key partners in that project are the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA) and the Christchurch Government Leaders Group, comprising senior 
leaders from government agencies based in Christchurch. The project is now an 
integral part of the BPS program. It sits at the interface of two of the Government’s 
top priorities (see Box 21.1)—delivering better public services and rebuilding 
Christchurch—and should contribute to the two economic priorities.    
Box 21.1
Government priorities
• Responsibly manage the Government’s finances
• Build a competitive economy
• Deliver better public services
• Rebuild Christchurch
The project provides early practical examples of BPS made real. Too often we 
tell agencies what to do without giving them guidance or shoot them down 
when they get it wrong. We need to also celebrate success and share examples 
of where they have got it right, including as a way to inspire other agencies to 
follow suit. The Canterbury innovations project is designed to 
• showcase and sustain the innovations, draw the lessons from them and apply 
them, where appropriate, to business elsewhere
• promote Christchurch as an innovation zone, applying deliberate and 
coordinated capability to help drive the Christchurch rebuild, and to 
prototype models of service delivery and design for the rest of the country 
as demonstrations of BPS
• draw lessons from Christchurch to help build innovation capability across 
the state services.  
Showcasing Christchurch Innovations and 
Applying the Lessons Elsewhere
The Christchurch innovations project began with four case studies demonstrating 
examples of innovative public service delivery and/or design emerging in 
response to the earthquakes. The organisations involved in the initiative, the 
value added by the initiative, what the innovation demonstrated in terms of 
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better public services, its potential scalability and next steps for the initiative 
were the subjects of a report to cabinet and published case studies, which are all 
available on the SSC’s website.2 
The initial four case studies covered the following.  
• The Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) eShared Care Record View 
(eSCRV): A secure online system for sharing patient information between 
health professionals—invaluable in a disaster when paper records were 
irretrievable and access to usual health providers was disrupted. The eSCRV 
was co-produced by the CDHB and a range of private health providers, 
ensuring buy-in and that the service met the needs of users. 
• Recover Canterbury: A joint venture between the Canterbury Development 
Corporation, the Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce and several 
government agencies including Inland Revenue, which supports earthquake-
affected businesses with advice, mentoring, referrals (to government as well 
as professional services) and grants. Users of the service report not knowing, 
or caring, whether they were dealing with public or private sector staff—
they just recognised Recover Canterbury as a vital support and a successful 
brand.  
• Justice Services Recovery: Including centralised court scheduling and the use 
of alternative facilities that enabled the maintenance of court proceedings 
despite significant damage to infrastructure. Co-location of justice agencies 
and community-based organisations is also being explored, building 
on agencies’ shared experience at Ngā Hau e Whā marae following the 
earthquakes.
• Earthquake Support Coordination Service (ESCS): Co-production between 
government agencies and NGOs to provide support for families and 
households following the earthquakes.
The innovations were significant in their own right; but more importantly, 
they offer lessons for the future design and delivery of public services in New 
Zealand. 
Citizen/Business-Centric Service Design: Designing 
services around the user  
Citizen-centric service design—building services around people’s needs—was 
a constant theme running through the case studies. Both Recover Canterbury 
and the ESCS used a tailored support model, with clients assessed on need 
and offered varying levels of support, from ‘light touch’ to full wrap-around 
2 <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/christchurch-innovations>.
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services based on that assessment—a triage approach to service provision. Both 
examples provided a coordinated service with multiple access points; there was 
‘no wrong door’. The sustainability of these models and the cost and benefits in 
different policy contexts will need to be evaluated over time. They provide live 
demonstrations of channel strategies for providing services and information 
(online, telephone, in person, and so on). 
Building services around citizen needs was a key theme of the BPS Advisory 
Group’s report.3 The Christchurch experience will help inform options for 
BPS Results 9 and 10 aimed at improving government interactions with New 
Zealanders.
Co-Production: Making the most of available 
capability  
The BPS Advisory Report argued that citizen/business participation is a 
powerful driver for delivering better services and value for money and that 
more use could be made of best-sourcing to drive improved performance in New 
Zealand state services. Christchurch provides practical examples of the value of 
co-production.  
CDHB’s eSCRV was the product of multiple stakeholders, public and private, 
coming together to design and agree on a mutually beneficial system (funded by 
CDHB). Recover Canterbury and the ESCS are further examples of co-production 
and tapping the best expertise available, whether public, private or community 
based, with funding and form following the desired function. 
The ESCS demonstrated a new approach to contracting with NGOs, involving 
providing funding to backfill the roles of staff seconded into the ESCS rather 
than the standard ‘contract-for-service’ approach.  
Co-Location: The foundation for joined-up services
Co-location and secondments to other agencies changed how public servants 
thought about their work and their operating environment. In Christchurch 
staff gained valuable insights from the opportunity to see how other agencies 
operate, and for those staff working in Recover Canterbury and the ESCS, a 
better understanding of the business and community sectors respectively. For 
example, interviews conducted with Inland Revenue Department (IRD) and 
Work and Income staff (Inland Revenue/Communications and Inquiry National 
Research Unit 2011) revealed that they now see joined-up government service 
3 The advisory group’s report is available on the SSC website: <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/better-public-services>.
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as the way of the future. Despite differences in organisational culture and 
functions, they recognised similarities in customers and types of services and 
the potential to realise efficiencies by sharing information and facilities while 
providing clients with the best possible assistance available. The Christchurch 
experience confirms the value of co-location for frontline services and provides 
a practical example of how common results have the power to break down 
agency silos. 
Information Sharing and Use of Technology Drives 
Better Services and Improves Efficiency
The Christchurch innovations show multiple examples of information sharing 
and the use of technology to drive better services, with improved outcomes as 
the driver and efficiency the by-product. 
Faster treatment, less duplication of diagnostic procedures and reduced acute 
admissions are some of the efficiencies facilitated by shared access to patient 
records, without the associated cost of having to design a central database or 
replace existing IT systems in CDHB’s eSCRV. 
The ESCS shared client information (with a consent process)4 between government 
agencies and with the community partners involved. Recover Canterbury 
similarly involved sharing information across agencies. This facilitated faster 
and better referrals and better services to clients. 
Centralised venue location, a centralised inbound calling function and text 
messaging were used to enable essential court services to be maintained 
following the earthquakes; the initiatives provided a practical application of 
work under way in the Ministry of Justice and are being fed into future justice 
sector planning. 
We have stressed the need to maintain the enabling environment in Christchurch 
to support and to monitor the current and emerging initiatives over time. 
This is crucial for testing the sustainability of those innovations and future 
iterations and for assessing their ongoing value including in other contexts. 
Some might be appropriate to an emergency situation and the transition phase 
but have diminishing returns under business as usual. Moreover, agencies such 
as Inland Revenue deployed staff and resources into the emergency response 
4 Sharing of personal information is allowed in emergency situations under the Privacy Act. The Privacy 
Commissioner communicated the Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) to 
clarify the conditions under which personal information could be shared. The Privacy Commissioner has since 
commissioned research into the use of the code (<http://privacy.org.nz/christchurch-earthquake-information-
sharing-code-2011-temporary/>), the results of which will feed into the development of a new code of practice 
applicable to any national emergency. 
Future-Proofing the State
282
in Christchurch that would need to be redeployed under business as usual. 
Agencies have been asked to monitor and evaluate the initiatives to assess how 
they can be applied to their business elsewhere. A further report to cabinet on 
sustaining innovation in Christchurch government services will be prepared in 
late 2012. 
Christchurch as an Innovation Zone and a 
Harbinger of Better Public Services 
The need to build new infrastructure in Christchurch offers a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to redesign government services and to test innovative models of 
service delivery. This should build on the lessons learned post earthquakes—for 
example, to maximise the opportunities for co-location and to design services 
around user needs. Several big opportunities stand out. 
Rebuilding Education Facilities in Greater 
Christchurch. 
The rebuilding of education facilities in Greater Christchurch offers a unique 
opportunity to test new approaches to governance, provision of school 
facilities and property (shared infrastructure/facilities with other community 
services), building on some of the interim arrangements introduced following 
the earthquakes, such as shared campuses and the use of portacoms for early 
childhood education. The focus for renewing the education network will be on 
strengthening the delivery of education including through sharing property and 
facilities and better transitions between learning stages, from early childhood 
to tertiary education. As in other service areas, the aim is to build back better 
rather than to simply replace what was there before. 
Office Accommodation for Government Services in 
Christchurch: Trialling Functional Leadership 
Government agencies’ needs for new accommodation in Christchurch provide 
the opportunity to develop innovative accommodation arrangements that 
are both more efficient and galvanise cross-agency work seeded during co-
location following the earthquakes. There are two key phases of work: securing 
government office accommodation for regional management and corporate 
support functions in the CBD rebuild, and a longer-term service delivery 
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network (in-person public interface sites). Christchurch provides an opportunity 
to operationalise and test the value of functional leadership5 that is a major 
component of the leadership stream of the BPS program.
Shared Front of House: Prototyping service 
transformation and BPS Result 10 
Decisions about the Government’s overall property strategy provide a limited 
window to implement some different approaches to face-to-face service delivery 
in Christchurch. Evidence from existing initiatives in Christchurch, and from 
similar front-of-house consolidation in other jurisdictions, confirms that 
integrated government service delivery has benefits for citizens as well as for 
agencies. These models put citizens at the forefront; services are designed around 
meeting their needs efficiently and effectively. Moving from an agency-centred 
service delivery approach to a citizen-centred one requires consideration of 
issues such as the alignment of technology, work practices, business processes 
and employment agreements. There is a significant opportunity in Christchurch 
to experiment with different delivery models and to trial a number of short-
term options in the interim phase, before longer-term accommodation options 
are fixed. These opportunities allow for some prototyping of options for BPS 
Result 10.6
Justice and Emergency Services: Opportunities for 
co-location
Police, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and Department of 
Internal Affairs (DIA) Fire Service, as well as ambulance and local government 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) are working together to 
co-locate and integrate some areas of service delivery into a shared campus in 
the CBD. It involves a rethink of infrastructure and property arrangements and 
an analysis of the synergies between agencies. Synergies between the justice 
sector and emergency services are sought through shared custodial services, 
shared office accommodation, shared emergency operations centres and a suite 
of shared facilities, as well as enhanced emergency management capabilities 
and processes for anticipating responses to a range of events. Drawing on 
arrangements following the earthquakes, several other examples of co-location 
in this sector are already operational.
5 Cabinet mandates have been given to three chief executives to assume leadership for driving greater 
cross-government efficiencies and effectiveness. Functional leader mandates relate to three functional areas: 
property, procurement and information and communication technology (ICT).
6 For a description of BPS results related to improving interaction with government, see: <http://www.ssc.
govt.nz/bps-interaction-with-govt>.
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Taken together, these projects (alongside the rebuilding of hospital facilities) 
represent significant capital investment and a key part of the Christchurch 
rebuild. A deliberate and coordinated approach to the rebuilding and redesign 
process is required. The Canterbury Government Leaders Group has built the 
foundations for ongoing cross-agency coordination. The willingness to try new 
things in Christchurch means there is scope to test new approaches to service 
provision, including delivery of BPS results. Christchurch can serve as an 
innovation zone for BPS, where new models of service delivery and design can 
be tested, prototypes developed and debugged, and the scalability to the state 
services assessed. 
Embedding Innovation across State Services: 
From ‘innovation by necessity’ to ‘innovation 
by design’ 
Most of the Christchurch initiatives were ‘innovation by necessity’; the status 
quo was not an option. Christchurch public servants innovated and continue to 
operate in a difficult and challenging environment. Christchurch can, however, 
offer lessons about what enables innovation to flourish in a public sector context.
Leadership and Permission are Crucial Enablers of 
Innovation
People on the ground in Christchurch could innovate because they had explicit 
permission from senior leadership to ‘do whatever it takes’. The tolerance 
for risk-taking was higher because the risk of not trying something new was 
greater, although this was not uniform across agencies (some regional staff had 
stronger decision rights than others; inconsistent regional boundaries had a 
further impact on the ability to act without referring to head office). 
Permission and clear goals articulated by senior leadership are key enablers of 
innovation; top-down sponsorship enables bottom-up innovation. A study of 
high-performing innovative public and private sector organisations and sectors 
(Albury 2011) concluded that a key characteristic of those organisations is 
having leadership that is passionate about goals, but is permissive about how to 
reach them. Innovation is not just a question of unleashing creativity or coming 
up with bright ideas. ‘Innovation by design’ requires investment in capability, 
a focus on users, expertise in the use of innovative methods, as well as strong 
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mandates to experiment and to take bounded, informed and well-managed 
risks. It requires engagement with staff at the front line where new ideas are 
often generated. 
Capability in Innovation Tools and Methods is 
Essential for Making it Happen  
A number of the Christchurch initiatives were enabled by pre-existing innovation 
capability and experience in applying innovation tools, methods and disciplines 
to problems. The Inland Revenue service design team based in Christchurch was 
instrumental in several of the innovations (in particular, Recover Canterbury 
and proposals for the shared front of house). Inland Revenue has developed a 
service design capability over the past seven years. Service design as a method 
has a strong focus on the customer and their experience as the starting point 
for designing services, and is a recognised method for driving innovation in the 
public (and private) sector. 
Similarly, the CDHB has established a reputation for investing in innovation. Its 
overall shared vision was developed through a process that included ‘Showcase’, 
a series of participatory workshops and the showcasing of innovative ideas and 
models of care, involving more than 2000 stakeholders, providers, consumers 
and health professionals. The earthquakes expedited the implementation of 
the shared care record, which was in development prior to that time, but the 
organisational foundations for innovation were well entrenched. 
Inland Revenue and the CDHB are exploring the potential to co-locate their 
service design functions in Christchurch in order to share skills and knowledge. 
This could provide a prototype to inform the development of some future cross-
agency innovation capability at the national level. Drawing on these exemplars, 
the SSC is preparing a case study on innovation capability that will test those 
organisations against the characteristics derived from the international literature 
about what makes for an organisation that enables and supports innovation. The 
intention is for this work to offer lessons to other agencies wishing to enhance 
their ability to be innovative.
Walking the Talk
In a small attempt to walk the talk, and inspired by CDHB’s Showcase, the SSC 
decided to try something innovative itself. We decided to forgo the usual cabinet 
committee briefing process in favour of an experiential session dubbed ‘Seismic 
Shifts’ to brief ministers on the initial and emerging Canterbury innovations. The 
session—something between a trade show and speed dating—involved public 
servants from Canterbury coming to Wellington to tell their own stories about 
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how they had responded to the earthquakes. They used visual props, including 
videos of users of the innovative services. The timing was such that ministers 
could choose only four of the eight booths to sit at. A bell was rung at five-
minute intervals, signalling a move to the next booth. On leaving the session, 
ministers were handed tent cards that subsequently ended up on several of 
their desks. That two-sided card had messages on each side about how to enable 
and how to stop innovation (see Box 21.2). A further Seismic Shifts session was 
held for senior officials. We received positive feedback from minsters about the 
session. It was a more powerful way of informing them about the Canterbury 
innovations than a dry paper or briefing from Wellington officials.    
Box 21.2
Seismic Shifts
How to stop innovation
• Demand people think differently and expect it to happen
• Create silos of thinking
• Punish failure
Lessons for fostering transformation
• Focus on the citizen
• Clear goals, flexible process
• Encourage frontline engagement
The Next Steps
We need to maintain the enabling environment in Christchurch to keep the 
momentum of innovation going. Christchurch has the potential to provide 
a model of twenty-first-century innovative and responsive state services. 
Agencies are being asked to report to central agencies and ministers about what 
new things they are trying in Christchurch, including prototyping options for 
BPS results. We also want to ensure that the lessons from Christchurch are taken 
elsewhere around the country. That does not mean simply taking a cookie-
cutter approach to up-scaling initiatives from Christchurch to another part of 
New Zealand. It means taking the essence of that innovation and grafting it to 
local conditions. It also means agencies developing their capability to enable and 
support new innovation, to seek new and better ways of doing things.
The challenge for the centre is to take the lessons from Christchurch to drive 
BPS work to embed innovation in a business-as-usual context. Canterbury was 
about disruptive innovation or innovation by necessity. We need to create a 
seismic shift in activity, behaviour and capability to achieve innovation by 
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design. An innovative public sector is one that is agile, responsive and ready for 
whatever comes its way. Building innovation capability is an important strategy 
for future-proofing the state.
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22. Examining the Public Sector’s 
Responses to the Canterbury 
Earthquakes
Lyn Provost, Henry Broughton and Andrea Neame
This chapter describes the Auditor-General’s program of work examining how 
public agencies performed during the recovery from the earthquakes that hit 
Canterbury in 2010 and 2011, especially the 7.1 magnitude earthquake of 4 
September 2010 and the 6.3 magnitude earthquake of 22 February 2011, which 
killed 185 people. 
The Role of the Auditor-General 
An auditor-general’s role is to provide assurance about the public money spent 
by public agencies. The Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) fulfils this role in 
four ways
• statutory, annual financial audits, and audits of service performance reporting 
• the controller function
• performance audits 
• inquiries. 
The Auditor-General is responsible for the audits of about 4000 public entities. 
Audit New Zealand (an operational business unit of the Auditor-General) and 
audit firms carry out annual audits on the Auditor-General’s behalf. Annual 
audits form most of the Auditor-General’s output. The Auditor-General carries 
out performance audits and inquiries at her discretion, with reference to an 
annual plan of work that is presented to Parliament.
Our Future Needs: Is the public sector ready? 
As Auditor-General, I have a firm belief that we should, wherever we can, help 
to improve the public sector. New Zealand has a public sector I am proud of, 
but I believe it can always be better. The focus of our 2012–13 work has been on 
our future needs. Is the public sector ready to meet future needs? An overriding 
need for New Zealand is to rebuild Christchurch, our second-largest city.
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Our Response to the Canterbury Earthquakes
The past 18 months and the 12 000 earthquakes and aftershocks in Canterbury 
have been a journey for us and many others. In many countries, the Auditor-
General would be busy during the emergency response phase to a natural disaster 
because of the increased risk of fraud, theft and corruption when significant 
public money and aid pour into a region. New Zealand is, however, fortunate to 
have a transparent and relatively corruption-free public sector, with operating 
controls and systems generally effective. Reviews of the response phase were 
carried out soon after the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes, 
and we saw no need to duplicate this work. During the response phase, we 
focused largely on our core work of annual audits. 
A few hundred of the 4000 audits we carry out every year are around Christchurch. 
We were pragmatic when public agencies asked us about accountability and 
reporting requirements. For example, we exempted about 40 schools from 
producing annual reports. The schools’ priority was to get functioning again 
and focus on their students. 
Many of our audit opinions on financial statements for 2011–12 drew attention 
to uncertainties about liabilities and asset valuations of public entities.
Agencies did their best to account for liabilities and damage from the earthquakes 
but, in many instances, ongoing change and a lack of information meant 
uncertainty was unavoidable. Indeed, uncertainty was a consistent theme right 
through to the financial statements of the Government, where, for the first time, 
we drew attention to uncertain matters. The statements included estimates of
• the Earthquake Commission’s liability for damage to home contents, houses 
and residential land
• the 60 per cent infrastructure costs that transfer from local to central 
government
• the Government’s guarantee for what is additional to the Earthquake 
Commission’s Natural Disaster Fund1 
• the cost of houses in the residential red zone (earthquake-damaged land and 
properties in Christchurch the Government agreed to buy and clear). 
The scale of public expenditure that the recovery and rebuild entails (it is 
forecast that about NZ$15 billion of public funds will go to the Christchurch 
1 There is a NZ$1.5 billion excess for each earthquake event. If the required Earthquake Commission payout 
exceeds the total of the excess and reinsurance (NZ$4 billion), the remainder of the payout is met by the 
commission up to the limit of the Natural Disaster Fund. If the payout exceeds those assets, a crown guarantee 
requires that the Government pays the remainder.
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recovery and rebuild) as well as the unique and uncertain context of that 
expenditure meant we needed to think carefully about how we could best use 
our limited discretionary powers. 
We set up a small team led by two managers: one from our local government team 
and the other from our central government team. The team visited Christchurch 
regularly, meeting public officials, community groups and people affected by the 
earthquakes. The team visited the Red Zone, meeting homeowners and people 
demolishing houses. The team met tradespeople repairing the houses as part of 
the Earthquake Commission’s Homes Repair Programme.
Always we were conscious of the need to keep in mind that many of the people 
working in the public sector in Canterbury had suffered through thousands of 
earthquakes. We listened and reflected on what we heard to inform our decisions 
about what work we should do. 
Learning from Audit Offices Overseas
As well as visiting Canterbury regularly, we also carried out desk research into 
the work of audit offices in other countries in response to natural disasters. This 
included the work of the Chinese National Audit Office (CNAO) following the 
Wenchuan earthquakes in 2008. The CNAO carried out a ‘real-time audit’ of the 
response and reconstruction that involved literally thousands of auditors over 
a three-year period. The audit involved tracking and auditing every step of 
the reconstruction effort, from preliminary planning, project development and 
commissioning, to completion of projects (CNAO n.d.). 
We looked at the Queensland Audit Office’s performance audit of the systems 
and processes involved in the national partnership agreement for natural disaster 
reconstruction and recovery (Auditor-General of Queensland 2011). The aim of 
this work was to provide assurance to the Queensland Parliament and public 
about the State’s systems to deliver the funding and services to the community 
as provided for in the agreement.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has looked at the government 
response to many natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, to gather and 
learn lessons. The GAO has compiled the key areas of learning from this work, 
which proved to be a useful resource for us to consider the key lessons and the 
key principles to an effective recovery effort.2 
2 See the US Government Audit Office website: <www.gao.gov>.
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We drew on the work of the UN Development Programme, the World Bank 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 
identify key themes for an effective government response and recovery to a 
natural disaster (OECD 2004; UNDP n.d.; World Bank 2011). These include
• public confidence and trust, gained through being transparent and 
communicating openly
• clear relationships between different levels of government to manage risks of 
duplicating work and poor coordination
• recovery authorities focusing strongly on gaining and maintaining cohesion, 
coordination and consensus.
An Assessment Framework Helps to Prioritise 
our Discretionary Work
We used the World Bank’s report on the Queensland Recovery Authority to create 
a framework to structure our thinking about the New Zealand Government’s 
performance in the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes (World Bank 
2011). This framework has 25 criteria for an effective recovery and rebuild from 
a natural disaster, which we put into a spreadsheet that we could regularly 
revise as the recovery moved into different stages. This living document has 
informed our thinking about how we structure our work program.
Through balancing what we have listened to, looking at the assessment criteria 
and talking to people throughout the public sector, we identified four areas of 
priority for our work in Canterbury. 
• Accountability and responsibility: Who is doing what? Who is accountable?
• Funding and finance: How much will the recovery and rebuild cost the 
taxpayer and ratepayer? How will costs be shared? 
• Procurement and monitoring: Are services being properly procured, and is 
the money being used appropriately?
• Insurance: How have the earthquakes affected the way public agencies insure 
assets? 
Table 22.1 summarises the main issues under each theme, as well as the type of 
audit response. 
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Table 22.1 Priority Themes, Main Issues to Address and Audit Response
Theme Summary of main issues Audit response
Accountability and 
responsibility
Complexity, heightened risk of 
duplication 
Regular reports on roles, 
responsibilities and funding
First report presented to 
Parliament in October 2012
Funding and finance A wide range of new 
appropriations and funding 
arrangements in place to 
finance the recovery and rebuild 
Central government and local 
government contributions; 
private sector funding; 
insurance and reinsurance; 
complex and expensive
Controller function
Report on roles, 
responsibilities and funding
Regular tracking of costs
Annual audit of financial 
statements
Procurement and 
monitoring
Significant contracts for 
the demolition, repair, 
and rebuilding of homes, 
infrastructure, and the central 
business district
Annual audits of financial 
statements and service 
performance 
Earthquake Commission’s 
Canterbury Home Repair 
Programme—large-scale 
procurement and project 
management . More than 80 
000 repairs
Performance audit, 2013
Repair and rebuilding of 
horizontal infrastructure—
mainly waterpipes and roads—
delivered through an alliance 
model of five contractors 
working with Christchurch 
City Council, the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority, 
and the New Zealand Transport 
Agency
Performance audit, 2013
Insurance and the 
public sector 
The increasing cost of 
insurance has been expensive 
for public entities throughout 
New Zealand
Parliamentary report (June 
2013) on the results of a 
survey of all public entities by 
our auditors 
Source: Authors’ summary.
Roles, Responsibilities and Funding 
Our first piece of discretionary work has been to map and describe the roles and 
responsibilities of the key public entities involved in the recovery. 
In October 2012, we published Roles Responsibilities, and Funding of Public 
Entities after the Canterbury Earthquakes (Office of the Auditor General 2012), 
which provides an objective view of how the recovery is being run. In doing so, 
it describes how the recovery is being carried out, the roles of agencies, how the 
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recovery is being funded and what the main risks and challenges are—for the 
agencies involved and for Cantabrians. We intend to provide updates on these 
matters at appropriate intervals. 
The report included mapping the relationships between public sector entities, 
private companies and Te Rūnanga Ngāi Tahu (the local iwi) in meeting the 
challenges of the Canterbury earthquake recovery. This was represented in a 
complex diagram that can be sourced from the OAG website.3 In drawing this 
diagram, we aimed to focus on the fact that the accountability needs to be 
understood from the viewpoint of people living in Canterbury. The recovery and 
rebuild effort involves significant funding, large-scale projects and contracts, 
and many entities with interacting roles and responsibilities.
The diagram shows the many organisations involved and the complexity of 
the recovery and rebuild. It is important to manage complexity effectively. 
Complexity can bring opportunities as well as challenges. For example, the 
State Services Commission has identified many good examples of public entities 
working in new and more effective ways in response to the earthquakes. 
To sum up, during our visits to Canterbury, we heard often about how the 
private sector, the public sector and iwi4 are working together, and we saw 
much evidence of this. 
Each agency has roles and responsibilities. These need to be clear to the agencies 
and their staff, as well as to their partners. Accountability needs to be clear, 
although that need not be agency by agency. Accountability can be by task and 
by outcome. People need to work together to be able to achieve outcomes that 
contribute to recovery. In fact, the agenda of better public services is challenging 
us all to think about how we work together to collaborate on shared outcomes. 
We consider that for the recovery to be effective and efficient it is important that 
all the agencies involved know what each is doing. If there is a lack of clarity, 
there is a risk that their work might not be mutually supportive, could lack 
direction and could be wasteful because of duplication. Accountability could 
be unclear and, in the end, the effective use of public spending could be put 
at risk. Because rebuilding in a changing environment is complex, leaders in 
Canterbury must continually monitor and take appropriate action to manage 
these risks.
As the rebuild in Canterbury changes, we will update our diagram regularly 
and ensure that we keep monitoring any changes. I have no doubt it will evolve 
3 This diagram can be found at http://www.oag.govt.nz/2012/canterbury/2012/canterbury/docs/figure1.pdf.
4 Iwi are Māori tribes.
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as new ways of working together and more collaboration become apparent or 
take place between agencies and Wellington and Canterbury and between the 
public and private sectors.
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